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This thesis deals with the trinitarian theology of the contemporary German theologian, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg. It notes his stated ambition to write `a theology more thoroughly 
trinitarian than any I know of, ' and evaluates it by answering two questions: (1) what does 
Pannenberg mean by his theology being thoroughly trinitarian; and (2) how far has his 
subsequent work, especially Systematic Theology, been successful in realising his stated 
goal. 
In addition to setting out the subject matter and approach of the thesis, the introduction 
argues for a reading of Pannenberg's theology as one whose ultimate concern is the 
centrality of God and whose indebtedness to German idealist philosophy, and Hegel in 
particular, is not as great as others have thought. It is shown that, for Pannenberg, 
`thoroughly trinitarian' applies both to what one says about God and to what one says 
about his entire economic activity. The answer to the first of the questions the thesis 
poses, therefore, must include both what Pannenberg understands by the doctrine of the 
Trinity and how all other theological topics are understood in the light of the trinitarian 
God. 
Part One "Pannenberg's Trinitarian Theology" offers a critical analysis of Pannenberg's 
trinitarian theology in answer to both our stated questions. The first chapter deals with 
Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity proper. It is shown that Pannenberg advocates a 
view of the divine Trinity based on God's historical revelation in Jesus Christ, and for this 
reason makes revisions to many traditional treatments. The following chapters, two to 
eight, discuss how Pannenberg treats other doctrines in a trinitarian way. They cover, in 
order, the doctrine of God's essence and attributes, creation, anthropology, christology, 
reconciliation, the doctrine of the kingdom and the church, and eschatology. Part One 
ends with a concluding chapter, which, in addition to surveying the content of the 
previous chapters, both offers reasons to suggest that Pannenberg's ambitions might be 
realised and outlines points of criticism to be laid against his trinitarian theology. 
Part Two "On Being a Trinitarian Theologian" is a piece of constructive theology written 
in the light of Pannenberg's trinitarianism. It takes up the most important point of 
criticism, namely that there are several points in his theology where, despite his stated 
aim, Pannenberg fails to employ trinitarian thinking. The common theme to these points 
of trinitarian reticence is that Pannenberg offers insufficient account of how the Trinity 
affects the practice of theology. An alternative account is offered that demonstrates that a 
trinitarian construal of the task of theology is incompatible with the theologian taking a 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, Wolfhart Pannenberg wrote an autobiographical piece in The Christian Century. 
Included in it were these words: 
In recent years, the doctrine of God has taken more and more definitive shape in 
my thought... Hence today I feel much more confident to develop a doctrine of 
God and to treat the subjects of Christian dogmatics in that perspective. That 
doctrine will be more thoroughly trinitarian than any example I know of. ' 
This thesis is an examination of these remarks, especially the ambitious claim of the 
final sentence that his doctrine of God would be more thoroughly trinitarian than any 
example he knows of. In short, it answers just two questions: (1) what does Pannenberg 
mean by his theology being thoroughly trinitarian; and (2) how far has his subsequent 
work been successful in realising his stated goal? It would be possible, of course, to 
consider Pannenberg's trinitarian theology in comparison with other trinitarian 
theologies, and so judge whether his doctrine was `more thoroughly trinitarian' than 
them. That task we leave to others. Here we are not making the comparative point, but 
are considering how adequately trinitarian Pannenberg's theology in fact is. 
Two assumptions are being made here, neither of which should raise any 
controversy. The first is that, since 1981, Pannenberg has kept to this goal. The second is 
that `the most trinitarian theology means not just that within a systematic presentation of 
Christian doctrine Pannenberg should include a section on God's triune nature that 
conforms to the highest standards of trinitarian orthodoxy, but also that an account of 
God's triunity should inform every part of his theological system. As for the first 
assumption, we need only note the wealth of publications Pannenberg has offered on 
trinitarian themes since he wrote those words. As well as a trio of important articles 
offered just before these autobiographical remarks2 and the later Systematic Theology 
that has a basic trinitarian structure, there have been a significant number of articles 
I "God's Presence in History, " The Christian Century, 11 March 1981, p. 263. 2 These are "Die Subjektivitaet Gottes und die Trinitaetslehre. Ein Beitrag zur Beziehung zwischen 
Karl Barth und der Philosophie Hegels", "Christologie und Theologie" and "Der Gott der Geschichte", 
which can all be found in W. Pannenberg Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie: Band 2 (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980) (Hereafter GS72). 
33 vols, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988-1997) (Hereafter "ST", and references in main text). 
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dealing with the Trinity since the early 1980's. 4 As for the second Pannenberg states at 
one point in STthat 
`under the sign of the unity of the immanent and economic Trinity the rest of 
dogmatics in the doctrine of creation, christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and 
eschatology will be part of the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Conversely, the doctrine of the Trinity is an anticipatory sum of the whole 
content of Christian dogmatics' (1.355) .5 
We are still, then, dealing with `a doctrine of God and... treat[ing] the subjects of 
Christian dogmatics in that perspective. ' 
This study will be taken up with a detailed examination of the trinitarian theology 
contained within ST. It is this work, which not only provides the most detailed, as well as 
the definitive, presentation of Pannenbergs understanding of the being and identity of 
the trinitarian God, but it also demonstrates more than any of Pannenberg's other works 
how the Trinity shapes his treatments of the other topics of Christian doctrine. 
Before embarking on this, however, we need to make clear some of the interpretative 
decisions that inform the approach adopted here. In the remaining part of this 
introduction, therefore, we shall answer three questions. Firstly, has Pannenberg's 
theology always been trinitarian? Second, why focus primarily on 57? And finally, what 
is the special contribution of this study in particular? 
Has Pannenberg's theology always been trinitarian? 
It is a fact that what is lasting and reliable, and in this sense true, comes to light only 
in the future' (1.54). 
4 These include: "Der Geist und sein Anders" in D. Henrich and R-P. Horstmann (eds. ) Hegels Logik 
der Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984), pp. 151-159; 
"Probleme einer trinitarischen Gotteslehre" in W. Baier et al (eds. ) Weisheit Gottes - Weisheit der 
Welt: Festschriftfuer Kardinal Ratzinger zum 60. Geburtstag (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1987), vol 1, pp. 329- 
342, which was also published in English as "Problems of a Trinitarian Doctrine of God" in Dialog 26 
(1987), pp. 250-257; "The Christian Vision of God: The New Discussion of the Trinitarian Doctrine" 
in Trinity Seminary Review 13,1991, pp. 53-60; "La Doctrina de la Trinidad en Hegel y su recepcion 
en la teologia alemana" Estudios trinitarios 30 (1996), pp. 35-5 1; "Eternity, Time and the Trinitarian 
God" in Dialog 39 (2000), pp. 9-14, expanded in C. E. Gunton (ed. ) Trinity, Time and Church. A 
Response to the Theology of Robert Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 62-70. 
s Pannenberg also says that in dealing with the issue of `the specific form that the unity of the divine 
life takes in the relation between the immanent and the economic Trinity... our dogmatics will have to 
traverse the various areas of the creation, reconciliation, and redemption of the world' (1.447). 
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Pannenberg's theological career has among other things emphasised `[t]he awareness of 
the provisional form of all our knowledge of truth. " Of course, by this Pannenberg 
intends the general point that one requires a certain hesitancy in advancing truth claims, 
since they can only be provisional hypotheses to be verified or not by the course of 
history. As for the general validity of this notion, we leave that to others, but we may 
perhaps see an instance of why it might be true by seeing how it applies to just a small 
part of universal history, namely, the field of Pannenberg scholarship. In a book of many 
valuable insights, Allan Galloway could have provided the most startling hypothesis that 
has subsequently been falsified. `Pannenberg's approach to theology, ' he once wrote, 
`signals the end of the great "prima donnas" in theology - the age of the multi- 
volume monograph in which a whole system of theology was elaborated as the 
achievement of an individual. '' 
For the purposes of this study, we note another of Pannenberg's interpreters who has 
offered another hypothesis that in hindsight we can see is in need of correction. This is 
one of the first articles in English on Pannenberg's doctrine of God by Herbert Burhenn, 
which otherwise has some more perceptive comments. `[T]he paucity of references here 
to the doctrine of the Trinity, ' he writes, is entirely consistent... with Pannenbergs own 
procedure. ' He continues, `The Trinity cannot function for Pannenberg... as a structural 
principle of theology. " 
Against Burhenn, it must be stated at the outset that the Trinity has always been 
present in Pannenberg's theology. We take as examples two of his most substantial early 
works. The first is the 1961 collection Revelation as History, in which Pannenberg 
writes, 
`In the fate of Jesus, the God of Israel is revealed as the triune God. The event of 
revelation should not be separated from the being of God himself. The being of 
God does not belong just to the Father, but also to the Son. The Holy Spirit also 
shares in the being of God by virtue of his participation in the glory of God that 
comes to life in the eschatological congregation. '9 
6 Introduction to Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), p. 54 (Hereafter "1ST'). On what 
Pannenberg means by doctrinal statements being hypothetical see ST 1.48-61, esp. p. 56, as well as 
Theology and the Philosophy of Science (London: DLT, 1976), pp. 332-345. 
7 Wol, f hart Pannenberg (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 133. 
8 "Pannenberg's Doctrine of God" SJT 28 (1975), pp. 535-536. 
9 Revelation as History, (London: Macmillan, 1968) (Hereafter RaH). 
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The God whose historical self-revelation is the object of Pannenberg's concern in this 
work, therefore, is none other than the `triune God' of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
The second is Jesus - God and Man, the original German edition of which was 
published in 1964.10 In this work there are certain criticisms of how other theologians 
have articulated trinitarian doctrine. As we shall note in chapter 5 of our study, the 
criticisms are not of the doctrine of the Trinity or of trinitarian theology, but of when the 
Trinity is presupposed. Pannenberg, then, is motivated not by a dismissal of trinitarian 
doctrine but by a deep concern for it. As in the later STthe criticisms are offered as a plea 
for a trinitarian theology that is grounded in God's historical revelation, for the doctrine 
of the Trinity is present in JGMtoo. This has been well brought out in The Doctrine of 
the Atonement in the Theology of Wolfhan Pannenberg by Herbert Neie. Although in 
that work Neie's purpose is not to refute views like Burhenn's, he nevertheless notes 
statements in JGMthat `construct the basis of a trinitarian doctrine. "' These include the 
following: 
`If Father, Son and Spirit are distinct but coordinate moments in the 
accomplishment of God's revelation, then they are so in God's eternal essence as 
well. 'lz 
`That the distinctiveness of Father and Son is a distinction in the essence of God 
himself is the beginning point for the doctrine of the Trinity systematically as 
well as historically. '13 
'The Spirit ... 
[is] a person over against the Son and the Father, because he leads us 
to glorify the Son and the Father, and thus demonstrates himself to be distinct 
from both. ''a 
And there can be no suspicion that these are proof-texts, since within JGMthere is also a 
whole sub-section entitled "The Unity in the Trinity. "" 
Furthermore, the doctrine of the Trinity is not just present in Pannenberg's early 
work, but it is also operative in a way that presages its later importance in ST. For 
instance, in The Apostles Creed in the Light of Today's Questions, the work of 
Pannenberg's early career that most resembles a mini-systematics, he writes: 
10 (London: SCM, 1968) (Hereafter JGM). 
" (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979) p. 219. 
12 JGM, p. 180. 
13 JGM, p. 169. 
14 JGM, p. 179. 
15 JGM, pp. 179-183. 
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'Is the description of God as Father not an obvious reflection of a patriarchal 
order of society? And if that is the case, can this word still be considered the 
natural expression of our experience of God in the altered conditions of present- 
day society? In answering such questions we must first notice that the creed 
does not simple make the baptismal candidate state that God is his Father; it talks 
about the Father per se, namely the Father of Jesus of Nazareth. Accordingly it is 
not, primarily speaking, important whether we can most appropriately talk about 
God in relation to ourselves through the image of fatherhood; the name 'Father' 
identifies the God about whom the creed is talking as the God of Jesus'16 
Contra Burhenn, then, the Trinity is structurally significant to his theology. 
Of course, as we shall see, there is expansion and development in what Pannenberg 
has to say about the Trinity. And there is not the same detail in the presentation in 1961 
as there is in the ST of 30 years later. It is none the less the case, however, that the 
Trinity is present at each stage of Pannenberg's theological development, and significantly 
so. 
Why focus primarily on Systematic Theology? 
It is wrong to say that Pannenberg did not always hold to the doctrine of the Trinity, nor 
was he unconcerned about trinitarian theology and only later adopted it as something 
wholly new. He did not just discover the Trinity in 1981 when he wrote that piece for 
Christian Century, nor does his later work on the Trinity represent a fundamental change 
of orientation to his theology. Having said this, as we investigate Pannenberg's 
understanding of the triune God we shall nevertheless have as our primary focus the latter 
period of his theology. In particular we shall devote most attention to his ST, which is the 
culmination and comprehensive treatment of the topics that have occupied Pannenberg 
throughout his theological career. We offer three reasons in particular for this choice. 
Firstly, ST gives the most complete and detailed presentation of Pannenberg's 
trinitarian doctrine of God. When Pannenberg handles the topic of the Trinity elsewhere 
than in ST, the treatments are either brief remarks or sections within books devoted to a 
quite different topic, or articles that address particular issues within trinitarian theology. 
In neither case is there the sustained attention accorded the Trinity in ST chapter 5. 
16 The Apostles' Creed in the Light of Today's Questions (London: SCM, 1972), p. 31 (Hereafter AC). 
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Often what we have in those other sources can nuance or supplement this primary 
account, but to understand the doctrine that shapes that `most trinitarian of theologies' it 
is to STwe must go. 
Second, ST comes at the conclusion of the development of Pannenberg's trinitarian 
thought. As we have already noted, to say that the Trinity is present in Pannenberg's 
later theology, but absent in his earlier work is inaccurate. To say instead that there is a 
development and increasing prominence of the Trinity in Pannenberg's theology when 
one compares the earlier and later writings is closer to the mark. 
That there has been such a development is evident from Pannenberg's own 
autobiographical remarks. He says that since his appointment as professor of systematic 
theology in 1958, `In my experience the most difficult subject to deal with was the 
doctrine of God. ' He continues, that although he had addressed the question of God in a 
number of his earlier publications, 
`In fact, not until the early 1980's did I begin to feel solid ground under my feet 
in this area ... It is only in a little book on metaphysics and 
in the first volume of 
my systematic theology... that I have published an argument that deals with the 
idea of God in its own right. Everything else, however, remains insecure in 
theology, before one has made up one's mind on the doctrine of God. '" 
What are the developments that led to this confidence in treating the doctrine of 
God? There is barely any suggestion explicitly given within Pannenberg's written works, 
and we must await either further comment from Pannenberg or the results of future 
research for further clarity on the matter. Nevertheless, we note at least two 
developments that specifically affect the presentation of the trinitarian God, rather than 
the doctrine of God in general, which contributed to this increased confidence in 
approaching the task of a comprehensive systematic theology. 
The first is his understanding of the mutual dependence of the trinitarian persons. In 
a recent article, "Divine Economy and the Immanent Trinity, " Pannenberg writes of a 
dilemma he had faced in trinitarian thought. Western and idealist treatments of the 
Trinity seemed to him to exhibit 
17 "An Autobiographical Sketch" in Braaten and P. Clayton (eds. ) The Theology of Wolffhart 




`a one way traffic from the Father to Son and Spirit, a conception that easily gives 
the impression of an ontological subordination of Son and Spirit to the Father. 
There is certainly an ethical subordination of the Son in his obedience to the 
Father, and in a similar way the Spirit glorifies, not himself, but the Son and the 
Father, but there is no ontological inferiority on the part of the Son and the 
Spirit as compared to the Father. Does not that require that as the Son and the 
Spirit are dependent on the Father, so also the Father [should] be dependent on 
his Son and the Spirit, though not in the same way? '18 
In part Pannenberg had already guarded against this as early as JGM by adopting the 
concept `self-distinction' to express the Son's difference from the Father such that both 
persons are active subjects, rather than just the Father. But this further step of seeing an 
ontological dependence to exist reciprocally between the persons only appears in 
Pannenberg's later work. 19 
Pannenberg himself states that it was John Zizioulas, who had called his attention to 
Athanasius' argument in the first treatise Against the Arians There Athanasius states that 
even the Father would not be Father without the Son, even venturing `to say that Jesus' 
claim that he is the truth and the life implies that he is the truth and the life of even the 
Father himself, so that the Father would have no truth and no life, if he were without the 
Son. ' This enabled Pannenberg to achieve a new emphasis on the mutuality in the 
personal relations within the Trinity. Therefore, `the Fatherhood of God depends on 
there being a Son. This seems to entail that even the divinity of the Father is not 
independent of his relationship to his Son. '20 
The second development is his appropriation of field theory to explain the being and 
action of the triune God. In ST there are two primary ways in which Pannenberg uses 
notions of field taken from modern science. The first is to provide a concept of the divine 
essence as spirit that does not understand it in terms of the human mind. Field theory is 
used to articulate a concept of the divine being that avoids the allegedly modalising drift 
of intellectual notions of spirituality in favour of one that does not threaten the divine 
Trinity. This first use will be taken up in our second chapter on Pannenberg's trinitarian 
understanding of the divine essence and attributes. The second is to explain the work of 
18 pp. 2-3 (Hereafter "DEET'). 
19 The reciprocity of the triune relations is clearly set out at least as early as Metaphysics and the Idea 
oGod (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), pp. 40-41. 
20 "DEET', p. 3. Pannenberg refers to Athanasius Contra Arianos 1.14,20,29,34. 
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the Holy Spirit in creation. Pannenberg thinks that the concept of field is better suited 
than that of mind to explicate how the third divine person is active in the created realm, 
i. e., how he is neither dualistically set against the natural order nor materialistically made 
part of it. This second use of field theory, and its use in explicating a trinitarian doctrine 
of creation, will be taken up in our third chapter. 
Although this thesis will frequently refer to Pannenberg's earlier works, it is right for 
our primary focus to be on the works published since 1980's, when he began to feel `solid 
ground: What we have in the years leading up to STis an increasing concern, focus, and 
ability to write an extended and in-depth theology with the trinitarian God at the centre. 
With ST, therefore, we see the culmination of Pannenberg's interest in and thinking on 
the Trinity. 
The third reason for our specific focus on STis that it, more than Pannenberg's other 
writings, shows how the Trinity fits within, and shapes the rest of Christian theology. His 
other major works do include references to the Trinity, but mostly they remain fairly 
brief. Even after 1981 the two most substantial works other than ST devote little direct 
attention to the doctrine. In Anthropology in Theological Perspective there are a few 
short remarks, although there is also an interesting short passage we shall investigate later 
that suggests social trinitarianism. 21 In Metaphysics and the Idea of God there is a short 
critique of certain Western and idealist views of the Trinity, 22 but not much else. What 
influence on the presentation the doctrine of the Trinity has in these works can be no 
more than implicit. For an explicit presentation of Pannenberg's trinitarian thought we 
must turn to ST. Just as its chapter 5, "The Trinitarian God, " represents the most 
sustained and detailed of all Pannenberg's treatments of the Trinity, so also chapters 6 to 
15 demonstrate a more rigorously trinitarian outworking of his theological programme 
than do any of his other publications. 
What, then, is the structure and argument of this study as a whole? Broadly 
speaking, there are three parts to it. There is this introduction in which we outline our 
general approach to Pannenberg. We not only introduce the topic and set out the basic 
outlines of the subsequent chapter. We also argue for a reading of Pannenberg, whose 
21 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985) (Hereafter "ATP"). See esp. pp. 183-4,235-7,484. The apparent 
social trinitarianism is most evident on p. 531, and will be treated in chapter 4. 
22 pp. 39ff (Hereafter MIG). 
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centre is to be found above all in his doctrine of God, and whose reliance on German 
idealism is not as great as many other commentators have suggested. 
The rest of this study is divided into two parts. "Part One, " which is entitled 
"Pannenberg on the Trinitarian God, " is by far the longest part is the second section. It 
deals with the content and use of the doctrine of the Trinity following the structure of ST 
We devote the first chapter of our study, "Pannenberg's Doctrine of the Trinity" to the 
treatment of the Trinity outlined in ST chapter 5 and in other places. The subsequent 
chapters trace how the rest of Pannenberg's theology is affected by his understanding of 
the triune God. In general we follow the order and content of the rest of ST So, for 
instance, our second chapter "Pannenberg's Trinitarian Doctrine of God's Essence and 
Attributes" corresponds to ST chapter 6, "The Unity and Attributes of the Divine 
Essence", and our eighth chapter "Pannenberg's Trinitarian Doctrine of the Final 
Consummation" to ST chapter 15, "The Consummation of Creation in the Kingdom of 
God". The intervening chapters deal with creation, anthropology, christology, soteriology 
and ecclesiology from the point of view of the Trinity. The emphasis in this second part is 
on both the explication of Pannenberg's trinitarian theology and critical analysis of the 
positions he adopts. This section has a concluding chapter which both summarises the 
content of the second section and, on the basis of our findings, evaluates in what ways and 
to what extent Pannenberg has succeeded and failed to offer a theology more trinitarian 
than any other. 
In "Part Two" we move beyond the analysis of Pannenberg's trinitarian theology. 
"On Being a Trinitarian Theologian, " is a piece of constructive theology written in the 
light of the analysis of Pannenberg's trinitarian thought offered in the second section. 
Here we take up the theological criticisms we have made regarding Pannenberg's 
trinitarian theology and suggest a proposal that does better justice to his high trinitarian 
ambitions. Specifically, we pinpoint the issue of how one goes about the task of theology, 
and the doctrinal topics of revelation, christology and faith that shape, or are shaped by, 
how one conceives how the theologian fits within the theological scheme. We query 
whether Pannenberg's account allows the Trinity genuinely to affect the practice of 
theology, i. e. the habitus of the theologian, rather than just theology's content or the 
conclusions it reaches. On this matter at least Pannenberg's claim to write the most 
trinitarian of theologies does not seem to be met. 
12 
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What is the special contribution of this study in particular? 
In addition to the reading of Pannenberg adopted here and the various theological 
judgements made of his work that are given during the course of the presentation, broadly 
speaking there are three ways in which this study aims to make a contribution to 
contemporary systematic theology. In particular it seeks to develop the field of 
Pannenberg studies by offering the first work in English of this length devoted exclusively 
to his trinitarian thought and by suggesting a particular reading of his theology, and to 
contribute to the field of contemporary trinitarian theology in one important respect. 
1. A comprehensive treatment ofPannenberg's mature trinitarian thought 
There already exist several treatments of Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity, which fall 
into four broad types. Firstly, there are works, which, though not devoted to Pannenberg 
specifically, discuss his thought within a more wide-ranging study of trinitarian theology 
in general. Ted Peters' God as Trinity and John Thompson's Modern Trinitarian 
Perspectives, for example, fit this category. 23 Secondly, there are works that offer an 
overview of Pannenberg's theology, which do treat his trinitarian thought, but only as 
part of a general treatment. Examples of this group include Stanley Grenz's Reason for 
Hope. - The Systematic Theology of Wollhart Pannenberg? 4 Frank Tupper's The Theology 
of Wollhart Pannenberges and Christiaan Mostert's God and the Future: Wollhart 
Pannenberg's Eschatological Doctrine of God, 26 as well as two shorter contributions by 
Christoph Schwoebel21 Third, there are articles devoted to expositing aspects of 
Pannenberg's trinitarianism. There are a large number of such articles, probably the most 
interesting of which are Anselm Min's "The Dialectic of Divine Love: Pannenberg's 
23 T. E. Peters God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in the Divine Life (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox, 1989), esp. pp. 135-144 and 166-168, and J. Thompson Modern Trinitarian 
Perspectives (Oxford: OUP, 1994), esp. pp. 34-36 and 136-139. 24 (Oxford: OUP, 1990). 
25 (London: SCM, 1974). 
26 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002). 
27 "Rational Theology in Trinitarian Perspective: Wolfhart Pannenberg's Trinitarian Theology" in JTS 
(October 1996), pp. 498-527 and "Wolihart Pannenberg" in D. Ford (ed. ) The Modern Theologians: An 




Hegelian Trinitarianism"2$ and Juan Martinez-Camino's "Wechselseitige 
Selbstunterscheidung? Zur Trinitaetslehre W. Pannenbergs. "29 
The fourth and final group is of those books that are largely devoted to discussing 
Pannenberg's trinitarian thought. Two such books have been published in continental 
Europe over recent years. They are Michael Schulz's Sein und Trinitaet30 and Klaus 
Vechtel's Trinitaet und Zukunft. 31 The former is an immense work which covers a 
number of Christian thinkers in detail, including Pannenberg, and the latter a study with 
a more limited focus on Pannenberg's philosophy and how it relates to his doctrine of the 
Trinity. We shall have occasion to use both these works in our presentation, but our 
study has a different aim. For one thing, it tends to be rather more sympathetic to 
passages within Pannenberg that to Schulz and Vechtel appear to offer a deterministic 
picture of God and suggest a residual Hegelianism. In this regard, we refer to 
Pannenberg's own published defence against their criticisms, "Divine Economy and the 
Immanent Trinity. " For another, both works are content just to study the doctrine of the 
Trinity outlined in ST chapter 5, rather than to investigate how Pannenberg develops a 
comprehensive trinitarian theology covering the whole sweep of the divine economy. 
Within English theology the last significant book length treatment was Timothy 
Bradshaw's Trinity and Ontology. A Comparative Study of the Theologies of Karl Barth 
and Wollhart Pannenberg, 32 which we must also include within this fourth category. 
Admittedly, this is a work that dedicates roughly equal attention to the trinitarian 
theologies of Barth and Pannenberg, but it is nonetheless a detailed analysis of 
Pannenberg's trinitarian thought. The chief drawback to using Bradshaw's work as a 
guide to Pannenberg's trinitarian thought is that it predates the publication of ST, written 
as it is in the mid-1980's. 33 
There presently exists, therefore, no book length treatment of Pannenberg's 
trinitarian theology in English that is up to date. 
28 In IJST 6/3 (July 2004), pp. 252-269. 29 In H. L. Ollig et al (eds. ) Reflektierter Glaube (Frankfurt: Haensel-Hohenbach, 1999), pp. 131-149. 
30 (St. Ottilien: EOZ Verlag Erzabtei, 1997). 
31 (Frankfurt: Knecht, 2001). 
32 (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 
33 This book was the result of Bradshaw's doctoral research, which was first published under the same 
title by Rutherford House Books in 1988, and whose writing predates the publication of ST volume 1 
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2A particular reading ofPannenberg ; theology 
In addition to providing a fuller understanding of Pannenberg's theology, we also offer a 
particular interpretation of it. What we have to say about his trinitarian theology arises 
from definite understandings of the general thrust of Pannenberg's theology and its 
relation to other streams of contemporary thought. In particular, we note two areas in 
which our study hopes to offer some general guidelines to interpreting Pannenberg's 
work. These are, firstly, the question of the organising centre of Pannenberg's theology, 
and second, the issue of Pannenberg's indebtedness to idealist thought, especially Hegel. 
Already within secondary literature on Pannenberg's theology there has been debate 
on its key theme or topic. The risk of such a strategy is to put the complex thought of an 
intricate and nuanced thinker into the straightjacket of a rather rigid concept or narrow 
agenda, and readers of Pannenberg can be grateful to Shults for highlighting false trails of 
commentators' attempts to find the lynch-pin of his thought . 34 Notwithstanding such 
reservations, however, attempts to delineate something like an organising centre to 
Pannenberg's thought can help the reader penetrate into the heart of his theological 
project and offer insight into his deepest concerns. 
The key theme or concern at the centre of Pannenberg's theology, in our view, is the 
doctrine of God. One should see Pannenberg's whole ST as a detailed and articulate 
statement of the centrality of God, the Christian God, for understanding the world, our 
place in it and its salvation in the work of Jesus Christ. For as he writes in the first 
volume, `God is the one all-embracing theme of theology as also of faith. Neither has any 
other theme beside him' (1.59). 
The centrality of God is a point that Pannenberg makes in many places, but it is made 
most pithily in IST. `In theology, ' he writes, 
`the concept of God can never be simply one issue among others. It is the central 
issue, around which everything else is organized. If you take away that one issue 
nothing would be left to justify the continuation of that special effort that we call 
"theology. "' 
and the discussion of the Trinity therein. The 1992 work shows no substantial alteration to the 1988 
publication. 
4 F. LeRon Shults The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), see 
especially introduction and chapter 1. 
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It was central for the message of Jesus which otherwise `might at best be remembered as a 
somewhat eccentric contribution to the cultural history of mankind. But without the 
reality of God, Jesus' teaching would be deprived of its core. ' The same applies to the 
church, for `though churches might continue as institutions that offer cheap substitutes 
for psychotherapy and occasions for moralistic advocacy and exhortation "': And this is 
no less true for theology. Pannenberg continues: 
The reality of God is crucial if one is serious in talking about a specific calling of 
the church as well as of a special task assigned to theology. Therefore, the 
concept of God cannot be exchanged for other concepts. It needs interpretation, 
but it is not a metaphor for something else, nor a symbol to express the changing 
desires of our human hearts, though certainly an entire dimension of what it 
means to be human falls into oblivion where the word "God" disappears 35 
That theology needs to take up this task can be seen, Pannenberg argues, by viewing 
the situation of contemporary society and the contemporary church. In society there has 
been increasing scepticism about both the worth or meaning of the term "God". In 
Pannenberg's opinion, 
`the word "God" is not taken for granted, or if so, it is taken as a token of 
religious language, valid only within the enclave of religious discourse. The 
word is not self-evident as pointing to the ultimate reality that embraces, 
governs, judges, and explains everything else. The spirit of secularism keeps in 
suspense whether there is any such ultimate reality. '36 
And in the church, too, there is a `more serious problem. ' For, 
`many in the clergy seem to feel insecure about the reality of God, and 
consequently they are even more desperate to adapt their message to the 
changing mood of the time.. . Within the setting of a secularist culture 
it is even 
more important than in a religiously informed culture to urge the ultimate 
reality of God upon the hearts and minds of the people, and there are no other 
agents to do it than the preacher and the theologian. '37 
This is the challenge for the contemporary Western church as it lives in and against the 
surrounding culture. 
`To insist upon the ultimate reality of God and its rightful claims upon our lives is 
to compensate for the basic deficiency in secular culture rather than to comply 





with its spirit .... Thus the theologian is required to restate the doctrine of God in 
terms of rational argument '38 
What we see in ST, we contend, is an example of a theologian restating the doctrine of 
God in terms of rational argument, speaking to and for the church in a society that senses 
God is absent. 
This restatement of the doctrine of God requires some hard thinking in the face of a 
number of difficulties. Pannenberg mentions two in IST The one is that `the concept of 
God which was developed by medieval and early modem theology in close contact with 
classical metaphysics is in need of rather radical revision. ' And the other is that `the 
theological effort at reconstructing the Christian doctrine of God has to meet is the 
desolate state of metaphysics in modern philosophy. "' Given such concerns, we should 
not be surprised by the importance of philosophical treatments of the concept of God for 
Pannenberg's theology, or by his efforts to offer some initial concepts or criteria for the 
truthfulness of any God-talk, as he seems to offer in the early chapters of ST. This is part 
of his prescription for the spiritual ills of modern Western society, but it is also suffering 
from neglect by theologians within that society. In modem theology (unlike earlier 
generations), he thinks, such rigorous conceptual argument `has often been disregarded or 
even openly dismissed, to the detriment of the intellectual seriousness of the theological 
argument. '40 
Our topic here, Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity, is part of `a revised doctrine of 
God, '" which he offers to modern Western society and to the modern Western church. 
So if, as we claim, the doctrine of God lies at the very centre of Pannenberg's theological 
enterprise, his doctrine of the Trinity is therefore to be accorded a place of high 
importance. It does not have the highest importance, since the doctrine of the Trinity is 
part of Pannenberg's doctrine of God and does not exhaust it, so there does exist the risk 
of exaggerating its significance. Another book would be required to deal with that topic. 
Nevertheless, as the Trinity occupies a pivotal and central position within this revised 
doctrine of God, the subject of our study here is nonetheless very important in getting to 
the heart of Pannenberg's theology. 
37 p. 22. 




40 pp. 24-25. 
41 p. 25. 
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To risk offering an over-simplification, we may say that the basic message of STis 
that the trinitarian God is the true God. There are at least two ways in which this is so. 
Firstly, the trinitarian God is the true God, since from His revelation of Himself in Jesus 
Christ we know that the one God is the Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit, and it is as such 
that He is the power that determines the world and everything in it. Second, the 
trinitarian God is the true God, since `only the doctrine of the Trinity could basically 
clarify the question of the union and tension between transcendence and immanence' 
(1.415). According to Pannenberg, `imagining God as a merely transcendent being also 
mistakes him for a finite reality. ' If He is really to be the infinite God, He cannot be 
understood as the opposite of finitude, and thus be imprisoned in his transcendence. 
Rather, he says, `the reality of God is not simply set over against the finite, but at the same 
time contains it in itself. "42 It might be difficult to resolve this issue of God's infinity with 
a divine monad, but, `The doctrine of the Trinity made it possible.. . to 
link the 
transcendence of the Father in heaven with his presence in believers through the Son and 
Spirit' (1.415). 
Since the centrality of God is, in our view, the organising centre of Pannenberg's 
theology, in his eyes alternative theologies fail at this point. What sets the agenda for 
them - or at least, there is the risk of this - is ultimately not God, but some human 
conception. For this reason Pannenberg cannot follow some dominant lines of modern 
thought. An important instance for his doctrine of God is his increasing distance from 
German Idealism. He writes, 
`It is only since the early 1980s that the limitations of Kant's critique became 
clear in my understanding. At the same time, while writing my anthropology 
book, I became more confident that the principle of self-conscious subjectivity 
need not be accepted as the final basis of every discussion of metaphysics, as was 
the case in the entire tradition of German idealism' . 
Even on the philosophical level, then, German idealism is not the only matrix within 
which to understand Pannenberg's thought 43 
42 GS72, p. 140. 
43 This may well have a lot to do with the reading of Descartes that he has held in recent years, which is 
also a possible candidate for the developments in Pannenberg's theology that has enabled his more 
sustained focus on the doctrine of God. Following some French interpreters, Pannenberg understands 
Descartes' approach not as the basing of all certainty on the human ego, but on the Infinite without 
which we cannot conceive anything finite. Such an interpretation fits with Pannenberg's own concern 
that divine reality, i. e. the Infinite, should be at the centre of our view of the world rather than human 
18 
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A similar emphasis is evident not just in his philosophical judgements, but in his 
theological judgments too. Insofar as they fail to put God in the centre, this is the 
problem with many modem treatments of Christian doctrine which make religion, and 
therefore subjective belief, the basis of dogmatics. 44 `Then, ' he writes `it could become a 
question whether one would ever arrive at a concept of God as [the] proper subject of 
theology-'41 It is also the problem with Barth, since in his case `the foundation of theology 
is still anthropocentric, because it is based on a subjective decision. '41 It is the problem too 
with German idealism's conceptions of the Trinity, including Hegel's, that view the 
Trinity after the model of the human consciousness 47 That Pannenberg can find fault 
here with Hegel takes us to our next point. 
We now take up the second general guideline to Pannenberg interpretation. This 
study will tend to lay less emphasis on the influence of philosophical idealism on 
Pannenberg's thought. In Bradshaw's work, for instance, German philosophical idealism 
is said to be the important context for understanding Pannenberg's trinitarian thought, as 
it is for Barth's also. For Bradshaw, `such areas of similarity' between Pannenberg and 
Barth `stem from a common influence exercised by the idealist tradition. '41 `There is no 
doubt, ' he writes, `that Pannenberg's theology does not belong to the family of Process 
theology, but to the subtler school of absolute idealism. '49 
In particular Pannenberg has often been termed a Hegelian. Again we cite Bradshaw, 
who states `Pannenberg claims to renew Hegel's thought, '50 a remark whose context in 
Trinity and Ontology would seem to be a general description of his theological 
programme. And again we seek to question the ease with which Pannenberg's 
interpreters apply this epithet. Throughout the following exposition we shall come across 
consciousness. This interpretation of Descartes has been outlined in a number of works dating from the 
mid-1980's, e. g., MIG, ch. 2 "The Problem of the Absolute" pp. 22-42, ST 1.83ff, 113ff, 350ff, and 
Theologie und Philosophie: Ihr Verhaeltnis im Lichte ihrer gemeinsamen Geschichte (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1996) (Hereafter "TuP"), pp. 142-156. A more extended reading of 
Descartes along these lines can be found in P. Clayton The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 51-144. 
as See 1.26-48. 
45 "Theology examines its status and methodology", unpublished paper., p. 1. 
46 ibid., p. 2. This same problem afflicts Barth's doctrine of the Trinity in Pannenberg's view. See 
1.296 and Problemgeschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1997), pp. 176-204. 
47 1.294ff. 
48 p. 1. 
49 p. 343. 
50 p 337. 
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elements of Pannenberg's theology that either adopt some of Hegel's ideas or at least make 
significant reference to them. We shall also come across aspects of Pannenberg's thinking 
which have been termed "Hegelian" inaccurately. Given the frequency with which this 
claim is made, we should devote some detailed attention to the validity of this epithet 
when used of Pannenberg's theology, especially his trinitarian thought. 
As a preliminary point, we should remember from earlier remarks that Pannenberg 
says he became increasingly aware that `the entire tradition of German idealism' was 
wrong to posit self-conscious subjectivity as the foundation of all metaphysical schemes. 
This, at the very least, should arouse suspicion about calling Pannenberg either an 
`idealist' or a `Hegelian: Yet we should be more than merely suspicious about the 
frequency of this classification of Pannenberg's theology. 
Much of Pannenberg's theological development took place in Heidelberg, where 
from the years 1950 to 1958 he completed both his doctorate and Habilitationsschrift, and 
gave lectures. In discussing this period in an autobiographical piece, Pannenberg deals 
directly with the idea that he is a Hegelian. This is worth quoting in full: 
`My lecture courses at Heidelberg were repeatedly devoted to the history of 
medieval theology and I could easily have continued in that particular field for 
the rest of my life. But I also had to teach courses concerned with the Lutheran 
Reformation and, especially, with the modem history of Protestant theology. It 
was in this connection that I came to appreciate the importance of Hegel's 
thought in the development of modem theology, but mainly as a challenge to 
theology. I never became a Hegelian, but I decided that theology has to be 
developed on at least the same level of sophistication as Hegel's philosophy and 
for that purpose I studied his writings carefully and repeatedly. Because my 
publications also gave evidence of this, the tenacious prejudice of my alleged 
Hegelianism developed, and it effectively concealed the more important 
philosophical roots of my thought. 's' 
So, Pannenberg is not a Hegelian. His reading of Hegel is not foundational since his 
appreciation of Hegel arose only when he came to realise his importance for a proper 
conception of modern Protestant theology. His interest in Hegel is not consuming, since 
he sees it not as the lifeline for theology but as a challenge to it. And he sees descriptions 
51 p. 16, emphasis added. 
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of his theology as Hegelian as guilty of a `tenacious prejudice' that prevents a true 
appreciation of the content and roots of his theology. 
It is worth contrasting this remark with some important lines of Pannenberg 
interpretation, which consider him in predominantly, or at least misleadingly, Hegelian 
terms. Among the numerous examples of interpreters who understand Pannenberg along 
these lines, we note two that represent both the earliest and most recent in the secondary 
literature. 
The first example is Allan Galloway, someone who would become a leading advocate 
and interpreter of Pannenberg's thought in the English-speaking world, in particular his 
`The New Hegelians. "52 In this review article Galloway sets up the following framework. 
On the one hand there is 20th century theology, represented by Barth and Bultmann, 
which divorces Christianity from both history and reason; and on the other there is 19th 
century theology, which in the spirit of Hegel understood the Christian religion in 
historical and rational terms. The `only point of common ground' shared by Barthians and 
Bultmannians, Galloway claims, `was the conviction that the whole of nineteenth century 
theology from Hegel onwards was an elaborate waste of time and energy. '53 And once 
modem theology is understood in these terms, the significance of Pannenberg and 
Moltmann, he says, is that `both take this unwanted child of faith unhesitatingly into the 
bosom of their theology. '-54 After a brief summary of one of Pannenberg's works, in which 
he cites no references to support this supposed retrieval of Hegel, Galloway writes of 
Pannenberg: 
`This is essentially a re-establishment of the Hegelian marriage of theology, 
philosophy and universal history - but with a difference! The difference is 
intended to accommodate the individual, the contingent and the open future in a 
way that Hegel failed to achieve. "' 
Galloway is right to note Pannenberg's criticism that Hegel left insufficient room for 
contingency within his thought. But to interpret his work in such exclusively Hegelian 
terms gives a one-sided picture of Pannenberg's theology. One might note the relative 
paucity of references to Hegel within Pannenberg's works, even in the works published 
by the time of Galloway's article, since thinkers such as Bultmann, von Rad, Heidegger, 
52 Religious Studies 8 (1972), pp. 367-371. 




Dilthey and Gadamer are cited more often. One might also note the fact that Pannenberg 
criticises, even in his early work, more than just Hegel's insufficient account of 
contingency. 56 And, of course, the later autobiographical remarks suggest that more 
careful reading would have recommended a different matrix for understanding 
Pannenberg. 
At least from the time of Galloway's article the tendency of scholars to appeal to 
Pannenberg's reliance on Hegel has often been assumed rather than considered, alleged 
rather than demonstrated. And this has continued even after Pannenberg's cautionary 
remarks. We see this in our other example. 
The second example is Samuel Powell, whose book The Trinity in Modern German 
T'hought' offers one of the more careful interpretations of Pannenberg's thought, and 
whose charge of Hegelianism among the most sophisticated. Yet, as with Galloway, 
Hegelian idealism is the suggested matrix for understanding Pannenberg, at least in the 
matter of trinitarian thought that is Powell's concern. He states that, as with Moltmann 
and Barth, `Although not often mentioned by [him], Hegel is in many ways the 
unacknowledged guide to [Pannenberg's] thought. '58 
Powell mentions two points, at which Pannenberg is indebted to Hegel, namely `his 
understanding of personhood as an intensely relational phenomenon' and `his emphasis 
on the historicity of God's being. ' Unfortunately Powell provides no references to back 
up the claim, but the care with which he lays the charge shows more attentive reading of 
Pannenberg than do either Galloway or most others who consider Pannenberg to be 
Hegelian. 
Powell is certainly correct to point to the importance of Hegel for Pannenberg's 
understanding of personhood. It is in the 1964 work, 1GM, that the influence of Hegel is 
most apparent. `Hegel, ' Pannenberg writes, `was the first to so elaborate the concept of 
"person" in such a way that God's unity becomes understandable precisely from the 
reciprocity of the divine persons. ' He continues: 
55p371. 
s6 See, for instance `Analogy and Doxology' in Basic Questions in Theology vol. 1 (London: SCM, 
1970), pp. 220ff for another example of Pannenberg correcting Hegel's thought. `[T]he fundamental 
doxological feature that belongs to all speech about God can also be indicated by referring to its 
character as an act of mediation. The concept of mediation points to an understanding of God which 
does not allow him to be comprehended in concepts, as in the case of Hegel's God, but which instead, 
like the Kantian doctrine of analogy, remains attentive to the infinite sublimity of God' (p. 221). 
57 (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). 
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Through [his] profound thought that the essence of the person is to exist in self- 
dedication to another person, Hegel understood the unity in the Trinity as the 
unity of reciprocal self-dedication... [This idea] constituted the high point up to 
now of the conceptual clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity with respect to 
the relation between unity and threeness: 59 
Insofar as it expresses Pannenberg's agreement with Hegel on this point, then, he can 
rightly be called `Hegelian. ' 
Regarding the historicity of God's being, however, the reliance on Hegel is more 
ambivalent. The first substantial contribution on this topic by Pannenberg - and the 
seminal one - was RaH, in which he criticised what he considered the unhistorical 
conceptions held by the followers of Barth and Bultmann. In that work he refers to Hegel 
at three points, none of which is pivotal for Pannenberg's presentation. At one point he 
suggests that `the strictly defined concept of revelation as the self-revelation of the 
absolute' was first developed by Hegel 60 At another, Pannenberg argues that a notion of 
history that demonstrates the deity of God should be broadened to include the totality of 
events. Pointing out the peculiarity of contemporary theological views, he writes, `This 
concept of history determined the Western philosophy of history up to the time of Hegel 
and Marx, ' and then takes a sentence each to explain briefly how the different approaches 
of both thinkers. 61 Third, Pannenberg notes that the idea of history as the totality of 
God's revelation, which he is advocating, was articulated in Schleiermacher's fifth 
discourse on religion. " Then, Pannenberg says, `Hegel gave systematic formulation to the 
concept of universal history as an indirect revelation of God in connection with his 
explication of the concept of self-revelation. '63 He goes on to note the similar 
contribution of Schelling, and then how the reaction against Hegel initiated by Strauss 
rested on a misunderstanding of Hegel's position. Indeed, on this matter, Pannenberg has 
cause to correct Hegel in RaH.. 6' 
S$ ibid., p. 193. 
59 JGM, p. 197 
60 pp. 4-5. 
61 p. 133. 
62 F. D. Schleiermacher On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (tr. R. Crouter) (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1996), pp. 95-124. 
63 pp. 16-17. 
64 On p. 18 Pannenberg writes. `If history is the totality of revelation, then there is further progress that 
must be made beyond Jesus Christ.. . In Hegel this departure was understood only as one of 
comprehending the revelation that came about in Jesus. But it also appears necessary to reckon with a 
development in the facts themselves. ' See also p. 152 on Hegel's view of the incarnation. 
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It is, we think, too much to call Hegel the `unacknowledged guide' to Pannenberg's 
trinitarian thought. Not only is it the case that - with the notable exception of the 
critique of Hegelian derivation of the divine threeness from the idea of a unitary subject - 
Pannenberg's account of the trinitarian God in ST can be understood perfectly well 
without any knowledge of Hegel. Also, Pannenberg has not been so silent as Powell 
suggests on the extent of Hegel's influence on his thought, as the above-mentioned 
autobiographical essay bears witness. Whereas Powell seems justified in calling 
Pannenberg's understanding of personhood a Hegelian influence, this is not the case with 
the historicity of God's being. Moreover, Powell's emphasis on Pannenberg's Hegelianism 
is not counterbalanced by references to other philosophical or theological motivations to 
his trinitarian theology. For, when one reads what Pannenberg says about his own 
theological development the attribution to Pannenberg of Hegelianism, whether 
acknowledged or unacknowledged, whether explicit or implicit, becomes problematic. 
There exists a fairly large body of literature that deals with the relationship of 
Pannenberg and Hegel, especially the extent of the dependence of the former on the 
latter. 65 This does provide some helpful insights to Pannenberg's thought, but often the 
Again, we cite an extended account of Pannenberg's own words, which offer further confirmation to 
our reading: `In a way that is materially mistaken [RaH] has been rated as theological Hegelianism. 
Many statements in the Introduction perhaps gave rise to this misunderstanding, but materially the 
concern was to solve the difficulties in Rothe's formulation of revelation as manifestation and in 
Rothe's formulation of revelation as manifestation and inspiration by returning to the idealistic thesis 
of all history as the revelation of God, but in such a way that the idealistic view of history undergoes 
decisive correction by the thought of the anticipation of the totality of history in the light of its end as 
we find this in the eschatological thrust of the teaching and work of Jesus' (1.228-229). 
65 See for instance M. Pagano Storia ed escatologia nel pensiero di W. Pannenberg (Milan: Mursia, 
1973), pp. 188-194; P. Eicher Offenbarung. Prinzip neuzeitlicher Theologie (Munich, 1977), pp. 438f; 
M. Fraijo El sentido de la historia. Introduccion al pensamiento de W. Pannenberg (Madrid: 
Christiandad, 1986), pp. 102-122; P. Clayton "Anticipation and Theological Method" in C. E. Braaten 
and P. Clayton (eds. ) The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg: Twelve American Responses 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), pp. 132ff, 138f; S. Greiner Die Theologie Pannenbergs (Wuerzburg: 
Echter, 1988), pp. 200-203; K. Koch Der Gott der Geschichte. Theologie bei Wolfhart Pannenberg als 
Paradigma einer Philosophischen Theologie in oekumenischer Perspektive (Mainz: M. Gruenewald, 
1988), pp 103ff; and E. Juengel "Verweigertes Geheimnis? Bemerkungen zu einer evangelischen 
Sonderlehre" in J. Rohls and G. Wenz (eds. ) Vernunft des Glaubens (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1988), pp. 488-494. We add to this list the recent article of Anselm Min "The Dialectic of 
divine Love: Pannenberg's Hegelian Trinitarianism". Pannenberg's, Min states, is a `Hegelian 
dialectical approach' (p. 252), and his application of the Hegelian dialectic results in a attempt to 
describe the triune God that is `deeply flawed' (p. 253). Min demonstrates a broad and deep knowledge 
of the argument of ST chapter 6, and in this he offers an account that is much more informative than the 
remarks of Galloway. Min notes nine innovations in Pannenberg's theology, all of which are 
"Hegelian. " Unfortunately, other than some very general remarks on 'Hegel's constitutive notion of 
mediation and relation' (p. 253), Min offers no evidence to demonstrate that it is either Hegel, or 
Hegelian ideas, that Pannenberg is relying on here. We wonder whether what he calls `the assumptions 




impression is created that this influence is somehow more important and more 
enlightening than any others. In our opinion it is no coincidence that the most 
illuminating of the secondary works on Pannenberg's theology tend not to make so much 
of the Hegelian elements, even to downplay them 66 Furthermore, we suggest that there 
are potentially more fruitful avenues of enquiry into Pannenberg's intellectual context 
and inheritance. In particular, one could take up Pannenberg's own suggestion and 
investigate how far Pannenberg's theology is influenced by the tradition of German 
Protestant dogmatics of the modern period, especially in its Lutheran form. It would be 
interesting to discover how far the debates in ST and his other works are aimed at 
discussions surrounding the work of recent Lutheran theologians such as Bultmann and 
Ebeling, and even further back to Ritschl and von Harnack. Epithets that help us get to 
heart of Pannenberg's theological project are more likely to be ones such as "German" and 
"Lutheran" than "Hegelian". 
As for the epithet "Hegelian" when used of Pannenberg, it is a label to which it is 
difficult to give significant substance. It is useful when made about specific points where 
Pannenberg takes up particular ideas or concepts directly from Hegel. As a general 
description of Pannenberg's theology it is problematic both exegetically and polemically. 
It is problematic exegetically, because analysis both of his intellectual biography and of 
his published work will not provide corroboration. All three of our examples do not pay 
attention to his own autobiographical remarks and state a reliance on Hegel beyond what 
the relevant texts will allow. And it is problematic polemically because an assessment - 
whether positive or (usually) negative - of Hegel's philosophy is first assumed, and 
Pannenberg's own theology is then defended or (usually) condemned by association with 
the German idealism on which it allegedly depends. Our first two examples especially 
have their own purposes for citing this alleged Hegelianism, which is based more on their 
opinion of Hegel than on what Pannenberg says. For Galloway it signifies a welcome 
return to the union of theology with reason and history. For Min it means a flawed 
understanding of God as determined by finitude. `The basic problem with Pannenberg's 
Trinitarian theology as a whole, ' he writes, is 
`its underlying Hegelian philosophical model of the dialectic of self-manifestation 
itself, ' which `is taken from the world of finite experience and finite being where 
66 Among such interpreters we note F. LeRon Shults, Stanley Grenz and Svein Rise. 
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indeed the essence of a thing, necessarily composite and potential, has to 
manifest itself externally in an essentially interdependent world 67 
At best, we believe, the breadth of the claim is inversely proportional to how enlightening 
it is. And given that Pannenberg himself says he `never became a Hegelian' our study will 
acknowledge Hegelian influence when evidence in the text may be found, but will not 
assume that he is one, even sub-consciously so. 
3. The practice oftrinitarian theology 
The third and final way that this study seeks to contribute to contemporary systematic 
theology is in its application of the doctrine of the Trinity to the practice of theology. In 
the recent interest in the doctrine of the Trinity relatively little attention has been paid to 
this matter. Yet it is important, and if a theology is heralded as `the most trinitarian I'- or 
any else -'know of', then it must be trinitarian in this respect too. 
It is this matter in particular, as we shall see, where we believe Pannenbergs 
trinitarian ambitions fail to be realised. Pannenberg has a number of commitments about 
the task of theology in modernity and its responsibility to adopt a position of open 
intellectual impartiality in its discussion of the truth of Christianity. Whatever the merit 
of these concerns, they nevertheless are in tension with Pannenberg's stated desire to put 
the trinitarian God at the centre of his theological project. Indeed, we suggest there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, the commitment to an open and 
impartial account of God in the modern age, and, on the other, the commitment to 
rigorous application of the triune God of Jesus Christ to all parts of Christian thought. 
There will be hints of this issue throughout the presentation of Pannenberg's 
trinitarian account of Christian doctrine, but it will be addressed directly and at length 
only in Part Two. The trinitarian God of Jesus Christ is known in a trinitarian way, so 
there has to be a trinitarian account not just of the content of revelation, but also of the 
reception of revelation. Knowledge of God, even if it is enjoyed by the theologian, is the 
work of the triune God alone, and so must be conceived as a spiritual matter through and 
through. It is a knowledge that is not accessible without the sanctification of the Spirit 
who bestows it, and so it requires humility. It is a divine reality that is only conferred by 
67 Min p. 268. 
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divine grace, and so it requires prayer. And it is insight into what is in itself invisible and 
unapproachable for us humans, and so it requires faith. 
The lack of trinitarian rigour on this topic in Pannenberg's theology is not an isolated 
matter. It also affects the treatment of several doctrines within ST, and so its effects can 
be seen throughout Pannenbergs presentation. These doctrines include those of the 
person of Christ, revelation and faith as well as how one understands both the tasks and 
methods of theology and the work of the Spirit. Sometimes when Pannenberg is 
addressing these topics trinitarian language and conceptuality is employed, but in ways 
which are questionable. Often it is on these matters that trinitarian language and 
conceptuality is not employed at all, and so it is here that Pannenberg's claim to write the 
most trinitarian of theologies looks at its least convincing. 
Conclusions such as these will presuppose that we know both what Pannenberg's doctrine 
of the Trinity is and how it affects the rest of his theology. Our second question - to what 
extent has Pannenberg's systematic theology has been successful in realising his 
trinitarian ambitions? - can only be answered once we have tackled the first question - 
what does Pannenberg mean by his theology being thoroughly trinitarian? So it is to this 








PANNENBERG'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 
1. The doctrine of the trinitarian God must be rooted in God's historical revelation in Jesus 
Christ, according to which the Father is the loving Creator God of Israel and Lord of the 
eschatological kingdom, the Son is the one who distinguishes Himself in loving obedience 
from the Father to establish the kingdom, and the Spirit is bond of love between Father 
and Son that enables their reciprocal fellowship. 
`To find a basis for the doctrine of the Trinity', Pannenberg says, `we must begin with the way 
in which Father, Son and Spirit come on the scene and relate to one another in the event of 
revelation' (1.299). Granted that he believes all God-talk by necessity presupposes some idea 
of God, Pannenberg explicitly adopts a starting point in revelation rather than one of 
empirical or rational self-evidence. ' Moreover, in STchapter 5, as we shall see, Pannenberg is 
critical of approaches that he considers are built on the sand of pre-trinitarian ideas of God or 
lack foundation in the Christ-event. It is exegesis of the biblical material that starts off his 
discussion and forms the basic frame of reference for what is said later on, and it is to be the 
rational explication of this God, the God of Jesus Christ that is the foundation and frame of 
reference for what Pannenberg considers a properly developed doctrine of the Trinity. 
This is the case for all three persons of the Trinity, whom we shall consider in turn. The 
Father is the God whose coming kingdom Jesus proclaimed and identified Himself with, so 
that `the differentiation of God as Father from his own person, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`is... constitutive for Jesus' message and attitude' (1.263). Primarily the Father Jesus 
proclaimed is Israel's God, the Creator God of care and compassion, who is bringing in His 
kingdom. He is `none other than the God of Jewish faith according to the witness of the OT° 
Shults has rightly regarded Pannenberg's method as distinct from that of foundationalism, at least in its 
classical form. The doctrine of the Trinity is thus a prime instance of how far off the mark is the 
classification of Pannenberg as a classical foundationalist, for it is revelation, not self-evident propositions 
that provide the basis for our understanding of the trinitarian God. 
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and it is He, rather than the divine essence or Trinity as such, who is the prime referent of 
the word "God" in both testaments? And on 1.259 Pannenberg notes many scriptural 
references from Jesus' ministry demonstrating that `God shows himself to be Father by caring 
for his creatures. ' And this generous concern is evident in His answering prayer, in particular 
the Paternoster with its focus on the coming of His kingdom. 
That this Father, the loving, coming, Creator God of Israel is an essential ingredient in 
understanding Jesus leads Pannenberg to distance himself from other assessments of talk of 
God as Father as either culturally inappropriate or dispensable. It is not culturally 
inappropriate, Pannenberg believes, since while noting that the `description of God as Father 
in the prophecy of Israel must undoubtedly be related to the patriarchal constitution of the 
Israelite family, ' he denies it is a projection of human gender in either Old or New Testament. 
He writes, 
`The aspect of fatherly care in particular is taken over in what the OT has to say 
about God's fatherly concern for Israel. The sexual definition of the father's role 
plays no part' (1.261). 
Hence Pannenberg both denies theories such as Freud's interpretation of Judaeo-Christian 
religion in terms of the Oedipus complex, ' and rejects proposals to revise the concept of God 
as Father in the light of changes in gender roles and family structure. As for the latter, 
Pannenberg writes: 
'Such a demand would be justified only if the idea of God were simply a reflection of 
the prevailing social relationships. This is a view which ultimately presupposes a 
projection theory of ideas of God after the manner of Feuerbach. ' 
Yet the biblical understanding of God `confronts the changing concept of fatherhood as a 
norm' (1.262). 
And it is not dispensable, which Pannenberg believes is the view of the "death of God" 
theologian Herbert Braun. For Braun `the term "God" is simply "an expression for the radical 
obedience and the radical grace" of conversion, an expression for the authority of Jesus' 
2 Here Pannenberg is relying on Rahner's "`Gott' als erste trinitarische Person im NT, " ZKT 66 (1942), 
pp. 71-88. 





Yet, Pannenberg states, Jesus expressly differentiated God the Father from himself, 
as shown in the Lord's prayer, and love for God is not just an expression for love of 
neighbour, but is its basis. 
The Son is the one who lovingly submits to the Father, and, as Jesus of Nazareth, not 
only is both the herald and the presence of the divine kingdom, but brings it to fulfilment by 
his life, death and resurrection. `Jesus, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`is the Son inasmuch as it is in his message of the nearness of the royal rule of the 
Father, his subjection to the Father's will, and especially the function of his sending 
as a revelation of the love of God, that this God may be known as Father' (1.264). 
This submission is the self-distinction from the Father, from whom He differentiates Himself 
as the one God, to whom he prays, and whose obedience is His all-consuming concern. 
But it is more than this, since it is precisely by this absolute submission to the Father and 
the kingdom, whose establishment is His commission, that He has His majesty as the Son. 
`From the primacy of the divine lordship he claimed for his message an authority which far 
surpasses all human authority' (1.263-264), since it was with and in Him that that the 
kingdom was coming. And with this Jesus is the ultimate revelation of God. For since Jesus 
`proclaimed that the Father's kingdom is not only imminent but also dawning in his 
own work, no room is left for any future talk about God which will replace his. The 
heavenly Father whom he proclaimed is thus so closely related to Jesus' own coming 
and work that it is by this that God is identified as Father' (1.264). 
It was, Pannenberg says, `by his resurrection from the dead' that `Jesus was instituted 
into the dignity of divine sonship. ' And this is the epistemological basis for seeing Jesus as the 
Son of the Father God whose kingdom he proclaimed. For, as Pannenberg adds, 
`As the resurrection of Jesus was seen as a divine confirmation of the claim implied in 
his earthly ministry, Jesus in the light of Easter had to appear as the Son of the Father 
whom he proclaimed' (1.264). 
How this is so we shall examine in more detail in later chapters, especially the one devoted to 
christology. Yet here we should at least note that from this vindication in His raising from 
4 Citing H. Braun Jesus der Mann aus Nazareth und seine Zeit, 2°d ed. (Berlin: Kreuz Verlag Stuttgart, 
1969), pp. 160-61. 
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the dead Jesus is seen as always having been the Son, the one eternally identified with the 
Father (and so really pre-existent) and to be addressed as "Lord" (and so truly divine) .5 
As for the Spirit, unlike theologies which make the church's experience the basis for 
theological reflection on the third divine person, it is the event of revelation in Christ's first 
coming that is primary. It is His involvement `in God's presence in the work of Jesus and in 
the fellowship of the Son with the Father' that `is the basis of the fact that the Christian 
understanding of God found its developed and definitive form in the doctrine of the Trinity 
and not in a biunity of the Father and the Son' (1.268). And unlike theologies which make 
the church's experience the basis for theological reflection on the third divine person, it is the 
event of revelation in Christ's first coming that is primary. Though scripture does point to the 
experience of the Spirit's working within the church, 
`the source of the specific mode of the Spirit's presence in the church is to be 
sought.. . in his function of mediating the fellowship of the Son with the Father. If the 
Spirit were not constitutive for the fellowship of the Son with the Father, the 
Christian doctrine of the deity of the Spirit would be a purely external addition to the 
confession of the relation of the Son to the deity of the Father' (1.268). 
It is this foundation of trinitarian dogma on the historical revelation in Jesus Christ that 
Pannenberg believes is, and always has been, its original and normative basis. Against other 
explanations of the rise of the early church's doctrine of the Trinity, he believes the 
importance of either Hellenistic philosophy or the baptismal formula to be exaggerated. `We 
are not, ' he writes, 
`to seek the setting of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity primarily in 
baptism, but in catechizing, i. e., in the development of the church's teaching. The 
starting point for this teaching is not simply in a three-membered formula but in all 
that the NT has to say about the relation of the Son to the Father on the one side and 
to the Spirit on the other' (1.268-269). 
God's historical revelation in Christ was, then, always the most important datum for the early 
church's discussions on the Trinity, rather than traditions, philosophical assumptions, creeds 
or the baptismal formula. Indeed, for Pannenberg, trinitarian theology has floundered when 
S See 1.266ff. 
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this basis in revelation has been marginalised and it has relied on the sand of bare traditional 
formulae. Hence in his judgement, 
`The Socinian Crellius was fully justified in arguing that nowhere in Scripture does the 
term Father refer to the whole Trinity, and Calov's arguments against him sound very 
artificial to modem readers and lack cogency unless one takes into account a thesis 
which is read into scripture, namely, that of the indivisibility of the outward works of 
the Trinity. Might it not be that this rule itself stands in need of revision? ' (1.326). 
To be trinitarian is to follow the path of the 4th century rather than the 17thand to be rooted 
in the sole criterion of the Christ event. 
2. A truly trinitarian theology needs to be liberated from the pre-trinitarian conceptions of 
God's unity that have afflicted theology since the time of the Cappadocian Fathers, in 
particular the trinitarian analogies after the likeness of the individual subject and the 
derivation of God's trinity from His unity. 
It was, Pannenberg says in the foreword to ST, `only reluctantly' that he concluded that he 
could not `concentrate solely on the essential coherence of the dogmatic themes, leaving to 
one side the confusing profusion of historical questions' (1. x). For, 
`Reflection upon the historical place of dogmatic concepts and the related 
identifying and relative weighting of the essential themes of Christian doctrine are 
indispensable to an impartial judgment of their fitness and scope in expressing the 
universal significance of the history and person of Jesus Christ' (1 xi) 
A key example of how such a procedure affects his presentation of trinitarian themes is the 
thesis here, as Pannenberg believes a proper contemporary articulation of the Christian God 
requires a revision - both in terms of examining again and in terms of alteration - of the 
standard accounts of the content and development of trinitarian doctrine in the history of 
theology. 
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Our way in will be some remarks on the most important event in that history, the 4th 
century debates surrounding the composition of the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan creed of 
381: 
'There can be no doubt as to the monotheistic intention of the Cappadocians or 
of pre-Nicene theology. Only with reservations, however, can we say that their 
line of thinking did justice to their intention. There are thus material reasons 
why later theology saw that it had to engage in new and more extensive 
investigations at this point' (1.280). 
As we shall see, Pannenberg believes that from the time of the Cappadocian Fathers there has 
been a conceptual pull in mainstream theology stifling a fully trinitarian understanding of the 
Christian God due to reliance on unitarian conceptuality. 
Pannenberg offers prolonged and involved discussion of how the theological tradition 
has related the doctrine of the trinity to that of the one God, which in another context could 
be the matter of greater attention. Here we shall note only three points salient for our topic: 
Nicene and pre-Nicene views of the divine unity; the derivation of the Trinity from the 
unity; and the structure of the Christian doctrine of God. 
Let us deal first with the Nicene and pre-Nicene understandings of the divine unity. 
According to Pannenberg, although the NT statements are the foundation for the 
trinitarianism of the early church, they lack clarity on the interrelations of the three, 
whether it be a definition of the relation of the Son to the Father, the differentiation of the 
Spirit from both Father and Son, or how the deity of Kyrios and Spirit is compatible with 
monotheistic belief in the unity of God .6 Various strategies were adopted by subsequent 
theology to resolve these matters, with differing success. Rightly, Pannenberg believes, the 
church eventually rejected both the hypostatic distinction of Father, Son and Spirit on the 
basis of different spheres of operation, as in Origen, 7 and the ontological subordination of the 
Son and Spirit to the Father, as in the Monarchians. Instead, `Athanasius and the 
Cappadocians emphasized the participation of all three hypostases in all divine activity as a 
consequence and condition of their unity of essence' (1.271), and the three equally 
6 See 1.269. 
7 De principiis 1.3.5-8 according to which `The Father works in each and all things, the Son only in rational 
creatures, and the Spirit only in the saints, i. e., the church' (1.271). 
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participated in the divine nature and were all distinguished on the basis of immanent 
relations. 
It is here that Pannenberg detects an ambiguity in the Nicene legacy, namely how 
accounts of the intra-trinitarian relations fit with the statements of equal deity. The 
ambiguity is not there, he believes, in Athanasius, who set the unity of the Son with the 
Father on the logic of the relation that is posited when we call God "Father. "8 `The Father 
cannot be thought of as Father without the Son' (1.279). Yet the ambiguity does arise in the 
theology of the Cappadocian Fathers. 
This rather long quotation expresses Pannenberg's misgivings: 
`The idea of the Father as the source and origin of deity so fused the person of the 
Father and the substance of the Godhead that the divine substance is originally proper 
to the Father alone, being received from Him by the Son and Spirit. In distinction 
from Athanasius this means a relapse into subordinationism, since the idea of the 
mutual defining of the distinctiveness of the persons does not lead to the thought of an 
equally mutual ontological constitution of their personhood but is interpreted in terms 
of relations of origin, of which it can be said that strictly they are constitutive only for 
the personhood of the Son and Spirit if the Father is the source and origin of deiy 
(1.280). 
It became more difficult, therefore, to view the trinity of the three persons as the real God in 
se and to speak of the divine essence in trinitarian terms, since the Cappadocian formulation 
tended, in Pannenberg's view, to fuse the divinity with the person of the Father. 
A consequence of Nicaea, then, was a lack of clarity about how to conceive the unity of 
the triune persons. Hence, what Pannenberg terms the `material reasons' for later theology's 
further investigations, whether fruitful or misguided. Our two further points are illustrations 
of approaches Pannenberg considers misguided that he will avoid in ST, namely, the 
derivation of the Trinity from the divine unity, and the structure of the doctrine of God. 
One traditional answer to the alleged ambiguity of the Nicene legacy, Pannenberg 
believes, is the attempt to derive the trinity from the divine unity. This approach inevitably 
meets a dead-end. `Any derivation of the plurality of trinitarian persons from the essence of 
8 Athanasius makes this argument in, e. g., Contra Arianos 1.29. 
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the one God, ' Pannenberg writes, `... leads into the problems of either modalism on the one 
hand or subordinationism on the other. Neither, then, can be true to the intentions of the 
trinitarian dogma' (1.298). 
In Christian theology Pannenberg believes the chief examples of this derivation of the 
divine threeness from the unity are spirit or mind on the one hand, and love on the other. 
Both of these, the mental analogy and the love analogy, are to be found in Augustine's De 
Trinitate and have been variously adopted by subsequent theology. 9 
Key in the development of the former derivation was Anselm, who in his Monologion 
took the Trinity directly from the concept of summa natura as spiritus. `The trinity is derived 
from the unity and embraced by it. The thinker and the thought, and the love which connect 
them, are one spirit' (1.286). Materially this approach forms a line of continuity, which 
Pannenberg traces through Aquinas and later in Melanchthon, Lessing, Hegel and even 
Barth. Yet in all its manifestations it is, he says, 
`a psychological interpretation [which] ultimately involves a reduction to 
nontrinitarian monotheism. For all the differentiation in the self-consciousness, the 
God of this understanding is a single subject. The moments in the self-consciousness 
have no subjectivity of their own' (1.295). 
Hence for all his praise of the trinitarian ambitions of his Church Dogmatics, Pannenberg 
feels he has to go beyond Barth, who in his view, 
`simply derive[d] the doctrine from the formal concept of a self-revealing God. Barth 
did not develop the trinitarian statements out of the contents of the revelation to 
which scripture bears witness but out of the formal concept [of the individual 
revealing subject]' (1.304). 
The latter derivation, namely from the concept of love, the summum bonum, finds its 
classic presentation in Richard of St. Victor and with modem dress in Eberhard Juengel, God 
being the one who loves of himself. In some respects Pannenberg prefers this procedure to 
9 Note that Pannenberg has in mind, not the analogies themselves, but their abuse. He writes: 
`the psychological analogies that [Augustine] suggested and developed in his work on the 
Trinity were simply meant to offer a very general way of linking the unity and trinity and 
thus creating some plausibility for trinitarian statements' (1.284). 
Notwithstanding his judgement that there is in De Trinitate an undue emphasis on the divine unity at the 
expense of the reciprocity of the divine threeness (see 1.283-284 and 323-324), it is the use of these 
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the derivation from the concept of mind, since it enables a stronger profiling of the 
personality of the trinitarian persons and their communion, since God is the lover, the 
beloved and their love. 10 Yet this too relapses into a pre-trinitarian unity of the subjectivity 
of the one God as the one who generates the other persons. God is presented as the one who 
loves, rather than as love. Both analogies, then, exhibit unitarian tendencies, which cannot 
pay full justice to the trinitarian dogma. 
The second false trail in response to the Nicene legacy is structuring the doctrine of God 
so that the Trinity is treated as an appendix, `added to the existing idea of the one God as the 
specifically Christian revelation. ' At least since the time of Protestant dogmatics this 
approach was often adopted due to a feeling that the OT, as well as Jesus' statement that God 
is spirit, justifies a prior presentation of God as the Supreme Being and also of His attributes. 
And in the course of dogmatic presentation `the attributes of God were derived from the 
concept of God as the Supreme Being or spirit' (1.281-282). Hence this is a structural 
correlate to the logical deduction of God's threeness from His oneness, and reinforces a pre- 
trinitarian view of the unity. 
For Pannenberg this is a problem affecting the West more than the East. For, even 
though the Trinity is treated in John of Damascus and Gregory of Nyssall afterthe nature and 
unity of God, it is explicitly the trinitarian God who is in view right from the start, and what 
derivation there is does not determine the systematic treatment of the doctrine of God as 
much as it would later do in the Latin theology of the Middle Ages (1.289). Pannenberg's key 
figure in this development is Aquinas, who, he says, `gave the structure of the doctrine of God 
its classical form for the age that followed. ' 
Basic to this structure is the derivation of the trinity of persons from the concept of 
the unity of substance. The arrangement of themes gives appropriate expression to 
the basic structure: the existence of the one God, his substance, his substantial 
analogies from the time of medieval Western theology, which translated these illustrations into logical 
derivations from the concepts of mind and love, that is Pannenberg's target. 
10 See Richard's De Trinitate 9.2ff., and E. Juengel God as the Mystery of the World: on the Foundation of 
the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), pp331- 
342.. A more recent discussion of the trinitarian God along these lines, which provides an even more 
striking example of deducing the Trinity from the idea of a loving subject is R. Swinburne The Christian 
God (Oxford: OUP, 1994). 
11 See John of Damascus Orthodox Faith 1.1ff., and Gregory of Nyssa Catechetical Oration. 
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attributes, the Trinity. But without a derivation of the trinity from the unity this 
sequence, which puts the unity first, would make no sense' (1.288). 
Yet in Pannenberg's view this basic structure left untouched by trinitarian revelation the 
concept of the divine unity, and the whirlwind was reaped in the post-Reformation period. 
In that period, building on some medieval precedents, Protestant scholastics such as Calov 
asserted the Trinity as a postulate of faith but did not think the matter through conceptually. 
This fateful omission gave rise to the strength of anti-trinitarian criticisms in Socinianism and 
Enlightenment theology. As Pannenberg states, 
`the moment it appears that the one God can be better understood without rather than 
with the doctrine of the Trinity, the latter seems to be a superfluous addition to the 
concept of the one God even though it is reverently treated as a mystery of revelation. 
Even worse it necessarily seems to be incompatible with the divine unity. Only in this 
setting can biblical exegesis and historical criticism be used to destroy trinitarian 
teaching. ' 
What is needed therefore is `a full and self-consistent presentation of the unity of the God 
who reveals himself in Christ' (1.291-292), a presentation less likely if the Trinity is either 
derived from the unity or is an appendix to an otherwise sufficient account of the one God. 
It is perhaps unreasonable to expect absolute historical accuracy in a theology that is 
primarily systematic or dogmatic - particularly so, perhaps, if the account ranges over nearly 
two millennia of theology. Yet given the importance of this discussion in Pannenberg's 
approach in going beyond traditional treatments for being not trinitarian enough, if there are 
significant historical misjudgements, possible sources of wisdom within the tradition can be 
unnecessarily overlooked. 
The two key instances Pannenberg gives of insufficient accounts of the trinitarian God 
(and the ones to which he devotes most time), Barth and Aquinas, do not fit his description. 
Barth does not, contra Pannenberg, base his Trinity on a pre-trinitarian concept of the 
revealing subject taken over from Hegel. This argument Pannenberg maintains from the time 
of "Die Subjektivitaet Gottes und die Trinitaetslehre: Ein Beitrag zur Beziehung zwischen 
Karl Barth und der Philosophie Hegels"12 (which is probably taken from Trutz Rendtorff s 
12 GST2, pp. 96-111. 
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equally off-beam argument in "Radikale Autonomie Gottes: Zum Verstaendnis der Theologie 
Karl Barths und ihrer Folgen"13), and remains operative in ST. As I have shown elsewhere14 
the common reading of Barth's treatment of the Trinity as either modalising or reliant on 
philosophical idealism will not do, for he not only shows a constant concern to state the 
doctrine of the Trinity according to scripture, repeating the very doctrine, not of Hegel, but 
of Augustine and Calvin, " but also explicitly explains why his doctrine is based on the 
content of revelation and not, as his less perceptive critics claimed, on the structure of the 
speaking or revealing individual subject. 16 Pannenberg, therefore, is just wrong to say: 
The structure of Barth's argument is in fact ... the self-relation of God as it is grounded in 
his self-consciousness. In this regard the more precise definition of Hegel was 
normative for Barth... Barth in fact bases his own doctrine on the supreme vestige, the 
image of the Trinity in the human soul, and not, as he demanded, on the content of the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ (1.304). 
And Pannenberg is relying on an account of Aquinas' theology that recent scholarship 
has shown to be highly questionable. Pannenberg describes it thus: `We... have a chain of 
logical deductions from the concept of the first cause of the world to statements about the 
trinitarian persons' (1.288). But this will not do. It might be enough to raise objections on 
the basis of Nicholas Lash's convincing argument that Aquinas' talk of God as "first cause" 
Aquinas is 'a matter of controlled metaphorical usage and not, as it were, a straightforward 
extension of the language of causality as we employ it to speak of things and processes in the 
world, '" or on Rowan Williams' demonstration that the doctrine of the Trinity was 
13 Pannenberg citations in the above article show his dependence on this piece to be found in Rendtorff's 
Theorie des Christentums: historisch-theologische Studie zu seiner neuzeitlichen Verfassung (Guetersloh: 
G. Mohn, 1972), pp. 161-181. 
la See my "In Defence of Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Trinity" IJST S/1 (1993), pp. 33-46, which though 
historical in nature and taking up criticisms offered by Rowan Williams, was also - and indeed (in perhaps 
too bashful a way) primarily - intended to defend Barth from the readings of e. g., Gunton, Moltmann, Alan 
Torrance and Pannenberg. 
is See especially my remarks on Barth's 1927 Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf. 
16 See the comment in small print in Church Dogmatics 1/1, pp. 296-297 (Hereafter "CD"). 
17 See his Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God (London: 
SCM, 1988), pp. 228. It is unfortunate that Pannenberg chooses to make many of his points in contrast to 
Aquinas, since he adopts a contestable reading of him: 'The argumentation of his theological Summa 
develops as a systematic reconstruction of the statements of Christian doctrine on the basis of the thought 
of God as the first cause of humanity and the created world' (1.22). 
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materially normative throughout Aquinas' theology and not a mere appendix to de Deo uno. 18 
Rather, an observation of Gilles Emery will suffice. Emery has shown there is a 
`redoublement of language' in Thomas' doctrine of God in the Prima Pars. 19 The divine being 
is viewed from two perspectives, first what is commune with reference to the divine essence, 
then what is proprium with reference to the divine persons. The one is not derived from the 
other, but both are preserved since the persons are the eternal relations of God that 
determine his whole being and action. `A relation is in God not as an accidental entity in a 
subject, but is the divine nature itself. '20 Aquinas, then, would seem to be an example of the 
very approach Pannenberg exonerates in Eastern thinkers. 
3. Instead of the traditional use of relations of origin, the basic means of distinguishing the 
trinitarian persons must be self-distinction, which better expresses the diversity and 
reciprocity of the intra-trinitarian relations. 
Pannenberg's basing trinitarian dogma on the historical revelation in Jesus Christ affects not 
just his method and the structure of his presentation. It also means a change in content and 
terminology. `If, ' he says, 
`... the doctrine of the Trinity is an exposition of the relation of Jesus to the 
Father and the Spirit, this has some incisive implications for the terminology 
which the classical presentation of the doctrine worked our to describe the 
relations among Father, Son and Spirit' (1.305). 
Yet, for all the revision that this entails for traditional trinitarian terminology, 
Pannenberg is here aligning himself with what he considers the original approach of 
Christian reflection. 
'$ R. Williams "What does Love Know? St. Thomas on the Trinity" New Blackfriars 82, pp. 260-272. 
19 "Essentialisme ou personnalisme dans la traite de Dieu chez saint Thomas d'Aquin? " Revue Thomiste 98 
(1998), pp-5-38, esp. p. 37. See also J-P. Torrell St. Thomas Aquinas vol. 2 Spiritual Master (Washington, 
DC: CUA Press, 2003), pp. 157-161, and N. Healy Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) pp. 68-74. 
20 Summa Theologica 1.29. a4. 
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'The self-differentiation of the Son from the Father on the one side and the Spirit on 
the other forms a basis for the thesis that there is a threefold distinction in the deity. 
The reason why Athanasius and the Cappadocians did not follow this line of thinking 
is as follows. No one in the Arian controversy denied the distinction of three 
hypostases. The issue was how to define their unity with the deity of the Father' 
(1.272). 
What Pannenberg is getting at here is that it is wrongheaded for relations of origin (the 
"processions") such as generation and spiration to function as the sole and basic way to 
differentiate the persons, as they came to consequent to the 4th century trinitarian debates. It 
is not that Pannenberg thinks they have no place, but that their place is not determinative for 
distinguishing the divine persons. And it is their determinative role in many dogmatic 
treatments that is the problematic aspect, which the use of the term "self-distinction" is 
meant to rectify. 
The focus within much of the tradition on relations of origin has, in Pannenberg's view, 
overlooked the diversity of relationships between the triune persons that we encounter in 
revelation. So, for instance, the analogies of mind and love noted above tend to view the 
relational traffic one way, i. e., from the first person to the other two. Pannenberg, however, 
notes any number of instances of intra-trinitarian reciprocity not taken account of on this 
model. For instance, 
`In the handing over of lordship from the Father to the Son, and its handing back from 
the Son to the Father, we see a mutuality in their relationship that we do not see in the 
begetting: 
Hence Pannenberg uses the term self-distinction to denote what is both a more rich and 
reciprocal understanding of the inner-triune relations. As he continues, 
`The self-distinction of the Father from the Son is not just that he begets the Son but 
that he hands over all things to him, so that his kingdom and his own deity are now 
dependent upon the Son' (1.313). 
It would be wrong, therefore, to mistake what Pannenberg means by self-distinction for how 
the term is used in other modem doctrines of the Trinity, especially those influenced by 
German philosophical idealism. As Pannenberg says, the term has been used 
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'almost always in the sense of the bringing forth of a second and third divine person 
by the Father. Starting with the self-distinction from the Father, however, we can use 
the term in a different sense, namely, that the one who distinguishes himself from 
another defines himself as also dependent on that other' (1.313). 
In Pannenberg's trinity, then, we have to deal neither with three instances of an 
undifferentiated nature nor with three moments of the development of a single 
consciousness, but with three entities that are genuinely other. 
Hence, Pannenberg claims that what is meant by self-distinction is not `exactly the same 
thing for each of the three persons' (1.321). So, for instance, on the self-distinction of the Son 
Pannenberg writes, Jesus 
'is the Son of God as in his own person he at the same time honours on behalf of all 
others the claim of the first commandment by giving God the lordship that he demands 
in his proclamation' (1.310). 
This, he thinks, does better justice to the biblical texts expressing Jesus' subordination to the 
Father that does the notion of an undifferentiated divine nature, as in, e. g., Christ's ignorance 
of the time of the end and his subjection of His own will to His Father's in Gethsemane 21 
The Holy Spirit distinguishes Himself by His glorification of the Son on the one hand, 
and by His glorification of the Father on the other. And it is precisely by thus pointing away 
from Himself but to the other person that He shows Himself to be distinct (1.316). In 
addition, since He is the fellowship of the Son and the Father He can be seen, as in Augustine, 
as `the love that unites the Father and the Son' (1.317). Given both by the Father to the Son 
in Christ's baptism, and by the Son to the Father at the cross, He is the indispensable medium 
of their fellowship, who also incorporates believers into this eternal fellowship. 
The most remarkable step Pannenberg takes, however, is to apply self-distinction to the 
person of the Father. As we noted before, Pannenberg has taken up John Zizioulas' insight 
into patristic theology, in particular Athanasius' arguments against the Arians, 
`that the Father would not be the Father without the Son... [T]he relativity of 
fatherhood that finds expression in the designation "Father" might well involve a 
Zi Pannenberg considers this a far more effective retort to Socinian criticisms of the doctrine than the older 
dogmatics achieved, which 'by its evasive answer.. . was missing the point that Jesus shows himself to be 
the Son of God precisely in his self-distinction from God' (1.310). See also "DEET, " pp. 1-2. 
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dependence of the Father on the Son and thus be the basis of true reciprocity in the 
trinitarian relations' (1.312). 
Pannenberg then differs from the traditional understanding of the Father's monarchy, namely 
`that the Father alone is without origin (anarchos) among the three persons of the 
trinity, that he is the origin and fount of deity for the Son and Spirit.. . He alone, then, 
is in everyrespect God of himself (1.311). 
Monarchy, on his interpretation, is the result, rather than the presupposition, of the being 
and activity of the Son and Spirit. For, 
`through the work of the Son the kingdom or monarchy of the Father is established in 
creation , and through the work of the Spirit, who glorifies the Son as the 
plenipotentiary of the Father, and in so doing glorifies the Father himself, the kingdom 
or monarchy of the Father in creation is consummated' (1.324). 
The Father, then, does not have his monarchy without the Son and Spirit, but only through 
them, and there is genuine mutuality. 
Pannenberg sees this approach as fruitful in rectifying difficulties within the tradition, as 
demonstrated here by two examples. The first has to do with the terminology used in the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Classical theology differentiates "generation" and "spiration", as 
eternal processions in God, from "sending" the Son and "giving" the Spirit, as temporal 
missions that refer to the relationship of the eternal God to the world in the economy of 
salvation. Pannenberg, however, states, `The biblical statements about the begetting of Jesus 
relate no less to his historical person than do those about his sending' (1.307), and there is a 
similar application to pneumatological terminology. Hence Pannenberg avoids the perceived 
impasse in the separation of the temporal missions from the eternal processions. 
The second relates to the question of the legitimacy of the filioque. Pannenberg like 
many contemporary thinkers in trinitarian theology takes issue with the catholicity of the 
West's inclusion within the Nicene creed, yet his specific critique arises from his 
understanding of the divine relations of self-distinction. Not only does this clause add to John 
15: 26 something that was not there originally, but more importantly the Son also receives the 
Spirit, as shown in Jesus' baptism, and so what is a more multifaceted relationship in 
revelation suffers in a reductionist way in the dogmatic formulation. So Pannenberg 
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recommends a correction at once both less antagonistic and more radical than standard 
Eastern critiques. It is not that the filioque is heretical, but inappropriate, for 
'the mistaken formulation of Augustine points in fact to a defect which plagues the 
trinitarian language of both East and West, namely, that of seeing the relations among 
Father, Son and Spirit exclusively as relations of origin. With this view one cannot do 
justice to the reciprocity in the relations' (1.319). 
Thus Pannenberg formulates the distinction of the three. With the next thesis we see his 
treatment of their unity. 
4. The trinitarian God-in-Himself is not made up of three persons who have divinity-in- 
themselves, but the persons depend upon each other reciprocally both for their personal 
identity and for their deity. 
The flip side of the thesis of self-distinction is that of their mutual dependence. In particular 
it takes up some of the points we have just noted, namely that with Pannenberg's more 
extensive account of the intratrinitarian relations, there is a mutuality in their fellowship that 
occasions greater elucidation than traditional accounts offer. What seems to be the target of 
Pannenberg's thesis of the mutuality of the persons of the Trinity is Augustine's argument in 
De Trinitate books 5 to 7. There Augustine attacked the idea that the mutuality of the 
persons has the relation of each to the one Godhead and its attributes as its content 
`because it would force us to the conclusion that the Father does not have wisdom of 
himself, and is not, therefore, wise of himself, but only through the Son.. . Instead 
he 
insisted that each of the persons has alone and directly a share in the one deity and its 
attributes rather than indirectly by way of the personal relations' (1.323-324). 
According to Augustine's formulation, then, the persons, at least those of the Son and Spirit, 
are dependent as regards their personhood, but not as regards their deity. 
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Yet in a point taken up from the work of Robert Jenson, 21 Pannenberg thinks this is a 
retrograde step from the 4th century debates, which undermines the very point of the inner- 
triune self-distinction he has outlined. `The self-distinction of each of the persons from the 
others, ' he says, `relates also to the deity and/or its attributes. This is indeed the theme and 
point of the self-distinction of one person from one or both of the others' (1.321). Instead, 
Pannenberg develops the line of argument present in Athanasius' Contra Arianos noted 
before, which he thinks the tradition subsequent to Augustine has obscured. `Athanasius, ' he 
says, 
'argued forcibly against the Arians that the Father would not be the Father without 
the Son. Does this not mean that in some way the deity of the Father has to be 
dependent on the relation to the Son, although not in the same way as that of the Son 
is on the relation to the Father? The Father is not begotten of the Son or sent by him. 
These relations are irreversible. But in another way the relativity of fatherhood that 
finds expression in the term "Father" might well involve a dependence of the Father 
on the Son and thus be the basis of true reciprocity in the trinitarian relations' (1.312). 
Developing such insights Pannenberg how the three persons both depend upon each other 
mutually and do so for their unity. 
As for the persons' mutual dependence, this, is not quite so surprising when stated as 
either the dependence of the Son and Spirit on the Father or that of the Spirit on the Son, 
used as we are to talking of their sendings. Yet key for Pannenberg is the point that the 
dependence is mutual. So the Son is referred to the work of the Spirit. As is seen in Christ's 
conception, baptism and resurrection, the Son relies on the work of the Spirit for the 
completion of His commission. He is indeed the Giver of the Spirit, but is so only as the 
Recipient. 
More strikingly the Father Himself is made dependent on the work of the other two 
persons, this again being another of Pannenberg's corrections of the tradition's tendency to 
make the dependence one way, with the Father coming first in order as the origin and fount 
22 `An important insight of R. W. Jenson is that here Augustine was not simply rejecting an inappropriate 
formulation of Nicene doctrine but missing one of its points, namely, that the relations between the persons 
are constitutive not merely for their distinctions but also for their deity' [The Triune Identity, p. 119: 
`Augustine's description of Nicene teaching is accurate. But what he regards as an unfortunate 
46 
of deity. So, since the Son is not merely the representative of the rule of God, but is the 
holder of lordship, Pannenberg writes, 
'the Father makes his kingship dependent on whether the Son glorifies him and fulfils 
his lordship by fulfill` ing his mission. The self-distinction of the Father from the Son is 
not just that he begets the Son but that he hands over all things to him, so that his 
kingdom and his own deity are now dependent on the Son' (1.313). 
And the Father's dependence on the Spirit is seen most clearly in Christ's resurrection. 
Following insights from Moltmann's The Crucified God, 13Pannenberg asserts that `the cross 
throws doubt not merely on the divine power but also on the deity of the Father as Jesus 
proclaimed him' (1.314). Yet the Son's glorification and vindication in the resurrection 
reaffirm the Son's lordship and deity and therefore the Father's as well. According to 
Pannenberg, as the creative origin of all life the decisive significance for Jesus' resurrection 
attaches to the Spirit, and to that extent we may say that here the Father and the Son depend 
on his working (1.315). 
The other key point regards the fact that the persons depend upon each other for their 
deity. Here we refer to what Roger Olson has referred to as "Pannenberg's principle, " 
namely: `God's being is his rule'. 24 This aspect of Pannenberg's theology will recur at several 
key points of our treatment of his trinitarian theology, and we shall see that it is one of the 
most complex as well as problematic aspects of his trinitarian theology. 
In sum, Pannenberg means by this that God can only be God if He is lord, and that His 
lordship is not so external to His deity that He could be God without it. Within the triune 
life God already has this lordship and therefore His deity, but with the event of creation His 
deity is only realised with His complete governance over that area too. As he puts it in ST 
chapter 5: 
'The self-distinction of the Father from the Son is not just that he begets the Son but 
that he hands over all things to him, so that his kingdom and his own deity are now 
consequence of the Nicene doctrine was in fact the doctrine's original purpose. The original point of 
trinitarian dialectics is to make the relations constitutive in God. ' 
Z3 (London: SCM, 1974), pp. 206ff. Pannenberg nevertheless denies that it is proper to speak point-blank of 
the death of God on the cross (1.314). 
24 See Theology and the Kingdom of God, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), pp. 55-56 (Hereafter "TKG"). 
Olson coins the nomenclature in "Wolfhart Pannenberg's Doctrine of the Trinity" in SJT43 (1990), 
pp. 196ff. 
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dependent upon the Son. The rule or kingdom of the Father is not so external to his 
deity that he might be God without his kingdom. The world as the object of his 
lordship might not be necessary to his deity, since its existence owes its origin to his 
creative freedom, but the existence of a world is not compatible with his deity apart 
from his lordship over it. Hence lordship goes hand in hand with the deity of God' 
(1.313). 
And it is on this basis that Pannenberg says that God's deity is in question or at stake in the 
events of Christ's incarnation. 
The point, it should be noted, is not just that each person requires the others to be 
Himself. That obtains only in God's immanent life before and without the creation of the 
world. Importantly, the point is also that each person requires the others' actions within the 
economy of salvation to be Himself. The other persons depend in turn upon the Father's 
sending, the Son's incarnation and temporal obedience, and the Spirit's raising Christ - 
otherwise they would be God. And such is the further point included within Pannenbergs 
talk of the persons' mutual dependence we noted above. It is one thing to say, for example, 
that the Father would not be the Father without the Son, as do Athanasius and Zizioulas. It is 
another to say, as Pannenberg does, `The cross throws doubt.. . on the deity of the Father' 
(1.314). The place for critical comment on this point will be after we have analysed his 
understanding of the relation of economic and immanent trinities, which is the topic of the 
next thesis. 
Now that the twin theses of self-distinction and mutual dependence have been 
introduced, we can see how Pannenberg goes on to reformulate two more examples of 
traditional terminology, i. e., monotheism and perichoresls, just as we have seen him do with 
monarchy and the ilioque. Here again we see him make a distinctive contribution to 
contemporary debate, since in both he differs from the positions deriving from one of the key 
works of recent theology, Moltmann's Trinity and the Kingdom. u Notwithstanding their 
common criticism of the tradition's frequent relapses into more unitarian rather than 
trinitarian conceptions, Pannenberg refuses to follow Moltmann's lead in rejecting the 
monotheistic description of the Christian God, and by seeking the divine unity in the persons' 
25 (London: SCM, 1981). 
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mutual perichoresis His positive assessment of the monotheism advocated both by the 
scriptural witness and by the tradition of philosophical theology leaves no alternative for him 
other than monotheism - not, of course, the pre-trinitarian "monotheism" that finds the 
unity in the Father with no necessary reference to Son and Spirit, but the "concrete 
monotheism" of the one trinitarian God in His one act (1.335-336). 
And this concrete unity he will not account for by the concept of perichoresis, as does 
Moltmann26 Although he grants that this concept does express the persons' reciprocity 
(1.319), he thinks it `presupposes another basis of the unity of the three persons. It can only 
manifest this unity. On its own, its starting point is always the trinity of persons' (1.334), and 
would thus still be guilty of the tritheism he detects in Basil's 38thletter, 27 which describes the 
divine unity as a unity of genus, the threeness already preceding the persons' common 
outward activity. 
5. As a doctrine of revelation, the doctrine of the Trinity states that the economic Trinity 
and the immanent Trinity are identical, but not in such a way that either the integrity of 
the three persons or the priority of the immanent Trinity is threatened. 
In the recent renaissance in trinitarian theology a particular stimulus is what has become 
known as "Rahner's Rule. " The rule is this: `The "economic" Trinity is the "immanent" 
Trinity, and the "immanent" Trinity is the "economic" Trinity. '28 Pannenberg too adopts this 
axiom. But lest there be a mistaken confusion of Pannenberg's use of the axiom with other 
theologies, we shall spend some time on why and how he follows Rahner in this. 
26 Ibid. pp. 174ff. 
I Although critical consensus (which we have no desire to criticise) deems this letter to be the work of 
Gregory of Nyssa, we shall nevertheless retain Pannenberg's attribution of it to Basil, since the theological 
point does not rest on questions of authorship. See Sarah Coakley's ` "Persons" in the social doctrine of 
the Trinity: current analytic discussion and "Cappadocian" theology', in Powers and Submissions. 
Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 
2 K. Rahner The Trinity (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 1970), p. 22. The determinative important of 
this thesis for contemporary trinitarian theology can be seen clearly in, e. g., C. M. LaCugna God for Us: 
The Trinity and the Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper, 1993), and Peters (1993). 
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In ST chapter 5 the key motivation for Pannenberg identifying economic and immanent 
trinities, and the context in which it is introduced, is the point adumbrated in the first thesis, 
namely that the foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity lies in revelation. For on Rahner's 
Rule he writes: 
This thesis means that the doctrine of the Trinity does not merely begin with the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ and then work back to a trinity in the eternal 
essence of God, but that it must constantly link the trinity in the eternal essence to 
his historical revelation, since revelation cannot be viewed as extraneous to his deity 
(1.328). 
And he sees it as a sharpening both of the place of the economic sendings in discussing 
trinitarian relations (1.307), and of Barth's demand to base the doctrine on revelation (1.327- 
328). 
Pannenberg's key argument, however, like Rahner's, comes from christology. 
`The starting point for Rahner's thesis is the assertion that Jesus Christ is in person the 
Son of God, so that the incarnation is not just ascribed to the Son, as distinct from the 
other persons of the Trinity, by external appropriation. The man Jesus is a real symbol 
of the divine Logos. His history is the existence of the Logos with us as our salvation, 
revealing the Logos' (1.328)29 
It is not then something accidental that the Son should have become flesh, but there must be 
some corresponding feature of the inner structure of the divine essence that would lead Him 
in particular to become incarnate. 
Yet, while adopting Rahner's Rule Pannenberg adopts two revisions, which follow 
naturally from the trinitarian doctrine he holds, and adds one important qualification. 
The 
first revision has to do with Rahner's own formulation, which he believes is still prey to some 
of the unitarian tendencies noted under the second thesis 
`Rahner's exposition does not work out his doctrine in terms of the self-distinction of 
Jesus from the Father but chooses as the key concept that of the self-communication of 
the Father by the Son. Closely related is Rahner's rejection of the idea of three 




Hence Pannenberg quite definitely speaks of 3 "persons" in the godhead, who are `living 
realizations of separate centres of action' (1.319). 
The second revision is that, for Pannenberg, the economy is decisive for the immanent 
life of the Father, not just the Son and Spirit. For Pannenberg, then, the identity of economic 
and immanent trinities is the window into the identity of all three persons, and it is only with 
the inclusion of the Father in the matrix of mutual dependence for the persons' deity -a step 
he does not detect in Rahner - that Pannenberg believes his rule can be given life (1.329- 
330). 
The qualification is that this identity of economic and immanent trinities is potentially 
open to abuse. Following the caution of Walter Kasper, 30 Pannenberg disavows any simple 
equation of the two which would mean `the absorption of the immanent Trinity into the 
economic Trinity', thus stealing from `the Trinity of salvation history all sense and 
significance'. Pannenberg refutes `the idea of a divine becoming in history, as though the 
trinitarian God were the result of history and achieved reality only with its eschatological 
consummation', for `the eschatological consummation is only the locus of the decision that 
the trinitarian God is always the true God from eternity to eternity' (1.331). 
This qualification is important to note, though how decisive its importance is a less 
obvious matter. The most thorough-going critique of the reciprocal identity of economic and 
immanent trinities in contemporary theology has been forcefully made by Paul Molnar in his 
recent and important book Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In 
dialogue with Karl Barth and contemporary theology. 31 There Molnar delineates a syndrome 
in much contemporary trinitarian theology that relies on an identification of economic and 
immanent trinities along the lines of Rahner's Rule, that is when mere lip-service is paid to 
the primacy of the immanent Trinity. When this occurs, he argues, strain is put on the 
29 On 1.307 as well Pannenberg notes that the basis for Rahner's formulating this thesis was `the insight 
that the immanent divine Logos is strictly the same as the economic Logos, i. e., the historical person of 
Jesus Christ' in the work known best in English as The Trinity. 
30 See his The God of Jesus Christ (tr. M. J. O'Connell) (New York: Crossroad, 1984). 
31 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002), 
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dogmatic matrix, one result being that God tends to be seen as dependent on, or 
indistinguishable from the course of history. 32 
Concerning the tendency to see God as dependent on, or indistinguishable from the 
course of history, Molnar states elsewhere: 
`While Pannenberg insists upon God's freedom and upon the fact that his eternity is not 
grounded in the historical process his method will not allow him to maintain the 
character of this insight ... [A] God who depends upon the course of history is in fact 
conditioned by the outcome of history; his freedom is compromised. '33 
It is difficult not to agree with Molnar. The particular problematic in Pannenberg is that the 
identity of economic and immanent trinities is coupled with the axiom that God's lordship is 
God's deity - or at least the particular interpretation he gives it. Here we resume the 
criticism held over from the previous thesis, for it seems that, whatever his intentions, 
making God's deity dependent on the establishment of the kingdom on earth does tie the 
hands of the trinitarian God in se. For with such an understanding of "Pannenberg's 
principle" in place, the identity of economic and immanent trinities becomes no longer the 
mere correspondence of trinitarian doctrine to the contents of revelation, which is the stated 
intention, but is in danger of becoming a requirement of God's being. 
One therefore has to take issue with the equation of immanent and economic trinities as 
Pannenberg presents it in ST chapter 5, for not least does the very subheading to the section 
"The World as the History of God" highlight the unease. Pannenberg is on firmer ground 
when he states, `the immanent Trinity is to be found in the Trinity of salvation history. God 
is the same in his eternal essence as he reveals himself to be historically' (1.331). The ground 
is less firm when he expresses himself thus: `the progress of events decides concerning his 
deity as well as the deity of the Son' (1.329). 
32 Molnar notes three other points. The second, that Christology becomes prey to imprecisions, notably the 
idea that Christ's humanity as such is the revealer, and the fourth, that theology tends to begin with 
experiences of self-transcendence, with the result that it is experience, rather than the object of faith, that 
determines the truth of theology, Pannenberg is guilty of. On this see the third thesis of our final chapter. 
The third, that there is not the proper distinction between human spirit and the divine Spirit, is not a 
p3roblem, we believe, in SY. On this see our chapter 4. 
"Some Problems with Pannenberg's Solution to Barth's 'Faith Subjectivism"' SJT48 (1995), p. 331 
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Whether Pannenberg's qualification is enough to quieten the misgivings aroused by 
Rahner's Rule, at least in a sophisticated treatment like Molnar's, is far from certain. 
Nevertheless, it is seriously meant, since there are in his view genuine instances of theological 
trespass. Take, for instance, his critical remarks on Robert Jenson's Systematic Theology. 
`In Jenson's presentation, the difference between the "immanent" Trinity - the eternal 
communion of Father, Son, and Spirit - and the "economic" Trinity almost vanishes. It 
is certainly true that the trinitarian God in the history of salvation is the same God as in 
His eternal life. But there is also a necessary distinction that maintains the priority of 
the eternal communion of the triune God over that communion's explication in the 
history of salvation. Without that distinction, the reality of the one God tends to be 
dissolved into the process of the world. '34 
In our concluding remarks we shall take up these critical issues and offer a more 
profound explanation of Pannenberg's thinking here. In particular we must have to consider 
why despite his desire to maintain the priority of the immanent Trinity, he states that the 
eternal God depends on His temporal activity and that His economic action decides for His 
immanent being; why despite the undoubted importance of the qualification, it seems to be 
overrun by other elements of the argument, namely Rahner's Rule and Pannenberg's 
principle; and how the problems here with regard to the formulation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity are a result of failing to be trinitarian enough at a key point in his theological system. 
We have considered the doctrine of the Trinity Pannenberg is working with in his most 
trinitarian of theologies. It is a doctrine founded on God's historical revelation that treats the 
Father, Son and Spirit insofar as they disclose themselves in the earthly career of Jesus of 
Nazareth, the Father the loving Lord of the kingdom, the Son the one who distinguishes 
Himself in loving obedience from the Father, and the Spirit the bond of love and fellowship 
between the two. Since the doctrine is rooted in revelation, it cannot, then, be based on the 
rational self-explication unfolding of a pre-trinitarian monotheism, as Pannenberg thinks has 
too often been the case in Western theology when it views the Trinity after the likeness of 
the individual subject. For this reason Pannenberg's trinitarian prefers `self-distinction' - 
34 First Things 103 (May 2000), pp. 49-53. 
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rather than relations of origin - as the basic means of distinguishing the trinitarian persons, 
and `mutual dependence' to denote how the persons depend upon each other reciprocally 
both for their personal identity and for their deity, and are thus the one God. And since the 
triune God should be understood from revelation rather than from pre-trinitarian 
conceptualities, the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity must be considered identical, 
with the proviso that this identity should threaten neither the integrity of the three persons 
nor the priority of the God's in se to His being pro nobis. This is the doctrine of the Trinity 
operative in ST. But what this trinitarian theology is we explore in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Two 
PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF 
GOD'S ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES 
`Only on the basis of a differentiated concept of the unity of the divine essence can there 
finally be also a definition of the trinitarian persons' (1.336). 
In his "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate 1 Karl Rahner wrote `it is now 
generally taken for granted that the treatise De Deo Uno must be divided and placed before 
De Deo Trino. ' Yet, he claims, 
'then one really writes, or could merely write, a treatise De divinitate una, since the 
unicity of the divine being justifies this procedure, and makes it very philosophical 
and abstract in development - which is of course what happens - with very little 
concrete reference to the history of salvation. '2 
Whether or not Rahner's arguments have won the day, they definitely have many followers, 
so that four decades on such a procedure is not as `generally taken for granted' as he thought 
in his day. 
A gauntlet has been laid down for theologians, then, to discuss God's essence and 
attributes after discussion of the Trinity. Yet there are relatively few examples of such a 
treatment of the one God. Despite Rahner's clarion call (as well as Barth's extended 
discussion of the divine perfections after the material on the Trinity) the recent fashion for 
trinitarian theology has not provided many examples of what a detailed examination of the 
one God, his essence and attributes, would look like. ' Pannenberg is a theologian who has 
'Theological Investigations vol. 4 (London: DLT, 1966), pp. 77-102. 
2 Ibid., p. 83 Rahner sees this phenomenon as typical of the treatment of the one God preceding that 
of the Trinity, but not as inevitable. 
3 CD H /l, pp. 257-677. 
4 Other treatments of the divine essence and attributes from an avowedly trinitarian perspective include C. 
Gunton Being and Act: Towards a Doctrine of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM, 2002), and in a quite 
unique way R. Jenson Systematic Theology vol. 1, (Oxford: OUP, 1997) pp. 207-236, esp. p. 223. 
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consciously sought to respond to Rahner's challenge: ' STchapter 6, "The Unity and Attributes 
of the Divine Essence" is devoted to explicating the trinitarian essence and attributes in 
accordance with the doctrine of the Trinity he has outlined. How his understanding of the 
Trinity affects his treatment of the divine essence and attributes we now examine with five 
points. 
1. God's trinity has been revealed but His unity now remains hidden. 
Following the words of John's prologue, "No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in 
the bosom of the Father, he has made him known, " Pannenberg states that `to know the 
incomprehensible God, therefore, we must hold fast to the Son' (1.339). The Trinity, 
therefore, is not only part of the content of God's revelation; it is also its formal possibility. 
Also, it is no part of the hiddenness of God, since in God's historical revelation in Jesus Christ 
we see the three persons of Father, Son and Spirit. 
But although, according to Pannenberg, the triune distinctions are not hidden, the unity 
of the essence is. This arises from our temporal situation, living as we do between God's 
revelation of his triune action in the events of the first 30 years of the common era and the 
final revelation of Himself in the eschaton. Pannenberg here wants to maintain a certain 
tension in our knowledge of God, but it is not what he terms "dialectical" or "dualistic". 
Whatever the tensions between God's revealedness and hiddenness in this age, they will all 
be resolved in the eschaton, when, with the taking up of time into eternity, the process of 
God's manifestation will be complete. Then the contradictions of historical experience will 
all be over and there will finally be revealed the unity of God, that is `the unity of the God 
who works in world history and the God whose love is revealed in Jesus Christ' (1.340). 
What Pannenberg is arguing for can only be appreciated fully when we are aware of 
what he is arguing against. Pannenberg's procedure is a self-conscious correction of, and 
significant departure from, some traditional approaches. In particular, it differs from the 
supposition he detects in traditional theology 'that the existence and essence of God are 
s See 1.280ff., esp. footnote 72. 
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accessible to rational knowledge through the works of creation, but that we may know the 
trinitarian distinctions only by special revelation' (1.341). Pannenberg traces this procedure 
in both sides of the Reformation divide, following as they do what he takes to be the classical 
form for the structure of the doctrine of God since Aquinas, namely `the derivation of the 
trinity of persons from the concept of the unity of substance' (1.288). He cites the typical 
examples of Hollaz on the Protestant side and Matthias Joseph Scheeben on the Catholic, who 
maintains: 
`the natural knowledge of God extends to all the characteristics of God... [including] all 
the attributes which appear in supernatural revelation and which belong to him in and 
in virtue of the essentiality and nature that is common to all three persons.. . In contrast, 
the Trinity is absolutely as well as relatively beyond the reach of natural knowledge' 
(1.341). 
Such an approach is problematic, Pannenberg argues, not just because it assumes a 
straightforward natural knowledge of the one God, but also because it neglects the problems 
of a conceptually satisfactory definition of God's triunity to which the conceptual rigours of 
theologians of the 4thcentury were devoted. The heated debates that led to the belief in a 
trinity of divine hypostases and their consubstantiality are clear evidence that the doctrine of 
the Trinity is not a peculiarly simple truth of revelation. What Pannenberg is wary of is that 
in much of the tradition all the conceptual work of the theologian seems to be focussed on 
the unity of the divine essence, not on God's triunity, so that scarcely any room is left for the 
divine threeness in the doctrine of God 
Even if one were sympathetic to Pannenberg's general concern, one might wish to take 
issue with him here. This is so, even if one overlooks two questionable points: firstly, the 
impression given that, when the eschaton comes, God will have ceased needing to reveal 
Himself to us for us to know Him; and second, the failure to account for the fact that 
scripture does present a certain sort of pre-trinitarian monotheism, since the Old Testament 
presents the one and only God and it is in the New Testament that this is revealed in its 
trinitarian fullness, the two of course not being in contradiction. 
A more telling objection is that Pannenberg is working with a very reduced conception 
of the divine unity, and thereby confuses the issue. In postponing the revelation of God's 
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unity to the eschaton, Pannenberg requires a particular understanding of God's unity, i. e., the 
unity of the God of Jesus and the God of history. In the God of Jesus we can be sure, 
Pannenberg believes, that God is love, but in the God of history there are tensions and 
contradictions which make God's loving nature appear less than clear. But even if 
Pannenberg were justified in this particular point, his point that God's unity remains hidden 
would need to be expressed with far more qualification than is the case. There are also two 
major meanings of God's unity, which would not fit his schema, those of God's uniqueness, 
that He is the one God, and His simplicity, that He is always consistent with Himself in the 
fullness of His attributes. From Israel's days it was revealed to them that Yahweh is the only 
God, and the revelation of the trinitarian fullness in the New Testament shows the three 
persons to be one in character, work and purpose. And as far as those theologies, to which 
Pannenberg takes exception, have been explicating these other senses of God's unity, the 
criticisms levelled against them lose much of their sharpness. 
2. God's essence, which comes to manifestation in the whole economy of God's trinitarian 
revelation, is to be conceived primarily as the infinite rather than as the first cause. 
Pannenberg addresses the question: `how are we to think of the unity of the divine essence if 
room is to be let for the trinity of persons. ' But `a satisfactory answer' for Pannenberg, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, would have to eschew all pre-trinitarian conceptions of the 
divine unity, that is, 
'neither by viewing the unity of God as grounded in the Father as the origin and fount 
of deity nor by deriving the trinity from the concept of the unity of God as spirit or 
love' (1.342). 
The `satisfactory answer' is one of the main preoccupations of the entirety of STchapter 6. In 
particular it is the key issue underlying our second and third theses, concerning God's essence 
on the one hand and His personality and spirituality on the other. Here Pannenberg seeks to 
overcome traditional treatments of de Deo uno that suffer from the types of unitarian 
conceptualities we saw him outline in the previous chapter. 
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The `satisfactory answer' involves Pannenberg's definition of the divine essence as 
infinity. Yet to understand the argument properly, and how the choice of this term is more 
fitting for the triune God, we should first investigate the part of our thesis which reads, `God's 
essence, which comes to manifestation in the whole economy of God's trinitarian revelation. ' 
Here we touch on points that will be dealt with elsewhere in more detail - in particular 
the final thesis of chapter 8- on how the Trinity for Pannenberg inevitably means that God's 
economic activity has to be understood as a process that embraces all of salvation history. For 
now we shall deal only with how this affects Pannenberg's argument for basing talk of God's 
essence and attributes on the one divine action. 
`We can accept as revelation of the essence, ' Pannenberg writes, `only the sum total of 
the manifestations of a single manifestation that is constitutive for this total' (1.358) .6 Two 
points are being made that are directly relevant to Pannenberg's trinitarian construal. First, 
God's revelation is a process, for it is the result of the sum total of the divine manifestations. 
Attention must be paid then to the whole sweep of creation, reconciliation and 
consummation, i. e., the whole work of Father, Son and Spirit. For, as Pannenberg goes on to 
conclude this chapter: 
`Only with the consummation of the world in the kingdom of God does God's love 
reach its goal and the doctrine of God its conclusion. Only then do we fully know 
God as the true Infinite who is not merely opposed by the world of the finite, and 
thus himself finite' (1.447). 
Second, there is no separation between God and His actions in the economy, because God is 
manifested. As Pannenberg explained in TKG, ' appearance or manifestation points to a 
transcendent being, yet is also more than seeming to be there - it means real (though not 
exhaustive) presence. 
As Pannenberg goes on to explain, these are both trinitarian possibilities. God has from 
all eternity His existence as the Father in relation to the Son. So, 
`[t]he Father.. . has his existence in the Son, and the Son reveals the one God, the 
essence of God, by revealing the Father. But the Father does not simply stand in place 
of the essence of God that is manifest through the Son and that has its existence in 
6 Emphasis retained 
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him. The Son also reveals the existence of the Father, and by the sending of the Son 
the Father reveals his essence, his eternal Love' (1.358). 
Whether it be God's essence or existence, then, we come to know it ultimately in trinitarian 
terms. For, firstly, in the economic action of the Father and the Son, as well as the Spirit who 
unites them, the revelation that is proleptically present in the incarnate Son, is the complete 
and true self-explication of the eternal God. And second we do really come to know God, for 
God's trinitarian self-revelation is His genuine manifestation. 
Now this trinitarian rationale, though explicit only towards the end of the second 
section, ' is crucial for Pannenberg's reformulation of the doctrine of the one God. For he 
writes, `the traditional doctrine of God's essence and attributes leads into such dead ends' for 
the very reason that `a distinction is made.. . between God's essence and his causal relation to 
the world, since he brings forth the world freely and not by any necessity of his nature' 
(1.364). This affects much of Pannenberg's discussion of the divine essence. So, for instance, 
on the one hand he rejects the application of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories to the 
doctrine of God and embraces the modern emphasis on the importance of relation, since this 
teaches a definition of essence that takes better account of the relations between the 
trinitarian persons and between God and the world (1.365-366). And on the other he 
criticises both the Palamist doctrine of divine energies which implies an autonomy of the 
divine qualities from the divine essence, and Latin Scholasticism which implied only an 
apparent multiplicity of the divine attributes (1.361-362). 
Yet, most importantly, on this basis Pannenberg outlines two fundamental approaches 
that theologians of previous generations have adopted in defining the divine essence, the one 
alleviating the quandries Pannenberg describes, the other producing and compounding them. 
The approach that meets with his disfavour is that of considering God as the first cause, and 
he illustrates this by considering what Thomas Aquinas has to say on the matter. Like 
Pannenberg, Aquinas stresses the unknowability of the divine essence and for this 
Pannenberg repeatedly praises his 13th century predecessor, but for Aquinas and Latin 




correct stress on the incomprehensibility of the divine essence was, according to Pannenberg, 
somewhat undone by his equation of God with the concept of first cause. ' The fact that God 
is the first cause along with the apophatic procedure adopted by Aquinas in his discussion of 
the divine essence made possible `positive statements about [God] as the cause of creaturely 
perfections' (1.343). One of the legacies of this procedure was the use continued well into the 
19th century of Denys the Areopagite's threefold method of knowing God, the via negations, 
the via eminentiae and the via causalitatis The last two are closely related, in Pannenberg's 
view, `for inferring the cause from the effects rests on the assumption that the perfections of 
the effects must be found to a higher degree in the cause, so that they may be predicated of it 
by a kind of ascent, whereas creaturely imperfections are denied it by negation' (1.344). God, 
on this reading, is not free to be himself but has to be described either positively or negatively 
in terms of a causal chain of being, the danger being that He is being portrayed after our 
image rather than His own. 
In addition, identifying God as the first cause brings with it two other difficulties for a 
trinitarian construal of the one God. The one is the inevitable impasse in describing God's 
essence and attributes. Although the idea of God as the first cause was not guilty of ignoring 
the distinction between God's essence and His causal relation to the world, nevertheless, 
Pannenberg says, `the qualities that are ascribed to him rest on his relations to the world 
which correspond to the relations of creatures to him' (1.364), even those like infinity and 
eternity which are negatively related to finitude. Of all the qualities which we ascribe to God 
on the basis of a relation to something else, therefore, it may be said that they cannot be 
God's in His essence if we think of the divine essence in its own unrelated and transcendent 
self-identity apart from all relation to the world. It becomes difficult, therefore, to say that 
what God is for us in his trinitarian action, He is in Himself, and our talk of God entertains 
the danger of anthropomorphic projections. 
The approach Pannenberg prefers is to consider God as the infinite. He claims that this 
better ensures the incomprehensibility of God in his essence and attributes, and not just that 
of the divine trinity. Here Pannenberg takes his lead from Gregory of Nyssa. 
9 That Pannenberg characterizes Thomas's procedure in STh thus, and that he is wrong to do so, we have 
noted already in the previous chapter. See especially the comparison with Lash. 
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'If God is infinite, [Gregory] said, it follows that we cannot ultimately define his 
essence, for it is indescribable. The concept of infinity is also and not least of all the 
basis of the incomprehensibility of the unity of God in relation to the doctrine of the 
Trinity' (1.342). 
This matter was worked out, in Pannenberg's view, in the trinitarian debates of the 4th 
century, in particular the Cappadocian's dispute with Eunomius. Eunomius held the opinion 
that the essence of God was His unoriginateness, that He is a being without origin, a 
conception that is uncomfortably close, as far as Pannenberg is concerned, to the idea of first 
cause. Gregory however maintained the incomprehensibility of the divine essence, the basis 
for this being not its causal relation to creaturely phenomena, but its being `simply one 
example of the incomprehensibility which follows from the divine infinity' (1.342-343). 
By maintaining the primacy of the divine infinity not just as an attribute but as God's 
very essence the incomprehensibility is maintained, since there is no positive identifying 
concept underlying all one might say about God. By being the first cause God is, in 
Pannenberg's view, inevitably regarded as a powerful, transcendent being outside the world. 
But if the root concept is infinity, one can avoid this impression. God is that undefined 
"something", which is not only above and beyond the world immune from its perishability, 
but also pervades it as an active presence, just as much "down here" as "up there". God's 
trinitarian nature for Pannenberg shows the untenability for the Christian theologian of a 
false transcendence and so better fits the designation of infinity, since already in this 
`undefined mystery which fills all things and transcends all things and embraces all things, 
the Father is close to those things through his Son and in the power of his Spirit' (1.359). 
3. God's spirituality is to be understood as a field rather than as a mind, and so His 
personality is to be located not in a single subjectivity or unitary essence, but in the three 
divine persons. God's action, whence we ascertain His attributes, is therefore irreducibly 
triune. 
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This point follows naturally from points mentioned above, in particular Pannenberg's 
concern to avoid anthropomorphism and the pre-trinitarian monotheism that tends to picture 
God after the likeness of a unitary thinking subject. He feels that this has happened in much 
of the tradition's discussion of common designators of God, namely that He is `person' and 
`spirit. ' Interpretation of john 4.24 "God is spirit" is a key instance often equated with the 
idea of mental intelligence. Developing points we noted in the second thesis of the previous 
chapter, Pannenberg criticises much theological God-talk for conceiving Him as the single 
hypostatised mind or subject, and the concomitant understandings of God's personality and 
therewith contests the validity of much talk of the one God as person and as the ultimate and 
infinite rational being. Such ideas, Pannenberg maintains, were 
9 never an authentic expression of the personal character of God according to the 
witness of the biblical writings... Because as Father he is related to his Son in all 
eternity, he is personal in eternity in the unity of Father, Son and Spirit. '"o 
God is trripersonal, not unipersonal, and this affects how Pannenberg understands his 
spirituality, personality and action. And it is by a revised understanding of God's spirit that 
we arrive at a proper estimate of His personality and action. 
The traditional understanding Pannenberg objects to so much first arose, he thinks, in 
the equation of pneuma with noun Pneuma was the biblical term for God's nature, coming 
from the Hebrew roach meaning not reason or consciousness, but the life force that proceeds 
from God. As Pannenberg reads the tradition, in the early years of the church Christian 
thinkers frequently took the understandable but wrong step of identifying the biblical 
pneuma with the Stoic view of the divine pneuma as a very fine substance that is invisible to 
us. From Origen onwards this conception was ditched given its implications of corporeality, 
divisibility, composition, extension and localisation, and in the De PrincipA ' it is argued that 
instead one properly speaks of God's spirituality as reason. It is, therefore, `a widespread 
notion, and almost taken for granted, the God, if he is real at all, is a self-consciously acting 
and in this sense "personal" being' (1.370). Yet Origen's argument had its "Achilles' heel": 
101ST, p. 35. 
11 1.1. 
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[Origen] had to take metaphorically all the biblical statements that ascribe bodily 
features to God but literally those that refer to him as a rational being, even though 
they may be ascribed to him only in the mode of undivided unity. But is this not to 
underrate the divine majesty that far transcends our own rational nature? ' (1.372). 
And this weakness was exploited in the modem period, since Pannenberg deems this 
understanding to be at the root of the modem atheist critiques of, among others, Spinoza, 
Fichte and Feuerbach. Violating the very divine infinity it was seeking to uphold, the 
traditional approach dating from Origen has likened God too much to the individual mind or 
subject and orthodoxy's critics have been right to highlight theological deficiencies within 
the tradition on this point. 
So, instead of including God among the set of intellectual beings, Pannenberg's 
theological proposal is to talk of the Spirit, both God's essence and the third person of the 
Trinity, as a field. " There is more to say on the application of "field" specifically to the third 
divine person in the next chapter, but here we shall examine its role in discussion of the 
divine essence and attributes. 
Note must first be taken of Pannenberg's goal in revising talk of God as spirit. Its specific 
context is Pannenberg's attempt to give an account of how one can ascribe attributes to God 
on the basis of His action in a way that is genuinely trinitarian and avoids the implication 
(detected not just in the Scholastic and older Protestant doctrine but also in the important 
modern treatment of Cremer13) of a single divine subject, with its modalising drift and 
anthropomorphic notion of a God who sets and realises goals. This is done by implementing 
here in the locus de Deo uno the conclusions of his de Deo trino, since he sums up the 
discussion of divine spirituality thus: its purpose was 
`to understand the trinitarian persons, without derivation from a divine essence that 
differs from them, as centers of action of the one movement which embraces and 
permeates all of them' (1.385). 
12 On Pannenberg's use of the term "field" to understand the divine spirituality see M. Muehling- 
Schlapkohl Gott als Liebe: Studien zum Verstaendnis der Liebe als Modell des trinitarischen Redens von 
Gott (Marburg: Elwert, 2000), esp. pp. 218-224. 
13 See 1.367ff., esp. 1.370. Hermann Cremer's position is to be found in Die christliche Lehre von den 
Eigenschaften Gottes (Guetersloh: Bertelsmann, 1897). 
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And it is for such a purpose that Pannenberg employs modern field theory to explicate 
the divine spirituality. It allows for a genuine and underived trinitarianism in talk of God 
that he thinks other theological models cannot achieve. For, 
`the autonomy of the field demands no ordering to a subject such as is the case when 
the Spirit is understood as noun The deity as field can find equal manifestation in all 
three persons' (1.383). 
The essence, then, need not be treated as a fourth divine hypostasis lying behind the three of 
salvation history, nor need it elide into the person of the Father as the sole source of deity. 
God is not a unitary intellectual self outside the world, but is the living God embracing and 
permeating the creation as befits the field of spirit. And the specifically Christian version of 
this fact that the one God is the living God comes to expression in the living fellowship of 
Father, Son and Spirit. `The deity as field can find equal manifestation in all three persons' 
(1.383). That is, this notion of divine spirituality, the divine life force, permeates all that the 
persons do and are, so that the three persons are nothing other than forms, eternal forms of 
this life force, without derivation from a pre-trinitarian notion of noun 
On this basis Pannenberg draws two consequences for a trinitarian account of the one 
God. The first is a reinterpretation of talk of divine intention, in a way that does not pattern 
God's action after that of the individual human self-consciousness. So, God's knowledge 
means `that nothing in all his creation escapes him' (1.379-380). And His will, or the goals of 
His action, does not as in human goals presuppose either a deficiency on the part of the agent, 
or a difference between the object of the will and its fulfilment. Rather, God in His eternal 
fullness already enjoys the fulfilment of His action, and what we mean by His will is the 
transcendent force that impresses itself upon us. 14 
The second, and more important consequence for the argument of ST chapter 6, is that 
there is a way to derive divine attributes from the content of divine revelation, i. e., the one 
economic action stretching from creation to consummation, that is the work of the three 
persons in their integrity. Pannenberg can now maintain both that `[t]he concept of action 
demands an acting subject, ' and that `[t]he eternal essence of God is not itself a subject 
alongside the three persons' (1.384). That is because Pannenberg has attempted to purge talk 
14 1.380ff and 1.385ff. 
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of the divine essence from its unitarian talk of a single pre-trinitarian subject in order to make 
room for a trinitarian notion of the essence which fits the trinitarian nature of God's 
revelatory action. For, he says, `The commonality of action of Father, Son and Spirit can be 
only a manifestation of the unity of life and essence by which they are always linked already' 
(1.385). 
By thus refusing to identify the divine essence with first causality and by revising talk of 
divine personality and spirituality, Pannenberg believes he furthers understanding of a 
genuinely Christian, i. e., trinitarian, treatment of the one God, both in negative and positive 
terms. Negatively, in Pannenberg's view his approach avoids more easily anthropomorphic 
ideas of God and their deleterious effects on the rest of theology. For instance, he thinks that 
totalitarian views of predestination and providence lead to a perverted concept of God's rule 
over world occurrence as a tyranny because they see God after the pattern of a finite subject 
(1.388). Positively, it allows for the differentiated concept of the divine unity that is 
appropriate to the triune differentiations God has revealed in His economic action, and a 
treatment of the attributes of the God in se who is really as He is pro nobis. As Pannenberg 
puts it, 
`By the common action of Father, Son and Spirit the future of God breaks into the 
present of creatures, into the world of creation, and on the basis of this divine action 
the attributes are predicated not merely of the trinitarian persons but also of the 
divine essence that is common to them all' (1.391). 
And how Pannenberg outlines the trinitarian attributes of this triune essence will be our 
topic of the following two theses. 
4. The attributes of God's infinity are to be understood, not as the negation of creaturely 
limits, but as their overcoming, for they find their concrete form in the trinitarian God's 
loving approach. 
Pannenberg divides the divine attributes into two groups. There are attributes of the divine 
infinity, namely holiness, eternity, omnipotence and omnipresence; and the attributes of the 
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divine love, i. e., God's goodness, righteousness, faithfulness, patience and wisdom. 
Pannenberg understands both sets in trinitarian terms, but with an important qualification. 
The qualification is the idea of infinity that is the ordering principle for the first set of 
attributes. To summarise at the risk of over-simplification Pannenberg's overall reasoning in 
his discussion of the attributes, " we may say this. Just as a general idea of God is the 
necessary presupposition for the understanding of the trinitarian God of Jesus Christ, for it is 
He alone who fulfils (though in a new way) this general idea; so the notion of infinity is the 
necessary presupposition to understand the trinitarian God of love who is Himself the perfect 
(and again new) fulfilment of the minimal requirements of true infinity. This is what 
Pannenberg means by saying that `we must talk about two types of attributes, those that are 
ascribed to God on the basis of his action, ' that is the attributes of love, `and those that define 
the subject of the statements, ' i. e., those of infinity. For, as Pannenberg continues: 
terms that explain the word "God" as such, e. g., terms like infinite, omnipresent, 
omniscient, eternal and omnipotent... are presupposed in order that we may 
understand the revelation of God in his action as the revelation of God. Of the God 
who is described thus we then say that he is gracious, merciful, patient and of great 
kindness (1.392). 
So, in Pannenberg's classification, attributes that are `ascribed to God on the basis of his 
action' are those of the divine love, and those that `define the subject of the statements' 
(1.392) are those of the divine infinity. 
God's infinity must be what Pannenberg considers a true one, one that is not limited by 
its negation but which transcends such a limitation. It is not, then, what Hegel would term 
"bad infinity" or a variety of the via negations that was often part of treatments of God as first 
cause. Hence it would be wrong to conceive God's holiness as separation, eternity as 
timelessness, or omnipresence and omnipotence in negative terms in relation to finitude. 
These aspects of God's true infinity find their proper form in the concrete revelation in 
the Christian God of the Trinity, as we shall see, taking them in reverse order. Firstly, 
Pannenberg says that God's omnipotence `means first that [God's] power knows no limits' 
(1.416). Yet it would be wrong, he thinks, to believe that this entails an `abstract idea of 
15 We are summarising 1.392-396. 
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unlimited power. ' Such views fit neither the biblical witness nor - and this is the point 
Pannenberg is most keen to stress here - the structure of the true Infinite. Along the lines of 
bad infinity they view God's power in antithesis to others who have power, since on this 
view that which rules is always tied to the antithesis to its object. 
What is required, therefore, is an omnipotence that is not threatened by the existence of 
creatures, but enables and wills it. This is provided by the trinitarian construal. Pannenberg 
writes, 
`The power of God over his creation as the transcendent Father finds completion only 
through the work of the Son and Spirit because only thus is it freed from the one- 
sided antithesis of the one who determines and that which is determined, and God's 
identity in his will for creation is led to its goal' (1.445). 
Importantly, this trinitarian omnipotence is not tied to the antithesis to its object. But what 
is perhaps of even greater importance for Pannenberg is that this trinitarian omnipotence 
allows room for the independent existence of the creature. This is the case not only in the 
original production of the created world, but most strikingly in its deliverance where we see 
the intractable commitment of divine omnipotence to creaturely independence. For God's 
delivering encounter with the apostate creature is not `with power and holiness % but 
`through the eternal Son, who in consequence of his self-distinction from the Father 
takes the place of the creature and becomes man so as to overcome the assertion of 
the creature's independence in the position of the creature itself, i. e., without 
violating its independence' (1.421). 
Second, God's omnipresence means neither the extension of the divine essence across the 
whole world nor corporeal limitation where God cannot be simultaneously present to things 
in different places. Rather, it is His presence that transcends all that He has made, 
permeating and comprehending all things, i. e., His presence `to all things at the place of their 
existence, ' His filling heaven and earth (1.4 10). For it to be a divine omnipresence it must be 
an omnipresence that is truly infinite or, in the words of the patristic dictum, God must 
comprehend all things without being comprehended by any. 
According to Pannenberg, to say, `Precisely as the one who incommensurably transcends 
his creation, God is still present to even the least of his creatures' (1.412), is to require a 
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concept of God that is trinitarian. For it is only the doctrine of the Trinity that `permits us so 
to unite God's transcendence as Father and his immanence in and with his creatures through 
Son and Spirit, ' so that `the permanent distinction between God and creature is upheld' 
(1.445). This doctrine, with its notions of the consubstantiality and perichoresis of the three 
persons enables `the Father, notwithstanding his transcendence [to be] viewed as present and 
close to believers through the Son and Spirit. ' As with the other attributes we consider in this 
section `the trinitarian life of God in his economy proves to be the true infinity of his 
omnipresence' (1.415) 
Third, Pannenberg's understanding both of the nature of God's infinity and the scriptural 
witness leads him to a specific view of the divine eternity. He rejects the Platonic view of 
time as the antithesis to change of what is eternal and always the same. For, although it 
'agreed with the one aspect of the biblical witness to God's eternity i. e., that God is 
unchangeably Himself, nevertheless it did not agree `with the thought that God as always the 
same embraces all time and has all temporal things present to him. Platonic eternity bears no 
relation to time' (1.403). Instead, he prefers the more positive relating of the two, advocated 
by Plotinus and Boethius, eternity being the presupposition of time. 
This `real relation of God to time, ' Pannenberg states, `demands the doctrine of the 
Trinity, ' i. e., `an "order and succession" in the trinitarian life of God which includes a "before" 
and "after"' (1.405). It is this trinitarian construal that provides `paradigmatic illustration and 
actualization of the structure of the true Infinite [i. e., eternity] which is not just opposed to 
the finite [i. e., time] but also embraces the antithesis' (1.408). For, while many have asserted 
a positive relationship of eternity to time, Pannenberg claims that those who omit a 
trinitarian construal fall into difficulties. Either, like Tillich, they cannot express the 
difference of the eternal God from the temporality of creatures or the eternal movement of 
their incorporation into God's eternal present, and eternity and time are thereby collapsed. 
Or, like Plotinus, they can portray the emergence of time from eternity only mythically as 
the fall of the soul from original unity (1.407-408), 16 and so time loses its positive significance. 
God is eternal, therefore, because in His triune differentiation He is His own future and is not 
16 Pannenberg here cites Plotinus Enneads 3.7.1. 
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subject to the march of time, and we who are bound to the temporal process can only look 
forward to the time when we shall share that future with Him. 
Finally, God's holiness too should not, in Pannenberg's view, be considered as bad 
infinity, as mere separation from the world. It is `truly infinite, ' he says, `for it is opposed to 
the profane, yet it also enters the profane world, penetrates it and makes it holy. ' For, `the 
holiness of God both opposes the profane world and embraces it, bringing it into fellowship 
with the holy God. ' And to be this truly infinite holiness, it cannot be the mere separation or 
negation of creaturely profanity, but must transcend its own antithesis to what is not holy. 
And, according to Pannenberg, this invading and transforming holiness is actualised in the 
work of the Son and Spirit. That is, it too is a trinitarian possibility: 
`According to the NT message the holiness that invades the world is mediated by 
Jesus Christ. It is also the work of the Spirit.. . who is called the Holy Spirit because 
he is the Spirit of the holy God. We also see the structure of the ... (1.400). 
In discussion of this attribute at least, there are problems with the trinitarian construal. 
As regards the presentation in ST chapter 6, he does not seem to have demonstrated 
adequately that there is `a structural affinity between what the Bible says about the holiness 
of God and the concept of the true Infinite' (1.400). 
The first is a tendency to describe God as subject to some impersonal process, such as 
Webster has detected. As he puts it: 
The absence of language of holiness as willed relation is striking here; Pannenberg's talk 
of "the essence of God as Spirit" which expresses "the fact that the transcendent God 
himself is characterized by a vital movement which causes him to invade what is 
different from himself and to give it a share in his own life" moves in a rather different 
direction. ' 17 
The uncritical reliance on Hegelian dialectic here - unlike most other references to Hegel in 
ST- compounds the problem here, which is intensified yet more by the second difficulty. 
A key component of theological grammar is that it is specifically and only the sinful 
world that God is ever opposed to, not the profane world. Pannenberg is confusing two sorts 
of concepts here. On the one hand there are concepts from the OT, those of holiness and 
17 J. Webster Holiness (London: SCM, 2003), p. 110, quoting 1.400. 
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uncleanness where God's holiness is opposed not to creatureliness itself but only to 
creatureliness in its sin. On the other there are concepts from comparative religion, namely 
those of the sacred and the profane where there is no distinction made between fallen and 
unfallen. If it is the witness of Scripture that God's holiness was never in opposition to 
creatureliness per se, and if it is the case that God's holy opposition to sin is never 
transcended but it is sin itself that has been done away with on the cross, it would seem that 
at least this attribute is an ill-fitting match for the structure of the true Infinite. 
Rightly we should draw attention to a weakness at this point, as has Webster, and seek a 
revision along the lines suggested here. Yet, is there an even more telling revision? For, may 
we even detect such a correction from Pannenberg himself later on in 57? He writes: 
The participation of creatures in the eternity of God is possible... only on the condition 
of a radical change, not only because of the taking up of time into the eternal 
simultaneity of the divine life, but also and above all because of the sin that goes along 
with our being in time, the sin of separation from God and of the antagonism of 
creatures among themselves (3.607). 
There remains, however, no explicit criticism of these earlier remarks in any of Pannenberg's 
subsequent writing and a very generous reading might want to argue that the remarks in ST 
volume 3 may have nevertheless been intended in STvolume 1. Evidence for such a generous 
reading is exceptionally thin, however, and the discussion of the divine holiness would seem 
to be a peculiarly blatant example of how the structure of the True Infinite can be ill suited to 
the character of the trinitarian God. 
Since God in his true infinity overcomes what separates us from him and brings us into 
free fellowship with him, all these attributes of the divine infinity are in the final analysis 
concrete expressions of the divine love. And herewith we come to the final point for 
consideration. 
5. God is to be understood as being love rather than as merely having love, for it is as the 
trinitarian God of love that the divine spirit finds its actualisation. 
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In discussing the love of God at the conclusion of his treatment of the one God Pannenberg is 
seeking to show, at least in preliminary terms, how the trinitarian God of love is both the 
realisation of the truly infinite God and the proper and reasonable explanation for our 
experience of the world in all its travails. The former theme we have dealt with already, 
whereas the latter will have to be postponed in our study. Here we shall deal with another 
key element of the discussion, namely Pannenberg's trinitarian interpretation of the divine 
love insofar as it avoids pre-trinitarian conceptions of the divine unity and thereby answers 
Feuerbach's critique. 
Pannenberg takes up Regin Prenter's interpretation of 1 John 4's "God is love", that the 
saying tells us more than merely that God loved the world. " The biblical saying is not 
describing a quality or attribute of God but his essence or nature of love, so the trinitarian 
persons do not merely have love as a common quality or mind; they are love. But, 
Pannenberg asks, `what does this imply for the relation between the divine love and the 
personality of the three persons? ' (1.425). 
Developing points made in the derivation of the divine trinity from the summum 
bonum, Pannenberg believes that on this understanding Christian theology has to discard talk 
of God as the loving subject, or, as Eberhard Juengel puts it, "he who eternally loves himself. " 
It is of course true, he argues that each of the trinitarian persons loves the other, but 
'if the one loves self in the other instead of loving the other as other, then love falls short 
of the full self-giving which is the condition that the one who loves be given self afresh 
in the responsive love of the one who is loved' (1.426). 
This ties in, of course, with a point we have seen Pannenberg making before, namely the 
eschewal of pre-trinitarian conceptions of the divine unity and of the idea of an omnipotent 
subjectivity floating free behind the God of salvation. By calling love God's very essence, not 
an attribute, Pannenberg feels he has found the necessary answer to Feuerbach's objection 
that Christianity gives love the rank merely of a predicate and not a subject: 
`In Feuerbach's polemics this subject [who loves] is the omnipotent God as an infinite 
spiritual essence which is as such a person, the personal God... Does it not do this if it 
thinks of God as the one who is the trinitarian subject? ' 
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`But', Pannenberg contends, 
'Feuerbach's criticism was aimed precisely against giving the essence of love a subject 
instead of viewing it as itself essence or substance... In this regard Feuerbach's criticism 
is in line with the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, which does not make the unity of 
the divine essence a fourth hypostasis alongside Father, Son and Spirit' (1.425). 
Like other elements of his treatment of the one God, Pannenberg presses his arguments 
far more than is necessary. To counteract those that say that God has love, rather than is it, 
one need not reply that God is love rather than has it. Defenders of the theologies 
Pannenberg is here attacking could offer the reminder that the tradition has invariably 
maintained that God is what He has, and what God is and has is according to His will and in 
His act. There would be no distinction therefore between on the one hand God's having love 
or being loving, and on the other His being love. 
To retain this traditional affirmation would not only resist Feuerbach's critique, but it 
would also more clearly distance talk of God's love from impersonal processes than his talk of 
God's infinity achieved. It is, nevertheless, our view that despite the initial appearance of 
some of his language Pannenberg more successfully manages to avoid subjecting God to such 
universal processes. We therefore have to judge Paul Molnar's critique at this point as 
exaggerated. He writes: 
`God is no longer the free subject of his own internal and external relations: "the 
divine essence overarches each personality" and "love is a power which shows itself in 
those who love.. . Persons do not have power over love. It rises above them and 
thereby gives them their self-hood ... This applies especially to the trinitarian life of 
God. " Here it appears that love is the subject, God's freedom to love is the predicate 
and God's love for us is conditional. "9 
It is true that such references might suggest that what is being appealed to is, if not a 
fourth hypostasis, then at least a principle lurking behind the three persons of revelation. 
Indeed in other trinitarian theologies it would be - but not in the context of Pannenberg's 
account of the persons' ec-static existence and divine spirituality. That is, we have seen 
18 See his "Der Gott der Liebe ist. Das Verhaeltnis der Gotteslehre zur Christologie" TLZ 96 (1971), 
401-413. ýý 
Molnar (2002), p. 153, citing 1.430 and 426-427. 
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already that Pannenberg's thesis of the persons' mutual dependence for their deity differs 
from the notion that each person has a direct share in their common deity. And we have 
seen that the divine essence as spirit is a field that overarches each of the three persons 
considered as individuals, but nevertheless exists only in them. Hence in this respect at least 
Pannenberg has not lapsed into modalism. 'Love, ' he says, 
'is no more a separate subject than the Spirit apart from the three persons. As the one 
and only essence of God it has its existence in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit' (1.428). 
Such a point might well be easier to articulate using more traditional trinitarian concepts. 
But nevertheless Pannenberg still makes the point. 
When in STchapter 6 Pannenberg devotes space to explicating what it means that God is 
love, it is in terms of the trinitarian act of salvation in Jesus Christ along the lines discussed in 
the previous chapter (1.428-432). In this way the way the three persons exist ec-statically, 
i. e., only in relation to one another, with their interrelations being constitutive for both their 
personality and the deity in which they are the sole participants. And the love that is their 
essence is played out in humanity's incorporation into the divine life through Jesus Christ. 
For, 
`The thought of love makes it possible conceptually to link the unity of the divine 
essence with God's existence and qualities and hence to link the immanent Trinity and 
the economic Trinity in the distinctiveness of their structure and basis. This is because 
the thought of divine love shows itself to be of trinitarian structure, so that we can think 
of the trinitarian life of God as an unfolding of his love' (1.447). 
So then, just as God's spirituality is not a substance separate from the trinitarian persons 
but is the divine essence permeating all the persons do and are, in the same way too love is 
the concrete form of this divine spirituality. `It is, ' he writes, 
'the eternal power and deity which lives in the Father, Son and Spirit though their 
relations and which constitutes the unity of the one God in the communion of these 
three persons' (1.428). 
That God is spirit, then, necessarily implies that He is love. And since this love, which is the 
trinitarian essence, is concrete, it is realised and known in the action of the divine economy 
(1.448). 
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In our survey of Pannenberg's trinitarian handling of the divine essence and attributes, we 
have noted five implications that the priority of the Trinity has on how Pannenberg treats the 
divine nature. Firstly, we should think of His unity as hidden, since its revelation is not 
fulfilled until the completion of God's economic action. Second, we should think of Him as 
infinite rather than as first cause, since such a concept better allows God to be defined by his 
trinitarian action in and to the world, rather than by deductions from creaturely phenomena. 
Third, since we must understand God as the irreducibly triune agent, we should speak of Him 
as field rather than as a mind to describe how He is spirit. Fourth, the attributes of God's true 
infinity, i. e., one that is not the negation of creaturely limits but is their overcoming, find 
their concrete form not in a monadic divine other, but in the trinitarian God's loving 
approach. Fifth and finally, God is understood as being love rather than as merely having 
love, for it is as the trinitarian God of love - and not as a unitary subject - that the divine 
spirit finds its actualisation. And to this triune love which is actualised in the divine 
economy we now turn in the following chapters of our study. 
75 
Chapter Three 
PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF 
CREATION 
`Any serious talk about God implies the requirement that we think of reality and the 
world as determined by God and established through him' (2. xv). It involves a twin task. 
Firstly, Pannenberg outlines the Christian understanding of creation and of humanity, 
which comprises the chapter 7's first section `Creation as the Act of God. ' Second, he 
investigates the explanatory power of the Christian teaching as he has presented it, given 
what we know about the world; we see this complementary task in the second section 
`The World of Creatures. ' For Pannenberg, both tasks are necessary, and what we learn 
about the one should influence our conclusions about the other. There is, then, a `mutual 
conditioning, ' according to which, 
If, in the light of the Christian doctrine of God, the world and human life are 
seen to be grounded in God, then conversely we have to consider a reformulation 
of the Christian understanding of God from the standpoint of experience of the 
world and humanity and the related reflection (2. xiv) 
If the Christian account of the world and its origins is to have plausibility and persuasive 
force, both the world and the human being have to be seen as phenomena that are best 
explained by the existence and action of the Christian God, as being the product of this 
all-determining reality. As he writes in A C, 
For us, the Christian tradition's claim that the God of Jesus is true can only be 
decided.. . once we 
have settled whether the God of Jesus is able to shed light on 
the problems of our contemporary life, and whether the reality in which we live, 
and which we ourselves are, can therefore be shown to be determined by him. ' 
For `the doctrine of creation in all its parts serves as a consolidation and corroboration of 
belief in God. '2 
1 p. 33. 
2 IST, p. 39. 
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Moreover, since for Pannenberg, the One who determines and establishes both the 
world and man is trinitarian God and not a pre-trinitarian monad, any serious talk about 
the trinitarian God implies also that we think of the reality of the world as determined 
and established by this same trinitarian God. It is this theme that we shall pursue in the 
next two chapters of this study, tracing how Pannenberg's understanding of the Trinity 
informs and shapes his doctrines of creation and of humanity. 
What effect the specifically trinitarian God has on the content of Pannenberg's 
doctrine of creation will be considered in the following five theses. 
1. Because God as the triune God is already active in and towards Himself, creation is a 
truly free action of God 
Pannenberg wishes neither to separate economic and immanent trinities nor to conflate 
them in such a way that God's action in history loses its significance. Similarly, he affirms 
creation as a real and free act of God. It is real because God for us is not a different God 
from God in Himself: if God is active in the economy, He is so also in His immanent life. 
And it is free because God does not need anything outside Himself to be truly Himself: 
God's act of creation therefore is not a necessary part of his self-realisation, as if without 
the world he was lacking something in his own inner life. It is, rather, the expression of 
free, spontaneous love. 
Creation is an action 
'Does there have to be a world of creatures for God to be thought of as active? ' Such a 
question Pannenberg answers firmly in the negative. And his `No! ' arises from the fact of 
God's self-sufficient inner-trinitarian fullness. `Christian doctrine denies [that God 
requires a creation to be active] by describing the trinitarian relations between Father, 
Son and Spirit as themselves actions. ' God as triune is already active within Himself and 
the actions in the creation of the world `are added as actions of a different kind, as 
outward actions' (2.1). Creation can be an action of God, therefore, because in creating, 
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the God who is already active toward Himself in His trinitarian relations becomes active 
in a new way outside Himself. 
Here Pannenberg adopts a specifically Western approach to his trinitarian doctrine of 
creation. The Greek fathers, he notes, `used the term "activity" (energela) only for the 
common outward action of the three persons with reference to the world of creatures' 
(2.1), and not for the immanent relations between the trinitarian persons. The early 
Western theologians Ambrose and Augustine did not go so far as to call the inner-triune 
relations actions, but it became common at least from Richard of St. Victor onwards .3 The 
latter `made procession, which was until then used more specifically for the Holy Spirit, a 
general term for all the trinitarian processes' (2.2), and in Aquinas it was even used for 
God's outward action .4 
Pannenberg notes the difficulty arising from using the term "action" for both God's 
inner life and His deeds in the economy, namely the suspicion that `the trinitarian persons 
are independent of one another in their mutual acts in the same way that the Creator God 
is independent of the world that he creates: Yet notwithstanding this, the Western 
approach is preferred. 
On the one hand, `it was a gain for the actual understanding of God that God should 
be thought of as active' (2.4), since it avoids the Palamist notion of uncreated divine works 
by linking the concept of God's eternal activity in Himself to the trinitarian relations. 
God's action in the economy therefore is not a change in God; rather, in creating the 
world God does not turn from inactivity to activity, but is active in a new way. On the 
other hand, the Western view better explains the economic actions of the individual 
persons. It does this 
by enabling us to think in trinitarian fashion of the relation of the one God to the 
world, i. e., as Creator, Reconciler and Consummator, so that the reciprocal action 
of persons always lies beyond the relation of the one God to creatures and the 
relation of creatures to the one God. The action of the one God in relation to the 
world is not wholly different from the action in his trinitarian life (2.5). 
Rather, the latter is the source of and determinative basis for the former. 
3 Ambrose De fide 4.8.90, and Augustine De Trinitate 1.4 affirm the inseparability of God's outward 
action. Richard of St. Victor's extension of the use of the term "procession" is to be found in his De 
Trinitate 5.6ff. 
4 STh 1.27.1 c. 
78 
Here as elsewhere Pannenberg seeks to define our knowledge of the triune God as far 
as possible by his actions within the economy, while seeking to resist any implication that 
before and apart from His economic action there is some lack within God. On 
Pannenberg's interpretation God is the active God in salvation history because He is this 
already in His immanent inner-trinitarian life, and thus the conflation of economic and 
immanent trinities is avoided. So, Pannenberg not only differentiates `the inseparable 
unity of the trinitarian persons in their outward action relative to the world and the 
distinctiveness of their inner activities relative to one another, ' but also adds Quenstedt's 
remark that `we cannot equate inner and outer works of the Trinity because the latter, 
even though inner acts of the subject, relate to an outer object' (2.3). 
If we should understand God's outward action as indissolubly trinitarian there arises 
the question concerning `the unity and inner cohesion of the different phases of the 
saving economy of the divine action' (2.6). This is a relevant issue here, and indeed 
Pannenberg begins to discuss this explicitly with reference to creation in the very first 
subsection of chapter 7 within the discussion of the nature of God's external creative 
action. For our purposes, however, we shall postpone this discussion until thesis 5, where 
it is possible to show more clearly how what Pannenberg has to say here relates to his 
broader understanding of the creative action of the triune God. 
The effect of this argument is to demonstrate a correspondence between God's inner 
and outer life that is both founded on and explicated in terms of God's triunity. In 
particular, this action has a real and active multiplicity that is proper to God's being, not 
only pro nobis but also in se. 
Creation is a free action 
`The world, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`is the product of an act of God. To say this is to make a momentous statement 
about the relation of the world to God and of God to the world. If the world has 
its origin in a free act of God, it does not emanate by necessity from the divine 
essence or belong by necessity to the deity of God. It might not have existed. Its 
existence is thus contingent' (2.1). 
The act of creation, therefore, is not necessary; God did it freely. 
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This free act of creation of a world that need never have existed, `derives, ' 
Pannenberg says, `from the freedom of God in his trinitarian life' (2.9). For, if God is 
already active ad intra, this `of itself... means that God does not need the world in order to 
be active. He is in himself the living God in the mutual relations of Father, Son and Spirit' 
(2.4-5). So, as Pannenberg also writes, `the origin of the world as creation by God's free 
action tells us that even if the world had not come into existence, nothing would have 
been lacking in the deity of God' (2.9). Also, despite the obvious incommensurability, this 
utter freedom of the external actions flows from the real freedom of the internal actions: 
`The action of the trinitarian persons in their mutual relations, ' he says, `is also 
free, but not in the sense that the Father might cease to beget the Son, that the 
Son might reject the Father's will, or that the Spirit might glorify something 
other than the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father' (2.9). 
God's trinitarian fullness is the ground for affirming creation as an act of pure love, 
rather than as a necessity or a making good of a lack within God. It is from this trinitarian 
context that Pannenberg understands, and offers a robust defence of, the early Christian 
formula "creation out of nothing", which rules out any dualistic or monistic view of the 
origin of the world. Rejected herewith are not only Plato's idea of the shaping of formless 
matter, but also process philosophy and process theology which are guilty of the former 
error, according to which the world is `the result of any working of God with another 
principle' (2.15). Views guilty of the 
latter error, according to which `the divine 
freedom... falls victim to an iron necessity governing the cosmic process subsequent to its 
origin' (2.17) included ancient views of 
heimarmene, Stoicism, Averroism, Stoicism, and - 
significantly - Hegel. As he summarises, 
The trinitarian explication of the concept of divine love avoids both these 
misconceptions. Hence the biblical concept of creation needs a trinitarian basis 
if it is to be proof against misunderstandings and shortsighted criticism (2.19). 
And Pannenberg argues that when theologians have tended to undermine the utter 
freedom of God's creation, this has been closely connected to a deficiently trinitarian 
understanding. So, for instance, Pannenberg's 
defence of creation from nothing leads him 
to criticise Barth's equation of nothing with `opposition and resistance, '5 as well as 
Moltmann's different interpretation of "nothing, " which identifies it as the space that God 
gives creatures as he himself withdraws. 
Pannenberg explicitly mentions that the latter 
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idea (and no doubt the former too implicitly) is a thesis which, with its dualistic 
overtones, `the trinitarian explication of the doctrine of creation must replace' (2.15). 6 
No less than with notions of "nothingness", a rigorously trinitarian account of 
creation will not compromise the divine freedom with faulty accounts of election and of 
God's glory. As for election, Pannenberg criticises those who adopt the idea of a divine 
decree to avoid misunderstandings of creation as divine caprice. So, when Moltmann 
resurrects Reformed notions of `the "union of nature and will in the concept of the eternal 
decree"' (2.20), Pannenberg worries that the creative act `seems to be only the necessary 
expression of God's eternal nature' (2.21). Barth's doctrine of election fares better with its 
more explicit christological basis, ' but for Pannenberg `theology has to develop the 
thought that the creation of the world is an expression of the love of God.. . along 
trinitarian lines, and to seek here an answer to the question regarding the freedom of the 
divine act of creation' (2.21). 
And as for seeing God's glory as the overriding motivation for creation, this too - at 
least in many of its traditional formulations - fails to respect the freedom of God's 
trinitarian fullness. Such ideas use teleological language that subjects God's creative 
action to a goal that He does not yet possess. This, Pannenberg says, `is not in keeping 
with God's eternal self-identity as though his identity were the result of his participation 
in the life of his creatures. ' Rather, `it is only on the condition of the trinitarian God's 
participation in the life of his creatures' (2.57) that one can properly speak of any purpose 
or temporal extension in God's creation, because they are the mere overflow of the eternal 
trinitarian fullness. 
2. Creation is to be appropriated to the work of the Father, but not in such a way as to 
compromise the distinct work of the Son and Spirit 
By the term "appropriation" theologians have usually meant the attribution of particular 
divine actions within the economy of salvation to individual persons within the Trinity, 
5 See Barth CD II1/3, pp. 289-368. 
6 God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985), 
pp. 86-93. 
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even though such acts nevertheless are themselves indivisible acts of all three .8 So, 
commonly, creation has been appropriated to the Father, reconciliation to the Son and 
consummation to the Holy Spirit. So Johannes Heidegger writes: 
According then to the order of subsistence and action, just as the Father is a se, 
exists and operates through Son and H. Spirit, the Son exists and operates a Patre 
through the H. Spirit, the H. Spirit exists and operates a Patre et Mo. So, 
suitably to this order of subsistence and action ad intra, there is also assigned to 
the Father ad extra the inauguration of things, or creation; to the Son their 
continuation, or redemption; to the H. Spirit their consummation, or 
sanctification and regeneration -9 
Such appropriations, then, are "appropriate" to the person concerned because such actions 
befit their eternal relations to the other persons. So, creation is a fitting action for the 
Father because he is the source of deity, and so on. 
Pannenberg also adopts this common practice, both affirming the indivisibility of 
God's outward works while also appropriating those same works severally. " Yet in 
expounding a trinitarian theology that eschews the unitarian tendencies of 
subordinationism and modalism associated with seeing God after the analogy of mind and 
love, these appropriations take on greater importance as Pannenberg profiles in greater 
detail the specific identity of all three persons. 
Our present topic of God's creative activity Pannenberg understands - like traditional 
treatments - as especially the work of the Father. 
'God is Father as the origin of creatures in their contingency by granting them 
existence, caring for them, and making possible their continued life and 
independence' (2.21). 
Yet, his stress is different. So, whereas traditional treatments would emphasise the 
Father as the origin and initiator, " Pannenberg emphasises the Father's love and 
7 Barth's doctrine of election is to be found in CD 11/2, pp. 3-506, which Pannenberg criticises in 
"Erwaehlung III. Dogmatisch, " RGG, II [P ed. 1958], pp. 614-621. 
8 For a typical definition see Aquinas De veritate qu. 7, art. 3. 
9 Corpus Theologiae (Zurich, 1700) IV, 45, cited in H. Heppe Reformed Dogmatics (ed. E. Bizer, tr. G. 
T. Thomson) (London: Harper Collins, 1950), p. 1 18. 
lo See 3.551-555 on the Spirit. Perhaps surprisingly, in ST at least, there is no explicit endorsement of 
the idea of seeing the work of reconciliation as appropriated to the Son. It seems best, however, to 
infer that this appropriation to the second person is assumed throughout - this is after all the most 
obvious appropriation since only one of the Trinity became flesh, - albeit that the term is not explicitly 
used. This seems to be indicated on 2.6. 
1 Heppe, p. 191, citing M. F. Wendelin, Collatio Doctrine Christianae reformatorum et 
Lutheranorum, (Kassel, 1660). p. 104: `Usually along with the statement that "creation is the work of 
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care. `From all eternity the Father loves the Son' (2.21) and is the free and loving 
origin of the Son, and so we are right to understand the free and loving origin of 
the created order as specifically His doing. As Pannenberg goes on to say, 
The love of the Father is directed not merely to the Son but also to each of his 
creatures. But the turning of the Father to each of his creatures in its 
distinctiveness is always mediated through the Son. The Father's love for his 
creatures is not in competition with the love with which from all eternity he 
loves the Son. The creatures are objects of the Father's love as they are drawn 
into his eternal turning to the Son (2.21). 
Why is this? It must be said that this is a matter of emphasis, and Pannenberg is 
certainly not denying that the Father is the source of the created realm, nor even in any 
outright way that He is the source of deity either. But it would be wrong to think of this 
as merely a matter of emphasis, since at least two other reasons present themselves. 
The first reason is Pannenberg's doctrine that the three persons depend reciprocally 
upon one another. As we have seen, he detects within the tradition an overemphasis on 
the Father as the source of deity, which both distorts the biblical witness and tends 
towards modalist and subordinationist notions. What Pannenberg considers to be an over- 
emphasis on the Father as the sole source of the divine life ad intra within much 
trinitarian theology, is reflected in his revision of statements concerning the Father as the 
sole source of the divine action ad extra. 
The second reason, and the one to the fore in this context, is that Pannenberg wishes 
to make room for the distinct action of the second and third members of the Trinity in the 
work of creation, not just the first. At least in the context of Pannenberg's doctrine of 
creation this is the more significant reason. He writes: 
On the Christian view creation... does not derive from a necessity that flows one- 
sidedly from the Father.. . but from the free agreement of the Son with the Father 
through the Spirit (2.31). 
And this greater profiling of the action of Son and Spirit is evident throughout the 
chapter, constituting one of its main themes. 
the entire Trinity" it is further insisted that "as God the Father is the fons sanctae Trinitatis or 
divinitatis, so too He is the fons of all the things which are from God and outside God". 
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Yet for all the attention paid to the other two persons, Pannenberg is clear that 
creation is primarily the work of the Father. The Son is not the prime initiator of 
creation, but is its mediator fulfilling the will of the Father - hence the Christian church 
`confesses the Father as the Creator of the world, not the Son, for the only 
content of the work of the Son is to serve the Father and to bring in his kingdom. 
The Father thus acts as Creator through the Son' (2.29-30). 
Just how that is, we now go on to discover 
3. The Son is the Logos and Mediator of creation, not as the timeless principle of 
wisdom, but as the one distinguishes Himself from the Father and is thus the basis for 
the existence of the creature. His self-distinction not only is free and gives rise to 
creation's independence, but also is its ontic basis and gives rise to its pluriformity. 
In both this point and the next it is very important to realise that Pannenberg is seeking to 
free trinitarian thinking from the intellectual understandings of God we have noted 
before. Such considerations underlie his remarks on the particular role of Son and Spirit 
in creation. So, we look first at the rival understanding he wishes to avoid. 
`The theological tradition, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`has explained the participation of the eternal Son in the act of creation with the 
help of the idea that the Logos corresponds to the divine intellect, which from all 
eternity contains within itself the images of things, the ideas' (2.25). 
The example Pannenberg refers to most often, is Aquinas. Aquinas writes, 
`the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect' and according as the creature `has 
a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is 
from the conception of the craftsman: 12 
So, in affirming that God is the exemplar cause of all things, Aquinas asserts that such an 
exemplar cause are none other than the 
ideas in the divine intelligence that are contained 
in the Son of God: 
[T]hings made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms 
must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for the divine wisdom 
devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. 
12 STh 1.45.7. 
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And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom [which is, according to qu. 
45, art. 7 ad. 6, the Son, `through which an intelligent cause operates] are the 
types of all things, which types we have called ideas - i. e., exemplar forms 
existing in the divine mind. And these ideas, though multiplied by their 
relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as 
the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. 13 
Pannenberg detects significant problems with this approach. Not only does it imply 
`a much too anthropomorphic distinguishing and relating of understanding and will in 
God, ' but it also fails to do justice to the contingency and historicity of what God creates 
(2.27). And, at least since medieval Scholasticism14 whose doctrine of divine knowledge 
led to a linking of the thought of ideas in God to the unity of the divine essence, it has 
tended to flatten out the trinitarian distinctions. So, although Aquinas `did, of course, 
relate the creative action of God to the person of the Son, for God creates all things by his 
Word, ' nevertheless, 
on his view.. . this means that the Son, like the Spirit, shares in the act of creation 
only inasmuch as the processions of these persons are linked to the essential 
qualities of the divine knowing and willing. The basic idea is that creation as an 
outward act is to be ascribed to the trinitarian God as subject, so that we need not 
differentiate the specific contributions of the individual divine persons. 
Christ's creative mediatorship, then, while not denied, is stripped of all function 
(2.26). 
Pannenberg's doctrine of creation retains the concept of Logos, but in a new way that 
articulates the distinct and important role of the Son. For Pannenberg, the Son is the 
Logos or mediator of creation, since as the One who distinguishes Himself from the Father 
He is the source, ground and principle of all that is different from God, i. e., creation. 
In seeking to fill out this alternative version of the Son's mediation Pannenberg takes 
up Hegel's insight that the Son is to be understood as the principle of otherness, of 
difference in the Trinity. " For Pannenberg, such an account has distinct advantages over 
the classical intellectualist account. On the one hand, it does not restrict the Logos' action 
to the beginning of the creative process. Rather, he believes, it 
13 STh 1 qu. 44, art. 3. 
14 Pannenberg does not detect such drastic unitarian tendencies in earlier periods, even when 
intellectual analogies were used (2.25-26 on Maximus and Augustine). 
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`not only describes the transition from the divine life to the existence of the 
finite but also offers a reason for the multiplicity of the finite inasmuch as 
everything finite has the characteristic of being other vis-ä-vis the other. ' 
For, unlike the static picture of mental ideas, Pannenberg finds here `a productive 
principle behind the emergence of ever new distinctions and therefore of ever new and 
different forms of finite existence' (2.27-28). On the other hand, it does not restrict the 
Logos' mediation to the end of creation. This is an advance on the deficient trinitarian 
construals both of Barth, for whom it `is simply... with a view to the Son that the Father 
created us' (2.30), 16 and of Pannenberg's own JGM, " which understands the Son's 
mediation primarily in a "final sense, " i. e., `creation will be consummated only in Jesus 
Christ' (2.24). Rather, any final ordering of creation to Christ 
presupposes that creatures already have the origin of their existence and nature 
in the Son. Otherwise the final summing up of all things in the Son-would be 
external to the things themselves, so that it would not be the definitive 
fulfillment of their own distinctive being (2.25). 
There are four elements to Pannenberg's understanding of the Son's mediation in 
creation. Firstly, His mediation involves His free decision. Just as the Son freely acts in 
His eternal self-distinction from the Father so in His creative work He acts with genuine 
and distinct freedom. Creation does not proceed necessarily from the fatherly love of God 
that is oriented from all eternity to the Son, as can be implied by certain accounts of 
creation that work with an intellectual doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, 
The Father sends the Son but thereby lays on him no compulsion to follow a 
command of fatherly love as though by outer constraint. In a free act of fulfilling 
his sonship, the Son himself moves out of the divine unity by letting the Father 
alone be the one God' (2.30) 
Hence, second, that creation's ongoing independent existence is grounded in the 
Son's self-distinction. Here we deal with some material that overlaps with the following 
thesis, but God's continuing preservation of the creature has a special ground in the Son's 
15 Hegel develops this thesis in his 1832 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (London: Kegan Paul, 
1896). 
16 It is here that Salai Hla Aung's claim that Pannenberg has progressed beyond Barth's trinitarian view 
of creation is most convincing in The Doctrine of Creation in the Theology of Barth, Moltmann and 
Pannenberg: Creation in Theological, Ecological and Philosophical-Scientific Perspective 
(Regensburg: S. Roederer Verlag, 1998), pp. 275-276. 
17 pp. 390-397. 
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eternal trinitarian relations. Though Himself God and remaining ever in His eternal 
fellowship with the Father, 
nevertheless, in the event of the incarnation, in the relation of Jesus of Nazareth 
to his heavenly father, the Son moved out of the unity of the Godhead. In his 
awareness of being a mere human, a creature, in his self-distinction from the 
Father, Jesus recognized the Father as the one God over against himself. In so 
doing he gave validity to the independent existence of other creatures alongside 
himself. This was part of the humility of the recognition and acceptance of 
creatureliness (2.29). 
That is, the Son's eternal self-distinction whereby He recognises the Father alone as God 
makes possible the self-distinction from God of the creature He assumes, i. e. the "mere 
human" Jesus of Nazareth. And in Him, who is the Logos of all creation and the universal 
creature, all creation shares this self-distinction from the Father and enjoys independent 
existence "over against" God. Moreover, on the other side of the relation, as the Father 
loves the Son as the one who is distinct from Himself, so the creature finds its ongoing 
basis not in some abstract decree but in the Father's eternal love for that which, in His 
Son, is distinct from Himself. So, the creature's ongoing independent existence is a 
trinitarian possibility both because the Son draws creation into His own eternal 
relationship with the Father and because the Father loves the creature by its inclusion 
into His eternal love for His Son. 
The third point requires a lengthier explanation. It is this: the relationship of Jesus to 
God His Father is not just the revelation of His eternal sonship, but it is also the ontic 
basis for the existence of the creature in its distinction from the Creator. 
What does this ontic basis mean? By the term `Logos' theologians have generally 
understood either the declarative word that reveals to us what God is like, or the rational 
order or structure of the universe. Pannenberg affirms both. 18 But he also intends a third 
meaning, namely that the Logos assumes a part of creation and in this obedience of the 
Son the structure and destiny of creation finds its fulfilment in Jesus Christ. This third 
meaning we examine here. 
Pannenberg writes: 
`if the eternal Son in the humility of his self-distinction from the Father moves 
out of the unity of the deity by letting the Father alone be God, then the 
87 
creature emerges over against the Father, the creature for whom the relation to 
the Father and Creator is fundamental, i. e., the human creature' (2.22). 
The Son, then, who is other than the Father, is an Other that takes creaturely fleshly form 
in Jesus Christ. This inner triune possibility of the divine freedom, in Pannenberg's view, 
is the basis of the existence of creatures. The Logos incarnandus infinitely and eternally 
predates the cosmos creatus Creation exists really and independently alongside God, not 
eternally but in the free external action of God, for the very reason that there already 
exists internally and eternally within God a real and independent being who freely 
assumes a creaturely form in the course of the history of creation. 
And the creation's ontic basis in the Son comprehends much more than just its 
origin. The Son is also the eschatological ground of our creaturely reality, since it is in 
Him that we will achieve the fullness of our created destiny, namely to share in the Son's 
free and independent fellowship with God the Father through the Holy Spirit. Our true 
being, which can only be constituted in the light of, and ultimately by, the 
consummation, is grounded in the eternal Son of God who has become the eschatological 
second Adam and who is thus the ontic basis of all creaturely existence. Pannenberg 
writes, 
The creaturely existence of Jesus actualizes in the course of his life the cosmic 
structure and destiny of all creaturely reality as in distinction from creation Jesus 
assumes his distinction from God the Father and totally affirms and accepts 
himself as God's creature, and God as his Father (2.23-24). 
Our existence and that of all creation, therefore, is intimately connected to the taking 
shape of the Logos in the world. That is, it means the incarnation of the Son in Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
For Pannenberg, then, this means that the creative working of the Logos is concrete, 
not hovering above our reality but entering it transforming presence. Creation means 
Christmas. Hence Pannenberg talks about the Logos `taking shape' or `taking form' in the 
act of creation. He does so in a general way, since the existence of the whole created 
order is always the continuing taking 
form of the One who is other in God, giving 
creatures continued independent existence according to His order of relations with God 
and with other creatures. He also 
does so in a specific way, since the cosmic structure and 
18 2.22,2.29. 
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destiny of all creaturely reality is achieved by this one man Jesus of Nazareth. The Logos 
is not something to be discovered or located outside Jesus, but is the pre-existent Son who 
is ensarkos, really, powerfully and dynamically present in this individual historical human 
being. For, 
`[o]nly in the person of Jesus of Nazareth... is the Logos fully one with the 
particular logos of each creature, namely with the "flesh" of each individual 
person' (2.63). 
The taking shape of the Logos in the whole sweep of creation, therefore, relies on and 
springs from this foundational and unique intra-trinitarian self-distinction, that became 
the taking form of the Son of God in the incarnation. 
That Pannenberg sees the work of the Logos as concrete and not abstract has at least 
two consequences. Firstly, the work of the Logos in creation is not a static or abstract 
natural law. Such a scientific description must, he says, `be distinguished from the way in 
which the divine Logos is the unity of creation in its plurality' (2.63). It also falls victim 
to a deficient christology, which sees the Son's creative work in creation abstractly - as a 
timeless universal principle -, and not concretely - the active, involved, dynamic actuality 
revealed in Jesus. For, `in the concept of the divine Logos we cannot separate the eternal 
dynamic of self-distinction (the logos asarkos) from its actualization in Jesus Christ (the 
logos ensarkos). ' The Logos 
`is active in the world only as he brings forth the particular logo! of specific 
creatures. Only in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, of course, is the Logos fully 
one with the particular logos of each creature, namely, with the "flesh" of each 
individual person' (2.63). 
Creation, then, is not in the grip of determinism's iron necessity or deism's regulated 
insulation. This is not to deny that there is in fact a natural law to the created universe, 
but it is to be understood in the light of the becoming Word, Jesus Christ. It is not a 
timeless structure or a theoretical system, but `the principle of the concrete, historically 
unfolded order of the world, the principle of the unity of its history' (2.63). 
Second, the natural order is anthropocentric. For the `goal' of the creation is 
its reconciliation in Christ, which `is achieved only at the human stage, ' i. e., by 
the incarnation. `All creation, ' Pannenberg writes, is waiting 
`for the manifestation of divine sonship in the human race, for thereby the 
corruptibility from which all creatures suffer will be vanquished... If, however, 
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this suffering is overcome by the adoption of humans into the filial relation of 
Jesus to the Father, the relation of non-human creatures to their Creator 
thereby also comes to fulfilment (2.73). 
So, because of the incarnation `we humans can be called the goal of creation only because 
in us, or more precisely in Jesus of Nazareth, the fellowship of the creature with the 
Creator comes to fulfillment as the Son of God comes among us as a man' (2.74). 19 
Creation, therefore, requires humanity, before and without which its destiny of 
fellowship with God `has not yet found direct fulfilment in the existence of each 
individual creature. ' Rather it awaits `the human stage in the sequence of creaturely 
forms' since only then `did express distinction come to be seen between God and all 
creaturely reality. ' Yet this is not man in general that is awaited, `but only the last 
eschatological man who appeared in the person of Jesus Christ will be taken up by the 
Spirit into the fellowship of the Son with the Father (2.138). And the "sonship" of us 
humans is the expectation of creation only as He and we in Him distinguish ourselves from 
the Father in perfect, loving obedience. 
Fourth and finally, the Son's self-distinction from the Father explains the plurality 
and unity within the created order. As the Son distinguishes Himself from God and can 
assume the conditions of finitude, so He is the principle of a creation that is finite and 
distinct. But necessarily, for Pannenberg, `it belongs to the finitude of a thing, to be 
limited by something else, and not just by the Infinite, but also by other finite things' 
(2.61). This plurality is not without any order or unity, however, since the Logos is not 
only the productive principle of diversity but is also the origin of each individual creature 
in its distinctiveness and of the order of relations between the creatures. 
Every part of creation is particular, since it originates from the eternal principle of 
difference and otherness. And every part of creation has a common source and destiny, 
since not only does it come from the Logos but also, in all its particularity, it is taken up 
by Him to share in the eternal glorifying of the Father. For, 
As the Son glorifies the Father by distinguishing himself from the Father, yet 
owing himself wholly to the Father even in his distinctiveness, so it is the 
destiny of each creature to honor the Father as its Creator in its own creaturely 
19 Whence Pannenberg finds preliminary confirmation the "anthropic principle, " whether in the weaker 
version of R. Dicke Introduction to Quantum Mechanics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1961) or the 
stronger versions of J. Barrow and F. Tipler The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: OUP, 
1986). 
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distinctiveness. In this way each creature shares in the filial relation of the Logos 
to the Father (2.64). 
Each creature thus shares in the filial relation of the Logos, who as the principle of 
otherness generates the rich and multifaceted otherness - from God and from other 
creatures - that is the natural universe. 
Yet the Son is not just the principle of distinction, but is Himself the link with that 
which is distinct. He is the Logos, too as the `interrelation' of creatures. For 
He gathers the[m] into the order that is posited by their distinctions and 
relations and brings them together through himself (Eph. 1: 10) for participation 
in his fellowship with the Father (2.32). 
As indicated above, this is a concrete order of plurality and unity. On the one hand, the 
Logos is not merely transcendent to the creatures, but His order inheres in the creatures 
themselves. This order of the Logos, therefore, is not detached from the plurality and 
individuality of creatures and does not treat creatures as `interchangeable' or as `no more 
than indifferent examples of the [natural] law' (2.62-63). On the other hand, this must 
involve the dynamic becoming of the concrete incarnation and destiny of the universal 
creature, Jesus Christ, in whom all of creation is taken up and brought to completion. For, 
The creaturely existence of Jesus actualizes in the course of his life the cosmic 
structure and destiny of all creaturely reality as in distinction from creation Jesus 
assumes his distinction from God the Father and totally affirms and accepts 
himself as God's creature, and God as his Father (2.23-24). 
This plurality and order, then, is neither external nor atemporal, but is actualised as the 
Logos assumes creaturely existence in the human Jesus. 
As the living One in whom all created reality finds its source and rich diversity, the 
Son is also the one in whom all things are to be gathered into their common destiny. As 
the One who pours out the Spirit the Father has given Him, this summing up of all things 
is the ultimate creative work of the Son. For, 
[The Logos] gathers the creatures into the order that is posited by their 
distinctions and relations and brings them together through himself (Eph. 1: 10) 
for participation in his fellowship with the Father. But this takes place only 
through the Spirit, for the creative work of the Son is linked at every point to 
that of the Spirit (2.32). 
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The interrelation of all things in the Logos, therefore, has an eschatological dimension. It 
necessarily has a pneumatological dimension as well, since to participate in the fellowship 
of the divine life requires the One who is Himself the communion of Father and Son. But 
that would be to trespass onto the territory of our next thesis on the work of the Holy 
Spirit. 
Yet before moving on to the Spirit, we shall note Colin Gunton's appraisal of this part 
of ST. Despite his praise for the marked trinitarian profile, Gunton is critical of 
Pannenberg's core notion of the Son's self-distinction: 
The chief question to be asked of this is whether it attributes too great a role to 
God the Son in initiating creation, rather than as the one through whom God 
creates the world. (Is there a trace of tritheism? ) There is a danger that the idea 
of Jesus' self-distinction from the Father will override the more central notion of 
his being sent by the Father and being what he is in free obedience to his 
Father's will. In the latter case, Jesus Christ remains the mediator of the Father's 
act, but as the one who is the eternal object of the Father's love and so other than 
the Father, and accordingly the one who enables the created order, too, to be 
genuinely other, though also other in inextricable relation. 20 
Pannenberg can answer this charge. For one thing, ST does not minimise the Father's 
initiative, since despite the increased emphasis on the free and distinct role of the Son in 
creation, the Father remains the initiator and the Son the mediator -'the Father sends the 
Son' (2.30). And for another, Gunton's distinction between Jesus' self-distinction and His 
obedience does not become in Pannenberg a separation. He affirms both. The Son, he 
says, 
`moves out of the deity in execution of the mission that he is given by the 
Father... Nevertheless, the Son's moving out of the deity to become the Logos of a 
world of creatures must be regarded no less as an expression of his own free 
decision' (2.29-30). 
Gunton's perceived danger, then, is averted. 
4. The Holy Spirit, as the medium of fellowship of the eternal triune relation of God the 
Father and the Son who distinguishes Himself from Him, enables both the 
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transcendent God to be present to His creatures and the creature to participate in the 
life of God as He causes them to share in the self-distinction of the Logos. 
`Even as the Son moves out of the unity of deity, he is still united with the Father by the 
Spirit, ' who `links the two in free agreement' (2.30). The Spirit, we have learnt, is for 
Pannenberg the fellowship of the Son, who receives the Spirit, with the Father, who gives 
Him. He is therefore the communion of what is distinct, between the Son who 
distinguishes Himself from God and the Father Himself. He makes possible communion 
between what is distinct, and He is the medium of this dynamic and vital relationship. 
For Pannenberg ascribes 'to the third person.. . both the positive relation, in the sense of 
fellowship of what is distinct, and also the associated dynamic, whether in the trinitarian 
life of God or in creation' (2.84) 
This internal activity of the Holy Spirit becomes external and takes form in 
the economy. It does so firstly in Jesus Christ, whose life in the Spirit has a double 
aspect. On the one hand, by the Spirit Jesus is in the most intimate fellowship 
with the Father, and on the other this intimacy occurs as Christ so radically 
distinguishes Himself from the Father. Since in Jesus we learn the activity of the 
Spirit both in the inner divine life and in the rest of God's creation, in the same 
way the creative work of the Spirit also has these two aspects, fellowship - the 
principle of the creative presence of the transcendent God with his creatures - and 
movement - the medium of the participation of the creatures in the divine life, and 
therefore in life as such (2.32). 
For Pannenberg, this work of link and movement brings out the specificity of the 
Holy Spirit as a distinct centre of action within the Godhead. He is not just God's 
immanence within the created order or a field of divine essentiality, since this work of 
link and movement is distinct from that of Father and Son. 'Certainly the difference of 
creatures among themselves and 
from God, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`cannot be thought of without reference to the one who is thus distinct. But the 
same applies to the Son's own relation to the Father' (2.84). 
That is, the Spirit's specificity holds both within God's immanence and in the economy 
20 The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1998), p. 157. 
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The creative work of the Spirit as fellowship means that creatures participate in the 
life of God, the life without which they would slip back into corruption. The Spirit is `the 
life-giving principle, to which all creatures owe life, movement and activity' (2.76), for 
according to scripture animals, plants and humans, indeed all of creation 21 are recipients 
of the Life-Giver. When He is given, there is life; when He is taken away, there is life no 
more (2.76-77). For, the creature is limited and finite, and to be maintained in existence 
and reach its fulfilled destiny, it must participate in the `unrestricted duration, ' who is 
God. `This life of creatures as participation in God that transcends their own finitude is 
the special work of the Spirit in creation' (2.33). Pannenberg does not thereby deny 
creation's real distinction from God, for as the Spirit of the Father and the Son He is by 
definition the One who creates and maintains fellowship between what is distinct. 
Creation participates in the divine life `only to the extent that self-distinction from God 
(and therefore the Son) takes shape in them' (2.34). 
The Spirit's role in creation also means movement. Key for Pannenberg's thought 
here is his understanding of the semantic range of the biblical words for the Spirit, roach 
and pneuma. He does not deny any reference to the divine Spirit and opt instead for 
"wind" or "breath", but he does not want to set the two in opposition either. So, then, for 
instance, `as regards Gen. 1: 2... we should not distinguish wind and breath. Plainly we 
must associate the reference to the Spirit of God with the creative speaking of God that 
immediately follows. What we have here is the breath of God that stands in affinity to his 
speaking' (2.78). The Spirit's action, therefore, means movement, reflecting the dynamic 
vitality of God's inner life. 
This movement of the Spirit is the ground for the whole dynamic of all creation in its 
progress towards the divine destiny. It has two main aspects. 
Firstly, the dynamic of the Spirit is to internalise the Logos in each of the creatures, 
which gives more precise and trinitarian form to the Spirit's work of fellowship. He 
enables the proper relation of self-distinction from God that is the taking shape of the Son 
within creation. So, as the one who became human in Jesus of Nazareth was Himself the 
Logos of all creation, so the Spirit enables all creatures to grow into the order, diversity 
and destiny purposed for them. 
21 Pannenberg has in mind Ps. 104 and Gen. 1&2. 
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For Pannenberg, this means: `The immanent dynamic of the life of creation may be 
more precisely described as a process of the increasing internalizing of the self- 
transcendence of creatures' (2.33). Pannenberg detects several traces of this 
internalisation of creaturely self-transcendence in the natural world. Not only does 
inorganic matter have `inner relation to the future of its own changes and also to its 
spatial environment', but this can also be seen `in the developmental thrust of plants and 
the instinctive life of animals' (2.33). Indeed, this "history of nature" in which the Spirit 
enables creatures to transcend their own finitude and to develop more complex and 
lasting forms is another way for Pannenberg to talk of evolution. The Spirit is the field of 
the future, who raised Jesus from the dead to new eschatological life; so also His life- 
giving work in creating is always in preparation for, and in anticipation of, the coming 
consummation? 2 This is not a power immanent to the creature, but requires an "ec-static" 
movement on our part as befits those who have to transcend themselves to participate in 
the divine life. 
Second, Pannenberg considers the notion of "field" particularly helpful in articulating 
the dynamic nature of the Spirit's work in creation as the living breath of God. It is 
certainly preferable to intellectual understandings, which `have been intellectualized in 
Christian theology under the influence of Platonic philosophy. '23 Indeed, the whole 
presentation is an effort to recast the Spirit's work purged of this intellectualising Platonic 
inheritance. 
Pannenberg's chief culprit is Origen. Hence, as in his discussion of the creative work 
of the Son, it is not surprising to find Pannenberg drawing on an understanding of the 
divine Spirit that was taken up by theologians before Origen's intellectualist turn. The 
main objection is that although Origen argued effectively against its materialist absurdities, 
in fact the Stoic conception of pneuma as a most subtle element like air was nevertheless 
`much closer to the biblical language than Origen's identification of pneuma with 
intelligence. '24 For, Pannenberg thinks that the idea of the field of force, which he goes on 
to advocate as a more appropriate concept for understanding the Spirit's creative working, 
can be purged of the material connotations it had in Stoic form and that scandalised 
Origen (2.81-82). 
22This point is made on 2.98 and 2.102. 
231ST, p. 43. 
241ST, pp. 43-44 
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Some remarks are necessary here on what Pannenberg means by field of force and 
second on what theological importance he accords it, not least because it has provoked 
controversy among Pannenberg's interpreters. So, firstly, by field of force Pannenberg is 
referring to the understanding in modern times (particularly associated with Michael 
Faraday) that nonmaterial forces cause material changes in the world. This view is 
contrary to earlier understandings of force, advocated by post-Newtonian physicists such 
as Ernst Mach and Heinrich Hertz, which reduced the concept of force to bodies and their 
inert mass. Naturally this had anti-religious ramifications, since, if any force can be 
sufficiently and solely explained by physical bodies, talk about God's activity in the world 
becomes meaningless superfluity. The conclusions of Faraday have particular significance 
in this context, because, Pannenberg says, `Faraday regarded bodies themselves as forms of 
forces that for their part are no longer qualities of bodies but independent realities that are 
"givens" for bodily phenomena. He now viewed these forces as fields that occupy space in 
order to avoid the problems involved in the idea of force working at a distance' (2.80). 
This is the meaning that Pannenberg finds suggestive for understanding the work of the 
Holy Spirit in creation. 
As for its theological importance, Pannenberg states simply: `The biblical idea of 
spirit as dynamic movement of air in the forms of wind, storm or breath is closer to the 
modem scientific concept of a field of force than to the notion of intellect. 'u That is, he 
finds it to have more biblical warrant than the mainstream understanding of the tradition. 
And unlike the intellectualist approach, Pannenberg sees the notion of field as more 
fruitful for denoting the Spirit's active involvement in creation. The identification of 
Spirit and mind had, for Pannenberg, the `fateful effect... that the relation of the divine 
Spirit to the material world and to the process of its creation was obscured. ' In addition 
this led to a compartmentalising of the Spirit's action. So, in the same passage Pannenberg 
notes a second effect: the divine Spirit was also separated from the created Spirit, the 
human soul. Consequently, the divine Spirit could be reduced almost to a principle of 
supernatural experience and insight. 
'26 And, given Pannenberg's stated aim to provide an 
account of the triune creation which will 
find hints of confirmation in the world as we 
know it, the understanding of the Spirit in terms of field has enlightening explanatory 
u 1ST, p. 44. 
26 1ST, p. 44. 
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power. Such considerations, he writes, `help to show that the theologically based idea of a 
dynamic of the divine Spirit working creatively in all events as the power of the future is 
by no means alien to a philosophy of nature' (2.101) 
Innovative though it may be, it should be remembered that Pannenberg's use of field 
theory here is for a specific purpose and is to be accorded more modest significance than 
some of his commentators suggest. In particular one should note that this approach arises 
out of material theological reasons. He is insistent that this is not a mere case of `bad 
apologetics. ' Rather, it is the result of the biblical interpretation offered in the pages of ST 
that provide a theological rationale for such a revision of terms. `Only then, ' he says, `is 
[theology] justified in developing such concepts in a way appropriate to its own themes 
and independently of scientific usage' (2.83). So, in the 1989 article reprinted in 
Beginning With the End, 2' Pannenberg detects an oversight in some of the comment on 
his scientific thinking by writers such as Philip Hefner and Jeffrey Wicken: 28 
'The theological use and reinterpretation of the field concept was not aimed at 
such applications, however. I decided to take the risk of using that concept in 
theology for strictly theological reasons, that is, in order to obtain a better 
understanding than the traditional one for the idea of God as spirit. '29 
Such critiques as Pannenberg is answering here miss the theological context and 
theological rationale for the adoption of the language of field theory. 30 This in our view 
explains Wicken's false allegation that the application of the field concept "physicalizes" 
God. 3' 
27 See W. Pannenberg "Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings: Response to Hefner, 
Wicken, Eaves, and Tipler, " Zygon 24.2, June 1989,255-71. See also ST 2.101 and C. Albright (ed. ) 
Beginning with the End: God, Science and Wo hart Pannenberg (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 
pp. 425ff. 
29 J. S. Wicken "Theology and Science in the Evolving Cosmos: A Need for Dialogue, " Zygon 23.1, 
March 1988. 
29 Albright (ed. ), p. 428. Emphasis added. 
30 In a recent colloquium in Oxford Pannenberg stated to a group of experts in the field of science and 
religion that such tight identifications of the meaning of terms used in contemporary scientific 
discourse and their application within his own theology are inappropriate since he is - in his own words 
-a "scientific dilettante". 
Moreover, at the same event Pannenberg said that he had originally been 
unconvinced of this use of field theory to understand divine action in creation, but changed his mind on 
reading Max Jammer, presumably his Das Problem des Raumes: Die Entwicklung der Raumtheorien 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1953) and Concepts of Force (Cambridge, MA, 
1957), although when writing on the topic he also cites Jammer's articles "Feld/Feldtheorie" and 
"Kraft" in Gruender and Eisler (eds. ) Historisches Woerterbuch der Philosophie (Basel: Schwabe, 
1971-) as well as some other authors. 
31 Wicken (1988), p. 52. 
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And for the same reason it is also wrong to assume that the use of field theory 
necessarily depersonalises the Spirit's work in creation. Aung, for instance, 32 states, 
`When [Pannenberg] speaks about field he is viewing God in an impersonal sense. '33 On 
2.83 Pannenberg emphasises clearly: `the person of the Holy Spirit is one of the personal 
concretions of the essence of God as Spirit in distinction from the Father and the Son; ' 
and, `The person of the Holy Spirit is not himself to be understood as the field but as a 
unique manifestation (singularity) of the field of the divine essentiality. '3' Grenz's 
summation rightly understands the relative modesty of Pannenberg's use of the concept, 
when he writes, 
his use of field theory to describe the work of the Spirit in creation does not 
require that he carry the impersonal nature of the cosmic field to his 
understanding of the Spirit, because Pannenberg uses the concept of the cosmic 
field as a clarifying model that has acknowledged shortcomings. 35 
Pannenberg's highly developed treatment of the Spirit's work in creation, much more 
developed than most other treatments, cannot be dismissed so easily. 
5. Creation, understood in trinitarian terms, cannot concern merely the world's 
beginning, but refers to all world time. 
Pannenberg is aware that `the traditional path' of theology `speak[s] of creation more 
narrowly in distinction from reconciliation and consummation' (2.8). That he departs 
from this has significant bearing on how he understands the work of the Trinity, the 
effects of which we shall examine partly here and partly in later chapters 36 Pannenberg 
includes within his doctrine of creation detailed discussion of God's ongoing work in 
maintaining the universe He has created and in bringing it to the goal He has appointed it. 
In particular he develops the doctrines of preservation, concursus and world government 
32 See also Gunton (1998), p. 161. 
33 Aung, p. 219, with reference not to the divine essence in ST chapter 6 but in particular to chapter 7's 
treatment of creation. Aung seems to say this on the basis of a less than clearly argued correspondence 
with Whitehead's metaphysics. 
34 Emphasis retained from the German. 
35 Grenz, p. 166. 
361n particular it effects the treatment of the newness of the work of Son and Spirit, which we shall 
consider in more detail when we look at Pannenberg's treatment of the Spirit's activity in kingdom and 
church. 
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along with their indispensable precondition, i. e., God's original creation which has 
occurred not in, but with, time. And we shall look at each of these three in turn before 
going on to see how they are given trinitarian shape in Pannenberg's scheme, and how 
they necessarily follow from explicating creation as a genuinely triune action of God. 
Creation, Pannenberg believes, inevitably involves preservation, and even then such 
preservation should not be understood as the mere maintenance of an original order set 
once for all. Rather, `it is a living occurrence, continued creation, a constantly new 
creative fashioning that goes beyond what was given existence originally' (2.34). And it is 
this creative action of God which continues to break into the world He has first created, 
that leads Pannenberg to advocate seeing His preserving work as creatio continuata or 
creatio continua. Concursus, on the other hand, goes one step further, having to do with 
God's `participation in the independence of [the] lives [of his creatures], even though the 
intentions of creaturely conduct may deviate from the norm of the relation of the Son to 
the Father' (2.58). The creatures that God has created and preserved are not left to 
themselves in their activities, but only in such a way that there is a divine omnicausality 
that does not exclude creaturely independence. And world government has to do with 
the future fulfillment to which all this is leading - it is `providence in its orientation to a 
goal' (2.57). God, the Creator and Ruler of what He has made will bring the creation into 
perfect communion with Himself. This is the goal of the world government, and its 
power is the fact that this 
divine intention is superior and sovereign over any and every 
abuse of our created independence. 
Now why and in what way do these notions of preservation, concursus and world 
government arise from a trinitarian understanding of creation? We have had cause to 
touch on some of them already especially regarding the work of Son and Spirit. For 
Pannenberg, their dynamic action involves not the mere preservation of an originally 
existing order, but the continuing production of new forms of being. The work of God in 
creating, as our survey of Pannenberg has already indicated, involves not just the mere 
positing of original form and matter, 
but includes both the taking shape of the Word and 
the moving of the Spirit in space and time. 
Of course there are other factors too, which influence Pannenberg's discussion here, 
yet of those others which are 
distinctively trinitarian we shall note four. First, one must 
go on to consider God's continuing rule of the world 
because its creation is a single act of 
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the triune God. That there is such a single divine act needs to be argued for, not just 
stated, as Pannenberg notes scripture's talk of a plurality of divine acts that should not be 
reduced merely to how it appears to finite creatures. `It is proper to God's action as well' 
(2.8), he affirms, emphasising that divine actions such as the incarnation and 
reconciliation are really something new. Against certain reductive understandings of 
divine simplicity, then, Pannenberg understands God's action as a complex and 
differentiated unity, revealing anew in finite temporality the surprising richness of the life 
of eternal Trinity. " 
The Trinity is, for Pannenberg, both the problem and the resolution of the unity of 
God's action. On the one hand he writes, `With the trinitarian mediation of God's 
outward action a... question arises concerning the unity and inner cohesion of the 
different phases of the saving economy of the divine action. ' Thus, that God acts as three 
centres of action not just in the initial creation by the Father, but also in the preservation 
and reconciliation that are the work of the Son and the Spirit's work of consummation 
and world government, provides an irreducible plurality to the divine activity. On the 
other hand, he continues, `The unity of action, which finally rests on the unity of the 
acting subject, links a variety of elements into a unity of process in the course of events' 
(2.6). That this threefold God is in fact one is the ultimate basis for seeing the extension 
of divine activity as itself a unitary and unified action. Just as to speak of God, then, one 
cannot simply say the Father and not go on to speak of the Son and Spirit, so to speak of 
God's action, one likewise cannot simply say creation and not go on to speak of 
preservation and world government or reconciliation and consummation. So, Pannenberg 
concludes, 
The trinitarian exposition of the concept of creation makes it possible, then, to 
relate what is said about creation to the totality of the world from the standpoint 
of its duration in time. It does not concern merely the world's 
beginning... Creation, preservation and overruling thus form a unity whose 
structural relation has yet to be defined more closely. 
37 Hence Pannenberg summarises: `[W]e might say very generally that what is new is that the sequence 
of the divine action, and therefore its multiplicity, is grounded in the trinitarian plurality of the divine 
life. Therefore the unity of this divine action in the economy of God's history with his creation is not 
lost by reason of the plurality of events' (2.8-9). 
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But since one cannot consider God properly unless one pays sufficient attention to Father, 
Son and Spirit, and since these three are the one God, their particular works are also their 
common work. And so, Pannenberg continues, it is by the doctrine of the Trinity that 
`all three are set in relation to the saving economy of the divine action in the 
world. God's action, then, is seen to be a single act that embraces the whole 
cosmic process, that includes at the same time many individual acts and phases' 
(2.34-35). 
For, `the sequence of the divine action, and therefore its multiplicity, is grounded in the 
trinitarian plurality of the divine life' (2.8-9). 
Second, God's ongoing creative activity is not determined by the nature of the world, 
but is a continuing act of free love because it flows from God's trinitarian fullness. This is 
closely connected to the previous point, but it has something distinct to say. There we 
saw that as a component element of the one God's external action in the economy 
creation, if conceived on its own, gives only a partial and distorted account of the triune 
God's action and self-revelation. Here, however, we note that since all this economic 
action is an overflow of what God already has in His trinitarian life, it remains 
gratuitous. 3' 
We shall examine two important consequences. The one is Pannenbergs correction 
of earlier theology, the other later commentators' attempted correction of Pannenberg. 
First come some critical remarks from Pannenberg about statements of older 
Protestant dogmaticians. Their `idea of a direct self-reference of the divine action 
whereby God is its final goal was adopted in the form of the statement that the glory of 
God and its recognition and praising by creatures is the goal of creation' (2.56). 39 
Pannenberg cannot accept such an interpretation of the goal of God's world government. 
To attribute to God's creating and providential acting a goal that God does not already 
have in his eternal immanent life not only makes God dependent on the world, but it also 
makes the creation a means to achieving an end God does not already have. The eternal 
Trinity as Pannenberg has explicated is the bulwark against such instrumental 
38 There is, then, some overlap with what thesis 1 had to say about God's freedom in the original act of 
creation, but here we need to make clear that for Pannenberg, albeit in a different way and under 
different conditions, God's triune nature means that He remains free in His ongoing dealings with the 
world, 
39 As typical examples on the Lutheran side Pannenberg notes D. Hollaz, Examen, q 14, Calov, 
Systema, pp. 900,1141 and J. Gerhard, Loci theologici, II, 15, n. 85. 
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understandings of creation that seek some higher telos for creation than the overflow of 
divine love. As he writes, 
[T]he creature was not created in order that God should receive glory from it. 
God does not need this, for he is already God in himself from all eternity. He 
does not need to become God through his action or much less become sure of 
his deity in the mirror of creaturely praise.. . As the activation and expression of 
his free love, God's creative action is oriented wholly to creatures. They are 
both the object and goal of creation. Herein is his glory as Creator, the glory of 
the Father, who is glorified by the Son and by the Spirit in creatures (2.56-57). 
Second is some recent criticism, which differs from the interpretation offered here, that 
Pannenberg undermines the freedom of God's outward action as soon as He has created 
the world. A typical sentence that is taken to be problematic can be found in ST chapter 
7: 
`though God is independent in himself, yet with the act of creation and in the 
course of the history of his creatures he makes himself dependent on creaturely 
conditions for the manifestation of his Son in the relation of Jesus to the Father' 
(2.7). 
Nor is this affirmation of God's dependence on the world, once created, an exception, but 
is part of a recurring theme in his Pannenberg's theology. A number of similar sounding 
statements can be found, in particular in his discussion of the incarnation as God's self- 
actualisation in 2.389-391. 
This has led a number of recent scholars to criticise Pannenberg at this point. 
Detecting a tension in Pannenberg's thought exemplified in phrases like the above cited 
`though God is independent... yet he makes himself dependent', Martinez-Camino, for 
instance, finds, if not a contradiction, then at least an insufficient explanation. He writes: 
the relationship between the debatability of God in the world and his 
omnipotence... is given no real explanation. God is the subject of his 
actualisation, which, the creation of a world once given, cannot happen without 
this world, but only with and in it precisely for the sake of God's true infinity 
and power. But if God is in fact actually infinite and omnipotent, can he at the 
same time be thought of as "at stake"? 
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He therefore detects in Pannenberg's position `a wavering between a positivity in 
the immanent life of God and a potentialising in the economy of his relationship 
with the world. '40 
Stated thus, the critique does have a fair degree of plausibility, yet it needs to be 
stated with greater precision. It is possible, if not to offer a defence of Pannenberg here, 
then at least to provide clarifications which blunt much of Martinez-Camino's criticism. 
It is true that such quotations from Pannenberg do appear deterministic, and one may 
wonder whether the dependence on Hegel might not be significant after all. Yet an 
apologia for Pannenberg need not rely solely on the counter-intuitive nature of a claim 
that a theologian as careful as Pannenberg should fail to see the incompatibility of 
statements of God's dependence on creaturely conditions with a robust account of 
creation from nothing. Two clarifications go some way to exonerating Pannenberg. 
The first is that those of Pannenberg's statements which sound deterministic have to 
be understood in the context of his revised concept of divine personality. We find that 
those statements of God's historical becoming or His dependence on the world that sound 
most Hegelian are made in the context of some radical correction of the terminology 
usually employed. We noted, for instance, that Pannenberg is often at pains to 
differentiate himself from Hegel, whom in many ways he sees as the apotheosis of the 
Western tradition of seeing God along the lines of subjectivity or mind, with its 
anthropomorphic talk of God's will or 
intention. And so Pannenberg often juxtaposes 
Hegelian sounding statements of divine dependence alongside very un-Hegelian notions 
of personality, which he strips of those supposedly anthropomorphising elements. 
Deterministic readings of Pannenberg can arise, therefore, by focussing on certain 
remarks he makes to the exclusion of, rather than alongside, other emphases. 
Particularly instructive is a passage early on in STchapter 7. There Pannenberg does 
indeed say that God `makes himself dependent on creaturely conditions. ' Nevertheless, 
this statement is prefaced by a revised understanding of the ends and means of God's 
action. So, having affirmed 
both the unity of God's action and the unity of the acting 
subject, on which it rests, Pannenberg 
distinguishes two types of action that take place in 
time. On the one hand there are actions, in which `the one who acts has a place in time 
and with the goals of the action aims at a 
future distinct from the present. ' And on the 
40 Martinez-Camino, pp. 146-147. 
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other, there are actions, in which `only the object of the action has its existence in time 
and takes shape under the conditions of temporal processes. ' He continues, `We may 
properly speak of God's purposeful action only in the second sense, otherwise we would 
`make God a needy and dependent being' (2.6). That is, God, the infinite and eternal 
subject, acts in time in a way utterly different from all finite subjects. When He acts 
externally, the first type of action does not apply since `the one who acts' is not bound by 
His place in time and does not aim at a future that He lacks in the present. Rather, it is 
only the object, namely the economy of salvation, which has a temporal form. For finite 
creatures, on the other hand, any act necessarily entails that they must use as means to the 
achievement of their goals conditions and posited for them. But for God to act entails no 
lack on His part or any need for external means. God's means are self-posited and self- 
conditioned, and so free, because they are the overflow of the free relations of the inner- 
trinitarian divine life. 
The second is that one should note that Pannenberg's discussion operates with two 
standpoints, the one of God's eternal immanence, the other of our finite temporality, 
which is the theatre of His economic action. As we saw in the first chapter, one misreads 
Pannenberg if one takes him to be baldly stating that God becomes Himself only as a 
result of history or that he depends on the world. Such readings overlook the fact `that 
from the point of view of God's eternity history is always seen as a whole, in the light of 
its ultimate completion. '41 Hence when Pannenberg says that with the creation of the 
world God makes himself dependent on creaturely processes it is for the reason that God 
Himself links the realisation of His will to the sweep of His economy. Yet this does not 
mean His freedom is compromised. On this he is adamant, saying, 
It is... wrong to say that with the transition from God's eternity to the act of 
creation and the economy of salvation no immanent trinity remains or that the 
immanent trinity is completely dissolved into the historical process, into the 
economic trinity. Quite to the contrary: in the face of the ambiguities of history 
the contrast to God's eternity, to the life of the immanent trinity, is intensified, a 
contrast that will be resolved only in the end, when in the kingdom of God the 
creation will be so transformed as to participate in the eternal life of the trinity. 
In the light of the eschatological future, the process of the divine economy in the 
history of salvation is not a process of divine kenosis, but a process of God's 
104 
spontaneous and gracious offering himself for communion with his creatures so 
that they may participate in his eternal life. 42 
That is, ambiguities remain from our standpoint, on the side of the realisation of the 
economy, where God, in order to reveal Himself and execute His will, acts and 
communicates in the form of human history. Yet, from the point of view of God's 
eternity this is always a free and fulfilled reality, which contrasts with how it appears to 
us, whose standpoint is an as yet uncompleted drama. Before and after creation, without 
and with the world, God's action is ever `spontaneous and gracious'. 
Pannenberg's trinitarian account of divine action, then, emphasises God's triune 
reality and fullness, because what He is for us in the economy He already is and has in His 
trinitarian immanence. It is only in the context of such remarks, then, that Pannenberg 
utters the phrase that otherwise might seem problematic that God `makes himself 
dependent on creaturely conditions'. As he expresses the matter later on in chapter 7, 
The idea of distance between the goal and the subject of action is not in keeping 
with God's eternal self-identity as though his identity were the result of his 
participation in the life of his creatures. The object of the divine will has to be 
thought of as already realized, even though God ties the realization to the 
creaturely conditions of creaturely life and conduct. It is only on the condition 
of the trinitarian God's participation in the life of his creatures, and therefore in 
the distinction of beginning and end that characterized creaturely life, that we 
can speak of a differentiation of subject, goal and object in the divine action 
(2.57). 
What Martinez-Camino has termed a `wavering', therefore, is for Pannenberg the viewing 
of the same thing, i. e. divine action, on the one hand from the standpoint of creaturely 
temporality, and on the other from that of divine eternity. 
Third, God's ongoing sustaining and directing of the universe is an expression of his 
inner-triune faithfulness. In the subsection on the divine world government, Pannenberg 
says that God's governing is an expression not of God's rigid immutability but of His free 
and constant faithfulness. And this faithfulness of God to His creation has its ultimate 
origin in His trinitarian life. 'God's faithfulness, ' he writes, `which proceeds from the 
mutual faithfulness of the Son to the Father and the Father to the Son, is the basis of the 
41 "DEET" p. 5. 
42 ibid. p. 5. 
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identity and continuation of his creatures' (2.53). Creatures, as Pannenberg says, are not 
the direct object of the Father's love and action. Rather, `only indirectly do they proceed 
from the self-distinction of the Son from the Father ... The Father wills and accepts them 
as an expression of the overflowing of the divine love with which the Father loves the 
Son' (2.87). 
Rejected herewith are understandings of the creation of the world, such as Hans 
Blumenberg's, who sees it as an act of pure caprice with no relation to what precedes and 
follows 43 The trinitarian refutation of such views is a natural corollary of the point made 
earlier that the Father's love for us is the same love with which He loves the Son and so 
shares in its eternal constancy. And our preservation is not self-grounded, but is grounded 
on the Logos in whom creation is kept in a relation of constant otherness to God. 
Fourth and finally, the goal of creation is to be understood in trinitarian terms. Of 
course, this will be dealt with in much greater detail in a following chapter, but it is 
nevertheless a constituent part not just of reconciliation and consummation, but of 
creation as well. In the introduction to volume 2 Pannenberg has already alerted the 
reader to this indispensable aspect of creation. And this eschatological aspect is not just a 
brooding and ever-present theme in the first two sections of chapter 7, but it comes to 
dominate the third section, "Creation and Eschatology. " Much of the detail of this section 
need not concern us here, since trinitarian concerns are not so explicitly to the fore there 
as elsewhere, and we shall devote greater attention to this topic in chapter 10. Yet here 
Pannenberg is clear that not only is the goal of creation participation in the Trinity, but 
the way that goal is reached is also trinitarian. The trinitarian God is not just the One we 
were created by, He is the One we are created for. Or, as Pannenberg puts it, 
If the destiny of all creaturely occurrence and existence is oriented to fellowship 
with God himself, then this idea takes the conceptual form of a plan of salvation. 
At this point the relation of the outward divine action to a goal acquires the form 
of trinitarian mediation inasmuch as the fellowship of creatures with their 
Creator is be thought of as a participation in the fellowship of the Son with the 
Father through the Spirit (2.7) 
How Pannenberg understands as specifically trinitarian God's work in accomplishing that 
goal we shall discover as we investigate his theology in further chapters. 
43See Blumenberg's The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 125- 
226. 
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Pannenberg's treatment of the doctrine of creation gives perhaps more substance than 
anywhere else in STto his claim to have written the most trinitarian theology he knows 
of. As a constructive attempt to arrange scientific and theological material relating to the 
origin and structure of the created order in terms of the eternal life of the triune God it 
has few if any rivals in thoroughgoing trinitarian rigour. Not only the positive dogmatic 
description of creation, but also the dialogue with the conclusions of science are examined 
in the light of the trinitarian God. Pannenberg's description of God's nature as triune 
explains how His creative action ad intra is genuinely free, since as the triune God He is 
already active in se. Creaturely existence is understood as the work of the Father who is 
prime originator within and outside the triune life. Creaturely independence and 
pluriformity are understood as the work of second divine person who is creation's Logos 
and Mediator as well as its noetic and ontic basis. Creaturely life, its ec-static 
participation in God and in the rest of creation, is understood as the work of the Holy 
Spirit, who is the eternal medium of fellowship that makes possible both God's presence 
with His creatures and the creatures' participation in God. And creation's ongoing 
development is understood as the process of the Word's taking shape and the Spirit's 
moving in space and time. In scope - and perhaps in depth too - Pannenberg's trinitarian 
account of creation may well be the most impressive part of ST. 
Using a trinitarian framework for the explanation of the natural world and its 
processes may well arouse the suspicions of some commentators, who fear Pannenberg 
may be projecting trinitarian categories onto the scientific material. In Pannenberg's 
defence it should be noted both that he is wary of the `bad apologetics' we noted before 
and that his goal is more to offer a plausible account of how the trinitarian God can be the 
source and sustainer of the universe we live in than to identify natural phenomena with 
theological terms. 
From a dogmatic standpoint, too, questions could be raised. Some have criticised 
Pannenberg for having too much discontinuity between creation and eschatology. '" 
Commenting on such criticisms, Svein Rise not only says that they are misplaced, since 
44 See Christoph von Schoenborn "`Aporie der Zweinaturenlehre": Ueberlegungen zur Christologie von 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, ' FZPhTH (1977), pp. 428-445, and Per Lonning Der begreiflich Unergreifbare. 
"Sein Gottes" und moderntheologische Denkstrukturen (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 
1986) 
107 
`When he affirms that the revelation in Christ is the key to the eschatologically-based 
ontology, it is Jesus Christ the mediator of creation who is involved here, '45 but he also 
treats Pannenberg's account as fundamentally correct. We agree with Rise that these 
misgivings are misplaced, but unlike Rise find Pannenberg's relating of the two still 
problematic. Our criticisms point in the opposite direction. 
If, as Pannenberg seems to suggest, creation means Christmas and the incarnation the 
completed creation of humanity, there could result the danger that all of God's action in 
the economy is part of the doctrine of creation. This is the danger that Barth earlier 
highlighted in when the doctrine of providence is not included as part of the doctrine of 
creation and becomes confused with God's election to salvation in Christ 46 Perhaps the 
greatest difficulty arises when Pannenberg handles the theme of new life in the Spirit, 
where he cannot easily account for scripture's talk of newcreation. It is one thing to state 
that our understanding of God's creation must include the ongoing production of new 
forms of created life and God's sustaining power, but it is quite another to say that the 
new thing He does in Jesus Christ is just another chapter of the unfolding of the old thing. 
It will become evident as we come to Pannenberg's treatment of the new thing, especially 
the gift of the Spirit, that this is a question he finds difficulty answering. 
45 S. Rise The Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Lewisten, NY: Mellen, 1997), p. 114, emphasis 
added. 
46 CD I11/3, pp. 3ff. 
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Chapter Four 
PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF 
HUMANITY 
Any attempt to precis the thought of a significant theologian inevitably involves 
omissions. Yet, given the very great importance to Pannenberg of the topic of 
anthropology, we need to offer a special word of explanation for the specific focus on his 
trinitarian doctrine of humanity in this chapter. The two most important reasons are, 
firstly, that already much anthropological detail has been outlined in the trinitarian 
account of creation and, second, that there will be much more to say as Pannenberg 
delineates the work of the Trinity in reconciliation and glorification. `A full 
anthropology, ' he explains, 
`would have to include as well [as a description of our destiny and the situation of 
our alienation from it] the actualizing of this destiny, which is the theme of God's 
redeeming work, its appropriation to and by us, and its goal in the eschatological 
consummation' (2.180). 
Our focus here will be the doctrine of humanity Pannenberg develops with particular 
reference to chapter 8 of ST. There is other material, mainly within ST which counts as 
part of an explicitly trinitarian anthropology, such as we have seen in the previous 
chapter already. And there is a wealth of other material that makes no appeal to 
trinitarian categories or reasoning (at least not directly), which is specifically devoted to 
anthropology. 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of anthropology in Pannenberg's work. 
Some remarks from TuP are especially instructive: 
`Today Christian theology too is referred first of all to the basis of anthropology 
for the proof of the universal human validity of the Christian faith, although this 
basis is not sufficient for assurance of the truth of the Christian idea of God and 
His revelation. For the confirmation of the truth of the Christian God it is 
imperative that world and history can at least be conceived of as His creation and 
work. But, in turn, to the world and its history belongs humanity, and for this 
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reason anthropology remains the first and most pressing topic in relation to 
which the universal validity of faith in God will have to be demonstrated. " 
And the centrality of anthropology to his theological project in general, up to and 
including the above quotation, is borne out by a survey of Pannenberg's publications. 
Even before RaH, which brought Pannenberg fame early on in his career, he had given a 
series of radio broadcasts which were subsequently published in English as What Is Man? ' 
In the meantime he has published several extended treatments of anthropological themes, 
including Human Nature, Election and History and Sind wir von Natur aus religioes? 'as 
well as some shorter pieces, and most substantially of all, ATP, which is the most detailed 
of all his writings on the topic. The focus of this study on the role the Trinity plays 
within his mature theology means that this central element within his theological project 
is necessarily given short shrift. We shall draw on some of the earlier writings too, 
especially ATP, where there is an explicit and complex theology at work, but the more 
explicit trinitarian focus of his theology is not so evident. Again we rightly rely most of all 
on ST. 
In this chapter we shall describe with the help of three theses how Pannenberg's 
doctrine of the Trinity affects his theological anthropology. The first is a general and 
rather negative one that shows what approaches Pannenberg declines to adopt, and why 
Pannenberg prefers a different tack to a properly trinitarian doctrine of humanity. That 
is, a trinitarian anthropology cannot mean, for Pannenberg, psychological or social 
models, but viewing humanity within the general framework of the triune God. The 
second and third are both more specific and more positive, and outline how the action of 
Son and Spirit form the indispensable framework for Pannenberg's theological 
anthropology. In the former we look at the role of the Spirit, whose free life-giving to 
humanity is the basis of its "spirit. " In the latter the image of God is reworked, not in 
terms of a human faculty, but as human destiny to be conformed to the Son of God. 
1 TuP, pp. 359-360, and chapter 12. For a very helpful treatment of the place of anthropology in 
Pannenberg's theological project as a whole, and the key place it has in the sublation which lies at the 
heart of the structure of Pannenberg's thought, see Shults. 
2 W. Pannenberg What Is Man? (trans. D. Priebe) (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970). German, Was ist der 
Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart in Lichte der Theologie (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1962). 
3 W. Pannenberg, Human Nature, Election and History (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), 
subsequently published in German as Die Bestimmung des Menschen (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1978). 
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1. A truly trinitarian doctrine of humanity does not see the Trinity primarily as 
providing a model for understanding the human mind or human society. Rather the 
Trinity is the essential framework within which to understand humanity. 
Broadly speaking we can outline three general ways in which theologians have articulated 
a theological anthropology that is trinitarian. They are firstly the view that the Trinity 
provides a model for understanding the human mind, secondly the view that the Trinity 
provides a model for understanding the structure of human society, and third the view 
that the Trinity provides the general framework within which to understand humanity. 5 
One should see Pannenberg as following the third of these approaches. 
The first, which we call the psychological view, finds human likeness to the 
trinitarian God in the differentiation within the human soul. The locus classicus for this 
approach is to be found in Augustine, especially the latter books of his De Trinitate, or at 
least this is how many, including Pannenberg, interpret him. ' There the psychological 
approach is developed on the premise - one which Pannenberg would not share? - that 
the highest point of our nature, and that by which humanity excels other animals, `is in 
his reason or understanding and in whatever else can be said about the rational or 
intellectual soul that may belong to what is called mind or consciousness. " And, so this 
approach argues, Augustine investigates how the faculties of the human mind can have a 
threefold structure, as befits the part of our nature that is the divine likeness. 
° W. Pannenberg Sind wir von Natur aus religioes? Schriften der Katholischen Akademie in Bayern 
120 (Duesseldorf: Patmos, 1986) 
s These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Both Augustine (the classic representative of the 
psychological view, at least as commonly understood) and Moltmann (the classic representative of the 
social view) also view the Trinity as a general framework within which to construct their doctrines of 
humanity. For Augustine, see his remarks on the immortality of the body in De Trinitate 14.24, and for 
Moltmann see his discussion of how believers are conformed to the image of the Son in God in 
Creation, pp. 242-243. Yet in ST at least Pannenberg - in our view rightly - adheres exclusively to the 
third option. 
6 We are aware of other interpretations of Augustine's intentions here. Nevertheless we represent here 
the most common interpretation and the one which spawned much of Western dogmatic treatment of 
the Trinity, regardless of its actual faithfulness to the argument of De Trinitate. 
7 Before and since Augustine this view has had an august pedigree. Perhaps without the explicit 
reference to the Trinity other church fathers had identified the divine image with human reason. We 
find this both in Clement Stromateis 5.94.5 and Origen De principiis 1.1.7.24. 
8 De Trinitate 15.1.1. 
111 
The second, which we call the social view, finds human likeness to the trinitarian 
God in the relations between persons in human social life. Though there are many 
advocates of social trinitarianism, 9 probably the name most associated with this approach 
is Juergen Moltmann. Moltmann's social trinitarianism is well known and can be found 
throughout his writings, but the most important treatment for how this affects his 
anthropology is to be found in God in Creation. There he writes, `Human beings are 
imago trinitatis and only correspond to the triune God when they are united with one 
another. "' 
At least as Moltmann presents the argument here, there has to be a likeness or 
analogue to the triune God in humanity, and the Augustinian psychological model is 
inappropriate. Not only does Moltmann think it `shows a tendency towards monotheism 
in the concept of God, and a trend towards individualism in anthropology, "1 it is, he says, 
`a pure analogy of domination, "2 that is, it accompanies ideologies that practise 
domination of the soul over the body and of man over woman. 
Rather than follow this approach which dominated Western thinking, Moltmann 
takes up a suggestion from the East, in particular the analogy of Gregory Nazianzen's 
Orationes 13 
`It is not the human individual, all by him- or herself, that corresponds to the 
triune God - it is not even the first couple, Adam and Eve; it is the family, as the 
nuclear cell of every human society. Just as the three divine hypostases form a 
unity by virtue of their common Being, so these three human persons also share 
the same flesh and blood, and form a single family. In the primal human 
community of husband, wife and child, the Trinity sees itself reflected and 
appears on earth. "' 
Pannenberg adopts neither strategy in his trinitarian anthropology, at least in ST. It 
differs from the psychological approach. We have noted already that Pannenberg 
9 E. g., the liberation version of Leonardo Boff Trinity and Society (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 
1988), esp. p. 149, and the more conservative version of John Zizioulas' Being as Communion (London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985). 
'o p. 216. 
" Ibid., p. 234. 
'2 Ibid., p. 240. 
13 This analogy is to be found in Orationes 31.11. To what extent these words of Gregory Nazianzen, 
or indeed any others of the Cappadocian Fathers, accord with Moltmann's interpretation of them is not 
so straightforward as a reading of Moltmann might suppose. For a helpful discussion see Coakley 
(2002), pp. 109-129. 
14 (1985), p. 235. 
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criticises the tendency, especially of Western theology, to pattern God after the individual 
rational subject. He also takes issue with the assumption of the psychological approach 
that the mind is the highest part of human nature and is somehow more divine than the 
rest of us. Not only does he say that `when it is a matter of the advantage of humans over 
all other creatures, the emphasis is not on intellectual ability' (2.190), but he also 
maintains: 
`human reason is not of itself filled with the Spirit. In its creatureliness it needs, 
like every other vital function, to be quickened by the living power of the Spirit 
if it is to be active, and it also needs the inspiration that lifts it above its own 
finitude and that in all its limitation makes it aware of the presence of truth and 
totality in the individual' (2.197). 
It also differs from the approach of social trinitarianism. Although Pannenberg 
shares with many social trinitarians a concern for drawing theology away from tendencies 
to speak of the divine unity at the expense of the trinity, whether those tendencies do or 
do not actually exist, he stops short of advocating trinitarian relations as a blueprint for 
human society. The Trinity is not, to quote someone else, his "social programme. "15 
It must be admitted that in the past Pannenberg has been attracted to this 
interpretation of a trinitarian anthropology, and there is some - but only some and that 
far from sufficient - warrant for ascribing to him the social view. 16 For instance, in ATP 
there are remarks that do seem to point in a social trinitarian direction. The last two 
pages of the work are the most obvious indication. '? He writes, `the image of God in 
human beings, when viewed from the standpoint of its realization in Jesus Christ, has in 
fact a "societal structure". "8 Then he goes on to write a remark that is probably the most 
social trinitarian of all: 
The correspondence between the image of God in human beings and the 
Trinitarian life of God is in fact fulfilled in the human community and 
specifically in the community of God's kingdom, whose King-Messiah is Christ 
15 The slogan `The dogma of the Trinity is our social programme' comes originally from Nicholas 
Fedorov. For a contemporary attempt to restate Fedorov's claim, albeit with qualification, see M. Volf 
"'The Trinity is Our Social Program": The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social 
Engagement' in Modern Theology 14 (1998), pp. 403-423. 
16 Anselm Kim, for instance, sees Pannenberg as a social trinitarian. 
" See in particular ATP, pp. 530ff. 
18 ATP, p. 531. 
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the Servant and in which all dominion of human beings over one another will be 
eliminated. 19 
Unsurprisingly, there seems to be dependence on Moltmann here. Not only is the 
language and content of what Pannenberg says highly reminiscent of Moltmann, but 
there are also two explicit references to his works20 
Yet, by the time of the writing of ST there seems to have been some cooling in 
Pannenberg's enthusiasm for this approach. Pannenberg still holds to the view stated in 
ATP that our eschatological destiny is one 'in which all dominion of human beings over 
one another will be eliminated. ' Yet he will not go as far as Moltmann and advocate an 
end to relationships of super- and subordination. So in ST Pannenberg takes issue with 
Moltmann's idea of a partnership of mutual influencing between body and soul. Not only 
does this, in Pannenberg's view, entail far too ideal a notion of harmony and agreement, 
but it is founded on a faulty conception of the Trinity. `As regards intra-trinitarian 
relations, ' he writes, 
We cannot reject out of hand the thought of the Father's rule, to which the Son 
obediently subjects himself, without also ignoring basic NT statements, and 
especially the fundamental concept of a kingdom of God. The important point is 
that the monarchy of the Father is mediated through the free obedience of the 
Son (2.201). 
Nor will Pannenberg countenance an obvious mirroring of triune relationships in human 
ones. One no longer reads, for instance, of `the correspondence between the image of God 
in human beings and the Trinitarian life of God. ' 
Two other points show Pannenberg's distance from the social view. The first is the 
distinction he makes between divine and human personhood. 1.430-1 is where 
Pannenberg sounds at his most social trinitarian in ST, noting that `the argument that the 
trinitarian concept of person has no relation to the modern view is mistaken. ' Yet he 
notes two important differences that distance his view from social trinitarianism. The one 
is that `being a human person is not so exclusively constituted by the relation to one or 
two other persons as it is in the trinitarian life of God. ' The other follows, namely that `in 
19 ATP, p. 532. 
20 The works of Moltmann that Pannenberg refers to are, firstly, a then as yet unpublished lecture 
which explained the destiny of human beings to a community based on the image of God as originating 
in the trinitarian community in God, and, second, his The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A 
Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology (tr. M. Kohl), (London: SCM, 1977). 
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human self-awareness the human I and the human self are different, ' whereas in the 
divine life the self is realised already. 
The second, and even more explicit point, is his rejection of the attempt to see 
relations between human persons as mirroring trinitarian relations. We shall note two 
instances of this rejection. The one is Pannenberg's taking issue with the attempts of 
Bonhoeffer and Barth, 21 who from the `Let us' of Gen. 1: 26 deduced that' humankind is 
the image of God in the plurality of co-human encounter in its basic form as the 
distinction and relation of male and female. ' This is a faulty approach, Pannenberg 
believes, since, 
`If we want to agree... that the sexual relation corresponds to the trinitarian 
relation of the Father and the Son, then we must subordinate woman to man as 
Barth subordinates the Son to the Father. The story, however, implies an 
equality of man and woman in principle inasmuch as the divine likeness applies 
to both, irrespective of sexual distinction' (2.205-206)22 
The other has to do with relations within the church. Commenting on the 
communio structure of the church, Pannenberg criticises those who use the trinity as a 
model that the church has to reflect in an order of hierarchy. `This danger, ' he writes, 
`becomes particularly acute when the hierarchical communio is viewed as a reflection of 
the trinitarian persons in the unity of the divine life, so that we must then think of the 
head of the hierarchy as analogous to the Father to whom the Son subjects himself in 
eternity. ' There is, he goes on, 
no need to see a close link between the communio structure of the church 
expressed in eucharistic communion and the trinitarian fellowship... The analogy 
between the minister and the Father cannot be based on the eucharistic liturgy. 
Instead, the liturgist, and with him the whole congregation, is drawn into the 
filial relation of Jesus Christ to the Father (3.106) 23 
In recent years two different assessments of the social view have been adopted by 
theologians who are very sympathetic with Pannenberg's overall project, including his 
21 This social trinitarian approach, which in the light of 1 Cor. 11 arguably has the strongest biblical 
warrant on the relationship between the sexes, is discussed in D. Bonhoeffer Creation and Fall (New 
York: Macmillan, 1959) and CD III/1 and II1/4. 
22 Though Pannenberg does distance his own remarks in ATP from this headship of man over woman, 
he still appears to be sympathetic with the general notion of trinitarian analogy of which this is a 
variety. 
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trinitarian aspirations. One such theologian is Stanley Grenz, who in his recent book The 
Social God and the Relational Seh 4 relies heavily on Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity 
and uses it to develop his own social trinitarian approach. `[T]he three members of the 
Trinity, ' Grenz writes, 
are "person" precisely because they are persons-in-relationship; that is, their 
personal identities emerge out of their reciprocal relations. The attendant 
ontology of personhood suggests that the Creator's intent that humans be the 
representation of the divine reality means that the goal of human existence is to 
be persons-in-relation after the pattern of the perichoretic divine life disclosed in 
Jesus Christ. ' 
The other is Ted Peters who again depends very much on Pannenberg's understanding of 
the Trinity, but exercises caution regarding any social analogies. So, the fifth of his 
trinitarian theses states: 
`The image of the immanent Trinity ought not to be used as a model for human 
society; rather, we should seek to transform human society on the basis of our 
vision of the coming kingdom of God in which God alone is the absolute. '26 
It is the procedure of Peters which seems more in line with Pannenberg than does 
Grenz's. 
The third approach is to see the trinitarian God as the general framework within 
which to construct a doctrine of humanity. There is a qualitative difference between this 
and the first two approaches. The first two approaches regard the imago Del as a 
similitudo trinitatis, where either the human soul or mind on the one hand, or human 
society on the other is a mirror of trinitarian relations. For Pannenberg the imago Dei is 
not like this. Christology and pneumatology are more important for him than the 
relations within the immanent Trinity for understanding what it means to be human. 
The imago Dei is not similitudo trinitatis but creatura opens trinitatis, that is, the human 
being is to be understood in trinitarian terms, not as an analogy of the threefold God, but 
as the one made by the triune God and destined for eschatological participation within 
I In particular Pannenberg sees this danger in the works of Joseph Ratzinger and J. Zizioulas. 
Zizioulas has been influential in the development of aspects of Pannenberg's trinitarian thinking, but 
here at least the two part intellectual company. 
24 S. Grenz The Social God and the Relational Self. - A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001). 
25 Ibid. p. 332. 
26 Peters, (1993), p. 184. 
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the trinitarian life. Exactly how the Trinity shapes Pannenberg's understanding of 
humanity we shall investigate under the following two theses. 
2. Human beings are spiritual, not because they have the divine Spirit as a constituent 
part, nor because they are rational, but because in every part, including their reason, 
they rely on and are animated by the life-giving Spirit. 
We saw in the previous chapter that Pannenberg moves from traditional notions of the 
Spirit as nous or mind to seeing Him as a vital creative force in ways analogous to modem 
field theory. This broader understanding of the Spirit's work has inevitable consequences 
for how one understands a properly Christian anthropology. Since the Spirit is the one 
who freely gives life to all things, both corporeal and psychic, Pannenberg believes that 
one has to refashion our understanding of body and soul to take account of this. Broadly 
speaking, human "spirit" is neither synonymous with, nor reducible to, the faculty of 
intellect, whether it be considered the soul or the mind. Rather, human spirit is our 
reception of the freely given spirit of the freely giving Spirit. 
Again Pannenberg consciously differentiates himself from Aquinas. Though noting 
Aquinas' genuine insight that the soul is the essential form of the body' which was an 
advance on earlier Christian theology's revision of Platonic concepts (2.184), Pannenberg 
detects a problem. There is a difference, he says, between Aquinas' account and that of 
the Bible, a difference that 
`lies in the understanding of the soul, and especially its spiritual or intellectual 
character (anima intellectiva). The biblical account certainly relates the soul to 
the spirit, but in a very different sense' (2.185). 
The `different sense' is that Thomas' formulation implies autonomy for the soul. 
Pannenberg, however, understands the Genesis account as affirming the soul as the whole 
living being (and so different from patristic exegesis), and one which is dependent rather 
than autonomous (and so different from Aquinas). He writes, 
The description of Adam as nephesh hayya represents him as needy and 
therefore desirous; his life has the form of need and desire.. .A human 
being as 
27 STh 1.76.1 and 4. 
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nephesh is a being of desires oriented to things that meet the desires, and one 
that is searching for them. Hence an ensouled body does not live of itself but by 
the Spirit of God who breathes life into it (2.185). 
Here we see the importance for Pannenberg of understanding spirit not as intellect, 
but as vital creative force. It enables him to avoid the move of much earlier theology, i. e., 
to see the mind as somehow more "spiritual" than the rest of us, since Pannenberg thinks, 
`[t]he interpreting of Gen. 2: 7 as an imparting of reason by the Creator was the 
basis of equating the human spirit and reason, which led Christian theology to 
see in the spirit-soul a higher part of our human constitution' (2.188). 
If spirit is seen as having some special affinity with intellect, then the impression can be 
given that our minds are somehow less dependent on the Spirit, the Giver of Life, than the 
rest of us. This Pannenberg avoids. As with all created things, he remarks, so with the 
human being too `only the Creator's breathing makes him... a living being, a living person, 
a living individual' (2.185). 28 
This has two implications. The first is that this breath of life cannot be separated 
from the Holy Spirit. Our "spirit", then, is not something other than the Spirit. Its being 
given or taken away is His giving or withdrawing. `As "flesh, "' Pannenberg writes, 
`we are perishable like all other living creatures. Conversely as long as human life 
lasts, it is due to the continued activity of the breath of life that comes from the 
Spirit of God' (2.186) 
The second is that `the working of the Spirit in living creatures does not mean that he 
is a constituent part of the creature' (2.186). Pannenberg believes this to be the teaching 
of both Old and New Testaments, as he has shown in his remarks on Gen. 2. And even 
when the OT assigns a relative independence to the ruahim, as for instance in the good 
and evil spirits sent on various OT figures29 or when the Spirit's continued but limited 
work in us is called "our" spirit, 30 `nowhere, ' Pannenberg says, `does the OT make any 
basic distinction between the divine ruah and the independent creaturely ruah as an 
essential constituent of living things' (2.186-187), any such idea being a Hellenistic 
28 Pannenberg here cites H. W. Wolffs Anthropology of the OT (London: SCM, 1974). 
29 Pannenberg notes in particular the evil ruah God sends on King Saul and others in 1 Sam. 16: 14; 1 
Kgs. 22.20ff.; Isa. 19: 14 
30 Here Pannenberg is referring to passages such as Ps. 104. 
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embellishment. And in the NT too, Pannenberg says, divine and human spirits are 
sharply distinguished 31 
Hence, if one is to speak of the human being as body, soul and spirit, the third term is 
not to be understood as a constituent part of the creature as the first two are. That is, 
`[t]he working of the Spirit in living creatures does not mean that he is a constituent part 
of the creature. ' Instead, we humans are spirit only insofar as we depend on the Spirit of 
life freely to quicken us into vitality. `[I]t means, ' he goes on, 
`that creaturely life has an eccentric character, that it is referred to the divine 
power of the Spirit that works upon it. Living creatures have the breath of life in 
them, but it is not at their disposal. God is always the Lord of creaturely life 
(2.186). 
Pannenberg is on guard here against the conflation of divine and human spirit32 and is 
adamant that the two are distinct. As he has written on an earlier occasion, 
`The spirit never belongs in a strict sense to the creature in his immanent nature, 
but the creature participates in the spirit - and I venture to say: in the divine 
spirit - by transcending itself, i. e., by being elevated beyond itself in the ecstatic 
experience that illustrates the working of the spirit. '33 
Whereas his trinitarian anthropology differs from intellectual notions of divine and 
human spirit, Pannenberg nevertheless does offer a trinitarian psychology. Naturally this 
differs from the trinitarian psychology Pannenberg criticises in the use of mental 
analogies for the Trinity we noted earlier, nor does it rely on assuming either that our 
reason is somehow more divine and less in need of the Spirit's life-giving work than the 
rest of us, or that it is what differentiates us from other earthly creatures, but it is 
nevertheless a genuine attempt to understand human intellectual activity in the light of 
trinitarian doctrine. 
There are three ways in particular in which Pannenberg sees human cognition in 
trinitarian terms. The first and most straightforward we have noted already, namely its 
31 On 2.187 he writes, `Paul could describe human beings comprehensively as spirit, soul and body (1 
Thess. 5: 23) and contrast the divine Spirit with the human spirit (Rom. 8: 16ff. ), even setting the two in 
opposition (1 Cor. 2: 10f. ), ' and points to more in R. Bultmann's Theology of the New Testament in an 
accompanying footnote. 
32 Hence we cannot follow the criticism of Roger Olson in "Pannenberg's Theological Anthropology: 
A Review Article' in Perspectives in Religious Studies 13 (1986), pp. 161-171. 
33 "The Working of the Spirit in the Creation and in the People of God, " in Spirit, Faith and Church 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970), p. 21. 
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utter creatureliness and therefore its equal dependence on and difference from the divine 
Spirit. `[H]uman reason, ' he writes, 
`is not of itself filled with the Spirit. In its creatureliness it needs, like every 
other vital function, to be quickened by the living power of the Spirit if it is to be 
active, and it also needs the inspiration that lifts it above its own finitude and 
that in all its limitation makes it aware of the presence of truth and totality in the 
individual' (2.197). 
As well as, on the one hand, entailing that reason cannot be the infusion of some divine 
faculty, this point contradicts, on the other hand, the concomitant idea that the human 
ego stands at the centre of cognition. Not only is the ground taken away from the idea 
that our reason is distinctively human and is the reason for our species' inalienable 
superiority over all others 14 Also, the more the mind is aware of its dependence on the 
Creator Spirit, the more it is open to the rest of the creation that is animated by Him. 
Thus we are referred not to some independent, internal faculty but to ecstatic 
participation, which, 
`expands the soul by experience of the world, which the Spirit creatively 
permeates, and especially by the experience of human fellowship in face of the 
infinite ground of the world' (2.197-198). 35 
The second is that the Son is the basis both for the individuality that we perceive and 
for the distinguishing of each particularity. The Son, as we have learnt, is for Pannenberg 
the principle of otherness within God and His creative activity and the basis of the order 
within the universe. Hence, the distinguishing of the other that is operative in human 
cognition is, Pannenberg believes, rightly to be understood as a participation in the work 
of the Logos. He writes, 
In a rational distinction of each finite thing from every other, and of all finite 
things, including ourselves, from the infinite, the divine Logos is at work, who 
creates and rules all creaturely existence in its individuality... [H]uman 
intelligence in its perception of the otherness of the other participates in the self- 
distinction of the eternal Son from the Father by which he is not merely united 
to the Father but is also the principle of all creaturely existence in its 
individuality (2.196). 
' See 2.189-190. 
15 This also explains the importance for Pannenberg of human imagination. 
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For what lies behind `the human consciousness that differentiates things and that also 
links what it differentiates' is `the self-distinction from the Father that constitutes the 
sonship of Jesus' (2.292). 
The third is that the Spirit is the `ultimate basis for the interrelatedness of that which 
is distinct in the consciousness, of the interrelatedness also of the I and the things of the 
world, especially similar living creatures' (2.196). As the one who in the immanent 
trinitarian life is the bond of fellowship between Father and Son, and in the work of 
creation is the one who lifts beings outside themselves to participate in the life of God, so 
in human cognition too the Spirit is the fellowship of what is distinct. The unity and 
wholeness which is the work of the Spirit in all things, then, also has its mark in human 
psychology, enabling genuine human personhood and a true, varied and united 
perception of the world outside us. Pannenberg expresses the matter thus in rich 
trinitarian prose: 
`As the Son, in his self-distinction from the Father, is united with him by the 
Spirit in the unity of the divine life, and as, in his creative activity, he unites 
what is distinct by the power of the Spirit, so the differentiating activity of 
human reason needs the Spirit who enables it, by mediating the imagination, to 
name each thing in its particularity, and in all the distinction to be aware of the 
unity that holds together what is different' (2.197). 
3. Humanity is created in the image of God, since its destiny is to be transformed into 
the likeness of Jesus Christ, the Son of God incarnate, who is Himself the true image 
of God. The realisation of this destiny is the work of the Trinity in time, and we 
attain to it as by the Spirit we accept our finitude just as Christ, the Son, distinguished 
Himself from God the Father. 
The issue of the imago Dei has a long, varied and august theological heritage, of which 
Pannenberg shows himself keenly aware. Yet Pannenberg finds himself dissatisfied with 
previous answers and seeks instead a more rigorously trinitarian solution. Whether the 
imago Del be understood as relationship or encounter that can entail patriarchy, " as 
36 Pannenberg is here referring to the view of Barth and Bonhoeffer we spoke of earlier. 
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wisdom or the soul that can ignore the reference to the whole person, 37 or as the 
exegetically unjustifiable upright stance, 31 Pannenberg will not adopt such approaches. 
What about Pannenberg's trinitarian alternative? After surveying traditional 
accounts he writes: 
`Christian theology must read the OT saying about our divine likeness in the 
light of the Pauline statements that call Jesus Christ the image of God-and that 
speak of the transforming of believers into this image' (2.208) 39 
Put very simply, many other accounts have tended to see human beings as themselves the 
image of God, whereas Pannenberg emphasises that they are properly only "in" or 
"according to" the image of God, which is Jesus Christ, the Son of God incarnate (2.215). 
And even where this distinction was noted, as, Pannenberg believes, in Reformation 
understandings of the imago Del in opposition to those of Latin Scholasticism, it was tied 
to notions of an original state which pay inadequate attention to NT talk of 
transformation into the new man 40 On the contrary, Pannenberg asserts, 
`In the story of the human race.. . the image of God was not achieved fully at the 
outset. It was still in process. This is true not only of the likeness but of the 
image itself. But since likeness is essential to an image, our creation in the image 
of God stands implicitly related to full similarity. This full actualization is our 
destiny, one that was historically achieved with Jesus Christ and in which others 
may participate by transformation into the image of Christ' (2.217). 
Pannenberg emphasises that to understand the divine image not as a general faculty 
but as a destiny that one achieves in union with God the Son, does not necessarily 
undermine its universality by limiting it to believers. Creation and redemption, that is, 
while related differently, are not sundered. Whereas this destiny has been actualised in 
37 This is what Pannenberg calls the `classical' understanding of the divine likeness in Christian 
theology, which through the Alexandrian theologians, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, became the 
mainstream understanding of Western theology. 
38 This is the suggestion of E. Juengel in his "Der Gott entsprechende Mensch" in Neue Anthropologie 
6, ed. H. G. Gadamer and P. Vogler (Stuttgart: G. Thieme, 1974). Pannenberg notes that Juengel can 
cite many other authors in support including Lactantius, Baumgarten, Ammon and Herder, but not, he 
believes, any scriptural ones. 
39 The Pauline statements that Pannenberg has in mind are, firstly, 2 Cor. 4: 4 and Col. 1: 15 on Jesus as 
the divine image, and, secondly, Rom. 8: 29,1 Cor. 15: 49 and 2 Cor. 3: 18 on believers' transformation. 
See 2.208. 
40 Pannenberg's dispenses with traditional dogma of perfect first estate, not least because he finds no 
evidence either for immortality before the Fall or for an Edenic perfect knowledge and holiness. And 
since Pannenberg identifies the image of God not with human origins but with human destiny, this is 
another reason for him to claim that it is incorrect to say that the image is lost or marred. On this see 
2.210-217. 
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believers and in Paul's letters is presented as an injunction to Christian believers, it 
nevertheless does so as a fact that has universal, ontological validity. As Pannenberg puts 
it, 
`In Paul's sayings about Christ as the image of God into which all others must be 
transformed, the Christian doctrine of the divine likeness must see an elucidation 
of our general destiny of divine likeness. But in so doing it may not expunge the 
differences between the fulfilling of our divine likeness in and by Jesus Christ on 
the one hand, and the OT statements about Adam's divine likeness on the other. 
To do this is to miss the point that our destiny as creatures is brought to 
fulfillment by Jesus Christ' (2.210). 
All of humanity has been created according to this image; and all of humanity is related to 
the true image, the eschatological new man, the second Adam who came from heaven to 
bring all of humanity to its destiny of fellowship with God. The image of God is our 
destiny for fellowship with God (2.224), a destiny that marks all of humanity, but is 
actualised not by ourselves but by the triune God. So, it is a trinitarian possibility and not 
one infused into us at our creation. `The hope of participation in this life, ' Pannenberg 
writes, 
`is guaranteed to believers by the fact that even now they put on the new man in 
the power of the Spirit..., namely, by righteousness and true holiness, by mercy, 
kindness, gentleness, and generosity, as Christ has taught and shown them' 
(2.220). 
Humanity itself, then, is not the image, but it is created "in" the image; it is a copy to 
be fashioned after the original. 41 And the image itself is the Son of God, and He incarnate. 
In Pannenberg's view, after Irenaeus theology took a wrong turn and lost sight of the fact 
that Jesus is God's image firstly in referring statements about the divine image to the logos 
asarkos, 42 and then again to the whole Trinity and the divine essence as such 43 This had 
the consequence that theological anthropology became increasingly devoid of 
christological and trinitarian specificity. As the action of the Trinity in time, then, the 
image is not to be understood solely protologically, but in terms of eschatological 
becoming. `It is, ' Pannenberg writes, 
41 Pannenberg takes up the language of original and copy especially in 2.215ff. See also the remarks on 
Irenaeus in 2.208f. 
42 E. g., Origen De Principiis 1.2.6; Athanasius De Incarnatione Verbi 13.7. 
43 E. g., Augustine De Genesi ad litteram 3.22. 
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`reinterpreted as our final destiny, which is manifested already in Jesus Christ 
and in which believers share already through the power of the Spirit, who is 
already effecting the eschatological reality of the new man in them' (2.220). 
Pannenberg also suggests that such moves obscure the eschatological thrust of our 
being made in the divine image. He claims, 
`If the understanding of human reason is further detached from the idea of the 
divine Logos, then our divine likeness can be viewed as a theme essentially 
different from the that of the Logos in relation to the Father' (2.209). 
Here the discussion differs from traditional Christian anthropologies, where the image 
tends to be seen rather like an independent faculty that was originally infused into 
humanity intact, which now needs to be restored 4' For it is not enough, he thinks, to 
equate the renewal in the image in Eph. 4 and Col. 3 with the creation account in Gen. 1. 
Paul's statements, he says, 
`that believers are changed by the Spirit into the likeness of Christ, who is God's 
image, must have in view, not merely restoration of the image, but a closeness to 
God that goes beyond the divine likeness grounded in creation' (2.215). 
And, for similar reasons Pannenberg's trinitarian account differs from modern views 
also. It is the de-coupling of notions of the imago Dei from the activity of the Son and 
Spirit that has led, at least from the 18th century, to much talk on the subject that 
Pannenberg considers moralistic. He writes: 
`if we detach the ethical statements of Col. 3 and Eph. 4 from the basic 
christological and eschatological relation, then, reversing the Pauline intention 
in what is said about the new man, we can use them only to describe the original 
divine likeness of Adam. Furthermore, we promote a purely moral 
understanding of human destiny such as had developed in much of modem 
Protestant theology' (2.220) 
In particular Pannenberg has in mind the thesis, championed by Kant and Fichte, 45 of 
seeing our destiny solely in earthly or moral terms, rather than as an eschatological future 
blessedness. `To do this, ' as with the other points just mentioned, is, Pannenberg believes, 
44 E. g., STh 1.93.1 ad 2, and the older Protestant dogmatics. 
as Pannenberg refers here to Kant's giving `material primacy to our moral destiny as against a destiny 
of future happiness, even though regarding the latter as a consequence of the former' (2.220) in a 
number of works. And as regards Fichte, see his Die Bestimmung des Menschen (new ed. ) (Berlin, 
1838). 
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`to miss the point that our destiny as creatures is brought to fulfillment by Jesus Christ' 
(2.210). 
So far we have seen in some detail what Pannenberg thinks the imago Del does not 
mean, yet not enough of his positive exposition of its being our destiny of transformation 
into the likeness of Jesus Christ. For Pannenberg has more to say on this, both in terms of 
the content of the image and in terms of its trinitarian formulation. 
The fellowship with God we are destined for is neither absorption into the divine life 
(as we shall see later) nor the separation from and self-assertion against God that 
Pannenberg goes on to delineate as sin in the second half of STchapter 8, '6 which is a self- 
centred hijacking of humanity's created destiny. Rather, the imago Dei means a 
fellowship that entails our independence and distinction as finite creatures of an infinite 
Creator, for 
`[o]nly by accepting our finitude as God-given do we attain to the fellowship 
with God that is implied in our destiny of divine likeness. In other words, [and 
here is the trinitarian move] we must be fashioned into the image of the Son, of 
his self-distinction from the Father. We participate thus in the fellowship of the 
Son with the Father' (2.230). 
Human fellowship with God, and so human destiny too, reached its apex, then in Jesus 
Christ, as the Son distinguished Himself, in a way unparalleled, from the Father. Thus He 
is the image. And in Him and His self-distinction from God our lives find their meaning 
and human destiny is fulfilled 47 
How, in trinitarian terms, is this so? The Son, as the one who eternally distinguishes 
Himself from the Father and did so definitively in the incarnation, is, as we saw above, 
the divine Other who is the basis for the existence of created others. And it is as such that 
He is the image "in" whom we were created and "according to" whom we are to be 
transformed, so that we, like He, may participate in free, genuine and unhindered 
fellowship with the Father. Hence Pannenberg can continue on the subject of the divine 
image using this trinitarian construal. 'In the Son, ' he says, 
`the image is achieved in the sense of full likeness, not because God made himself 
the same or similar, but because the Son distinguished himself from the Father 
and the Father from himself in order to reveal that father as the one God. In this 
46 See 2.231-275. 





way the Son is so in accord with the being of God as Father that only in relation 
to him is the Father eternally Father and God. Only to the degree that the self- 
distinction of the Son from the Father takes human form in the human 
distinction from God do we find a person who corresponds to God, who as the 
image of God is destined for fellowship with him' (2.230-231). 
Humanity's destiny, therefore, is to share in the self-distinction of the Son from the 
Father. And its ethical duty - one laid explicitly on believers in the NT - is by the Spirit 
to live out and to grow into this independence we have in union with Christ and in our 
relationship with, i. e. our self-distinction from, God the Father. For `by thus 
distinguishing God from everything finite, ' Pannenberg says, `we pay him the honour of 
his deity' (2.230). 
According to Pannenberg, then, understanding humanity in trinitarian terms is to see 
it'in terms of ecstatic participation in the life-giving Holy Spirit and its destiny to be 
conformed to Christ, the Son of God. Yet if Pannenberg takes it that humanity is ordered 
to and completed by the incarnation, we have to see in the following chapter whether his 




PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF 
JESUS CHRIST 
So far in our treatment of Pannenberg's trinitarian theology, what we have had to say 
about the figure Jesus of Nazareth has tended to be explained in terms of the second 
divine person. The life and ministry of Jesus, that is, are to be understood as the humility 
and mission of the Son, which spring from His eternal self-distinction from the Father. 
This is not the whole story, to be sure, as shown, for instance, in Pannenberg's insistence 
that the foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity is the historical revelation in Jesus 
Christ. Nevertheless, in the doctrines surveyed so far the focus has been on the trinitarian 
person at least as much as the historical figure. 
Yet according to some readings of Pannenberg common especially before the 
publication of ST, this may appear surprising. This explains some of the critique of 
Burhenn we discussed above that Pannenberg lacks a necessary understanding of God as 
Trinity, since so much of his work on Jesus Christ - especially his 1964 Grundzuege der 
Christologie, which was published in English four years later as JGM- has been taken up 
with defending the importance of the historical Jesus. Burhenn writes, 
`A major emphasis in his christology is that one must proceed from below - that 
is, one must begin logically from the man Jesus... Consequently, descriptions of 
the unity of essence come at the end rather than at the beginning of the task of 
systematic theology. " 
Since our treatment of Pannenberg's theology has been structured according to his own 
systematic ordering rather than chronologically, the surprise for those who have followed 
Pannenberg's career of seeing Pannenberg write at such length on the eternal Logos might 
escape us. 
In part this is explained by the limited focus of the earlier work. The English title 
might give the misleading impression that JGM offers a complete presentation of 
Pannenberg's christology. The purpose was, however, merely a detailed discussion of 
1 Burhenn (1975), p. 536. 
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"Grundzuege" or foundations for the task of christology, which among other things 
emphasised the need for an approach "from below" that sought the distinctive identity of 
Jesus not apart from history but in and through it. 
But there is also the undeniable fact that Pannenberg's thinking on christology has 
changed. Since the first edition of JGM Pannenberg has clarified certain aspects of his 
doctrine of God and has developed a full-blown doctrine of the Trinity, as we noted 
earlier. Although it is possible to overestimate the importance of this change, it is real 
nonetheless. There are genuine differences in STfrom JGMin overall structure and tone 
as well as in detail. What is this change and how does it relate to Pannenberg's increased 
focus on the doctrine of the Trinity? The following discussion will outline an answer in 
greater depth, but in general terms we may say here that after the publication of JGM 
which argued for the necessity of christology "from below" Pannenberg began to show 
worries about some of its implications if not qualified by an approach "from above" and 
that from the mid-1970's onwards there was a marked change of emphasis - although not, 
we believe, a substantial change in content - in his handling of christology. 
In the christological discussion in chapters 9 and 10 of ST the Trinity is put to work 
in Pannenberg's christology and forms a large part of what he has to say. Nevertheless, 
much of Pannenberg's concern is to provide an alternative trinitarian account to that of 
classical orthodoxy, which, as Pannenberg understands it, presupposes a doctrine that acts 
as a procrustean bed for the historical Jesus, rather than being its most compelling 
explanation. This will be the subject matter of the first thesis. The next two points 
outline Pannenberg's alternative account, the one expounding how Jesus Christ is 
properly understood in terms of the self-distinction from the Father of the eternal Son of 
God, the other stating that this is not something that is alien to the life of the immanent 
Trinity, nor even its copy or fulfilment, but the self-actualisation of the triune God. 
1. Christology, in its defence and explication of the deity of Jesus, should not seek refuge 
in a speculative doctrine of the Trinity that is the abstract presupposition of the 
incarnation. Rather, for it to be rational and theological, such a claim must arise as 
the reasonable and necessary explanation of the historical figure Jesus of Nazareth. 
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Christology, Pannenberg thinks, faces a methodological problem. It is this: 
Should we begin with the basis in God and his initiative in sending the Son, or 
should we move on the plane of human reality, on which we must show that the 
event took place, if it really took place at all? (2.277). 
Whether or not the terms are original to him, it is from Pannenberg, especially his JGM, 
that these two approaches have been known by their common terms, "christology from 
above" and "christology from below. " The issue is, which approach to adopt to begin 
theological reflection on the person of Jesus Christ. 
So far as Pannenberg explains the terms in ST 2 by "christology from above" is 
understood `interpreting the whole NT witness to Christ from the standpoint of this 
sending of the preexistent Son into the world' (2.278). That is, as Pannenberg put it in the 
earlier work, `the doctrine of the Trinity is presupposed and the question posed is: How 
has the Second Person of the Trinity (the Logos) assumed a human nature? '3 And by 
"christology from below" is meant an approach where `the historical Jesus Christ is the 
starting point and measure of all christological statements about his person, ' and 
`christological statements are viewed as an interpretation of his historical reality' (2.280). 
That is, without the presupposition of later Christian christological dogma the evidence of 
the life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth is taken independently and on its own merits as 
a piece of historical investigation - there has, then, to be a quest of the historical Jesus. 
Our main subject is not Pannenberg's christology, so we shall not give the two 
approaches the extended treatment that might be appropriate elsewhere. But one point at 
least should be noted that is relevant here, which sometimes has been misunderstood. 
Pannenberg is not adopting one approach to the exclusion of the other. This is especially 
clear in ST, for instance 2.290, which states, 
`regard for the reciprocal conditioning of concepts of God and concepts of human 
nature and destiny is a methodological premise if we are to achieve a 
systematically comprehensive christology. ' 
And, though not so clearly, it is present also in JGM. In the 1970's Pannenberg was aware 
that in that work there might have been an over-emphasis on the approach "from below" 
2 Although perhaps the later treatment has added nuance and sophistication, the original statement of 
the two christologies in JGM p. 33 is fundamentally identical. 
3 JGM, p. 34. 
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that gave a misleading interpretation of his general intent in framing a christology. So, 
responding to some of Tupper's critical remarks, he writes: 
Because of my approach from the anthropological-historical perspective ("from 
below"), I concentrated my attention on the inherent meaning of the events 
rather than on a divine intention attributed to them, although I did relate the 
historical events to the activity of God. Only after the Christology was published 
was I able to clarify certain aspects in the doctrine of God to my own satisfaction 
so that I could dare now to speak of a divine intention in historical events. ' 
And even before the publication of ST, one can see Pannenberg correcting 
impressions of such one-sidedness, in particular in the article "Christologie und 
Theologie. "5 In that article Pannenberg argues a point continued in ST, that without 
appeal to a concept of God, i. e. without theology, the significance of Jesus and his ministry 
gets lost. `The man Jesus is not accessible without his God. '6 Pannenberg writes that both 
classical incarnation christology (of which he had been critical in JGM) and the modern 
christology "from below" (which he had attempted to reinstate) suffer from a `common 
deficiency. ' For `they both agree that one already has to presuppose an idea of the reality 
of God gained otherwise than by Christology before one can begin Christology in the 
proper sense. " Then, dealing with misgivings he has with some contemporary approaches 
to christology he poses two questions: 
`Does not such a christology "from below" rest on a problematic presupposition, 
namely that the man Jesus in himself becomes the object of the investigation and 
his relation to God must first be put to one side? Is such a procedure fair to the 
situation that Jesus' existence has to be thought of as determined by the God he 
proclaimed, if the failure of his claim and his message should not be already 
presupposed? ' 
Then he continues, `Such questions have to be asked too of my own Jesus - God and Man, 
so far as it begins "from below" from the man Jesus of Nazareth. '$ 
The conclusion Pannenberg reaches is that christology should not focus one-sidedly 
on the man Jesus. Rather there needs to be a different sort of "christology from below, " 
which `can present itself as the implementation of the true christology "from above. "' 
4 Tupper, p. 305- 
5 GS72, pp. 129-145. 
6 Ibid. p. 130. 
7 Ibid. p. 134. 
8 Ibid. p. 131. 
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That is, it should be - in words that presage the presentation of ST- `the implementation 
of a christology of God's self-actualisation, ' which rests on `[n]ot the difference of Jesus 
from God, but His self-differentiation from him. '9 What is called for, then, is a more 
explicitly trinitarian christology. 
Yet, even after writing "Christologie und Theologie" in the postscript to the 5th 
German edition of JGM, Pannenberg wrote, `The alterations that appear to be necessary 
still do not mean any departure from the path engaged by this book, but rather a 
continuation of it. "° What we see in the development, then, is not so drastic a change as 
the "shift" detected by Philip Clayton, " but a change in emphasis in later works that 
draws out themes already present in Pannenberg's earlier writings. 
For this reason, one has to judge as insufficient the accounts of Pannenberg's 
christology - at whatever period - that see him advocating only the approach "from 
below, " even in JGM. Gunton, for instance, misses this twofold basis in Pannenberg's 
christology. For he writes, 
`In place of the double movement, with anthropological considerations being, so 
to speak, answered by a theological movement from above, Pannenberg's process 
of thought is continuous, a movement from the finite to the infinite. "' 
It is in fact the other way round than in Gunton's description. For `[o]nly 
methodologically, ' Pannenberg says, does he `give precedence to arguing from below... In 
truth, material primacy belongs to the eternal Son, who has become man by his 
incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth' (2.289). 13 
The point for Pannenberg, therefore, is not that an unabashedly trinitarian 
interpretation of the christological task is illegitimate, nor even that beginning from the 
counsels of the immanent trinitarian life of God and only then moving to their 
actualisation in the historical Jesus of Nazareth is completely excluded. Rather, there are 
two approaches that Pannenberg wants to avoid in employing such a procedure, both of 
9 Ibid, p. 145. 
10 JGM, p. 399. IST, p. 67 also states, `the emerging synthesis is no more what I earlier called a 
"christology from below. " But it presupposes and integrates that methodological approach. ' The 
element of "from above" in Pannenberg's works pre-dating ST is admirably highlighted in Rise, pp. 
127-187, especially 183-186 on "Christologie and Theologie". See also Shults, pp. 166ff. 
11 See his "The God of History and the Presence of the Future" Journal of Religion 65, (1985), pp. 98- 
108, where he uses the term `shift' on pp. 98 and 101, and `new methodology' to describe the emphases 
he finds in the articles within GST2. 
12 C. E. Gunton Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology (2"d ed. ) (London: SPCK, 
1997), p. 20. 
13 The very same point is made in JGM, p. 337. 
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which bear on the use of the Trinity in shaping his theology. The one is when the Trinity 
is presupposed in discussion of the person of Christ, the other when Christ's uniqueness 
and significance is solely understood in virtue of the Trinity. 
It is then, firstly, the presupposition - understood literally as a judgement supposed 
before historical investigation or corroboration - of an abstract doctrine of the Trinity 
that Pannenberg is seeking to exclude. The approach "from above" even of classical 
christology whose leading question is, `How has the Second Person of the Trinity (the 
Logos) assumed a human nature? '14 just like the approaches of those such as 
Schleiermacher and Bultmann who interpret the Christ as the temporal instantiation of 
some presupposed eternal principle - be it the religious God-consciousness15 or existential 
crisis, '6 - remains abstract and insufficient without the justification of proper historical 
investigation into the figure of Jesus of Nazareth. So, for Pannenberg, theology may not 
begin with a concept of God that is not shaped for its part by the revelation of God in the 
human history of Jesus. Only through Jesus is it manifest who or what God is. 17 
Theology had to learn this lesson in particular in the post-Reformation reaction to 
the Chalcedonian understanding of Christ's identity. With the advent of anti-trinitarian 
Socinianism that `threw doubt on the trinitarian understanding of the confession of 
Christ's deity and to a large extent the whole idea of his pre-existence, ' Pannenberg argues 
that `another way of grounding christological statements was needed' (2.278). Indeed 
Pannenberg makes the point that the need for an approach to christology "from below" 
was occasioned precisely because in the post-Reformation period the traditional 
trinitarian approach to viewing the person of Jesus - namely as God the Son, eternally 
begotten from and consubstantial with the Father - was being faced with serious 
questioning. Pannenberg writes: 
'Another way of grounding christological statements was needed only with the 
Reformation, when antitrinitarians and Socinians threw doubt on the trinitarian 
14 JGM, p. 34. 
1s Pannenberg believes Schleiermacher's approach insufficient for a proper christology from below and 
is actually the wrong type of christology from above. See 2.3 10 and JGM, p 25. 
16 Pannenberg, along with many of Bultmann's pupils in the post-war years called for a recovery of the 
quest of the historical Jesus, lest the Christ figure become the tool of ideologies. Hence he cites with 
approval Ebeling's critique: `If the person to whom the kerygma refers is in no way concretely 
definable in his historicity, if the reference of the kerygma to Jesus consists exclusively in assertions 
for whose understanding Jesus himself is irrelevant, as merely a cipher that is accidental and in itself 
says nothing, then the kerygma - if it then could be kerygma at all - would be pure myth' (G. Ebeling 
Theology and Proclamation, (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1962), p. 64, cited in JGM, p. 27) 
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understanding of the confession of Christ's deity and to a large extent the whole 
idea of his preexistence. Since the criticism was made on the basis of a strict 
scripture principle, debate with it had to be in terms of biblical exposition. 
Hence the messiahship of Jesus as the core of the NT witness and the basis of 
dogmatic statements about his person came increasingly to the fore' (2.278-279). 
Those approaches of christology "from above" that Pannenberg considers illegitimate, 
then, are those that do not allow an irreducible epistemological basis in Christ's human 
history per Se, i. e., those that cannot be justified in terms of that history and do not 
necessarily rest on it. 
There is, however, another approach that Pannenberg's method excludes, although 
this is not so obvious as the matter of abstract presupposition of trinitarian doctrine. That 
is, that Jesus' uniqueness and significance is to be understood in virtue of the Trinity. This 
point is not so obvious as the rejection of an abstractly presupposed doctrine of the 
Trinity, since Pannenberg does not treat this matter directly. Yet it is important, and will 
be taken up in more detail later in our concluding critical evaluation of the thorough 
trinitarianism of Pannenberg's theology. 
A clear statement of what is meant by understanding Jesus' uniqueness and 
significance in virtue of the Trinity is the pithy phrase of Paul Molnar: `Christ's humanity 
draws its meaning from the immanent Trinity and not from history. '18 It is in virtue ofthe 
Trinity, since it is the strength of the trinitarian action alone and not of a corresponding 
human strength that is the key to Jesus' identity and how we come to know Him. 
Such a position does not dispute the need to avoid the abstract presupposition 
Pannenberg also denies. Rather, it introduces the distinction that although Christ's 
identity is revealed in His human nature, for we should not look anywhere other than 
Jesus to know the triune God, it is not in virtue ofHis human nature that this knowledge 
comes, but only by the power of the second person of the Trinity incarnate in that one 
human being. Yet, in the very places where one might look for Pannenberg offering such 
a distinction, it is not there. So, for instance, while acknowledging that `only God himself 
could be behind this event, ' he goes on to state that `we can know that it actually 
happened only as it took place on the plane of our human, creaturely reality' (2.277). 
Again, he writes, 
17 See the remarks in GS72, pp. 129ff. 
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'We must discover the contours of the divine sonship of Jesus in his human 
reality, which as eternal sonship precedes his historical existence on earth and 
must be regarded as the creative basis of his human existence' (2.325), 
once more omitting any such distinction as we have noted. Furthermore, a large section 
of chapter 9, "Anthropology and Christology" is devoted to the attempt to decipher 
something unique in Christ's humanity per se that would justify Christian claims to His 
uniqueness and divinity. '9 Svein Rise, commenting on JGM, nicely puts his finger on this 
emphasis: 
`A fundamental idea in the book on christology is that the eternal God becomes 
visible in Jesus' factual, historical activity. This is why Pannenberg emphasizes 
that the revelation of God takes place, not only through individual events in 
Jesus' life, but in Jesus' history as a whole. It seems therefore to be quite natural 
that christology therefore must take its starting-point in the human being Jesus, 
and that it must build in all circumstances on the historical accounts of Jesus' 
life . 
"120 
Of course, if Pannenberg wishes to make room for the possibility of a quest of the 
historical Jesus, i. e., the investigation of Jesus' identity on the basis of a general historical 
method, it follows that to state that Jesus' identity is comprehensible only in virtue of the 
triune God removes the possibility of a neutral "from below" discovery of Christ's 
significance that he is after. We recognise the consistency here. Nevertheless, we must 
also note that the question remains whether it is possible to square such a claim that 
Christ's self-revelation is not solely empowered by His being the second person of the 
Trinity but requires arguments for the historicity of his resurrection, with Pannenberg's 
other claim to write the most trinitarian of known theologies. For now we shall have to 
leave this question hanging until later, and move onto further elements of Pannenberg's 
trinitarian christology. 
There is more to be said on this particular matter. And what we have to say will not 
be without criticism, since Pannenberg's remarks here fit into a matrix of themes where 
we do not believe the high trinitarian credentials he has set himself have been met. In 
18 Molnar, p. 280 on Barth's understanding of the anhypostasis of Christ's human nature. 
19 See 2.297-323, where Christ's significance is traced to His founding a new humanity as the new 
Adam. 
20 Rise, p. 149. 
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this respect his theology is not a step forward from the emphases of thinkers that have 
preceded him. 
2. The historical Jesus of Nazareth is the eternal Son of God, the second person of the 
Trinity. The epistemological basis of Jesus' divine sonship is His resurrection, which 
is the Father's vindication of, and identification with, Jesus Christ. The ontological 
basis of Jesus' divine sonship is His self-distinction from the Father, which finds its 
ultimate realisation and perfect expression in Christ's suffering obedience. 
For Pannenberg there has to be a way from below to above for christology to have a 
proper foundation. Yet there also has to be a way from above to below to account for the 
substance of the claim that the man Jesus is the eternal Son of God. 
Yet that this individual has not just human, but also divine status needs grounding. 
And this grounding may not be the mere claim to, or sense of authority, on the part of 
Jesus. It has to be something about Jesus' observable human historical existence, rather 
than His divine eternal sonship, which gives epistemological legitimacy to claims for His 
deity, although of course Pannenberg believes the ontological primacy for the claim 
attaches to His triune identity. 
The Christian claim that the historical individual Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah of 
Israel and the pre-existent Son of God, the second person of the triune Godhead must 
have a basis. In line with his advocacy of the necessity and mutual compatibility of doing 
christology both "from below" and "from above, " Pannenberg posits a dual basis for 
Christ's eternal divine sonship: epistemologically, it is based in Christ's resurrection; 
ontologically, it is based in the Son's eternal self-distinction from the Father. 
Epistemological basis 
That a proper understanding of Jesus Christ requires us to see in Him the person of the 
Son of God who is eternally pre-existent, finds its epistemological basis, for Pannenberg, 
in the resurrection. For, it is `the Easter event, ' he says, which 
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`became the starting point of apostolic proclamation and the church's 
christology. Both rest on the distinctive significance of this event in its reference 
back to the pre-Easter history of Jesus' (2.363). 
How is this so? Working from below to above, the resurrection of Jesus by God is a 
twofold validation. Firstly and directly it demonstrates that Jesus was executed 
innocently and is God's approved messenger, and secondly and more importantly that 
God is eternally one with this man of Nazareth. 
Firstly, then, the resurrection of Jesus, which for Pannenberg is His divine 
confirmation and vindication, clears Him of all charges laid against Him. In particular He 
is justified in face of his Jewish and Roman accuser. So Jesus' raising overturns the Jewish 
charge of blasphemy. For, `precisely by not making himself equal to God, he is righteous 
before God as the "Son" of the Father, as the resurrection discloses this' (2.364). And 
against the condemnation by the Romans, by God's resurrection it is shown that Jesus `is 
not the Messiah in the sense of a political ruler and therefore in the sense of the charge of 
revolt against Roman domination, ' but `was confirmed as a fully authorized representative 
of the royal rule of God that he proclaimed' (2.364). 
And, second, this divine validation of God's raising Jesus from the dead also has what 
Pannenberg calls retroactive force. That is, it is a divine stamp of approval that reaches 
back to Jesus' ministry, His personal identity and even into the furthest reaches of 
eternity, demonstrating that Jesus of Nazareth is not just an innocent divine messenger. It 
shows, rather, that He is the very presence of the divine rule, the Messiah in person, and - 
ultimately - God the Son from all eternity. 
The resurrection, then, is first of all, the validation of the reality of Jesus' implied 
claim, namely, that the future of God is present in and by him. For, Pannenberg states, 
`The resurrection of Jesus now gives confirmation that already in his earthly 
ministry he acted on the Father's authority, so that the kingly rule of the Father 
was indeed present in him' (2.365). 
Next, it shows that not just Jesus' ministry, but His whole person and identity were at one 
with the Father. `The resurrection of Jesus, ' Pannenberg continues, 
`confirmed not merely his message and work, as though the content of these 
were detachable from his person, but Jesus himself, the person upon whom his 
message had cast a half-light. Jesus' filial relation to the Father thus could rightly 
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be dated back to the actual beginning of his earthly existence, to his conception 
and birth' (2.365-366). 
And the resurrection's revelation of the Son has a retroactive force that goes back beyond 
this, stretching into the furthest eternity. `[T]he confirmation of his message by the God 
who raised him to life, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`says ... that God is from all eternity the One whom Jesus proclaimed him to 
be... if the Father is from all eternity the One he is shown historically to be in 
relation to Jesus his Son, and through him, then we cannot think of the Father 
apart from the Son... The relation reaches back also to the time before his earthly 
birth' (2.367). 
So, in the light of the resurrection, `we must speak of a preexistence of the Son' (2.368), 
and not some mere ideal or functional pre-existence, but such that `the Father cannot be 
the Father without the Son and hence is never without the Son' (2.371). And on this 
basis, Pannenberg believes, one can rightly affirm the orthodox doctrine worked out in 
the 4th century. 
So, the resurrection is Pannenberg's epistemological basis of Jesus being God the Son. 
We now consider the ontological basis, - or what Pannenberg terms the "inner basis, " 
which is the intra-trinitarian rationale for the incarnation of the Son whose deity we have 
reason to affirm on the basis of His resurrection. 
Ontological basis 
This "inner basis" is, he writes, not some abstract divine nature, but the specific being as 
the Son. In particular it is - as predicted in "Christologie und Theologie" - the Son's self- 
distinction from God the Father. To understand this better, let us see how Pannenberg 
differentiates his understanding from what he considers the import of the two natures 
theory, namely that the person of Christ should be understood as constituted of a divine 
and a human nature. Two differences are especially instructive for our purposes. 
The first is that the incarnation has to be understood as more than protological union. 
There was, Pannenberg thinks, `a fateful change.. . or at least a fateful change of emphasis' 
in the early church21 when `the schema of twofold evaluation "after the flesh" and "after 
the spirit"' was reinterpreted so that `succession gave way to simultaneity. ' The 
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incarnation, i. e. the union of deity and humanity in Christ, then, was considered solely in 
terms of the beginning of Jesus' existence. For Pannenberg, such an approach will not do, 
even if Easter shows that Jesus' conception was the becoming human of the eternal Son. 
As he goes on to elucidate, 
`Only in his life as a whole is he the Son. Hence we must not restrict what we 
say about the incarnation to his conception and birth at the beginning. If he had 
followed a different path in his human development, if he had not been baptized 
by John, if he had not been the herald of the rule of God, if he had not accepted 
the consequences of his mission by taking the path of suffering, he would not be 
the Son of God. And he is this only in the light of Easter morning because only 
in this light is his path defined unequivocally as a path of obedience and not of 
human arrogance' (2.384). 
Christ's sonship, the actualisation of the divine sonship of eternity, had to be "made 
perfect" in the course of His life, so for Pannenberg more than a protological union is at 
stake in the formation of Jesus' identity. We have to think of the sonship as mediated by 
jesus'relation with the Father. 
The second difference in Pannenberg's account from the two-natures doctrine, is that 
Jesus is God incarnate not in the sense of the linking of deity per se with the humanity, 
but of the divine person who eternally distinguishes Himself from the Father in loving 
obedience. An undifferentiated idea of God, such as Pannenberg detects in the concept of 
a "divine nature, " makes sense of biblical texts that subordinate the Son to the Father by 
ascribing them to Christ's humanity alone-22 Yet Pannenberg's explanation arises not 
from the concept of human nature, but the triune reality, i. e., the Son's relationship to the 
Father. 
A key instance of this is Pannenberg's explaining why `Jesus did not make himself 
equal to God, not even in the sense of declaring himself to be the Son of God. ' 
Pannenberg explains it thus: 
He differentiated himself from God by subordinating himself to the Father so 
that he might serve the Father's lordship by all that he did.. . Only in this self- 
distinction from the Father by subordination to his royal rule, and in service to 
it, is he the Son (2.363). 
21 In particular Pannenberg cites Ignatius Ephesians 18.2. 
22 Pannenberg notes among others Mark 10.17-18; John 10: 33; 14: 28. See 1.263,309-310 and 2.372- 
373. 
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Both in His incarnation and His eternity, Pannenberg thinks, "`The Son can do nothing of 
his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing" (John 5: 19)' (2.372). And so for 
the Son, this renunciation of the honour due to the Father befits both His eternal deity 
and His assumed humanity. As Pannenberg puts it, 
`The relation of the Son to the Father is characterized in eternity by the 
subordination to the Father, by the self-distinction from the majesty of the 
Father, which took historical form in the human relation of Jesus to God... As the 
incarnation of the Logos was the result of the self-emptying of the eternal Son in 
his self-distinction from the Father, so the self-humbling of Jesus in obedience to 
his sending by the Father is the medium of the manifestation of the Son on the 
path of his earthly life' (2.377)23 
It is the natural outflow of His eternal submission to the Father in the triune life. Indeed 
we are to understand the resurrection in these terms. `The divine vindication vis-ä-vis the 
judgment of human judges says.. . that precisely by not making himself equal to God, he is 
righteous before God as the "Son" of the Father' (2.364). 
There is in ST a repeated emphasis on the fact that this assuming flesh by God the 
Son is not alien or accidental. For example, Pannenberg states, `The deity is not an 
addition to this reality [the human history of Jesus]' (2.325), nor may the eternal Son be 
`detached' or `treated in isolation' (2.368) from the incarnation, and `The self-emptying of 
the Preexistent is not a surrender or negation of his deity as the Son. It is its activation' 
(2.327). Again, 
`[T]he assuming of human existence by the eternal Son is not to be seen as the 
adding of a nature that is alien to his deity. It is the self-created medium of his 
extreme self-actualization in consequence of his free self-distinction from the 
Father, i. e., a way of fulfilling his eternal sonship' (2.325). 
The Son who became incarnate as the human Jesus did indeed empty Himself, but this is 
wholly appropriate to His eternity. 
Two consequences follow. The first is that Pannenberg joins the ranks of the critics 
of kenotic christology, i. e., the doctrine outlined in such works as G. Thomasius's Christi 
Person und Werk24 and C. Gore's The Incarnation of the Son of God, 21 that the self- 
23 The same point is made on JGM, p. 336. 
24 Christi Person und Werk: Darstellung der evangelischen-lutheranischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkt 
der Christologie aus (3`d ed. ) (ed. F. J. Winter) (Erlangen: 1886,1888). 
252 nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1892). 
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emptying of the Logos involved the putting aside of at least some of the attributes of deity. 
Critics of kenosis, including Dorner, says Pannenberg, 
`rightly saw here a renouncing of deity itself. This would then destroy the whole 
concept of incarnation. If God is not truly and totally in Christ, what sense does 
it make to talk of the reconciliation of the world with God in him? ' (2.378). 
Rather such kenosis as there is in the incarnation is for Pannenberg not the setting aside 
of deity, but the true expression and actualisation of the God, who in the person of the 
Son eternally offers Himself in submission to the Father. The incarnation, then, is not the 
putting off of the divine reality, but deity put into action. `The self-emptying of the 
Preexistent, ' Pannenberg writes, 
'is to be understood as a renunciation not of his divine essence but simply of any 
equating of himself with the Father. By distinguishing the Father from himself 
as the one God, the Son certainly moved out of the unity of the deity and became 
man. But in so doing he actively expressed his divine essence as the Son. The 
self-emptying of the preexistent is not a surrender or negation of his deity as the 
Son. It is its activation. Hence the end of his earthly path in obedience to the 
Father is the revelation of his deity' (2.377). 
The christological hymn of Philippians 2, then, Pannenberg understands as referring 
neither to the human Jesus or the divine Son exclusively, but to both, the temporal 
obedience of the one being the eternal self-differentiation of the other. 26 
The second is that, for Pannenberg, the ultimate explanation for the nature of the 
incarnation is not so much determined by human misery, as if the Son's mission were an 
accommodation to humanity's plight that otherwise ill befits the Son's divine majesty. 
Rather its highest and most basic ground is the inner-triune relations themselves, most 
notably that of the Son to the Father which came to expression in the incarnation. Jesus' 
obedience, Pannenberg says, 
`should not be understood first as an unselfish turning to us, though it is that also. 
Rather, it is primarily an expression of the self-giving of the Son to the Father in 
an obedience that desires nothing for self but serves totally the glorifying of God 
and the coming of his kingdom' (2.379). 
For these reasons, then, Jesus can only be properly understood, so far as Pannenberg 
is concerned, in trinitarian terms. The identification of Jesus with the divine Son is, he 
26 See 2.375-377. 
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admits, an indirect one, in that as the One in whose submission His Father's kingdom is 
realised, He alone must eternally and essentially belong to Israel's God. But Christ, as the 
herald of the kingdom, is the One the Father completely identifies with and as the one in 
complete and perfect submission to the Father, corresponds perfectly to the second person 
of the divine life. The humiliation and suffering of the Son of God are not, then, a drastic 
emergency measure that fits ill with the divine Christ, but are His perfect self-expression. 
On the particular points discussed here there are different avenues of criticism. One 
has been voiced already by Klaus Vechtel. In Trinitaet und Zukunft he argues that it is 
better to say that the Son corresponds to the Father rather than distinguishes Himself 
from Him. Vechtel writes: 
God has revealed Himself in the life and death of Jesus not just provisionally, but 
definitively, in unique events and in a way that can never be surpassed. This 
does not mean ... the distinction, but the mutual correspondence and unity of the 
trinitarian persons ... the Son corresponds to the Father perfectly in His 
obedience, and the Father corresponds to the Son in remaining faithful to Him 
beyond death and raising Him from the dead. 27 
Against Vechtel, however, we must state that it does not follow that Pannenberg's 
emphasis on the Son's self-distinction contradicts His correspondence to the Father. They 
are not alternatives, since it is precisely as self-distinction that Christ's correspondence 
takes its form. As Pannenberg writes: 
There is no "correspondence", however, with the Father without obedient 
submission to his will, which is to say without self-distinction that does not put 
one's own person in the place of God, but rather submits to the authority of the 
Father. Furthermore, it could be argued that the description of Jesus' 
relationship to the Father in terms of "correspondence" needs to be interpreted as 
self-distinction, because otherwise the personal distinctiveness would not be 
expressed. 28 
And as he notes in the same place, correspondence is a term he himself uses. We do not, 
then, believe Vechtel's criticism holds. 
We offer another criticism. It is this: why is the basis of Pannenbergs Christology 
trinitarian ontologically and not epistemologically? This too belongs to that matrix of 
concerns about Pannenberg's reticence concerning the Trinity on matters methodological 
27 Vechtel, p. 272, emphasis retained. 
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and epistemological, and can be formulated as follows. If, as Pannenberg says, Christ's 
person and being have their basis in the free, gracious self-presentation of the triune God 
and can only be rightly understood as such, why is this not also the case for how we come 
to knowHim? 
The human being, Jesus of Nazareth, has no independent existence apart from the 
sustaining power of the second triune person. On this Pannenberg is clear, and he argues 
the point saying that the assumed humanity `is the [Son's] self-created medium of his 
extreme self-actualization' (2.325). But is it equally clear that our perceiving the identity 
of Jesus of Nazareth has no independent existence apart from the enabling and sustaining 
power of the triune God? This is stated both in scripture29 and within the theological 
tradition 30 In Pannenberg, however, it is the resurrection - and that conceived in terms 
of our positive judgement of its conformity to valid historical investigation and method - 
that performs this function, rather than spiritual discernment. Indeed one traditional way 
of safeguarding this truth, i. e. the doctrine of the anhypostasia or impersonalitas of 
Christ's human nature that states that the active subject during the incarnation was the 
person of the Son of God rather than the assumed humanity, Pannenberg misinterprets to 
mean that Jesus lacks what we commonly call a "personality" (2.389). In our conclusion 
we shall see that this bifurcation of who Jesus is and how we come to know Him is a 
pervading problem within ST, with important consequences for its high trinitarian 
aspirations. 
Just as we saw in the previous chapter that the incarnation was not alien to the 
assumed humanity, 31 so it is not alien to God the Son who assumed it. Neither is it alien 
to the other trinitarian persons, as we shall see under the following point. 
3. The incarnation reveals and involves not just the Son of God, but the Father and Holy 
Spirit also: it is the self-actualisation of the triune God. 
28 "DEET, " p. 4. 
29 As examples we cite Matt. 16: 17, John 6: 44-46 and the narrative of Luke 24 where v45 states that 
knowledge of the risen Christ came not from the evidence of the resurrection presented to him but to 
His own opening of their minds. 
30 Calvin, for instance, writes that there is no effect unless `Christ himself, inner Schoolmaster, did not 
by his Spirit draw to himself those given to him by the Father' (Institutes 3.1.4). 
31 See ST chapter 8 and 2.385-386. 
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The incarnation, we have seen, is not alien to the deity of the Son. Yet for Pannenberg 
there is more: it `is not irrelevant to the deity of the trinitarian God, ' and `was also 
significant for the eternal fellowship of the Father with the Son by the Holy Spirit' 
(2.389) 32 That this is so, of course, gives substance to two others of Pannenberg's claims. 
On the one hand, that God involves Himself in time in this way is a fitting realisation of 
the fullness of the divine life, thus demonstrating the unity of economic and immanent 
trinities. And on the other, it is in this that we gain sufficient knowledge of the divine 
being, and so the history of Jesus is able to serve as the foundation for the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Yet the point of emphasis for Pannenberg here is that in Jesus Christ the triune 
God is Himself. 
The incarnation, to use Pannenberg's own expression, is God's "self-actualisation. " 
Pannenberg does not offer any exact definition of what he means in positive terms, 
although we might provide a rough summary thus: in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ 
we have God's very self made real and effective with respect to His creation. His 
approach rather is to make clear how not to understand what he means by offering three 
clarifications or qualifications. 
The first clarification he offers is that divine self-actualisation `cannot mean that the 
trinitarian God has no prior reality in himself (2.393). This is not just the most natural 
meaning in semantic terms, since there has, for Pannenberg, to be a self already to be the 
subject of its actualisation. It is also theological reality. For, 
`The monarchy of the Father had been actualized already in the eternal 
fellowship of the Trinity. It did not need the existence of a world. In all eternity 
the Son gives the Father the honor of his kingly rule. The rule is thus 
eternal... But it now applies to creation as well' (2.390). 
Here, again as in ST chapter 7, we have clear evidence of distance between Pannenberg's 
own position and that of Hegel, whose understanding of God is that He only actualises 
Himself for the first time in the course of the self-development of spirit. 
We have noted before that there might be misgivings about how successfully 
Pannenberg safeguards the divine freedom, yet we have to regard as correct Grenz's 
attempt to distance Pannenberg's christology from the charges of Hegelianism laid by 
32 Emphasis added. 
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Roger Olson 13 In Olson's view Pannenberg's Christology undermines the `graciousness of 
God's redemptive activity in the history of Jesus Christ, ' since `God must save the world 
by unifying it with himself in order to realize his own deity. '34 Olson's reading conflates 
Hegel's view of God being necessarily Creator and Pannenberg's according to which He is 
only contingently so. As Grenz demonstrates, `the process of God's self-realization in the 
world is but the revelation in the history of the world of the eternal self-realization of 
God found in the intertrinitarian life. '35 
The second is when the subject and result of divine action are different. As 
actualisation of God's self, Pannenberg argues, subject and result have to be the same. In 
other words, economic and immanent trinities are the same. Hence, he states: 
The term "self-actualization" is better for what is at issue than Barth's "repetition 
of God" because it avoids the idea of copying and instead pregnantly expresses 
the unity of the immanent and economic Trinity. The reality that is achieved in 
the eternal fellowship of the Trinity and by the economy of its action in the 
world is one and the same (2.393). 
So, it is not a correlate of God that appears in the life and ministry of Christ. It is not that 
in the incarnation God is like Himself or perfectly corresponds to Himself, but really is 
Himself. 
The third is that `we do not have a simple subject but the threefold subjectivity of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit as both the origin and the result of the event. ' Here, as in 
many other places, the idealist doctrine of the Trinity is in Pannenberg's sights. We do 
not have to deal with a God who is a single subject comprising three moments of action or 
expression. `[T]he action of the trinitarian persons, ' Pannenberg continues, 
`is... oriented... to the other persons. In the economy of salvation the same is true 
of the sending of the Son by the Father, of the Son's obedience to the Father, and 
of the glorifying of the Father and the Son by the Spirit. Hence the self- 
actualization of the one God is one of reciprocity in the relations of the persons 
and the result of their mutual self-giving to each other' (2.394). 
33 See his "The Human Self-realization of God: Hegelian Elements in Pannenberg's Christology, " 
Perspectives in Religious Studies 13 (1986), pp. 207-223. 
34 Ibid. p. 222. 
35 (1990), pp. 138-139. 
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And so it is that the presence of God and His kingdom, for Pannenberg, are mediated in 
an inner-triune distinction and reciprocity. For there is a sending, ruling Father as well as 
an obedient Son on whom the Father depends (2.391). 
The incarnation, then, is the presence and enactment of the kingdom of God, i. e. self- 
realisation of the God who is both our Creator and Lord and relationship with whom is 
our destiny. `Since, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`we cannot separate the deity of God from his royal lordship, it follows that the 
irruption of this lordship in the work of the Son has as its content the absolute 
reality of God in and for the world' (2.392). 
Thus it is in the very act of reconciliation that expresses the self-distinction of the Son 
that godself is revealed and enacted in creation. 
This explains Pannenberg's remarks on the divine absence and impotence, which are 
themselves to be understood in expressly trinitarian terms. For, Pannenberg writes, the 
world that has emancipated itself from God experiences Him only as a limit, and God the 
Father is absent for such creatures, this absence expressing creation's inescapable 
judgement. But since Pannenberg holds that `without lordship over his creation, God 
would not be God' (2.390), to actualise Himself God must make himself present and exert 
His power, so inaction is not an option. Yet judgement too, while exerting divine 
authority to some extent over against creation, is also insufficient. While an assertion of 
might, it is nevertheless a thwarting of His purpose. For as Pannenberg puts it, 
`By judgment God remains the Lord of creatures that turn aside from him. But 
the judgment that sinners cannot escape also expresses the impotence of the 
Creator. God as Creator does not will the death of sinners.. . He wills the 
existence and life of his creatures' (2.391-392). 
God, to be Himself, therefore, cannot be idle or merely Judge. He has to become 
incarnate. So, Pannenberg continues: 
In this sense his deity is tied to the sending of the Son, who with the Spirit is 
already present to all creatures from creation, but who himself also took 
creaturely form in order that by his message the future of God might be present 
to the world, to its salvation and not its judgment. In this way the Son glorifies 
the Father in the world and completes the work of creation (2.392). 
For the Son in His crucifixion both shows and takes the place of our two-fold plight of on 
the one hand our independent self-assertion against God, and on the other the Father's 
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absence from us. But for God's self and rule this cannot be the end, since we also share in 
the new life by the Spirit that the Father grants the Son. For it is in this self-distinction 
and mutual dependence that constitute the divine life that we receive salvation. 
How this salvation is conceived in terms of the Trinity we explore in subsequent chapters. 
Yet in ending this section on the christology in ST, let us offer a brief critical review. We 
have seen that, for Pannenberg, the Trinity is operative, but not as an abstract 
presupposition from which to derive the incarnation. Christ's identity and significance 
are to be discovered, rather, in the contours of His earthly historical existence, in which 
we come to realise that the ontological basis for Jesus' divine sonship is His eternal self- 
distinction from the Father. Pannenberg also emphasises that the incarnation is the self- 
actualisation of the whole Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and so in Jesus Christ we 
are dealing with the divine reality in its triune fullness. 
By definition at the heart of any Christian theology is the treatment of christology, 
and the moves made here will be of significant moment for the rest of systematic 
theology. To this Pannenberg is no exception, and more extensive studies than the one 
here would be able to show the importance of the conclusions reached in this locus for 
shaping the whole of his theology. The account Pannenberg offers has roused several 
misgivings in his readers. Some of these have been misunderstandings as we have shown. 
There nevertheless remain for us misgivings about the argument in ST chapters 9 and 10, 
misgivings bearing on our trinitarian theme, which as yet appear unresolved. We shall 
return to them again. 
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Chapter 6 
PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE 
OF RECONCILIATION 
There is a development in Pannenberg's thinking on reconciliation that mirrors the 
development we noted in his christology. Already in 1974 Pannenberg alerted his readers 
that one day he would produce an account of the atonement that would give due weight 
to the action of God in the cross of Christ. He felt that he needed to revise the 
interpretation of the crucifixion he offered in JGM, where his approach "from below" - as 
we noted in the previous chapter - was an anthropological-historical perspective that 
focussed on the inherent meaning of the events rather than on a divine intention 
attributed to them. A supplementing was called for, so that in the postscript to Tupper's 
book he writes: 
Only after the Christology was published was I able to clarify certain aspects in 
the doctrine of God to my own satisfaction so that I could dare now to speak of a 
divine intention in historical events. As a consequence, in relation to the 
crucifixion, as in other respects, the self-explication of God in the history of Jesus 
will get closer attention when I am able someday to revise the text of that book. " 
Not that talk of divine agency was absent from JGM, even talk of trinitarian divine 
agency, as we have already seen, but in the later presentation of Christ's reconciling work 
in ST the themes to which Pannenberg believes he paid insufficient attention in the 
earlier work are given greater treatment. In chapter 11 of ST, `The Reconciliation of the 
World', this is especially clear. The discussion is structured around a series of issues - in 
particular the idea that reconciliation embraces not just the past history of Jesus but also 
the present and ongoing ministry of reconciliation -, which appear easier to resolve once 
trinitarian thinking is put to work. The divine agency, which Pannenberg has said he 
wanted to clarify, has to do primarily with a proper understanding of the human 
reception of reconciliation. As he puts the matter, 
'Tupper, pp. 304-305. 
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`Is the divine action in Christ's death no more than the object of human 
interpretation and reception? Or is God himself at work in the proclaiming of 
Christ's death as the reconciliation of the world to him? If he is, is there still 
room for the free entry into his reconciliation of those who are to be reconciled? ' 
(2.437). 
So, a keynote of Pannenberg's presentation here is the scope of reconciliation. For one 
thing, the concept covers not merely the past history of Jesus, but also the present 
apostolic ministry of reconciliation. For another, the concept involves not just the work 
of the Son during His earthly ministry but also human reception by the Spirit, raising the 
issue of how the history of reception relates to God's own reconciling action in the death 
of Christ. 
The subjectivity of the triune God in the reconciliation of the world is at the 
forefront of Pannenberg's trinitarian understanding in his discussion, and it will therefore 
be our focus too. Yet other less dominant themes are of note. In particular we should 
note the treatment of salvation, which for Pannenberg is primarily an eschatological 
event, and reconciliation, which is a present reality. This ties in with earlier discussions, 
which show that God's triune action mirrors the breaking in of the future into time that is 
structurally identical with the concept of the true Infinite. `Since future salvation is 
mediated in the present by Jesus, ' Pannenberg writes, `we may extend the term soteria to 
his work' (2.402). The Trinity, therefore, is operative not just in the fourth subsection 
("The Triune God as Reconciler of the World"), but in the earlier ones also. Nevertheless, 
we shall guide our discussion according to where Pannenberg is most explicitly 
trinitarian, and investigate in turn the subjectivity of each of the triune persons in 
reconciliation. 
1. The Father is the reconciling God in giving His Son for us and sending Him to die for 
our salvation, but not so as to exclude the free co-operation of the other trinitarian 
persons. 
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`It is only a correct doctrine of God that makes it possible to integrate Jesus' death into 
the concept of God in such a way that the death too can be understood as a mediation 
of the Father's divine reality. ' 
The cross was the act of God the Father to reconcile the world. It is not just an event to 
be understood in terms of the actions and motivations of the human agents involved, but 
also has its basis in the divine initiative of the Father who sent His Son into the world to 
fulfil His mission which necessarily culminated in His salvific crucifixion. As Pannenberg 
argues, 
In the crucifixion of Jesus the law of action did not rest finally with the human 
executioners. Through all the baseness, cowardice and brutality, God the Father 
was at work in this event according to his providential directing of the course of 
history. He "gave up" his Son (2.438). 
In this context he notes the NT evidence, not merely where the Father is said to "give up" 
His Son (e. g., Rom. 8: 32), but also where He "sent" (Rom. 8: 3) and "gave" Him (John 3: 16). 
Christ's reconciling was, therefore, the action of the sending and giving Father. 
This follows from the exegetical evidence that the crucifixion follows as a 
consequence of Jesus' proclamation of the imminence of God's kingdom. The Son so 
completely subjects Himself to the rule of the Father as to follow His will and initiative. 
And it is also, for Pannenberg, the proper inference from the resurrection. In the 
resurrection the Father raised and exalted His Son, and so is God the Reconciler. `God is 
the acting subject in this expiatory action, for... the crucifixion of Jesus has atoning force 
only in the light of his resurrection by God. ' For it is in this way, Pannenberg continues, 
that `God showed himself to be the Victor over sin and death in reconciliation of the 
world' (2.412). 
To view the Father as the subject of reconciliation is to distinguish it from two 
approaches Pannenberg rejects, on the one hand to see the Father either as the object of 
reconciliation, not its subject, or on the other to consider Him the sole subject of 
reconciliation to the exclusion of Son and Spirit. Pannenberg detects the former 
procedure in many classical doctrines of the atonement. Key for Pannenberg is 2 Cor. 
5: 19, whence he concludes, `God did not have to be reconciled; the world is reconciled by 
Z Rise, p. 197. 
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God in Christ' (2.407). That is, what has to be changed is not the nature or disposition of 
an otherwise unreconciled or unreconcileable deity, whether this be by the obedience of 
the Son or by the sacrificing of His life on the cross, but a world which is at enmity with 
the God who loves it. 
This insight was progressively lost in Christian theology, Pannenberg believes, from 
the time of Irenaeus. For Irenaeus, our reconciliation with God accomplished by the 
second Adam is Jesus' reconciling, by His perfect obedience, the Father, against whom we 
had sinned. As he puts it, `in the last times the Lord has restored us into friendship 
through His incarnation, having become "the Mediator between God and men", 
propitiating indeed for us the Father against whom we had sinned. '3 The Father, on this 
model, is made propitious to sinful men on the basis of the sacrificial self-offering of the 
Son. So, for Pannenberg one should not, with Irenaeus and much subsequent tradition, 
wrongly interpret Romans 5: 19 (`For just as by the one man's disobedience the many were 
made sinners, so by the one man's obedience the many will be made righteous), which, he 
says, `does not speak of any softening of an angry Father by the sacrificial death of Christ' 
(2.404) ,4 
but should start from 2 Corinthians 5: 19 ('in Christ God was reconciling the 
world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them') and view the Father as 
reconciliation's active subject. 
In emphasising the work of the triune God of reconciliation, therefore, Pannenberg 
departs from the satisfaction theory of the atonement, which has dominated much 
Western theology up to the post-Reformation period. According to this theory, a hostile 
God who is outraged by human sin and disobedience is the object of reconciliation, 
satisfied and appeased by Christ's procuring merit or righteousness for us by His dying on 
the cross in our stead. ' In such construals Pannenberg thinks that the Father is portrayed 
wrongly as the recipient of Christ's offering, rather than as the agent. So, he concludes, 
3 Irenaeus Against Heresies 5.17.1 
° Pannenberg here seems in our opinion to treat the issue with a little over-simplification. 
Notwithstanding his reliance on the arguments of Ritschl, acknowledged in Problemgeschichte, there is 
the other problem that his reference to Rom. 5: 19 does not pay attention to the context of the letter, 
especially chapters 1-3. By chapter 3 there has built up a large amount of divine wrath, yet there 
results `peace with God' in 5: 1. One need not by any means intend to say that the atonement is 
something done to the Father, rather than by him. Yet one can say that what also needs to be dealt with 
is the problem of the divine displeasure, which must be put right by Christ's death in order for peace to 
be proclaimed. 
SA typical articulation of this is the shared statement of the Augsburg Confession (art. 3) and the 39 
Articles (art. 2), which reads, 'Christ.. . was crucified, dead and buried, that he might reconcile the 
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'It must be regarded as a merit of modem Protestant theology that after critical 
destruction of the satisfaction theory it reinstated the Pauline orientation of 
reconciliation statements to the world, to us who are to be reconciled. It now 
came to view the reconciliation of the world by Christ as an outworking of the 
love of God in the face of the opposition of humans who are hostile to God, a 
love of God that we see operative through Jesus Christ' (2.407). 
Even when, as was often (perhaps invariably) the case in those pre-modern accounts, note 
was taken of the Father or the whole Trinity at work in reconciliation, the insight was 
undone. For according to Pannenberg, 
`the idea of appeasing divine wrath, along with the concept of the Mediator, 
which Lombard, under Augustine's influence, related to the human nature of 
Christ, resulted in the statement that in regard to power it is the whole Trinity 
that is involved in reconciliation but that the Son alone is mediator according to 
his human nature according to his obedience. The equation of reconciling with 
Christ's mediatorship also caused the leading 13th century theologians to relate 
both concepts to his human nature' (2.405-406). 
The reconciliation of the world that was achieved in the Easter story is, then, the 
work not on, but of the Father. Yet - and this is the second point of clarification - for all 
the emphasis Pannenberg puts on reconciliation as the active work of the loving Father, 
reconciliation is brought about not by Him alone, but also with the agency of Son and 
Spirit. This is in keeping with his desire both to free theology from the tendency, 
common at least in the Western tradition, to view the deity (even the triune deity) as 
ultimately synonymous with the sole subjectivity of the Father, or, as Pannenberg puts it 
elsewhere, to make the other persons a mere object without any active, conscious co- 
operation; and to make adequate sense of the biblical references to the other persons' 
agency. Indeed, as we have noted before, in this central element of the establishment of 
the monarchy of the Father, the establishment of His kingdom both takes the form of a 
trinitarian action and is dependent on the work of the other two persons. So it is the 
object of both Father and Son. `This is possible, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`only if the action of the Father in giving up the Son does not make the Son a 
mere object but implies his active cooperation, and again if the action of the Son 
does not rule out the fact that initiative in the event lies with the Father' (2.439). 
Father unto us. ' See P. Schaff (ed. ) The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes 
150 
And it is also true of the Spirit. just how this is so we shall investigate in the following 
two points. 
2. The Son is the reconciling God in that He actively obeys the Father in giving Himself 
for our sins as our Representative. As the eternal Son His work of reconciliation is 
not to be restricted either to His earthly history or to His human nature. 
The reconciling death of Christ is to be understood `not merely in the sense that God 
acted in Christ's death for the reconciliation of the world.. . but also in the sense that the 
Son offered himself up in this event' (2.443). Pannenberg cites the witness of scripture 
that corresponding to the giving up of the Father there is an active obedience of the Son, 
as shown in such passages as Mark 14: 32ff par.; Rom. 5: 19; Gal. 2: 20; Heb. 5: 8; 7: 27. So, 
Pannenberg states, 
'The Father does not act alone in the offering up of Jesus to death. Jesus himself 
is not simply passive in this action, for the Son is also acting subject in the event. 
As such, he is the Saviour of the world' (2.441). 
As Christoph Schwoebel summarises, `The obedience of Jesus to the Father must, if we 
follow the logic of Pannenberg's Christology, be interpreted as an expression of the action 
of the eternal Son. In this sense the Son is an agent in the process of salvation. '6 
Such a trinitarian reading of the Easter story that understands it as the work of the 
second divine person, precludes, Pannenberg believes, two interpretations. The first is 
that Christ's reconciliation is to be understood only in terms of His earthly history, the 
second that Christ's reconciliation is achieved only by His human nature. 
As for the first, to see in the death of Christ not merely an event on the human plane, 
but also the activity of the eternal Son of God requires knowledge of Christ's resurrection. 
It may be, Pannenberg says, that statements of Christ's active agency `correspond to the 
Gospel accounts of the passion as foreknown to Jesus.. . and even planned 
by him. Yet, ' he 
goes on, 
vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1931), pp. 9,488. 
6 (1996), p. 514. 
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`they are in tension with the historical judgment that although Jesus certainly 
reckoned with the possibility of a violent death and ultimately faced its 
inevitability, he can hardly have sought it as the goal of his message and 
ministry' (2.438-439) 
And even were it granted that Jesus came to expect his own death as likely, to get to an 
idea of the Son's self-offering is a `big leap' (2.439). The biblical witness as well as 
subsequent trinitarian and christological reflection on the life and mind of Christ does 
then, according to Pannenberg, presuppose knowledge of His resurrection and exaltation, 
if one is to see the Son as the subject of reconciliation. Pannenberg writes, 
'He who was exalted as Son of God came to be seen as the true subject of the 
history that led him to the cross. He was detected in the course of events. 
Exalted, Jesus is also the subject of the history of proclamation in which his death 
is explained and proclaimed as the reconciliation of the world' (2.440). 
And as in his christology the resurrection alters drastically what we are obliged to say 
about Christ's person, so in Pannenberg's doctrine of reconciliation it affects our 
understanding of His work. Pannenberg therefore distinguishes three levels or aspects of 
the reconciling work of the Son. `We first have, ' he writes, 
`the human historical level of the work and fate of Jesus. Then we have the same 
history as the medium of the eternal Son of God, who is at work in it as he 
became man in the person of Jesus. Finally we have the same history again as the 
medium of the active presence of the exalted Lord through the apostolic 
proclamation that explains to the world at large the saving significance of this 
history' (2.441). 
All the reconciling acts of the man Jesus, therefore, are the deeds of the active subject, the 
Son of God, even the crucifixion which is not just an action inflicted on a human being, 
but is the mighty act of God. 
It is for this reason that Pannenberg can go on to affirm positions that he had earlier 
criticised, especially the doctrine of Christ's threefold office which he wrote against in 
JGM. There Pannenberg argued that in historical terms the justification of Christ's 
threefold office of prophet, priest and king is untenable. Whether in terms of the 
inherent meaning of anointine or of the term "Christ, "8 or in terms of the functions 
7 See JGM, pp. 213f. 
8 See JGM, pp. 213ff. 
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apprehended by or devolved upon Jesus, Pannenberg concludes, `the concept of the three 
offices in the dogmatics of Protestant orthodoxy is subject to considerable objection. '9 
In ST the earlier position is not so much rejected as supplemented. `The historical 
Jesus, ' he still maintains, `... was neither priest nor king nor, in the strict sense, prophet' 
(2.445). Yet, Pannenberg continues, such a judgement is insufficient if one is to view the 
second triune person as subject in the work of reconciliation, an insight highlighted and 
safeguarded by the doctrine of the threefold office. Hence a retraction: 
Deliberations on the fact that looking back from Easter we see that the thought 
of divine sonship means not only incarnation but also an activity of the Son in 
the history of Jesus have now forced me to correct the position that I took up in 
1964. The only point remaining is that between the human action of Jesus in the 
context of his earthly history and the action of the Son of God in that history 
must be made, and that the relation between the two stands in need of 
clarification. Naturally the Son of God incarnate in Jesus acts through his human 
activity, but his action embraces the distinction between the human activity and 
the fate of Jesus. The earthly activities thus have contexts other than those that 
appear on a purely historical approach (2.446). 
And Pannenberg outlines in what sense Jesus Christ, the risen and exalted eternal Son of 
God can properly be ascribed the offices of prophet (2.449), priest and king. '° 
The second interpretation that Pannenberg's trinitarian approach precludes, is that 
the Son's reconciling activity is the work of His assumed human nature. That is, the cross 
and resurrection must be understood as being achieved not so much by the humanity that 
was assumed, as by the One who assumed it. It is therefore, the person of the Son 
incarnate, the God-man, and not His human nature as such that is the mediator. 
Pannenberg's notion of the Son's mediation is in explicit contrast to what he 
considers the classic Western understanding of the Son's work, that He became incarnate 
to appease the divine wrath. That is, that `in regard to power it is the whole Trinity that 
is involved in reconciliation but that the Son alone is mediator according to His human 
nature according to his obedience' (2.405-406). 11 The result of such formulations is that 
although the trinitarian agency is affirmed, inevitably the main focus of the work of 
9JGMp. 215. 
10 See 3.449. 
" Emphasis added. 
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reconciliation is lain on the Son's assumed humanity. Such a view has roots in Augustine 
and is operative, Pannenberg believes, throughout medieval theology, for instance in 
Lombard, Anselm, Bonaventure and Aquinas. For, as the last of these writes, `as the one 
and only Mediator, Christ reconciles us to God by His sacrifice, doing so according to his 
human nature. "' 
In reconciliation there is not just the giving up of the Father, but also the active co- 
operation of the Son, and as such a divine active co-operation. This, then, is a second 
trinitarian reason (to follow the discussion of the subjectivity of the Father) for 
Pannenberg's rejection of satisfaction theories of the atonement. 
3. The Holy Spirit is the reconciling God who completes God's work of reconciliation, in 
that He lifts us up into ecstatic union with Jesus Christ, and as the one who is distinct 
from both Son and Father allows us to live in joyful differentiation from God. 
`As the self-offering of the Son for the reconciliation of the world and his being 
offered up by the Father are one and the same event and form a single process, so we 
are to see the work of the exalted Christ and that of the Spirit in us as different aspects 
of one and the same divine action for the reconciliation of the world' (2.450) 
The Spirit is not the Son. This in itself elementary piece of trinitarian theology, that the 
second and third divine persons are genuinely distinct and not to be confused, requires, 
Pannenberg believes, further penetration into the doctrine of reconciliation than is 
sometimes recognised. It is of a piece with one of the points we (like he) shall deal with 
in the chapter on ecclesiology, namely the rejection of the Barthian understanding of the 
reconciling work of the Spirit, that `the Spirit is the power in which Jesus Christ bears 
witness to himself, ' which in Pannenberg's view pays insufficient attention to the distinct 
subjectivity of the Spirit. 13 And it is a further development of Pannenberg's rejection of at 
root inevitably modalising conceptions of the being and action of the trinitarian God. 
12 STh 3.26.2. Pannenberg notes similar statements in Lombard Sentences 2.3-4, and Bonaventura 
Sentences 3.19.2.3. 
13 Barth makes this remark in CD IV/1,645, and Pannenberg his reservations in 3.5. 
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The reconciling action of the Spirit is not, or rather is not to be confused with, the 
reconciling action of the Son. As in being so also in action, there are three distinct centres 
of action within God, and, in particular, the third person cannot be subsumed as an 
extension of the second. In support Pannenberg notes the exegetical evidence, 
particularly in Paul and John, that for all the unity there is a clear distinction between the 
reconciling work of Son and Spirit. So, Pannenberg emphasises, `At issue' in the 
reconciling action of the Spirit 
`is not just a later appropriating of the fruit" of the once-for-all event in the 
death of Jesus. By baptism believers are inserted into the death of Jesus (Rom. 
6: 3). This takes place through the Spirit.. . By the power of the Spirit, then, 
Christians are incorporated into the body of Christ (1 Cor. 6: 17), which itself by 
the resurrection is a pneumatic reality (1 Cor. 15: 4f. )' (2.451). 
By this distinct action of the Spirit, then, which is more than the mere fruit or application 
of Christ's benefits, we are made `recipients of the reconciliation that was made in his 
death' (2.451). 
Theologies that in Pannenberg's view are reticent on the work of the Spirit, go wrong 
at precisely this point. In ST Barth again serves as a conspicuous example, for whom the 
event of reconciliation in Christ's crucifixion `was "self-contained. " It was not an ongoing 
process towards some distant goal' (2.413). Yet such accounts leave hanging an important 
question, namely, `Do we not have to regard not merely God's reconciling act but also its 
human acceptance as constitutive for the event' of reconciliation? What is needed, 
Pannenberg believes, is `an answer that does justice to the situation of the recipients as 
human beings, as sinners in need of reconciliation' (2.415), and one that sinners can 
appropriate in a way that leaves room for their human creaturely independence. In sum, 
there needs to be an account both of reconciliation and of the God of reconciliation that 
does justice to human reception. 
Pannenbergs view of the scope of reconciliation relies on his interpretation of 2 Cor. 
5.18-6: 2, according to which God's reconciling the world to Himself is not limited to the 
death of Christ. Reconciliation also occurs "now" in the ministry of the apostles and the 
repentance of the Corinthians, whence the appeal in v. 20 to be reconciled to God. '5 As 
14 Emphasis retained. 
15 Hence Pannenberg considers Barth's exposition inadequate, which sharply distinguishes the 
apostolic ministry of reconciliation v. 18 from reconciliation itself (2.413). 
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Pannenberg writes in another place, `In and by [the church] there is now being fulfilled 
already the reconciliation of humanity to God that is the work of the crucified and risen 
Lord' (3.432). 
How are we to account for this extension of reconciliation beyond the events of Good 
Friday and Easter Sunday? Pannenberg says at one point that this is Jesus' ongoing work: 
`It is Jesus Christ himself, the exalted Kyrios, who "now" gives us reconciliation 
through the ministry of the apostles and the preaching of the church' (2.440). 
But such an understanding of this ongoing reconciliation in terms of the work of the Son 
is one that Pannenberg deems insufficient. Reconciliation means, for Pannenberg, our 
renewal in independent existence. But for us to be truly independent, `this cannot come 
solely from the Father, nor can it be achieved solely by the sending of the Son into the 
world. It must, ' he says, `happen on our side as well. ' Now, this does, for Pannenberg, 
involve the Son, but only `in exemplary fashion. ' But it is properly understood to be the 
work of the Spirit, he maintains. Humans need, Pannenberg says, to be taken up into the 
room the Son has made for us alongside Himself. And, 
`this taking up is not merely in the sense of something that happens to them from 
outside but as a liberation to their own identity. This takes place through the 
Spirit. Through the Spirit reconciliation with God no longer comes upon us from 
outside. We ourselves enter into it' (2.450). 
The event of reconciliation, then, has to be understood in broad terms, because it 
`includes the whole process of the renewing of our fellowship with God that sin had 
broken - the process that begins at the cross of Christ and continues by means of the 
ministry of the apostles' (2.413). 16 And this broader understanding of reconciliation 
requires a broader understanding of the reconciling God, who is not just Father and Son 
but also - and distinctively - Holy Spirit. 
So, what is this distinct work of the Spirit corresponding to His distinct identity? The 
Spirit completes reconciliation, Pannenberg says, `by enabling us through faith in Jesus 
Christ to accept our own finite existence before God' (2.454). This acceptance of our 
finitude, the very thing that sinful humanity failed to do, and that Jesus' consistent self- 
distinction from the Father reverses can only come not in ourselves, but `in Jesus Christ', 
16 This broader scope of reconciliation is one of the themes Pannenberg develops (see 2.412-437, where 
he argues that not merely God's reconciling act but also its human acceptance as constitutive for the 
event of reconciliation), which, he maintains, can only be resolved properly when understood in the 
trinitarian terms we outline here. 
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and not through our unaided effort but `through faith. ' This, then, is the reconciling act 
of the Holy Spirit. 
'The Spirit, ' Pannenberg says 
`lifts us above our own finitude, so that in faith we share in him who is outside 
us, Jesus Christ, and in the event of reconciliation that God accomplished in his 
death. Believers are "ecstatic, " i. e., outside themselves, as they are in Christ' 
(2.451). 
This is not, Pannenberg believes, either dehumanising or depersonalising. In "ecstatic" 
being with Christ believers are not taken up into an autocratic God or an alien deity. 
Though `outside themselves' they are not, Pannenberg believes, `in bondage to another. ' 
This is because, he continues, 
`Jesus as the Son of the Father is for his part fully God and therefore the man 
who gives himself up for others ... Those who believe in Jesus are thus not 
estranged from themselves, for with Jesus they are with God, who is the origin of 
the finite existence of all creatures and their specific destiny' (2.452). 
We achieve our true identity, then, by the action of the trinitarian God. By the Spirit we 
become ourselves in Christ as we are brought into true relationship with the Father. And 
by accepting our true identity not in ourselves but outside us in Christ, the Spirit 
completes the divine act of reconciliation by causing us to seek and recognise our real 
selves in the reconciling work of the Father and the Son. 
We can further flesh out the detail of this third element of God's trinitarian act of 
reconciliation by noting three explanatory points in Pannenberg's exposition. The first 
two are relatively straightforward and concern two possible misunderstandings regarding 
reconciliation that Pannenberg thinks his proposal avoids. Firstly, it excludes totalitarian 
understandings of reconciliation, namely `the replacement of those who are represented'. 
That our reception is not overwhelmed and colonised by the work of the Son, but is 
referred to the enabling Spirit, does justice to what Pannenberg considers the true 
meaning of representation. A true representative, he thinks, `only temporarily takes the 
place of others and thus leaves open the place that is only representatively occupied. 
With permanent occupation the representative becomes a replacement' (2.432). And 
second, it avoids any idea that our reception of salvation is an unaided human work. The 
divine action in Christ's death is indeed more than the object of human interpretation and 
reception `Awareness of being reconciled to God, ' Pannenberg writes, 
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`is something that Christians do not find on their own but through faith in Jesus 
Christ. They achieve it as the Spirit teaches them to know the heavenly Father 
in Jesus the Son' (2.454). 
The third is rather more complex and interesting. It is that as the one who is distinct 
from both Son and Father, the Spirit allows us to live in joyful differentiation from God. 
With this clarification Pannenberg differentiates his approach from understandings of 
salvation as a divinisation that merges humanity and divinity. The Spirit unites us, not 
with divinity as such, but with Christ who distinguishes Himself from God the Father. 
So, `believers who in Christ share in the filial relation of Jesus to the Father differentiate 
themselves therein from the Father as Jesus did' (2.452-453). 
Not only this, but by the Spirit we are also distinct from God the Son, for our ecstatic 
union with Him is not our being merged into Him, but our being linked to Him outside 
ourselves. `[B]elievers, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`know very well that their own existence is different from Jesus Christ in whom 
they believe, even though they are united to him by faith. An irrevocable part of 
their union with Christ in faith is awareness of the difference between their own 
existence and him their Head (2.452). 
And this is fitting for the third trinitarian person since as the one who eternally maintains 
the distinct unity of Father and Son, the Spirit likewise maintains us in a distinct unity 
with Jesus Christ. As Pannenberg puts the matter, 
`By the Spirit, believers are capable of this self-distinction from Jesus, who is in 
person the eternal Son of the Father, for the Spirit himself differentiates himself 
from the Son by not openly glorifying himself but glorifying Jesus as the Son of 
the Father and the Father in the Son. The Spirit, who is himself God, brings with 
him fellowship with God, but only as he distinguishes himself from the Father 
and the Son, and with himself all those whose hearts he fills and lifts up to God. 
Even the ecstatic working of the Spirit does not mean that self-distinction from 
God is no longer a condition of fellowship with him. It makes it possible for us 
to rejoice in this distinction in peace with God' (2.453). 
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It is the same point being made here as Pannenberg will make again in his distinction 
between our "Gotteskindschaft", i. e., the adoption as God's children that believers enjoy, 
and "Gottessohnschaft", i. e., the eternal sonship which only the Son has. " Our sharing in 
the Son's filial relation to the Father, then, neither supplants nor disregards His original 
and unique sonship. 
It is in this context that we should note a sub-theme of Pannenberg's exposition that 
has a bearing on this point, namely Christ's making room for others in reconciliation. 
`[T]he acceptance of death, ' he writes, `was the extreme consequence of the self- 
distinction of the Son from the Father, and by it he made room not only for the glory of 
God but also for the existence of others alongside Jesus' (2.450). 
This point is closely related to the rejection of both totalitarian understandings of 
reconciliation and Barthian understandings of the application of reconciliation. Yet it is 
not quite the same. The divine work of reconciliation means not the setting aside, but the 
renewal of human independence, but in Jesus of Nazareth this took place only `in 
exemplary fashion. ' This means that our renewed independence can be really our own, 
for 
`[t]hrough the death of the Son... God gives room alongside himself even after 
death. Because the Son dies in the particularity of his human existence, all 
others in their otherness are not crowded out by him as though his human 
particularity were the measure of all things and excluded all others' (2.434). 
Our integrity and particularity are therefore both assured. And this explains both the 
absence of Christ now ascended and why it is good that He leave for the Spirit to come. 
For, 
`Although Jesus himself was filled with the Spirit of God, it was only after he left 
the disciples that they received the Spirit as an abiding gift. His absence put 
them in a position in which they could independently recognize the glory of 
Jesus in his humility and lowliness and thus be reconciled to God in their own 
lives.. . Hence the 
Johannine Christ could say that it was good for them that he 
should leave them..., for they could then attain to the independence of their 
own relation to the Father by perceiving the glory of the Son in his death and 
passion' (2.454). 
17 See 3.211, especially footnote 350. 
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The room, then, that Christ makes in reconciliation is both for the Spirit and for us, 
namely for reconciliation to be completed as the Spirit enables us to participate in our 
own personal way in reconciliation by sharing the Son's relationship with the Father. 
In sum, then, we may say that Christians are enabled by the Spirit to be in real and 
direct relation with God the Father by virtue of their union with Christ. Hence they 
enjoy both freedom, since by the Spirit they have been liberated from the bondage of the 
world, sin and devil for a life of righteousness, and immediacy to God, since they share 
Christ's filial relationship to the Father. They do not have to become God or even Jesus 
Christ, since in their union with them they remain distinct from both. For this reason, 
`[t]his immediacy to God is to be lived out in the particularity of their own life- 
fulfillment' (2.453). 
Pannenberg's account of God's reconciliation of the world is not as full as many other 
dogmatic accounts of the atoning work of Christ, being shorter than the sections on 
creation, christology, the church and eschatology. The emphasis on the Trinity within 
the discussion, then, is proportionally very strong, as Pannenberg seeks to apportion to all 
three persons in turn their proper role in the drama of salvation. Nevertheless Herbert 
Neie in his book on Pannenberg's doctrine of the atonement suggests he might go further 
and proposes how a more explicitly trinitarian account of the passion might be worked 
out: 
The fact that the Son and the Father realize themselves in their unity precisely 
by their reciprocal self-dedication and common dedication to the creatures, 
which includes participation in the others' suffering, would enable Pannenberg 
to teach that God in his love for humanity and all creatures suffers on the cross 
the passion of love - without compromising his principle, historically 
established, of the distinction of Father, Son and Spirit in the essence of God 
itself To say, then, that God suffers on the cross means that the Persons of the 
trinity participate in Jesus' passion on the cross - as in all suffering of all 
creatures on all crosses. '8 
The Trinity is operative is Pannenberg's presentation in ST, as we have seen, but not in 
the way that Neie has proposed. Rather than a revised patripassianism, Pannenberg's 
18 Neie, p. 223. 
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trinitarian doctrine of reconciliation focuses on how God's triune action in saving the 
world has the character of a process. God's act of reconciliation is not limited in 
Pannenberg's presentation to the events of Good Friday and Easter Sunday, but 
encompasses the Spirit's reconciling work in the establishing of the kingdom and the 
ministry of the church. To this we now turn. 
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Chapter Seven 
PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE 
OF THE KINGDOM AND THE CHURCH 
Pannenberg's deep interest in ecclesiological and ecclesiastical matters may have escaped 
some of his readers, especially those readers of his works in English translation. Alongside 
the more familiar interests in anthropology, theological method, christology and 
theology's relationship to philosophy and the natural sciences, there is also a significant 
body of literature penned by him on the nature and vocation of the church., Nor is his 
interest in church matters restricted to the purely academic in view of his activities in 
contemporary ecumenism. For example, since 1956 he has been a member of the 
ecumenical working group of Protestant and Catholic theologians in Germany, being the 
theological leader on the Protestant side from 1975 to 1990; and from 1975 to 1990 he was 
a member of the World Council of Churches' Commission for Faith and Church Order. 2 
The importance and scope of Pannenberg's discussion of the church in ST results in a 
survey that includes much material that would often be organised under a different 
theological locus. Not only does chapter 13, "The Messianic Community and Individuals, " 
contain material on the nature of the church (section I) as well as lengthy treatments of 
the sacraments (section III) and ministry (section IV), but there is also substantial 
discussion of the virtues of the Christian life, namely, faith, hope, love, along with 
adoption as God's children and justification .3 Hence Pannenberg can write in the 
foreword: 
Not just externally the theme of the church lies at the heart of the third volume of 
the present exposition of Christian doctrine. It occupies by far the largest chapter, 
though also embracing the doctrine of the Spirit as an eschatological gift that aims at 
the eschatological consummation of salvation (3. xiii). 
1 For details see the bibliography in Braaten and Clayton (ed. ). 
2 Such information comes from Beitraege zur systematischen Theologie: Band 3 (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2003), p. 9 (Hereafter BST3). 
These are all discussed in section II, "The Basic Saving Works of the Spirit in Individual Christians" 
(3.135-236). 
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Nevertheless, Pannenberg provides dogmatic checks on the inflation of ecclesiology, 
two in particular: the stress on individual participation, and the context of pneumatology 
and the kingdom. As for the former, `what is the church, ' Pannenberg asks, `except a 
fellowship of individuals who believe in Jesus Christ? ' (3.97). Hence, 
`the focus of the discussion is on individual participation in salvation, with the 
church and sacraments simply as signs of its future consummation.. . It is only in the 
immediacy of the personal relation to God that future salvation is already at work, 
changing present-day life into a life of faith, hope and love' (3. xiii) 4 
So, for instance, discussion of sacrament and ministry follows that of the works of the 
Spirit in individual believers. 
As for the latter, `as a sign and tool of the coming kingdom of God the church has its 
end not in itself (3.45), but in the kingdom brought in by the work of Son and Spirit. We 
can see this primarily in Pannenberg's placing discussion of ecclesiology within the realm 
of pneumatology. Chapter 13 on the church follows chapter 12, "The Outpouring of the 
Spirit, the Kingdom of God, and the Church. "5 It is, then, this `relation to the kingdom of 
God, ' which is `the context of the church's existence' (3.97). It is the work of the Spirit in 
bringing creation to its perfection that is to set the agenda for the church, not vice versa. 
And the ultimate end of the Spirit's activity is not the church, but to bring to 
consummation the kingdom of God, with which the church should never identify herself, 
but to which she can only point. For, 
`[t]he church can only try to fulfill its function as a sign pointing to God's kingdom 
but in distinction from it, in this way mediating to believers assurance of their 
participation in eschatological salvation, and thus itself being able, in its liturgical 
life, to be the place of the Spirit's presence already on this side of the eschatological 
consummation' (3. xv). 
With the spiritual poverty and humility that the Son himself showed, the church too 
must not seek for itself the glory that is the prerogative of God alone. For, 
`[a]s Jesus in his earthly proclamation humbly distinguished himself from the 
Father and the future of his kingdom, so the church must distinguish its own 
existence from the future of the kingdom of God' (3.32). 
4 Pannenberg's emphasis on the need for individual participation is stated very clearly in IST chapter 1. 
s Pannenberg could also defend himself from advocating too high an ecclesiology by means of the his 
trinitarian categories is in his statements of the church distinguishing itself not just from the Father, but 
also from the Son and the kingdom which breaks in with His coming. See e. g., 3.32. 
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The church, Pannenberg believes, must never confuse itself either with Christ or with its 
own future glorification in God's universal kingdom. 
A central emphasis of Pannenberg's discussion is to correct predominant 
understandings of the personality and work of the Spirit within standard Western 
treatments of the Trinity. In his view, the description of the Spirit in Western theology 
from the time of Augustine as gift or love within the divine life has led to accounts of the 
Spirit's work, which tend to restrict His operation either to the institution of the church 
or to the individual Christians within it. By offering an alternative trinitarian theology 
along the lines of ST chapter 5, Pannenberg gives an account that describes the Spirit's 
essence less as gift but more as Life-Giver; that sees Him less as the emanation of the Son 
but more as an equal partner in a relationship of mutual dependence; and that 
understands His work in reconciliation less as the isolated activity of generating faith and 
grace in Christians, but more as enabling ec-static existence in Christ as part of His 
general work within creation. 
There are four specific points to be addressed in this chapter on Pannenberg's 
trinitarian doctrine of the church. The first two, i. e., that the Spirit is gift only as life- 
giver and that the church is the creature of both Son and Spirit, make similar revisions to 
traditional Western treatments to the scope and nature of the Spirit's work in general and 
towards the church in particular, and so form a natural pair. The third deals with the 
immediacy to God achieved by the Spirit's work in reconciliation, and the fourth treats 
the various ways in which the Spirit's ecstatic work takes shape in individuals and the 
church fellowship. 
1, The Holy Spirit is the gift of the Father and Son who imparts salvation, but is so 
only because He is first of all the Giver of life who consummates the creation. 
The triune God of reconciliation is the same triune God of creation. The existence, 
appearance and activity of all three persons, then, are neither novel nor confined to the 
later work, but they co-exist and co-operate in all stages of salvation history. This point 
was made earlier, when Pannenberg argued with Athanasius and against Origen that the 
work of the Spirit was not to be restricted to spiritual beings, but was to share in the 
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entire breadth of divine activity of Father and Son (1.271). Here a more specific and 
related point is being made, i. e., that the work of the Spirit in reconciliation is in 
continuity with His creative work as God's mighty breath and the origin of all life and 
movement, and must be understood only against this background. `The work of the Spirit 
of God in his church and in believers, ' Pannenberg states, 
'serves the consummating of his work in the world of creation. For the special mode 
of the presence of the divine Spirit in the gospel and by its proclamation.. . is a pledge 
of the promise that the life which derives everywhere from the creative work of the 
Spirit will finally triumph over death' (3.2). 
The soteriological work of the Spirit, then, has to be understood in the context, and fits 
into the grander narrative, of the eschatological renewal of creation. It is a `pledge' of this 
greater scheme, which it `serves. ' 
In Pannenberg's view this has been a blindspot of other theology, especially that of 
the Christian West 6 `Perhaps' from Augustine's doctrine of the Spirit as gift7 later 
theology tended to identify the Spirit with the application of salvation, whether as with 
the medieval scholastics He was linked with grace, ' or with the Reformers He was 
primarily associated with faith. ' In modern theology too this tendency is evident in 
Barth, who describes the Holy Spirit as the `"awakening power" by which the risen Lord 
created the church, ' and, according to Pannenberg, `almost dualistically set the Spirit as 
eschatological gift in contrast to existing world reality' (3.3). Yet, Pannenberg notes, the 
Spirit is active in both creation and the eschaton, in the former as `the source of the 
movement and life of all creatures, ' in the latter as `the enabling and transforming power 
that gives creatures a share in the glory of God' (3.4). We should beware, therefore, of 
making the Spirit's activity in only the soteriological phase of His work (i. e., His being as 
sent by the Son as gift) the sole determination of His activity. As Pannenberg summarises, 
6 The two references he gives to a proper relating of the Spirit's work to creation and eschatology are 
the Orthodox liturgy for the Feast of the Epiphany and Basil's De Spiritu Sancto 16.38 (3.4). 
7 The `perhaps' is to be found on 3.2 and is - again perhaps - evidence of greater nuance in 
Pannenberg's critique of Western trinitarian thinking than many other contemporary theologians. Here 
and at other points we are yet to be fully convinced of the accuracy and validity of such readings of the 
Western theological tradition. 
8 Pannenberg here relies on W. -D. Hauschild, "Heiliger Geist/Geistes Gaben IV. 
Dogmengeschichtlich, " TRE, XII/1 (1984), 196-217, esp. pp. 202-203. 
9 Pannenberg cites Luther's Small Catechism. 
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'The sending of the Spirit by the Son relates.. . to the special nature of his work in 
connection with the revelation of salvation' (3.5)10 
But what is this "special nature" of the Spirit's soteriological work? Pannenberg 
states, 'the special nature of his function relative to the salvation event is that the Spirit's 
work on believers ceases to be merely 'an external, invisible, and incomprehensible field 
of force' - as in creation - but 'is given to them as a gift' (3.7). 
Three aspects of this nature as gift are mentioned. Firstly, the Spirit is given 'as a 
lasting possession of believers. ' Unlike the self-imparting of the Spirit in creation in 
general, there is no taking back of the vitality and movement of the divine Life-Giver. 
We see this archetypically in the gift of the Spirit to the incarnate Son. As the one who in 
eternity is the recipient of the Spirit, Jesus Christ is given the Spirit without measure, in 
such a permanent way that it is operative in and beyond the grave. And by the Spirit's 
uniting us with Christ, this permanent gift becomes one that believers share. For, 
`the Spirit who proceeded from the Father, and who was thus conferred on Jesus 
for his earthly work, is the power of God... by which God raised him from the 
dead. Just as those who are linked to Jesus in faith will also be raised up by the 
Spirit, who is granted to them... [F]or this reason.. . the gift of the Spirit [is] for 
believers a pledge of their own future resurrection' (3.11). 
Second, `participation in the eternal life of God is made possible' (3.12). The Spirit's 
work of lifting creatures beyond their finitude has, in its soteriological function, a definite 
and comprehensible object that is not so much the case as in His activity in creation. The 
specific thing is that we are irreversibly related to Jesus Christ, who by His life, death and 
resurrection has secured an eternal destiny for the children of Adam. Since believers 
receive as a gift the eschatological power of Jesus Christ, who bears the Spirit, they share 
both in His destiny and in the new life of the future that broke in with His resurrection 
(3.4-5). 
Third, and consequently, the gift of the Spirit means for believers also that `their 
resurrection to a new life in fellowship with God is guaranteed' (3.12). This Spirit is by 
nature the Life-Giver, whose work is fulfilled not just in individual illuminations, but in 
the consummation of life in all its fullness. And when He is given so that He dwells in 
believers, He becomes `a pledge of the promise that the life which derives everywhere 
10 Emphasis added. 
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from the creative work of the Spirit will finally triumph over death' (3.2). Thus it is an 
anticipation of our divine destiny. It is an eschatological gift. 
Yet for all the importance of the Spirit's soteriological activity as gift, Pannenberg 
believes there is a danger of over-emphasis on this particular aspect. To do so is to 
privilege one stage of the divine economy at the expense of the others where the Spirit's 
nature as gift is not so essential. 
It is not the case in creation. There '[t]he Logos and Spirit work together.. . in such a 
way that the Word is the fashioning principle, while the Spirit is the source of the 
movement and life of creatures. ' Truly the Spirit as gift is not separate from His creative 
work (as outlined in ST chapter 7), as Pannenberg believes Western trinitarian theology" 
has traditionally understood the matter, isolating the Spirit's illumining from His creative 
work. For His salvific work, Pannenberg writes, 
`takes place in full and continuous connection with his work in the world of nature 
as the origin of all life, and especially in humans as the source of the spontaneity of 
their "spiritual" activities that lift them ecstatically above their own particularity 
and thus enable them to grasp that which is beyond themselves and distinct from 
their own existence. In just the same way the Spirit effects in us the spontaneous 
recognition of Jesus as the Son of God that leads to faith in him as the Messiah of 
God's people' (3.17). 
Hence, Pannenberg thinks that 'in an extended sense' the breath of life we are all given, 
'may be seen as endowment with God's Spirit' (3.9). And special manifestations of the 
Spirit, as well as the endowments of the Spirit that certain characters in the OT had, may 
also be described as gifts. 12 'The Spirit's work, ' then, 'is always in some measure linked to 
an imparting of his dynamic even though he is not in the full sense always imparted and 
received as gift' (3.9). Yet, for all its continuity, it is also something new. Something new 
and definitive happens when the Spirit is given. 'The gift of the Spirit to humanity at 
creation and the charisms of the old covenant as well, ' Pannenberg writes, 
'are simply anticipatory signs of this eschatological gift. By this gift alone the Spirit 
binds himself to the lives of the recipients in such a way that even death can no 
longer separate these lives from his creative power' (3.12). 
1' Pannenberg comments on 3.17, 'Western theology has often failed to see this because it has isolated 
illumination by the Spirit in faith's recognition of Jesus Christ from the Spirit's work in creation and 
especially in our own creaturely life. ' 
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Nor is it the case in consummation, in which, 
`the Spirit is active as the enabling and transfiguring power that gives creatures a 
share in the glory of God, while the Son, as the agent of the last judgment, is the 
criterion of belonging to God and his kingdom or for incompatibility with them' 
(3.4). 
Hence, Pannenberg believes, one should not make too much of the fact that in 
reconciliation the incarnation of the Son precedes the imparting of the Spirit to believers. 
It is `only in this connection"3 that we can `speak of the Son "sending" the Spirit who in 
eternity proceeds from the Father' (3.4). 
Augustine's, again, is for Pannenberg a prime example of a theology that falls prey to 
this danger. Augustine's view, at least as Pannenberg presents it, is that the Spirit is 
essentially gift, because `only here, ' i. e., in the term "gift" rather than "Spirit, " 
`do we find in the Spirit the element of relation that characterizes the trinitarian 
persons, which in the case of the Father or the Son lies already in these personal 
terms, and which must also be constitutive for the Spirit as a trinitarian person' 
(3.8). 
That is, to understand the essential particularity of the Spirit as related to the other 
persons, His name is not enough in contrast to the Father and Son (the begetter and 
begotten), so His role as gift must fulfil this function instead. 
Such formulations, Pannenberg thinks, fail to note that, 
'the imparting of the Spirit as gift is only a transitional stage in his work in salvation 
history ... 
[It] characterizes the distinctiveness of the soteriological phase of his work 
in the event of reconciliation' (3.12). 
Indeed, `the first thing to call for notice when he is said to proceed from the Father' (3.7) 
is His nature as wind, not gift. Pannenberg therefore contests what he calls the 
Augustinian tradition's `equating of donum and processio' (3.8). Augustine believes that 
the Spirit proceeds eternally from both Father and Son, being from all eternity their 
mutual gift in the sense that He proceeds from both as origin. This is to fail to give due 
emphasis, Pannenberg believes, to the fact that the Spirit eternally proceeds from the 
Father, but only in the ongoing work of reconciliation proceeds from the Son (i. e., after 
Christ's resurrection). `We have, ' he says, `to distinguish from [the Spirit's eternal 
12 3.9 notes `special capacities for insight, artistic gifts, prophetic inspiration, and leadership charisma, ' 
in particular King David and the promised Messiah. 
13 Emphasis added. 
168 
procession from the Father] the Son's participation in the imparting or sending, especially 
because the Son himself is a recipient of the Spirit who proceeds from the Father' (3.8). 
And Pannenberg backs up his contention with Jesus' baptism and conception, in which 
the Son is both the recipient of and constituted by the Spirit (3.9). 
Yet Pannenberg does not conclude from this that since the Spirit is not the mutual 
gift of Father and Son in terms of relations of origin, He is not their mutual gift in just any 
sense. He is not to be seen as proceeding from both as source, but as given from one to 
the other and then returned. For, just as Jesus' receiving the Spirit at His baptism is 
followed by His yielding it up at death, so `the Father gives the Spirit who proceeds from 
him, ' and `the Son gives him back and in this way proves his self-distinction from the 
Father as the Son who in eternity receives from the Father the Spirit who raises him to 
life. ' And in this reciprocal giving believers are involved as they are caught up in this 
dynamic in union with the Christ. For, as Pannenberg continues: 
`The gift of the Spirit to believers in which the Father and the Son work together 
follows only from its mediation by the fact that believers, linked by faith and 
baptism to the Son revealed in Jesus Christ, become members of his body, so that 
sonship in relation to the Father finds manifestation in them, too, as participation 
in the sonship of Jesus and therefore in the intratrinitarian life of God, in the 
reception of the Spirit by the Son and in the giving back of the Spirit to the 
Father' (3.11). 
Christians, then, receive the Spirit as a gift, since the Spirit is first of all gift in the triune 
reality of God. For, unlike the general giving of the Spirit they share in the gift of the life- 
giving Spirit to the ultimate and definitive recipient, Jesus Christ, the risen spiritual 
second Adam, who received Him without measure or restriction. 
This reconfiguration of the role of the specifically soteriological role of the Spirit and 
its implications for trinitarian theology in general are continued under the next point. 
2. Both the Son and the Spirit are active in producing the kingdom as their work and 
the church as their creature, their activity being irreducible the one to the other. 
The Son is the one into whose body believers are gathered, and the Spirit the one 
by whom they can thus belong to church and kingdom. 
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Pannenberg notes passages such as 1 Cor. 3: 11 which name Jesus Christ as the foundation 
of the church, and certain others (particularly Luke-Acts) that trace the church's 
existence back to the power of the Spirit. So, as persons of the Trinity who, as we have 
seen, have each their own integrity and mutually indwell and depend upon each other, 
the work of the Son and Spirit are not competitive but together constitute the future 
kingdom and the church which points towards it. As Pannenberg puts it, 
`Each by faith is related to the one Lord and hence to all other believers. By the 
Spirit each is lifted above individual particularity in order, "in Christ, " to form 
with all other believers the fellowship of the church' (3.13). 
Again, this is continuous with the divine work of creation and eschatology where 
both Son and Spirit are at work. They are active together in creation `in such a way that 
the Word of creation is the fashioning principle, while the Spirit is the source of 
movement and life of creatures, ' and in consummation with the Spirit as `the enabling and 
transfiguring power that gives creatures a share in the glory of God' and the Son `the 
criterion for belonging to God and his kingdom' (3.4). In the work of establishing the 
kingdom and the church which is its sign, the work of Son and Spirit Pannenberg 
apportions thus. On the one hand Christ is the one into whose body believers are 
gathered together in the fellowship of the church, and He is thus its one foundation. On 
the other hand the Spirit, as the one who gives glory to Christ, is the one by whom we 
participate outside ourselves in Christ, and so it can be said, `only by the work of the 
Spirit, then, is Jesus Christ the church's foundation' (3.16). And as the Spirit is also the 
Life-Giver, Pannenberg writes, it is always against the wider background of the kingdom 
that we should view the church. For, 
`[t]he function of the pneumatological grounding of the church is to enable us to 
perceive in the eschatological consummation of creation, which was already the 
goal of the earthly mission of Jesus, the glory of Jesus Christ in virtue of which he 
is the new Adam and therefore also the Head of the church as his body' (3.20). 
'The church, then, is the work of both Son and Spirit. This Pannenberg finds in the 
biblical witness, especially in John and Paul. In John, the two persons are linked, not just 
because the Spirit is sent by the Son, but also because the Spirit leads people to knowledge 
of the Son and by the Spirit the Son is "in" His disciples. Both Paul and John refer to this 
mutual indwelling of the triune persons. Pannenberg comments on John 14: 23, 
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`As the Spirit bears witness in believers to Jesus as the truth of God, they themselves 
are ecstatically raptured and are outside themselves in Jesus, while conversely Jesus 
is in them to bind them in fellowship with one another, and along with Jesus the 
Father also takes up his dwelling in believers' (3.16). 
As the Spirit in creation lifts beings above their own particularity, so in building the 
church He `effects in us the spontaneous recognition of Jesus as the Son of God that leads 
to faith in him as the Messiah of God's people' (3.17). 
Two main points follow from this. Firstly, as the One who binds us to the one Lord, 
the Spirit both in the church and in believers is a common gift. It is, he says, `not just for 
individual believers but aims at the building up of the fellowship of believers, at the 
founding and the constant giving of new life to the church' (3.12). This is the message, so 
Pannenberg says, of the account of Pentecost in Acts 2, `[for this story does at all events 
demonstrate that the Spirit was given to all the disciples in common and that therewith 
the church had its beginning' (3.13). Here, he says the Spirit not only provides assurance 
of salvation to the individual believer, but also founds the fellowship. 
Secondly, since the church is the creature of both Son and Spirit, the work of the one 
should not be reduced to that of the other. For Pannenberg this entails that no one model 
of the church is to have hegemony over the others. `Each theological concept of the 
church', Pannenberg writes, 
`must integrate into itself the material aspects articulated in these different 
conceptions to form an intrinsically unified view of the constituting of the 
church by Jesus Christ and the work of the Spirit, and consequently an 
interpretation of the relation between church and Spirit that cannot be treated as 
identical with any one NT concept because of a compulsion to erase the 
differences' (3.15). 
And there is an inevitable fall-out when the work of one person is emphasised to the 
exclusion of the other. If the christological grounding starts to obscure the 
pneumatological, then, Pannenberg states drawing on the work of recent ecumenical 
theology, there arises the danger of theocracy, either of official church structures14 or of 
proclamation. 15 For without the work of the Spirit, 
14 A perceived weakness of much Western Christianity (3.18-19). 
15 This is a weakness of Reformation theology with its notion of the church as a creation of the Word. 
Pannenberg is here drawing on the critique in W. Kasper and G. Sauter (eds. ) Kirche - Ort des Geistes 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1976), as well as R. Gruetzmacher's critical remarks on the theology of Lutheran 
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`the history of Jesus and the gospel Word concerning him [would have] remained 
external to hearers of the message, even as a purely external authority, and 
[would] not [have] led to personal knowledge and the resultant spontaneous 
involvement' (3.18). 
And a one-sided stress on pneumatology can, as some of Schleiermacher's remarks 
might suggest, 16 lead to a view of the church's Spirit after the manner of the esprit de 
corps that characterises and unites other human communities. The christological 
foundation, then, can operate `as a brake on the unregulated enthusiasm that with an 
appeal to the dynamic of the Spirit breaks free from the church's tradition and 
institutional order as though it alone counted as a sign of spiritual vitality. ' For, 
Pannenberg says, 
`The church and its members do not control the gift of the Spirit as though it 
were their possession. The gift remains linked to the foundation that they have 
outside themselves in Jesus Christ' (3.19). 17 
Hence the church as the community of the Spirit must be engaged in recollection and 
glorification of the Son, since the Spirit's life-giving work always relates to Jesus and the 
eschatological consummation realised in Him. 
It should be noted that here as elsewhere, Pannenberg's thinking is closely bound up 
with his understanding of the internal triune relations, the economic action of the persons 
being at one with their immanent constitution. Of particular importance here is the 
relationship between the second and third persons of the Trinity, with Pannenberg 
seeking to avoid some of the perceived abuses that some have traced to the Western 
adoption of the ilioque. For, Pannenberg writes, `[w]e do not exhaustively describe the 
Spirit of God by saying that through him the risen Christ still works on earth, even if 
invisibly' (3.5), 18 and His significance consists in more than just the application of 
redemption. This follows, since the Son does not merely give the Spirit. He also receives 
it. The Spirit, therefore, does not merely take from what is the Son's and make it known 
to us. He does this because He is firstly the one who constitutes the identity and work of 
the incarnate Son. 
orthodoxy in his Wort und Geist: Eine historische und dogmatische Untersuchung aum Gnadenmittel 
des Worts (Leipzig, 1902). 
16 Christian Faith pp. 560ff. 
17 Emphasis added, but properly represents the specific point Pannenberg is making, as can be seen in 
the attached footnote. 
'$ 3.5 argues primarily against Barth. 
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Some critical comment is called for here on the points Pannenberg makes in our first 
two theses, particularly on two matters. We shall need to say some more below in the 
critical sections of the conclusion, where we shall raise questions about some of the moves 
being made in the midst of all this trinitarian language. Yet for now we can note 
positively that Pannenberg has shown clearly and succinctly the need to understand 
pneumatology in terms of the whole economy of salvation. There is indeed something 
incomplete about identifying the Spirit's work with faith since scripture testifies that one 
day our faith will give way to sight. " 
Yet we raise two criticisms. Firstly, Pannenberg's depiction of Western theology is 
more of a caricature than an accurate portrait. The idea that the Spirit is `much more than 
just cognitive divine help' (3.2) by no means requires an overhaul of Western 
trinitarianism. The dominant view of Western theology is that the Spirit links us to 
Christ, and it is thus that we receive the richness of divine blessing, not just cognitive 
help. Whereas earlier he could uncover a parody of Western trinitarian theology on the 
matter of intra-trinitarian `actions' (2.4), his reading is less sympathetic when he writes 
`The Reformation concentration on the relation of Word, Spirit and faith could 
easily lead to a restriction of the Spirit's function to an imparting of the 
knowledge of faith that is not accessible... to human reason (3.3). 
Calvin, for instance, with his knowledge of and reliance on Augustine's writings as well as 
his abiding influence on subsequent Western Christian thought, represents a theology 
four-square within the Western and Reformation traditions. His pneumatology will not 
fit in Pannenberg's scheme, however. `The Holy Spirit, ' Calvin says, `is the bond by 
which Christ effectually unites us to himself, '20 whence comes not just knowledge, but all 
blessings 21 
There may be something more significant than faulty history that is awry in 
Pannenberg's argument, however. In defence of his stress on the Spirit's work in more 
than the application of redemption, Pannenberg cites the Augustinian rule that all the 
external works of the Trinity are undivided. Chapter 12 begins: `In all its forms the 
activity of the trinitarian God in creation is an activity of the Father by the Son and Spirit, 
19 E. g., Rom. 8: 24; Heb. 2: 8; 11: 1. For a helpful elucidation of this point see H. Berkhof Christian 
Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith (revised) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), pp. 108- 
111. 
20 Institutes 3.1.1. 
21 Ibid. 2.16.19 
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an activity of the Son in obedience to the Father, and the glorifying of both in the 
consummation of their work by the Spirit' (3.1). We wholly concur, as would all 
orthodox theology, both eastern and western. Pannenberg's deployment of the rule 
makes the justified point that the Spirit is involved not just in divine acts of reconciliation, 
but in creation too. Yet this rule cuts both ways. It is equally justified to conclude from 
this rule that every work of the Spirit is a giving of what is Christ's to us. And if "what is 
Christ's" is - in the work of reconciliation, unlike that of creation - an utter reconstitution 
of our being that involves death and resurrection that is only accessible by faith, then the 
regenerating work of the Spirit appears rather more drastic than does His providential 
ordering of the universe. The significance of this point becomes clearer in the light of the 
one that follows. 
. 
The second question we have to raise here concerns a theme present throughout ST 
but whose trinitarian outworking is particularly evident here. This is Pannenberg's 
insistence that redemption represents the completion of creation, the act of which is only 
complete with the eschatological consummation of the world. There are a number of 
points in ST where this is emphasised. In chapter 7, for instance, Pannenberg emphasises 
that God's creative work `embraces the whole cosmic process and permeates all phases of 
the divine action in history' (2.41), and the christology presents Christ as the one in 
whom creation first comes to completion. Yet the issue is perhaps most pressing here in 
the discussion of pneumatology. 
A perhaps rather simplistic way to introduce the issue which causes us concern is to 
ask this question: When Christ says `Behold! I have made all things new, ' how new is 
new? The reconciling work of the Holy Spirit is the application of Christ's death and 
resurrection, and thus means the annihilation and reconstitution of our existence, because 
of which we are to consider ourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 
6.11). This explains why His work is described in terms of new creation, new birth and 
regeneration, i. e., an utter reconstitution of our identity and a completely new life. 
Indeed to appeal to the Augustinian rule to justify seeing reconciliation more as the 
completion of creation than as re-creation is rather misleading, since the undivided nature 
of the external works of the Trinity signifies not so much that there is only one action, but 
that there is only one agent. And since the work of reconciliation means for the Son our 
complete re-creation, so should it also 
for the work of the Spirit. 
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We noted already that Pannenberg is writing in a polemical context against the idea 
of the Spirit as `divine cognitive help' that he thinks bedevils Western theology. We do 
not take particular exception to this, since against tendencies often termed Gnostic or 
Manichaean, one has to state that salvation is not from creation, nor is its goal a creation 
other than this one; rather it is the salvation of creation, and of this creation. But in 
addition, one also has to state, against tendencies commonly referred to in an early age as 
Sadduceean, that the saving work of Son and Spirit in redemption is not just the 
completion of creation, but is its complete and genuine renewal. The way in which 
Pannenberg structures his account of the Spirit's work in reconciliation, we believe, 
pushes some of his remarks in a Sadducean direction. We conclude by noting two points 
where Pannenberg's account of the Spirit puts his treatment of kingdom and church 
under particular strain. 
Firstly, Pannenberg's stress on the continuity of the Spirit's work leads to some 
questionable theological judgements. For instance, he accuses Otto Weber and Karl Barth 
of `almost dualistically set[ting] the Spirit as an eschatological gift in contrast to the 
existing world reality' (3.3). Yet for all that it is this world reality that will then be 
changed, is it not the point of the consummation that it is in contrast to existing world 
reality - `flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God'? 22 Both Barth and Weber 
are careful to differentiate their accounts from gnostic soteriologies of salvation from 
creation, which would be dualistic, but at this point their grasp of the genuine and total 
newness of the new creation is the more convincing in our opinion. 
Second, there is inevitable tension between the emphasis on the continuous work of 
the Spirit throughout the economy and Pannenberg's account of what the Spirit does 
which often focuses on the discontinuity. For Pannenberg, no less than other theologians 
who place more stress on the newness of the Spirit's work, wishes to emphasise that it is 
not a possession we have of ourselves and that it is the coming of the future reality rather 
than the mere maintenance of the present. Our fellowship, he says, is something `that by 
the Spirit [we] have beyond [our]selves in Christ, ' just as by faith we are `lifted up 
... 
beyond the self in Christ' (3.134). So, for instance, on Christian baptism he writes, `It is 
the actual reconstitution of the person in the form of the sacramental sign.. . the gaining of 
22 1 Cor 15: 50. 
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true human self-identity' (3.275). Moreover, Pannenberg's account of conversion 
maintains that 
`faith is not effected in us by God's Spirit in the same way as all life's phenomena go back 
to the Spirit's work in creation. It is with the eschatological reality of the new life 
manifested in Jesus Christ that believers also receive the Holy Spirit as a gift' (3.200). 
Often it is either the ecstatic nature of our being in Christ extra nos or eschatology that 
allow for these references to the unique and salvific character of the life-giving acts of the 
Spirit, and it is only thus rather than by some immanent process that Christ can be said to 
be in us. 
Yet this uniqueness seems not always to be so clearly stated with reference to the 
Spirit. At one point Pannenberg writes: 
This work of the Spirit takes place in full and continuous connection with his 
work in the world of nature as the origin of all life, and especially in humans as 
the source of their "spiritual" activities that lift them ecstatically above their own 
particularity... In just the same way the Spirit effects in us the spontaneous 
recognition of Jesus as the Son of God that leads to faith in him as the Messiah of 
God's people' (3.17)23 
There are at least two problems with these comments, especially in saying that the Spirit 
works in just the same way when He produces faith in Christ as when He enables other 
instances of human ecstasy. For one thing, faith in Christ means being united in Christ's 
death and resurrection, which means both death to the world and the utter recreation of 
worldly reality. So, faith in Christ involves not a continuity with the rest of the Spirit's 
work in creation, but the discontinuity of something totally and radically new. For 
another, faith in Christ means being united with a supernatural object, i. e., the Son of God 
who became incarnate. 
Pannenberg goes on to say, `The special distinction of faith's recognition rests simply 
on its object, not on the nature of its perception' (3.17). But can this really be maintained? 
If it is the case, as Pannenberg believes, that Christ is really the unique Son of God 
incarnate, and so radically different from all creaturely reality, then surely the mode of 
perceiving it must be unique too. If it is merely a case of something being outside of us 
then there is no problem with the nature of perception remaining the same no matter 
what the object is, but the incarnate Son of God cannot be put into a species of things that 
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are outside of us. Deus non est in genere, even if the deus is God the Son and even if the 
genus is that of things external to us. Christ is the invisible God veiled in flesh, and so can 
be known only in that unique mode of perception, which is faith that the Spirit gives. 
Certainly it is the same Spirit who is operative both in the preserving of creation and in 
faith in the crucified Saviour, but in a wholly new way. 
3. The Spirit grants Christians immediacy to God and thus gives them true freedom, 
that is, He unites them to Jesus' filial relation to the Father both as individuals and 
as the fellowship of believers. 
The content and ordering of Pannenberg 's ecclesiology is guided by the concern not to 
fall prey to an individualistic subjectivity or spirituality. One can see this both in his 
placing the section on the immediacy of individuals to Jesus Christ (3.122-135) after the 
one entitled `The Mediating of the Fellowship of Believers by the Common Confession' 
(3.110-122), and by stressing the trinitarian context of the individual Christian life. The 
discussion of believers' immediacy God is in many ways Pannenberg's interpretation of 
Luther's notion of the priesthood of all believers and his On the Freedom of the 
Christian. 24 By placing this discussion in an ecclesial and kingdom context, and by giving 
it trinitarian content - the full title of the section is "The Immediacy of Individuals to 
Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit and the Communicating of the Gospel by the Church, " - 
Pannenberg takes up Luther's insights shorn of individualistic and subjectivist 
interpretation. 
Two questions arise. What is this immediacy? And how is it a work of the 
specifically trinitarian God? 
Firstly, what Pannenberg means by this immediacy is when the recipients of the 
gospel message `achieve their own independent relation to the matter, and hence a 
relation of immediacy that can cause them to forget the communication process. ' This 
`work of the Spirit' is `the immediacy of a personal relationship' with Jesus, and in Him 
the Father (3.124). It is not the individualism of lone ranger Christians who conduct 
23 Emphasis added. 
24 LW vol. 31, pp. 327ff (WA 7.20ff). 
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themselves outside the visible church, which is, Pannenberg believes, a peculiarly modern 
phenomenon, and not the intent of the Reformers' notion of the priesthood of all 
believers (3.125-6). 
The individual believer's commitment is mediated by the church's praise and 
confession of her Lord, just as the church is the gathering of individuals with an 
immediate relationship with Jesus. It is freedom, freedom from sin, from law, from 
corruption and death; it is a freedom founded on the basic freedom of direct access 
to God. For Pannenberg, it means being God's children, rather than servants, since 
'by participation in the filial relation of Jesus Christ to the Father, Christians have 
free access to the Father and may address him as Father.. . as Jesus did' (2.128-129). 
Pannenberg notes two elements of this liberating immediacy that the Spirit brings. 
The first is knowledge of Jesus. It includes `the freedom of individual judgement 
regarding the content of the tradition' (3.123), and even the right sort of critical 
reflection. Hence the responsibility of church leaders to instruct believers in the 
substance of scripture so that they too can share in the joy and freedom of this immediacy 
to Christ, and the need to beware of the wrong sort of priestly mediation (3.127). The 
second is `the immediacy of a personal relationship. ' For believers, Pannenberg writes, 
`have immediacy to Jesus because all have individual fellowship with Jesus in faith' 
(3.124). In this way believers achieve their own independent relationship with God. 
As for the second question, it is a triune action thus: this evangelical freedom is 
possible only because it is first the work of the Spirit, who is permanently given to 
believers, in order that they may share in the filial relation of Jesus to the Father, with its 
free access to God. Let us look at the various components of this in turn. 
That our immediacy to God is the work of the Spirit is to be expected given what we 
have already mentioned on His creative activity and His work in the human reception of 
reconciliation. Yet there is something more to notice. `[T]his is not just one work of the 
Spirit among others, ' Pannenberg avers. `The freedom of believers expresses the fact that 
the Spirit of God not only works in them but is permanently given to them' (3.129). For 
as the pledge of eternal life He is our unending link to the Son, by which we share in His 
unrestricted gift of the Spirit. " 
25 John 3: 34. 
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It is for this reason, i. e., the permanent gift of the Spirit, that the second part of our 
definition holds true, namely, in order that they may share in the filial relation ofJesus to 
the Father, with its free access to God The permanent gift of union with the Son, for 
Pannenberg, explains Christ's words, `"If, then, the Son makes you free, you will be free 
indeed" (John 8: 36)' (3.129). 
And since this "freedom indeed" is achieved only in union with Christ, Pannenberg 
distinguishes it from what he considers false freedom. In particular it is not just formal 
freedom, a freedom from, by which one distances oneself from a spectrum of possibilities, 
but a freedom for, by which we are firmly linked to the good and so choose it. It is a 
freedom not of detachment or isolation, but the freedom of humanity's new and true 
identity in Christ. For, as Pannenberg states, 
In fellowship with the eternal God believers are freed from anxiety about their 
finite existence, from fear of others, and from the powers of this world. The 
Spirit grants this freedom not only by liberating us from fixation on our own ego 
and lifting us above our own finitude, but by becoming lastingly ours as he gives 
us a share in the sonship of Jesus Christ (3.130). 
The final part of the above thesis that we have to exegete concerns how the Spirit's 
work of granting immediacy is for both believers and the church. As Pannenberg notes, 
in modem times especially there has been an interpretation of Christian immediacy to 
God that sees it as a key insight in the history of the liberation of the individual from the 
collective. Pannenberg does not want to deny every element of this. Indeed, there is an 
irreducibly individual element to the work of the Spirit. As he puts it in the first of his 
summary points, 
The Holy Spirit is the medium of the immediacy of individual Christians to God as 
he lifts them up to participation in the sonship of Jesus Christ and grants them, as a 
permanent gift, the Christian freedom that enables them to call confidently on God 
as our Father because the Spirit gives them assurance that they are God's children 
(3.134). 
Yet this trinitarian work of giving believers immediate access to the Father through 
the Son and by the Spirit is not opposed to what he has said earlier about the common 
confession. For, since the Spirit unites individual believers in common to the Son, the 
freedom of our new identity is a freedom with and for others. In other words, the 
particular ec-stasy in the individual appropriation of salvation is the Spirit lifting us out of 
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ourselves to participate in the salvific work of Christ to be members of His body. 
Pannenberg writes, 
Hence, 
By the event of this elevation of our own particularity, we as individual believers are 
also linked with others in the fellowship of believers, a fellowship whose common 
setting is the extra nos of faith in the one Lord (3.135-136). 
`raising up to existence outside the self in Christ.. . does not simply assure individuals 
of their freedom in Christ but in so doing brings them to the place of believers' 
fellowship. Not just the individual, but the church, too, in its liturgical life has its 
existence outside itself in Christ. In this way it shows itself to be a fellowship of the 
Spirit' (3.130). 
The independent existence of human creatures, which is the goal of God's action in 
the economy is not autonomy either from God or from fellow humans, but the mature life 
before God in the community of faith. And this too is achieved by specifically trinitarian 
action. For against other common causes that may be most `unholy' Pannenberg states 
that `by the Spirit the future of Jesus Christ is already present to believers as their personal 
and common future of salvation' (3.134). It is thus that the Spirit `releases and reconciles 
the tension between the fellowship and the individual in the concept of the church' 
(3.130). The form that this takes in the lives of Christians as well as its trinitarian 
outworking is the subject-matter of our next thesis. 
4. The Holy Spirit's ecstatic work in raising believers outside themselves into Christ 
takes form in individual Christians as faith, hope, love, adoption and justification, 
and is signified in the church community in the sacraments of baptism and 
eucharist. 
`In all their forms of manifestation the works of God's Spirit have an ecstatic character' 
(3.135). As befits the procedure of seeing the Spirit's soteriological work as gift within the 
context of His more comprehensive activity as Giver of Life, the spotlight moves from the 
general to the particular: what is the case in all of creation and in all human life , 26 applies 
26 `Every living thing lives its life by existing outside itself, namely, in and by the world around it' 
(3.135). Cf. 2.33-34,128ff. 
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also for all human faith and finally for specifically Christian existence. This is so both for 
what Pannenberg calls "The Basic Saving Works of the Spirit in Individual Christians" and 
for "The Significatory Form of the Presence of Christ's Salvation in the Life of the 
Church. " These two topics, which form a large part of Pannenberg's discussion in chapter 
13, also shape the rest of our treatment of his doctrine of the kingdom and the church. 
The Spirit's ecstatic work in individual Christians 
The particular ec-stasy in the individual appropriation of salvation is the Spirit lifting us 
out of ourselves to participate in the salvific work of Christ to be members of His body. By 
the event of this elevation of our own particularity, `we as individual believers are also 
linked with others in the fellowship of believers, a fellowship whose common setting is 
the extra nos of faith in the one Lord' (3.135-136). Hence, individual ecstatic existence in 
Christ and its spiritual fruit - faith, hope and love as well as adoption and justification - 
are irreducibly ecclesial. 
Faith 
The `extra nos of faith in the one Lord, ' Pannenberg says, has its basis in God's historical 
revelation. That is, knowledge of the history of Jesus and assent to its truth and 
dependability as well as to the future it presents to us is faith's presupposition, and it is 
`[b]y putting one's trust in the future God will bring' that `one has faith in God Himself 
(3.138). Such in very general terms is Pannenberg's presentation of Christian faith. 
What has this to do with the trinitarian God? Two answers can be given to this 
question, the one more complimentary, the other less so. The more complimentary 
answer in the light of the avowed trinitarian ambitions is that in Pannenberg's account 
the Trinity provides the context and foundation for faith. There is a trinitarian context 
since it is within the framework of sharing Christ's sonship by the Spirit that Pannenberg 
deals with the phenomenon of faith - such is the `extra nos of faith'. Also, the foundation 
is trinitarian, as the Trinity is more than simply a `thought of faith' consisting of an 
interpretation of the history of Jesus, although trinitarian doctrine is that too (3.160). For 
ultimately God's historical revelation has its ground in the trinitarian God, since it is the 
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God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit who, Pannenberg says, is `the final and material basis 
of the historical reality of Jesus' (3.160). 
The less complimentary answer to the question, `What has this to do with the 
trinitarian God? ' is - frankly -'Not much. ' While not denying that the trinitarian context 
and foundation do exist, one must admit that their role in the discussion is very much 
back-stage rather than centre-stage. Notably, of all the "Basic Works of the Spirit in 
Individual Christians" the section on faith is by far the longest, and its references to and 
reliance on trinitarian thinking by far the fewest. In our opinion the conspicuous silence 
on the Trinity here is part of a general lack of trinitarian reference on matters to do with 
our knowledge of God, which we shall examine in the conclusion where we shall return 
to Pannenberg's treatment of faith. 
Hope 
Since faith is trust in God's saving action in time, and since this action is directed towards 
future consummation, faith necessarily implies hope. For Pannenberg this is part of the 
same trinitarian dynamic. Sharing in His Spirit `believers in Christ, to whom they are 
united in the ecstatic "outside-the-self of faith, acquire a hope beyond death, ' enjoying 
the permanence of filial relationship to the Father. This is the basis for the Christian hope 
that endures beyond the grave, and thus `faith lifts us above our entanglement in the 
vicious circle of sin and death' (3.177). 
That Christian hope results from this trinitarian dynamic safeguards it, Pannenberg 
argues, from rival false versions that hold it to be either generated by the self or exclusive 
to the self. Pannenberg's account of the ecstatic work of the Spirit in general distances 
itself from self-generation and self-limitation; but his treatment of hope provides a helpful 
illustrative example? ' 
Firstly, it is not generated by the self, because it is a trinitarian possibility rather than 
a human power. `In keeping with its nature as Christian hope, ' Pannenberg writes, `it has 
its basis outside itself, namely, in Jesus Christ. ' Because of this different basis Christian 
hope is distinct from all other human hopes, and thus `its content exceeds all that we may 
27 E. g., the treatment of love shows that its trinitarian enabling entails its generation by God rather than 
us and its necessary inclusion of all those who have a share in Christ (3.182ff). 
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hope for or expect according to human experience' (3.174). Thus, in contrast to self- 
generated expectancy it can rightly be considered as a promise addressed to us. 
Second, it is not exclusive to the self, since spiritual ecstatic existence provides a basis 
`for overcoming the egotistical structure of human hopes. ' For by faith we are snatched 
from self-centred ambition and `find the fulfillment of [our] personal life precisely in the 
fellowship of the body of Christ and the work for the future of humanity in the kingdom 
of God' (3.177). 
Love 
That Pannenberg believes faith mediates our inclusion into the divine fellowship of love 
means that he understands Christian love on the basis of faith, and thus along the lines of 
standard Lutheran treatments that 'love.. . ought to follow faith. '28 Yet much of 
Pannenberg's account of Christian love is intended to correct certain understandings 
common in Lutheran theology, partly understandings of grace in Western theology, and 
more specifically the idea common in certain strands of 20th century Lutheran theology 
that Christian love is only expressed in downward and outward love of neighbour rather 
than peculiarly upward longing for God. Pannenberg's trinitarian resolution of these 
issues concerning Christian love affect all three of the sub-sections he includes. 
First, on the matter of love of God and love of neighbour, Pannenberg understands 
the latter as inclusion in the dynamic of love - we love others because God first loved us 
together with the rest of humanity. But Pannenberg wants to say something more, and 
for trinitarian reasons. In particular he is seeking to correct a rival understanding of 
Christian love, one which makes a sharp distinction between two sorts of love, eros and 
agape, the former an upward movement of our self-seeking and self-justifying love for 
God, and the latter a downward movement of God's giving and suffering love for us 29 
The trinitarian underpinnings to Pannenberg's theology allow him to endorse both a 
downward and an upward element to Christian love. Love of neighbour, he says, is 
28 Apology for the Augsburg Confession II, 74. 
29 The classic statement of this position is A. Nygren Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1953), esp. 
pp. 53-55. Perhaps the most eloquent critique of the view of Nygren is to be found in J. Burnaby Amor 
Del: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine: the Hulsean Lectures of 1938 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1938). See also O. M. T. O'Donovan The Problem of Self-love in Augustine (New Haven: 
183 
'participation in the Father's love for the Son that extends also to the world of creatures 
and embraces it' (3.187), and thus grounds our love outwards. 30 But our understanding of 
agape must be `trinitarian' and therefore include the reciprocity that characterises the 
divine life. So, Pannenberg writes that Christian love also has an upward element since it 
shares in Christ's filial relationship to the Father, and that `as a response that the Holy 
Spirit makes possible to the love received from God, we have a part in the intratrinitarian 
life of God, in the mutuality of fellowship between Father, Son and Spirit' (3.193). 
Second, this trinitarian understanding is fundamental for his treatment of love and 
grace, in particular the tackling of the longstanding issue within Western theology of 
whether love should be understood as gracious favour or as infused gift. `Only the ecstatic 
structure of faith, ' Pannenberg writes, 
`enables us to understand that the Spirit of God and therefore also the love of 
God that is poured into believers' hearts do not become part of our creaturely 
reality when God's Spirit is imparted to us as a gift and he pours God's love into 
our hearts' (3.200). 
In this way Pannenberg affirms on the one hand that the Spirit really is given to us and 
that Christ really is in us, and on the other that this grace is not independent of the 
history of Jesus Christ, since it is not autonomous but only exists as we are taken up to 
exist in Him. 
Third, the trinitarian construal informs Pannenberg's treatment of prayer. The 
context for prayer is the mutuality in the filial relationship to God Christians have, `the 
mutuality, ' he says, `that has its basic eternal form in the mutual perichoresis of the 
trinitarian persons' (3.204). Our participation in divine love includes a responsive love to 
God that expresses itself in spontaneous address to God and intercession for others. Thus, 
he says, `the link between love of God and love of neighbor finds concrete manifestation 
in Christian prayer' (3.205). 
Adoption & justification 
Yale, 1980) for further insights into how common views such as Nygren's were in 20" century 
Lutheran theology. 
30 That the Father's love for the world is in the Son also guarantees the independence of God's love 
from its creaturely object (3.187). 
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If Pannenberg's trinitarian rubric for understanding the Christian life, i. e., that by the 
Spirit we share in the Son's relationship with the Father, had a significant effect on 
certain Lutheran understandings of immediacy to God and of love, the effect is even 
greater on Lutheran interpretations of justification. There are a number of points at issue 
in Pannenberg's treatment, 31 such as the meaning and importance of baptism, and the 
plurality of metaphors of reconciliation of which justification is only one. For our 
purposes, however, the focus here is on the importance of the Trinity for the 
reinterpretation and relativising of the doctrine of justification. 
As we have seen, Pannenberg's trinitarian construal of reconciliation is that by the 
Spirit we exist outside ourselves to share the Son's relationship to the Father. Indeed it 
may be more than coincidence that since justification, on Pannenberg's reading, is not a 
mere declaration extra nos but is a consequence of our being joined by the Spirit to Christ 
the Son of God, STs treatment of justification comes after faith as one of a series of works 
of the Spirit's reconciling action. And it is this basis of ecstatic fellowship with Christ by 
the Spirit that controls the treatment of justification, too. 
This basis in sharing Christ's filial relation to the Father means a special emphasis on 
adoption. Indeed, for Pannenberg, adoption, understood in terms of this trinitarian 
dynamic takes us deeper into the mystery of salvation than does justification. As the 
children of God, ' Pannenberg states, 
`... believers are caught up both in the Son's fellowship of love with the Father and 
in the obedience of the Son of God on his path to the world. In other words, those 
whom the Spirit of God impels are God's children... Being God's children is thus of 
the essence of the Christian life' (3.211-212). 
This, Pannenberg thinks, is the message of Paul and Jesus himself (3.212), and has 
rightly been retrieved in modern theology view that adoption is not merely an effect of 
justification, 32 but its equivalent. It is, he argues, also the understanding of Luther, for 
whom `ecstatic fellowship with Christ, to whom believers entrust themselves, forms the 
basis... of justification' (3.215) . 33 `Being declared righteous is not the 
basis of the 
31 On justification see also Hintergruende des Streites um die Rechtfertigungslehre in der 
evangelischen Theologie (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), and the relevant 
articles in BS73, where the impact of the doctrine of the Trinity is less obvious. 
32 E. g., A. Ritschl A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation 
(trans. J. S. Black) (Edinburgh: Edminton & Douglas, 1872). 
33 3.215-219 chronicle Pannenberg's reading of Luther's doctrine of justification, and how it is 
consonant with his own. 
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righteousness of faith, ' writes Schwoebel. `Rather, the righteousness of faith is the basis 
for being declared righteous. '14We are first united with Christ through faith, then we are 
accounted righteous on the basis of Christ's merits; we are not first declared righteous and 
then adoption ensues. Justification follows adoption. 
Here, in Pannenberg's view, Reformation accounts, Luther aside, 35 need to be 
corrected, both Tridentine theology and the Lutheran tradition stemming from the later 
Melanchthon. The Council of Trent, he says, `did not pay adequate attention to the 
decisive significance of faith for the relation of those born again by baptism to God' 
(2.324). Yet the more direct critique is directed at those of Pannenberg's own 
denomination, a critique that has particular relevance given the recent Lutheran-Catholic 
rapprochement that led ultimately to the joint Declaration on Justification, which still 
remains contentious among German Protestants. 
The position, august within Lutheranism, that he is questioning is represented by 
some words of Quenstedt, who writes: 
`The immediate effect of faith is the remission of sins, adoption, union with 
Christ, access to God, and peace of conscience. Among these effects of faith, 
justification is the principal, to which all the rest can be referred. '36 
Contrast this with Pannenberg's judgement: `There is no reason to subordinate these other 
descriptions to the idea of justification, ' he writes, `particularly as Paul himself already 
presupposed faith fellowship with Christ in the verdict of justification and then this 
theme in terms of adoption into the filial relation to the Father. ' Indeed, justification has 
for Pannenberg `only a partial function' (3.235) in describing the trinitarian action of 
regeneration, certainly an important function in emphasising the present and assured 
participation in salvation, but still partial. 
The Spirit's ecstatic work in the Church's Sacramental Signs 
Pannenberg's focus turns from the individual to the church community, where also the 
Spirit's ecstatic work is basic for its being and work. His discussion deals with both the 
34 (1996), p. 518. 
35 Pannenberg's reading has been much influenced by the Finnish interpretation of Luther associated 
with T. Mannermaa's Der im Glauben gegenwaertige Christus: Rechtfertigung und Vergoettung: zum 
oekumenischen Dialog (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1989). On this see 3.215-216. 
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church's being lifted above itself in Christ and its living in the world as the locus of 
Christ's presence and action through the Spirit. This includes in chapter 13 the topics of 
sacraments, ministry and the relationship of the church and the people of God as well as 
chapter 14's focus on the election and sending of God's people into the world and its 
history. The focus of our particular treatment of trinitarian themes will be directed only 
to the topic of sacraments. 
Does this limited focus obscure unique insights into Pannenberg's trinitarian 
credentials available in the other sections? It has been argued, for instance, that in the 
section on church ministry the concern of unity is much to the fore, at the expense of a 
view popular in some ecumenical circles that unity is expressed in a communion of 
churches based on their reconciled diversity. Noting this, Christoph Schwoebel says that 
`Pannenberg seems to operate with a notion of unity in which diversity is a shortcoming 
that is to be overcome, ' one which he believes is ultimately rooted in his view of the 
Trinity. `Could it be, ' he asks, `that the element of personal particularity associated with 
the three persons of the Trinity is not strong enough to allow for a relational view of the 
church, its communal life, its ministry and its unity? '37 It may be that Schwoebel is 
correct; and it may also be that Schwoebel's comments might rely on a version of social 
trinitarianism that neither we nor (we argue) Pannenberg would endorse. Yet, however 
the matter rests, there seems to be no reliance on trinitarian thinking that is notably 
different from the trajectories Pannenberg has already outlined in his discussions of the 
work of the Spirit in individual Christians and in the church's sacramental life. 
The focus for the rest of this chapter, then, will be on how Pannenberg understands 
the trinitarian rationale of baptism and eucharist. Specific references to the Trinity, it is 
true, are not so common as elsewhere in ST but they tend to be more explicit and 
frequent than elsewhere in the latter parts of chapter 13 and chapter 14. Here 
Pannenberg develops variations on a now familiar theme: `The issue in both baptism and 
the Lord's Supper, ' he writes, `... is the fellowship of individuals with Jesus Christ' (3.238). 
Just how this is so we now investigate 
36 Theologia Didactico-Polemica IV, 286, in H. Schmid The Evangelical Theology of the Lutheran 
Church (tr. C. Hay & H. Jacobs) 3'' rev., (Minneapolis, Augsburg, 1961), p. 426. 
37 (1996) p. 521. 
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Baptism 
The form that fellowship with Jesus Christ takes in baptism is its `unique grounding' 
(3.238). For according to Pannenberg baptism is the regenerating event whereby the 
believer `is now constituted by this relation to God and concretely by participation in the 
filial relation of Jesus to the Father' (3.239), and thus forms the basis for believers' 
adoption and hope in God. Indeed Pannenberg even surmises that the practice of 
Christian baptism is referred back to Jesus' own, thus reinforcing the significatory power 
of the act in effecting our incorporation into the Son of God. 'The link between baptism, 
reception of the Spirit, and addressing God as Father, with at least the implied thought of 
a filial relation to God, ' he claims, `... refers the baptismal practice of primitive 
Christianity back to Jesus' own baptism' (3.280). 
Specifically, fellowship with Jesus Christ means fellowship in His death and 
resurrection, for the exalted Christ does not govern His disciples `independently of his 
earthly way or apart from his history' (3.242). Thus Christian baptism is our sharing `in 
the fruit of [Christ's] death and in the new and eternal life that his resurrection 
manifested and that vanquished death' (3.240). It is the enacted sign of our dying and 
rising with Him. 
By definition Christian baptism is also a spiritual act, as Pannenberg notes from the 
NT's frequently relating it to the eschatological gift of the Spirit 38 For the Spirit is the 
One `by whom the new life of the resurrection of Jesus is already present to the baptized 
and its future consummation is guaranteed' (3.240). As the one whose ecstatic work lifts 
humans above their finitude into the eternal fellowship with the Father in Jesus, His Son, 
the Spirit is the agent by whom we are joined to Christ's death and resurrection and share 
His destiny. Thus it is that our receiving the Spirit is the conferring on us of a new 
identity (3.469) as we come to be who we are outside ourselves in Christ in the power of 
the life-giving Spirit. So, baptism too is for Pannenberg a significatory action of the 
church properly understood as being to the Father, in the Son and by the Spirit. 
Eucharist 
38 3.240, for instance, cites Acts 2: 38; 19: 5-6 and 10: 44ff. 
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'[T]he fellowship of individuals with Jesus Christ' is important to Pannenberg's 
understanding of the eucharist too, though not so dominant as in his remarks on baptism. 
It is, he says, 'the assuring and demonstrating' of this fellowship, and so forms part of the 
individual history of appropriation of the new existence of Christians that is constituted 
by baptism' (3.238). Yet since Pannenberg understands the eucharist more as signifying 
the form of the reign of God, there is perhaps greater stress on the common fellowship of 
believers with each other on the basis of their fellowship in Christ rather than on the 
basis itself. 
In traditional treatments the role of the Son is particularly significant, since usual loci 
focus on the institution of the supper by the Son and the nature of His presence in the 
elements. Both are here also in ST, the former considered as the continuation of table 
fellowship in Jesus' ministry that prefigures the eschatological banquet (3.283-287), and 
the latter as symbolically present in the bread and wine (3.293-304). Yet what is of 
greater interest here is the role of the Spirit. Important for our trinitarian concerns are 
Pannenberg's attempts to incorporate pneumatology into the nature of the church's 
eucharistic practice, in particular an increased focus on the role of epiclesis, i. e., the 
invocation of the Spirit onto the elements. 
Much of what Pannenberg says corresponds both to recent ecumenical developments 
and to the trinitarian framework for ecclesiology outlined in the early sections of ST 
volume 3. The ecumenical developments include revived dialogue with Eastern theology 
and movements of liturgical renewal and find their expression in the Lima report. This 
document states that `at the eucharistic meal the Holy Spirit makes the crucified and risen 
Christ truly present for us by fulfilling the promise of the words of institution' (3.321- 
322). 39 The coherence with the account of trinitarian actions and relations outlined 
earlier is the complementary emphasis on both Son and Spirit in the being and action of 
the church. And, not surprisingly given his earlier critique, here too Pannenberg detects 
a deficiency in Western formulations of holy communion, which he thinks have obscured 
the epiclesis and increasingly linked the consecration of the bread and wine exclusively to 
the priest's recitation of the words of institution. 
39 Pannenberg cites the WCC Lima Report II Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, 14. See P. Scrotenbocr 
(ed. ) Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry with an Evangelical Response (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992). 
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This treatment of eucharistic matters with particular focus on pneumatology carries 
with it several implications. For one thing, it resists restricting the presence of Christ in 
the elements to the recitation of the words of institution as might certain understandings 
of the transsubstantiation of the elements ex opere operato. `As such, ' Pannenberg states, 
`it does not itself effect Christ's presence in bread and wine. Only the Spirit himself to 
whom prayer is made can do that' (3.322). And since Pannenberg refuses to separate the 
action of Son and Spirit, he does not regard the words of Christ and the coming of the 
Spirit as competitive. In eucharistic celebration too, then, Christ's presence does not by- 
pass the person of the Spirit, for it is the Spirit that makes Christ present. 
For another, it shows the "medium" or "locus" of Christ's spiritual presence in the 
eucharist. By the Spirit, Pannenberg writes, `the promise of the Lord.. . that he would be 
present to his disciples in the bread and the wine of the Supper, finds its fulfillment' 
(3.323). Christ, he says, is actually present to His community by the Spirit, and this is 
what provides the basis of His real presence in the elements, as was the case when on the 
night on which He was betrayed the Son was present with His followers and made 
Himself present in those elements. For the Spirit unites us with this Christ in this supper. 
In addition, it means the changing of the worshipper. The Spirit, as the One who 
ecstatically lifts us above ourselves into Christ, makes possible the invitation to `lift up our 
hearts' in the communion service. `Liturgical participants, in faith, ' Pannenberg says, `are 
outside themselves with Christ as they recall their Lord's passion' (3.307). Hence he 
believes that a trinitarian understanding of the Lord's Supper safeguards anamnesis from 
being any mere `act of human remembering of which we are still the subjects. ' Rather, it 
is the `self-representing of Jesus Christ by his Spirit' (3.306) 40 
And this ecstatic existence that the Spirit enables in the eucharist inevitably involves 
a transformation in the attitude and behaviour of the celebrant. By the Spirit we are 
`drawn into the movement of the life of Jesus Christ, ' which produces in us two fruits. 
Firstly, it instils thanksgiving, both for the Son's faithful sacrifice for us and for the gifts of 
creation. Second, it produces dedication, as we too participate in Christ's offering and 
ourselves become spiritual sacrifices to God (3.324). 
40 A similar dynamic is present in Pannenberg's understanding of baptism and confirmation (3.271). 
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Pannenberg's discussion of the kingdom and the church, like his doctrine of creation, 
contains a large amount of dogmatic material and makes widespread use of the doctrine of 
the Trinity to give it form and content. The trinitarian construal of the kingdom and the 
church eschews the doctrine of the Trinity associated with the Christian West, which 
holds to the filioque and understands the Spirit's work primarily as the outflow of that of 
the Son, instead of also seeing the Son as dependent on, and constituted by, the Spirit. 
We see this in Pannenberg's qualification to calling the Spirit the divine gift: He is the 
triune gift in His reconciling action, but this too should be understood in the context of, 
and is only possible because of, His first of all being the Giver of life who consummates 
the creation. We see this too in how Pannenberg understands the triune persons to be 
active in the formation of the divine kingdom and the church. The second and third 
triune persons are irreducibly involved in a relationship of mutual dependence, the Son 
being the one into whom, and the Spirit the one by whom, creation is gathered, so both 
Son and Spirit are unique, complementary and equal. It is as this creative Life-Giver, the 
principle of life and fellowship within and outside the inner-triune life, that the Spirit 
works in the church. As in His creative work in general, He enables creatures to live 
outside themselves in ec-static existence, but His reconciling work involves lifting 
creatures into participation with God the Son crucified and risen. For all Christians this 
means that the Spirit lifts them up into Jesus' filial relation to the Father, and thus into the 
triune life. And for the Christian life, this ec-static existence by the Spirit takes form in 
individual Christians as faith, hope, love, adoption and justification, and is signified in the 
church community in the sacraments of baptism and eucharist. 
The thrust of Pannenberg's trinitarian construal of the kingdom and the church, 
then, is to understand the ongoing work of God's reconciliation of the world with greater 
emphasis on the integrity and particularity of the Spirit than have many other treatments. 
In particular, the breadth of the Spirit's creative work provides the context within which 
to understand the application of the fruits of Christ's passion. For all the insights within 
Pannenberg's treatment, we have had cause to query both his negative assessment of the 
role of the Spirit in Western discussions of the Trinity as well as how far his account 
allows for the newness of the Spirit's work in redemption. We must return to these 
matters in another context, but only after we have completed Pannenberg's account of the 
work of the triune God in the final consummation. 
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Chapter Eight 
PANNENBERG'S TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE 
OF THE FINAL CONSUMMATION 
Pannenberg has often been characterised as an eschatological theologian - 
correctly. `Eschatology, ' he writes, `is not just the subject of a single chapter in 
dogmatics; it determines the perspective of Christian doctrine as a whole' (3.351). 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that despite all the emphasis on the centrality 
of eschatology - and perhaps even because of it - what Pannenberg actually has to 
say on the matter is surprisingly thin. Among such critics are Gunton, ' Jenson 
and Bradshaw, who writes: 
The great problem for Pannenberg comes when time runs out, because he is left 
with the whole finite process gathered up as the perfect ontological self- 
expression or revelation of the free God, and he seems compelled either into 
going back into some kind of correspondence, two-tier structure of finitude 
with God, or else of an identification of all finitude with the Son - and the Son 
will be seen always so to have been, according to the retroactive principle... He 
is committed to an eschaton at the end of history as the very nerve of his 
system, hence he cannot posit an endless course of history. It is interesting that 
idealists, ancient and modem, from Origen to neo-Hegelian, have great 
difficulty in developing a beginning and end for creation .3 
Bradshaw's point is that Pannenberg, like other idealists throughout the ages, 4 has 
monistic tendencies that make it difficult consistently to maintain that the created order 
' The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity. The Bampton 
Lectures 1992 (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 92-93. 
2 Systematic Theology. Volume 2: The Works of God (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 310. 
3 (1988), p. 342 
4 It is most likely correct of Bradshaw to call neo-Hegelians idealists, much less so Origen and, I would 
argue, Pannenberg. Despite Pannenberg's respect for and reliance on Hegel at several points, as noted 
above, at times it is misleading to categorise Pannenberg as an idealist theologian whose emphases as 
well as strengths and weaknesses naturally mirror those of the broader philosophical movement. 
Merely on the matter of eschatology at issue here Pannenberg sets clear water between him and the 
'idealism' of Kant, Hegel and their followers (3.533). Whatever the points of similarity with 
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can remain truly itself and not be ultimately subsumed into divine reality. Hence the 
alleged reticence on creation's consummation. 
Whether such critics are ultimately satisfied with the material content of his 
eschatology need not obscure the fact that at least in ST, Pannenberg has provided an 
eschatology that is not merely formally determinative, but also materially substantial. 
Indeed a mere formal significance for eschatology is not nearly enough for Pannenberg, 
and in his view was a failing of some of the dialectical theologians of the first half of the 
previous century. Barth, he says, did little to give shape to the final future of humanity and 
the world (3.536-537). Pannenberg, then, is aware of the danger that Bradshaw highlights. 
Formal importance for eschatology as in Barth and Bultmann will not do without material 
content. Pannenberg is not only aware of the traditional topics of resurrection from the 
dead, the kingdom of God, the last judgement and Christ's return, but also deals with them 
in novel ways 5 
Since the consummation has been formally determinative throughout his whole 
theology, substantial aspects of Pannenberg's material eschatology germane to our topic 
have appeared in the foregoing discussion that he does not feel the need to expand at 
length in ST chapter 15. Perhaps the most important of these is one which was a 
significant theme in the chapter especially devoted to the Trinity, namely the idea that at 
the consummation the Son, having brought about the rule of God in creation, will hand 
the kingdom over to the Father. At one point in the discussion he writes: 
As already in his earthly proclamation Jesus prepared the way for the lordship of 
God, so at his return the lordship of the risen Lord and its consummation will have 
as its only goal the definitive establishment of the kingdom. The kingdom of the 
Father whose imminence Jesus proclaimed on earth, and which broke in already in 
his work on earth, is indissolubly bound up with the Son and his work and will thus 
find its consummation when Jesus Christ returns in glory (3.608). 
In both Pannenberg's discussion and in our treatment of it this point will be presupposed 
and explicated indirectly, rather than given direct and extended treatment. The action of 
the trinitarian God at the end of the ages is to be described as the handing over of the 
philosophical idealism Pannenberg, like his predecessor Origen, is first of all a Christian theologian, 
and it is as such that he should primarily be judged. 
5 See also "Die Aufgabe christlicher Eschatologie" in BST3, pp. 271-282. 
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kingdom from the Son to the Father, but it also takes other forms, which we shall discuss 
here. Four points in particular merit our attention. 
1. Our eschatological destiny is to participate in God's trinitarian life. 
Pannenberg's emphasis on the future as the ultimate determination that shapes our 
present has always had as one of its central elements - if not the central element - that 
this future is participation in the divine life. It has shaped our creation: hence 
Pannenberg asserts, `the destiny of all creaturely occurrence and existence is oriented to 
fellowship with God himself (2.7). And it is our hope: 'Christians, ' he says, `... expect a 
future in which all their temporal life will be permeated by praise of God and will be 
glorified as incorruptible fellowship with this eternal God' (3.602). 
More precisely, Pannenberg means by this that in the eschaton we will share in God's 
trinitarian life. `God wills fellowship with us, ' he says, `namely, our participation in the 
fellowship of the Son with the Father by the Spirit in the life of the Trinity' (3.582-583). 
Again he writes, 'The aim of giving creatures independent existence was that they should 
be able to share in the relation of the Son to the Father and hence in the trinity's eternal 
fellowship of love' (3.630-631). The fullness of eternity, which is the trinitarian life, will 
one day become ours when God brings our temporal sphere to an end. 
To be even more precise, we should note that this participation in God's trinitarian 
life is God's allowing us a share of the Son 's relationship to the Father. The ultimate goal 
of the divine action, this `fellowship of creatures with their creator is to be thought of as 
participation of the Son with the Father through the Spirit' (2.7). The purpose of the 
whole economy of divine action has been our fashioning after the image of the Son, a 
destiny which marks not only our creation (2.138) and our reconciliation (3.12), but our 
glorification, too. 
Some eschatologies have been criticised for positing an end-time divinisation of 
humanity with our participation in the trinitarian life becoming the end of our 
creatureliness and entailing a blurring of divine and human reality. Bradshaw, for 
instance, fears this is the case with certain idealist constructions of eschatology, 
Pannenberg among them. Pannenberg, he says, 
194 
has not yet produced a clarification of how his system continues to distinguish finite 
reality from the eternal Son when temporality ceases and the Son is constituted as 
eternal. When time ends and God's triune being is wholly consummated, when God 
is all in all and the whole creation is summed up as permeated by the Spirit, then is 
there a hypostasis of creation to be God's partner? Will not God be communing 
with himself, having enriched his pure freedom through the variety of finite 
history ?6 
Pannenberg, however, is on guard against this danger: participation is not absorption. We 
have noted this already in his treatment of other doctrines, in the treatment of 
reconciliation above all. The emphases there have been retained here, and the 
consummated life of humanity, just like its reconciled life, is an independent one that is 
distinguished both from the Father and from the Son. 
There is, for Pannenberg, no fusing of Creator and creature in the eschaton. The Son, 
in whose image we are being conformed, is the one who eternally and freely differentiates 
Himself from God His Father. As the formal principle and source of our destiny, 
therefore, He fashions for us a life like His, one that is in true relation to God because it is 
independent, freely self-differentiated. `This independence does not end in the 
eschatological consummation, ' Pannenberg states, and the mutuality of the divine-human 
relationship is not transcended. He continues, 
We can speak of this mutuality only because creatures have an existence with 
its own centre and characterized by spontaneity in relation to God and their 
fellows. Hence the glorification that accrues to them cannot simply imply their 
absorption into the life of God. Instead the spontaneity of the glorification of 
the Father who is manifested in his glory by the Son is the medium in which 
the glorification of creatures themselves takes place by the Spirit (3.643). 
Indeed the independence of the creature, which does not cease at the eschaton, but is 
maintained as God's purpose for creation, is to be understood in terms of the Trinity. 
Moreover, this would be to misunderstand our participation in the Son's relationship 
to the Father. We shall remain distinct, not just from God the Father, but also from the 
Son. Pannenberg writes, 
The distinction between head and body preserves the individual distinction of Jesus 
from his people notwithstanding his unity with them in the fellowship of his body. 
6 Bradshaw (1988), p. 341. 
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Similarly we must say of the resurrection of believers that their individuality will 
not disappear even though their separation from each other in their earthly 
existence is one of the things that will be profoundly changed by the eschatological 
transformation of this mortal life into the new corporeality of the resurrection from 
the dead (3.629)? 
Distinction is not done away with in our life to come, only the separation that comes 
from human rapacity and the sin of seeking to be as God. In our glorified state we will 
accept one another and be for one another, just as we accept the Father as God and Jesus 
Christ as Lord. We will relate properly to, but not become, the other. `In all these 
relations, ' Pannenberg states, `not only particularity but also its positive acceptance, and 
therefore also self-distinction, are still the condition of fellowship, the same being true in 
relation to God' (3.629). 
2. As the end-time gift that makes present the eschatological future to all creation, both 
for the individual and for the whole created order, it is the Holy Spirit to whom the 
divine work of glorification is to be appropriated 
The previous chapter considered Pannenbergs understanding of the Spirit as gift. The 
Giver of Life, that is, is given to believers as pledge and possession. Yet, to be precise, we 
must add that He is the end-time gift, the one who - both given and giving - is primarily 
concerned with the end-time consummation. It is 'in the eschatological futurd that He 
`will transform believers, and with them all creation, for participation in the glory of God' 
(3.553) .8 
How this is so and how it affects the other operations of the Spirit we shall 
explore further here. 
The Spirit makes present the eschatological future... 
7 Such a differentiation between Christ and believers in the future consummation has been a feature of 
Pannenberg's writing on the subject earlier in his career and is neither novel to the later ST nor a 
reaction to critiques such as Bradshaw's. See e. g, GST2, pp. 185-186. 
8 Emphasis added. 
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For all his stress that future eschatology must determine the whole of Christian doctrine 
and that this eschaton comes as a spontaneous act of God without any human co- 
operation, the end, for Pannenberg, is neither remote nor alien. This is so, because of the 
activity of the Spirit. For the Spirit, whose proper work is the final consummation, is also 
active in our present as the power of the future. 
This emphasis characterises what Pannenberg says about the work of the Spirit in the 
Christian believer, who is given the Spirit both as assurance of a right relationship with 
God and as a pledge of future glory. For, `By the Spirit the eschatological future is present 
already in the hearts of believers' (3.552) 
Yet by this Pannenberg also wants to state something, on which other theologies 
often lay less emphasis. That is -a point Pannenberg has made much of throughout his 
theology - the work of the Spirit beyond the assurance of the individual believer. The 
matter is well summarised in the following quotation: 
If by the creative presence of the divine Spirit within it creaturely life is already a 
foretaste of eternity, by the reconciling act of God in Jesus Christ this creaturely life 
is kept and saved for eternity, and even now is assured of future salvation by the gift 
of the Spirit (3.644). 
We should note here the three elements to the Spirit's work in bringing God's future into 
the present, i. e., present assurance, reconciliation in Christ and creaturely life. 
The first is his presence as the gift that brings assurance of salvation for believers. 
Again, even though this is the personal and subjective aspect of the gift of the Spirit, it 
should not be understood merely within the confines of the ecstatics of human 
consciousness. The assurance of the Spirit is not only emotion. Rather, `the gift of the 
Spirit, as the pledge of future glory, constitutes the eschatological assurance of salvation 
for those who are linked to Jesus by faith and baptism' (3.552), for it is 'an advance ... on 
the life of resurrection from the dead' (3.241). The Spirit is assurance and pledge to us in 
view of this more extensive work, namely His work in Christ and creation. 
The second is the reconciling act of God in Jesus Christ. As we saw earlier, the work 
of the Spirit in reconciliation cannot be seen merely as the fruit or application of the 
Spirit, as has often been the case in Western theology. Rather, in line with other 
implications Pannenberg draws from Jesus' life, he states that the Spirit's eschatological 
action is not limited to His being given by the Son but includes - and flows from - His 
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being given to Him. Hence, Pannenberg says, we already see anticipations of 
eschatological salvation 
`in the incarnation of the Son in time, which took place by the Spirit's power; not 
in Jesus' birth alone, but also in his baptism by John, and finally in the 
confirmatory event of the resurrection of the Crucified' (3.552). 
Here Pannenberg sees his own conclusions as an advance on the eschatology of 
Gerhard Ebeling, the third volume of whose dogmatics9, like Pannenberg's own, is 
structured around the twin foci of pneumatology and eschatology. In both, according to 
Ebeling, the world is transcended, though in different ways, 10 and this difference requires 
`christological bracketing of the two in the person of Jesus Christ. ' Yet, Pannenberg 
thinks, this structure fails to pay due note to the fact that Jesus Christ too, both His person 
and work, is `already an expression of the dynamic of the Spirit. ' He continues: 
The relation between the future and the present of God's kingdom in the person of 
Jesus was itself already mediated pneumatically, both in the historical situation of 
the earthly proclamation of Jesus and with reference to the relation between the 
Jesus of history and the returning Christ who now exercises his lordship by his Spirit 
(3.553). 
Hence, `we must, ' Pannenberg writes, `expound the relation between pneumatology and 
eschatology not merely christologically but also in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity' 
(3.554). Each of the triune persons' identity and activity is to be treated with integrity 
and not reduced to an outcrop of the others, Pannenberg argues, and so the Spirit's 
subjectivity in eschatology should not be put in what he considers to be christological 
parentheses. 
The third is the Spirit's work and activity in all of creation. This is, he says, `already a 
foretaste of eternity' (3.644). From beginning to end, God's economic action not only has 
been fully trinitarian, but is also directed towards creation in its entirety. The eschaton, 
as we shall go on to investigate, is the transformation not just of the "religious" sphere but 
of the material also, and not just of individuals but of the whole universe. Hence it 
follows that the Spirit in bringing this eschaton into the present, has been at work since 
creation imparting His life and dynamic to all creatures. As Pannenberg puts it, 
9 Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens: Band Drei (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979). 
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`the creation of each individual creature is itself already an expression of the 
divine love that grants existence to each creature, enabling it during the time of 
its existence to share in the vital power of the divine Spirit' (3.644-645). 
For, as he writes elsewhere, Pannenberg believes that the present age shows manifold 
evidence of the `proleptic manifestation of the Spirit who in the eschatological future will 
transform believers, and with them all creation, for participation in the glory of God' 
(3.553). " 
... both 
in general and in particulars 
This distinction of general or universal eschatology on the one hand, and particular or 
individual eschatology on the other, provides the basis for the structure of the central 
sections of Pannenberg's eschatology. The second paragraph, `Death and Resurrection' 
picks up the theme of individual eschatology, namely the question of our individual 
human destiny after death (3.555). The totality of individual life requires fulfillment 
beyond the grave of both soul and body. And the third paragraph, `The Kingdom of God 
and the End of Time', deals with universal eschatology. That is, there will come the 
consummation of human fellowship through peace in righteousness when the full reality 
of the kingdom is inaugurated and revealed with Christ's return. 
This division of the last things into individual and universal eschata, common since 
the time of Rahner, is, for Pannenberg, a fruitful procedure. 12 In Theological 
Investigations Rahner thereby provides an anthropological basis and interpretation for 
eschatological statements, which Pannenberg considers so necessary for a plausible and 
sufficient treatment of the doctrine. Citing Rahner, he writes, `If the future means the 
future of salvation as the fulfillment of the whole person, then knowledge of this future, 
10 As Pannenberg notes, citing Ebeling ibid., p. 29, 'the present that is filled with the Spirit can 
experience the eternal as present already, whereas eschatologically the present that is oriented to the 
eschaton grasps the eternal as future' (3.553). 
11 There have been statements of this already in ST, e. g., the remarks on creation's praise of God on 
2.174. 
12 3.546. Rahner's classification of eschatological topics is to be found primarily in his article "The 
Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions" in his T14, pp. 323ff., and in his article "Eschatologie" in 
Lexikon fuer Theologie und Kirche, 2"d ed., III (Freiburg, 1959), pp. 1094-98. This division of the last 
things into individual and universal eschata is not novel to Rahner, however. For instance, see J. W. 
Baier Compendium Theologiae Positivae (Halle: 1685), p. 353. 
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regardless of its hiddenness, is constitutive of human life as it now is' (3.543). 13 So, since 
as persons we are both individuals with body and soul and social beings in community, 
the fulfillment of our wholeness requires eschatology, therefore, to be both and at once 
individual and universal. " 
Yet the anthropological presuppositions and basis are insufficient and bare without 
the content of the promise, 15 the promise which is provided by God's triune action. The 
inbreaking work of the God of the future is the ultimate determination of this 
anthropological basis and gives content to this empty form. The debatability of Christian 
claims - especially this most contested one of end-time expectation - is answered by the 
work of the Trinity, which is both individual and universal. 
This twin focus characterises the work of the Son. The foundation of the promise of 
complete fulfilment in both its individual and universal aspects was laid in the work of 
Jesus. This occurred both in his ministry in calling individuals to faith and bringing people 
into fellowship in anticipating in sign the feast of God's rule, and in his resurrection which 
`manifested the individual salvation of the resurrection of the dead that is linked to the 
collective consummation of salvation' (3.550). Hence as a result of belonging to Jesus, 
individually believers already have a guarantee of future participation in the eschaton by 
baptism, and communally they already celebrate God's future kingdom by the eucharist. 16 
And this two-fold eschatology, both individual and universal, is also - and for 
Pannenberg chiefly - the work of the Spirit, as we shall discover in our next point on how 
Pannenberg appropriates to Him the work of glorification. 
13 T14., pp. 329ff., 333-334. 
14 One should note here another instance of Pannenberg distancing his position from that of Hegel (see 
3.636). Pannenberg, in agreement with Habermas's opinion in Theory and Praxis (Oxford: Polity, 
1973) believes Hegel's Die Vernunft in der Geschichte: Einleitung in die Philosophie der 
Weltgeschichte 3`d ed. (ed. G. Lasson) (Leipzig: Meiner, 1930), especially pp. 48-49,76-77) is guilty of 
sacrificing individuals to the collective. 
is The discussion of the relation between anthropological basis and promise in chapter 15 is both subtle 
and important. In saying that both are required he means that there are corresponding approaches both 
from the creaturely condition and from the divine Word, the former being taken up into the latter - this 
is another example of what Shults and Camino have identified as Pannenberg's method of sublation. 
Pannenberg is correcting certain inadequacies in the post-Barthian recovery of eschatology as practised 
in, e. g., P. Althaus Die Letzte Dinge (Guetersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1949), W. Kreck Die Zukunft des 
Gekommenen: Grundprobleme der Eschatologie (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1961), J. 
Moltmann Theology of Hope (London: SCM, 2002) and G. Sauter See his Zukunft und Verheissung: 
Das Problem der Zukunft in der gegenwaertigen theologischen und philosophischen Diskussion 
(Zurich: Zwingli Verlag, 1965). See the comments on 3.550. 
16 The importance of the eucharist as the church's sign of the end-time universal hope is reiterated in 
Freude des Glaubens (Munich: Claudius, 2001), p. 310. 
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Glorification is to be ascribed to the Spirit. 
We noted above that Pannenberg apportions the one divine action to the various 
trinitarian persons by appropriation, and that to the Holy Spirit he appropriates the work 
of consummation. Here we see how and why he does so. `It is from the Spirit of God, ' he 
writes, 
`... that the Christian world expects the eschatological fulfillment of believers, 
the changing of our mortal life into the new life of the resurrection of the 
dead.. . and creation's waiting 
for the manifestation of the children of 
God.. . suggests that 
its own corruptibility will be vanquished by the power of 
the life-creating Spirit as the world is transformed into the new creation of a 
new heaven and a new earth' (3.551). 
Both the individual Christian, then, and all of the surrounding creation wait on the Spirit 
in particular for the fulfilment of their glorious destiny. 
The full sweep of the divine action can only be properly explained with reference to 
the complete triune identity. It needs the completion of the Holy Spirit. While noting 
what he considers the inadequacy of the concept of promise as the framework for 
eschatological statements, since it pays insufficient attention to the `event of fulfillment 
that has taken place already in Jesus, it is not, Pannenberg avers, only the role of the 
second divine person that we overlook at our peril. For, he says, `salvation has not yet 
been definitively actualized already for humanity merely by the mission of the Son. ' As 
Messiah, the work of the Son `relates to something distinct from himself, namely, the 
people of God, which is to find its definitive form through the faith in the one God to 
which he summoned' (3.551), a faith not ofthe Son but in Him arising from the related 
yet distinct work of the Spirit. 
Not only the completion of the external activity of the triune God, but also the, for 
Pannenberg, key issue of individual and universal eschatology is properly ascribed to the 
Holy Spirit. This befits His work both in creation, where 'in virtue of its ecstatic nature 
the life of individuals is linked in many ways to that of others and their fellowship, ' and in 
reconciliation, in which `by baptism individuals receive the Spirit as an abiding gift. The 
gift is not for each in isolation; it binds all of them into the fellowship of the church' 
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(3.552). And as the fulfilment and integration of individual and universal blessedness is 
primarily a future expectation rather than present reality, it is, if anything, more fitting of 
the one who brings the future into the present. For, as Pannenberg continues: 
This twofold function of the Spirit for the lives of individuals and the 
establishing of fellowship among them relates his work to the twofold form of 
eschatological hope, which on the one side aims at the totality of individual life 
and on the other side at the consummation of fellowship through peace in 
righteousness. The consummating work of the Spirit integrates these two aspects 
and in this way overcomes the antagonism between individuals and society that 
holds sway in this present world (3.552). 
The Spirit, then, is for Pannenberg, no less than the Son, the executor of both individual 
and universal destiny. Indeed He is more so. 
It is to the Spirit, then, that glorification is ascribed, but why glorification? The 
meaning and significance of this glorification will become clear as we examine the two 
key reasons he adopts the term here. 
The first is that glorification best describes the wide variety of the Spirit's 
eschatological actions in the economy of salvation in all its many functions and 
applications, for Pannenberg the most common categorisation of the Spirit's work is as 
`the source of salvation, of the new and eternal life' on the one hand, and as `the organ of 
judgement' (3.623) on the other. But both these activities too are aspects of the one 
activity of the Spirit. The whole compass of [the Spirit's] work comes into view, ' 
Pannenberg writes, if we think of it distinctively as a work of glorification. '17 He 
continues: 
The thought of glorification links the new life of the resurrection to the moment of 
judgment that carries with it the transfiguration of this earthly life by means of the 
relation to God the Father and to the praise of God. The glorifying of God in this 
comprehensive sense is the proper and final work of the Spirit' (3.623-624) 
There may be many facets to His work of purification and vivification, for the Spirit is also 
the Creator of life, the source of all knowledge, faith, hope, love, freedom and peace, and 
hence of the common life of both the church and God's kingdom. Yet, 
17 Emphasis added. 
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[I]n all these areas the work of the Spirit always aims at the glorifying of God in his 
creation, and in his eschatological work this aspect will come to the fore in an 
overwhelming way, gathering together and transforming all else' (3.624). 
The second is that the term `glorification' highlights how the Spirit's end-time action 
in the economy corresponds to his eternal activity in the immanent Trinity. Pannenberg 
writes: 
Relating the third and final phase of the economy of salvation to the Holy Spirit 
seems to make sense only from the standpoint that we can also ascribe to the 
Holy Spirit, who as the Spirit of fellowship between the Father and the Son 
fulfills the unity of the Trinity, the eschatological participation of creation in the 
life of the Trinity by its glorification, the glorification of God by creatures and 
that of creatures by God being two sides of one and the same event (3.554). 
There will be mutual glorification in the eschaton, then, of God and His creation by the 
Spirit, just as in eternity there is the mutual glorification, again by the Spirit, of the Father 
and the Son. And we see this intratrinitarian mystery as its actualisation is exhibited in 
Christ's ministry, in particular the fourth gospel's account of the relationship of Father 
and Son. 
The Son has glorified the Father (17: 4) by proclaiming his lordship. He now asks 
the Father to glorify him by reaccepting him into his original fellowship with the 
Father. In this way, and by the participation of believers in the common glory of 
the Son and the Father (v. 22), the glorifying of the Father by the Son will come 
to fulfillment. This event, however, is mediated by the work of the Spirit, who 
will glorify the Son in believers (16: 14) by bringing to remembrance Jesus and 
his message and therewith the Father (3.626). 
The Spirit is then for us both end-time gift and the divine agent of glorification, 
since in the fullness of the immanent Trinity He is both eternally, that is, the gift 
bestowed and received by Father and Son, and by whom the one glorifies the 
other. 
-,,. 
3. Eschatological judgement is a trinitarian act since all three persons are at work: the 
Father as the ultimate judge; the Son as the one executor and criterion of the 
judgement; and the Spirit as the means of purification and transfiguration. 
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`Eternity is judgement' (3.610). Creatures, then, can only participate in eternity once they 
have undergone a radical change, a change, that is, both from temporality to eternal 
simultaneity and primarily from earthly sin to glorified holiness. This radical change may 
be anticipated in the sanctifying work of the Spirit, as well as its counterpart in penitence, 
baptism and believers' acts of mortification. " It is seen most clearly in `the history of 
Jesus of Nazareth, ' where `the eschatological future, and with it the eternity of God, really 
enter[ed] the historical present' (3.604), including the power and purity of His divine 
judgement. " Yet its concrete form, which ultimately gives substance to all these other 
instances of judicial purification, lies in the definitive establishment of the kingdom at 
Christ's return (3.608). 
Father 
Who will execute this judgement? In many accounts of eschatology the final judgement 
has been appropriated to the Son. So Francis Turretin, for example, in his Institutes of 
Elenctic Theology, writes, 
Christ will be the judge in that very visible nature in which he was condemned for 
us. For although judiciary power is common to the whole Trinity, still it will be 
specially exercised by the incarnate Son. Judgment is said to have been given him 
by the Father (Matt. 28: 18; John. 5.22; Acts 10.42; 17: 31) as being the King of his 
church, the avenger of his elect, the most strict punisher of the wicked and 
rebellious, the Lord of all. 20 
Pannenberg acknowledges the NT evidence that (following Turretin et A this is the 
work of the Son: He is the One who delivers from the coming wrath (1 Thess. 1: 10), and 
judgement is clearly meted out at his hands according to other texts (e. g., 1 Cor. 4: 5; 2 
Cor. 5: 10; Matt. 10: 32-33). Yet, Pannenberg cannot follow unreservedly the 
appropriation of earlier theology. For one thing, judgement in the NT is also - and most 
'$ See 3.612, where Pannenberg sees these as present instances of future purging 
19 On 3.604-5 Pannenberg demonstrates that judgement is an integral part of Christ's first coming, and 
is not exclusive just to His return. 
20 F. Turretin Institutes of Elenctic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1997), vol. 3, p. 599. 
Not only judgement, but also universal and final resurrection is appropriated to the Son (whereas 
Pannenberg seems to ascribe this to the Spirit) in H. Bavinck Our Reasonable Faith: A Survey of 
Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), p. 562. 
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often - ascribed to the Father (e. g., Rom. 2: 3ff; Matt. 6: 4; 1 Pet. 4: 5). And for another, 
notwithstanding the references already considered Pannenberg highlights Christ's specific 
denials that He is the Judge (John 3: 17; 12: 47). 
This ultimate taking up of time into eternity at the end, with its judgement and 
transfiguration, is - unsurprisingly - dealt with in trinitarian terms along the lines of 
Pannenberg's revised understanding of the doctrine. And as such it deals not just with the 
exegetical difficulties of the traditional appropriation of judgement to the Son, but also 
with other issues associated with Christ's return. 
Son 
Judgement, as we have noted, is the work of the Father. But how does Pannenberg 
envisage the work of the Son in this, in order to account not only for Christ's denials that 
He is judge but also for the references to his very real role in the final reckoning? There 
are two elements: He is the executor of judgement and its criterion. 
Eschatological judgement is something `that is put in Christ's hands' (3.619). As the 
obedient Son commissioned to establish the Father's rule in creation He brings it into 
submission both in His incarnation and ultimately in His return. Indeed what 
Pannenberg calls `the first and decisive function' in judgement by the Son is that He is the 
executor of the will of the God of heaven: 
'In proclaiming the presence of the saving rule of God, Jesus also brought conversion 
and purification from sin. In so doing he guaranteed deliverance from the coming 
wrath of judgement' (3.613). 
For, by the Son's first coming there has been an irreversible intervention of eternity into 
time bringing restitution, repentance and renewal - both judgement and the disarming of 
the forces of this world had become present reality. 21 And by His second coming He shall 
reveal and enact His commission to establish the Father's rule with ultimate and final 
effect. 
The second way in which the Son is operative in the Father's judgement is as its 
criterion. Pannenberg writes, 
21 See 3.605. 
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`[I]t is by [Christ's] person and words that our future will be decided at the last 
judgment. Those who do not believe are judged already, for the word that he has 
spoken will condemn them on the other' (3.614). 
Such a criterion is not so concerned about individual encounter as the litmus-test, but 
entails a basic conformity and allegiance to the Son as revealer and executor of the 
Father's rule. For the will of the Father as Christ preached it, is that all be conformed to 
the Son's likeness, which purpose Christ serves both by purging us from all that is 
incompatible with our destiny of filial fellowship with God and by completing the rule of 
God in our lives. As Pannenberg states, 
The risen and returning Christ is his word in person. The reality of the returning 
Christ that the image of fire represents is thus seen to be identical with the one who 
became incarnate for our salvation and may thus be understood as the completion of 
what began then: the transformation of our human existence into the image of the 
Son' (3.620). 
And it is as such, rather than as an arbitrarily distributed badge of elitism, that He is the 
measuring rod for inclusion in the Father's kingdom. 
Pannenberg thinks that this understanding of Christ's role in the judgement can, on 
the one hand, avoid `any appearance of an unfair particularism' such as John Hick 
alleges, 22and on the other maintain the biblical emphasis on the advantage believers will 
have on that final day. As for the former, Pannenberg believes that such a focus on 
Christ's word, rather than just an event of personal encounter, can 
`reconcile the Christian thesis that only fellowship with Christ guarantees a share in 
eschatological salvation with the fact that all people, whether Christian or not, have 
the chance of participation in the kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed' (3.615- 
616). 
For the message can function as a norm for all, those who have heard and those who have 
not, and all, again without distinction, to whom the Beatitudes apply will share in the 
coming salvation. 
As for the latter, the advantage Christians have 
`is that in the person of Jesus they know the standard for participation in eternal 
salvation and hence also the standard of judgment. By relating their lives to Jesus 
22 Pannenberg has in mind here the arguments of J. Hick's Death and Eternal Life (London: Collins, 
1976). 
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Christ in baptism and faith they can also be sure already of future participation in 
salvation. In Christ they already receive justification and pardon at the hands of the 
future Judge' (3.616). 
Christian assurance then is a reality of knowing and sharing in the blessings of the age to 
come. 
Spirit 
As elsewhere in his dogmatics Pannenberg seeks to give the Spirit a greater profile in 
God's external actions than previous theology has often allowed. Usually, he claims, the 
Spirit's eschatological work has been primarily concerned with anticipation of the end, 
rather than a distinct role at the consummation itself. Yet, as befits the One who brings 
the future into the creaturely present, the Spirit in His work of anticipation must properly 
be understood in terms of His work of consummation. Pannenberg writes: 
the gift of the Spirit can have for the believer's present the significance of an 
anticipation and pledge of future salvation only because the Spirit is also the power 
of God effecting future salvation itself (3.622). 
It is the Spirit of life who raised Jesus and has brought things into being since the creation 
who is the source of the new eschatological life that is roused and permeated by the Spirit. 
This life, for Pannenberg, is `a spiritual life, a life wholly permeated by the divine Creator 
Spirit, ' one `that will also be immortal by virtue of this indissoluble relation to the divine 
Spirit' (3.622). 
And this extension of the role of the Spirit applies to the specific topic of the end- 
time judgement, where Pannenberg's remarks offer a more sustained pneumatological 
perspective than one often finds in the tradition? 3 Yet, as the matter is presented here, 
the pneumatological focus aids the discussion. The judgement of Father and Son, 
Pannenberg has stated, `is no longer destruction but a fire of purging and cleansing' 
(3.619). And the Spirit, the argument continues, is the means by which Christ 
accomplishes that very purgation and cleansing, both for believers and strangers to the 
23 Compare, for instance, the absence of eschatological reference in that otherwise unjustly neglected 
classic of pneumatology, John Owen's Pneumatologia: orA Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit 
(London: 1674). 
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gospel. The various activities of the Spirit in glorification that we noted earlier come 
together: 
`One and the same divine light of glory brings believers liberation from the scum 
of sin and death even as the wicked have to fear it as a consuming fire. The 
power at work here ... is the Spirit of God, who will lead creatures to the 
eschatological praise of God' (3.625). 
That is, the Spirit's work of glorification comes to most intense expression in the 
purification of a people for God in order to fit them for life in glory. 
For what the Spirit is eternally in the immanent life of God, the medium of the 
mutual glorification of the Father and Son, He becomes for us in God's acting for our 
salvation. For at Christ's eschatological manifestation, 
`by the power of the Spirit believers will glorify Jesus Christ and the Father and will 
themselves be changed from glory to glory by the knowledge of the glory of God in 
the face of Christ' (3.627). 
For it is the same Spirit that is working renewal and transformation into glory in the lives 
of believers right now that will consummate His work at Christ's return. 
4. This world will ultimately be shown to be the creation of the triune God of love, as by 
the Spirit the economic work of the Trinity will be completed in the consummation 
of creation. 
The discussion here deals with aspects of Pannenberg's discussion thus far, which have 
had to be held over until this point. In simple terms, the matter at issue is what has been 
known as the theodicy question. What Pannenberg is objecting to is rather easy to 
denote, namely, the attempt to justify the providential action of God in purely rational 
terms, such as Pannenberg believes Leibniz did in his Theodicy. 24 For Pannenberg, every 
rational theodicy has at best only provisional significance, and he questions whether even 
the mere attempt may itself be already an expression of unbelief (3.632). What he has 
suggested instead for the greater part of his career is an eschatological resolution to the 
Z4 G. W. Leibniz Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origins of 
Evil (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951). 
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issue, " and in the final section of SThe frames this in trinitarian terms, as indicated by its 
subtitle, "The Justification of God by the Spirit. " 
What is this trinitarian construal, so that theodicy is by the Spirit? Key to 
understanding Pannenberg's meaning is the point noted before that God's being Trinity 
entails that His action is to be understood as a process. `From the doctrine of creation to 
eschatology, ' he says, the subject is `the action of the trinitarian God. ' And so, he 
continues, 
`It is only in the light of the conclusion, i. e, of eschatology, that we can give material 
definition to this one act that spans the whole economy of salvation and that is the 
work of the trinitarian persons in concert even though they appear in different ways 
in its individual phases' (3.630). 
That God's being and action are trinitarian means, as Pannenberg demonstrated earlier in 
STchapter 7, that it is complete only when all three persons and their appropriate activity 
have been taken into consideration. 
It should also be noted that in STthe treatment of the divine actions in the economy 
has as an inclusio the posing and testing of the claim that `In the answering of the 
question, `In the rule of God's wisdom there may be seen the power of love over the 
march of history. ' Pannenberg then asks: 
But is this really so? Even two thousand years after the birth of Christ does not 
humanity offer the picture of an unreconciled world? Have Christians made 
much change? Has not the church itself been drawn into worldly 
conflicts?.. . Has not the Christian God of love proved to be powerless against the 
march of events in the world, powerless even in the lives of Christians and the 
fellowship of the church? (1.441) 
Moreover the particular sort of divine unity that interests Pannenberg in STl (as we noted 
before) is the unity of the almighty and infinite God of history on the one hand and the 
triune God of love on the other. Provisionally, as we have already noted, Pannenberg 
answers that the triune love sublates (takes up and fulfils) the idea of God as true Infinite 
and all-determining principle. So, at the end of that volume, having already established 
that there must be some "True Infinite" that is responsible for the existence of the world, 
and having explicated the triune God of love revealed in Jesus Christ, Pannenberg writes: 
25 E. g., Tupper, p. 304. 
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`What we have not yet shown, however, is how God's relation to the world is to be 
understood in the light of the trinitarian understanding of God' (1.447). 
The intervening discussion of God's economic action, then, from creation through to 
consummation (i. e., STchapters 7 to 15), constitutes Pannenberg's answer to the theodicy 
question. The world is shown to be God's in that its full course as determined by the 
infinite power underlying it clearly shows itself to be the work of the triune God of love 
revealed in Jesus Christ. In this way we see both the confirmation of the truth of 
Christian doctrine and the goodness of the Creator God. 
And since, in Pannenberg's view, the answer to how a world of suffering can be the 
creation of a God of love is achieved not by rational reflection, but by the economic 
activity of the triune God, it is in the conclusion of the economy of salvation, i. e., the 
work appropriated to the Spirit, that divine justice will be vindicated. The reconciliation 
of the world, as we noted in an earlier chapter, has to be understood in trinitarian terms, 
and thus as completed only once the work of the Spirit in His enabling others to have 
their own share in the work of Christ is finished that creation can rightly be said to have 
moved from being "unreconciled" to being "reconciled. "26 It is the `eschatological 
perfecting of the world' that will both `show how wrong is unbelief with its doubting of 
God's existence' and `will prove the love of the Creator for his creatures' (3.632). 
There is another aspect to the fact that justification is by the Spirit, i. e., that the 
coexistence of a world of suffering and evil on the one hand and a Creator God of love on 
the other, includes humanity's independent and spontaneous response. This growth into 
independence has been a recurring theme in Pannenberg's theology. Independence not 
only is what we are destined for (3.580) and requires the succession of time to be 
achieved, ' but it is also our Spirit-enabled participation in the creative Logos, Christ the 
Son. The same Spirit who enables the relationship in distinction of Father and Son that is 
characterised by genuine mutuality, achieves for us a similar independent communion 
with God our Father in Jesus Christ. So, continuing his insistence that our inclusion 
within the triune life does not mean absorption, Pannenberg writes: 
26 Short of this vindication by the Spirit Pannenberg refers to creation's "unreconciled" state in 3.63 1. 
' See 2.95,2.272, and especially 2.138-9. 
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`the spontaneity of the glorification of the Father who is manifested in his glory 
by the Son is the medium in which the glorification of creatures themselves takes 
place by the Spirit' (3.643). 
For eschatological glorification is a mutual affair. It is `the glorification of individuals, 
along with that of the Father and the Son by them, ' and it is only then that `the 
justification of God in face of the sufferings of the world will be not only achieved but 
also universally acknowledged' (3.636). 
Pannenberg, then, understands theodicy in trinitarian terms as the justification of 
God by the Spirit. There is, however, another way he describes it that bears on our 
theme, namely the unity of the economic and immanent Trinity. 
Pannenberg's view, as noted already, is that `[t]here is a distinction, but also 
inseparable unity between the eternal trinity and its revelation in history. '28 At one point 
he likens it to the relationship of love of God and love of neighbour. Love of neighbour is 
distinct from and depends on love of God but it is the same love, not `two wholly different 
realities but two aspects of human participation in one and the same love of God' (3.193). 
And so the relationship is more intimate than repetition or correspondence, for the two 
are `one and the same' (2.393), but not so that the one collapses into the other. 
Pannenbergs conception of economic and immanent trinities also contains a 
temporal dimension that bears especially on the matter of theodicy. The eschatological 
reality that meets us is one in which the immanent life of God has been actualised in the 
course of human history. It is, he says, `the incursion of the eternal future of God to the 
salvation of creatures and thus a manifestation of the divine love' (3.646), which is itself 
the economic action of the triune God. 
What does this mean? According to ST, God already exists in trinitarian fullness, in 
the complete life He shares with Himself in the multifaceted relations of Father, Son and 
Spirit. And what He is already in Himself He also is for us in the outworking of his action 
for us, in which He perfectly expresses and realises His identity. So, it is the entirety - 
and not just part - of God's economic action in temporal creation that actualises the 
fullness of God's immanent identity. This is the temporal dimension of the unity of 
economic and immanent trinities. 
28 "DEFT, " p. 2. 
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Living as part of the temporal order in which the trinitarian fullness of God is 
actualised in the economy, we live with the final revelation of the goodness of God in all 
His works ahead of us. And since we do not yet see but merely expect the full 
correspondence of the economic Trinity with God's eternal immanence, we live in the 
period when His reality and goodness are questioned and await demonstration. For, as 
Pannenberg says at one point, 
`Viewing the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity as one presupposes... a 
concept of God which can grasp in one... the eternal self-identity of God and the 
debatability of his truth in the process of history, along with the decision made 
concerning it by the consummation of history' (1.333). 
It is by outlining the account of the trinitarian God in the way he does that Pannenberg 
offers such a concept of God. The immanent trinitarian God of Father, Son and Spirit that 
is given in the revelation in Christ is displayed for us in the process of His economic self- 
unfolding. The final unity of the immanent and economic trinities is for us an 
eschatological matter, just as the divine demonstration that the true Infinite that 
determines the universe really is the triune God of love that Christianity proclaims. 
Pannenbergs ST finishes, then, with a trinitarian resolution of the claim that this 
world is the creature of the Christian God of love. It is the divine love that 
is the eternal basis of God's coming forth from the immanence of the divine life 
as the economic Trinity and of the incorporation of creatures, mediated thereby, 
into the unity of the trinitarian life. The distinction and unity of the immanent 
and economic Trinity constitute the heartbeat of the divine love, and with a 
single such heartbeat this love encompasses the whole world of creatures (3.646). 
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CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of our study we stated that it answers two questions: (1) what does 
Pannenberg mean by his theology being thoroughly trinitarian; and (2) how far has his 
subsequent work been successful in realising his stated goal? As for the second question, 
we have already evaluated how far the high trinitarian ambitions have been fulfilled. A 
fuller answer to this question, however, requires a second section where we move beyond 
critical analysis of Pannenbergs theology and in order to construct our own theological 
proposal that is offered in the light of - and as an alternative to - Pannenberg's own 
approach. We shall nevertheless offer here some points in answer to this second question 
insofar as they have been addressed thus far in our presentation, while leaving our final 
remarks to the next section. As for the first question, chapters 1 to 8 have provided a 
detailed answer to it, and we ought here to summarise the main points we have 
discovered. 
What Pannenberg means by his theology being thoroughly trinitarian is both that 
the theological locus dealing with the Trinity itself should offer a precise and compelling 
account of the God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that such an account of God's 
triunity should inform every part of his theological system. So, we shall summarise what 
we have discovered about how both his treatment of the Trinity and his discussion of the 
other doctrines are trinitarian. 
How is Pannenberg's doctrine of the Trinity trinitarian? For Pannenberg, to be 
trinitarian means that any doctrine of the Trinity must be based on God's historical 
revelation in Jesus Christ, and thus must deal with the Father, Son and Spirit insofar as 
they disclose themselves in the earthly career of Jesus of Nazareth. The doctrine of the 
Trinity cannot, then, rely on modes of thought that can be reduced to a pre-trinitarian 
monotheism, as Pannenberg thinks has too often been the case in Western theology, 
which tends to view the Trinity after the likeness of the individual subject and to derive 
God's trinity from His unity. For this reason Pannenberg opts for the term `self- 
distinction' - rather than relations of origin - as the basic means of distinguishing the 
trinitarian persons, and for `mutual dependence' to denote how the persons depend upon 
each other reciprocally both for their personal identity and for their deity, and are thus 
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the one God. And since the triune God should be understood from revelation rather than 
from pre-trinitarian conceptualities, Pannenberg understands the economic Trinity and 
the immanent Trinity to be identical, intending to threaten neither the integrity of the 
three persons nor the priority of the immanent Trinity. 
The other doctrines that Pannenberg approaches from a trinitarian point of view deal 
both with God's being and His action, which we shall deal with in turn. What does it 
mean, then, that God's being, i. e. the doctrine of God's essence and attributes, is 
trinitarian? We noted five implications that the priority of the Trinity has on how 
Pannenberg treats the divine nature. Firstly, the divine unity should be thought of as still 
hidden, since its revelation is not fulfilled until the completion of God's economic action. 
Second, the divine essence is to be conceived primarily as the infinite rather than as the 
first cause, since such a concept better allows God to be defined by his trinitarian action 
in and to the world, rather than by deductions from creaturely phenomena. Third, since 
we must understand God as the irreducibly triune agent, we should speak of Him as field 
rather than as a mind to describe how He is spirit. Fourth, the attributes of God's true 
infinity, i. e., one that is not the negation of creaturely limits but is their overcoming, find 
their concrete form not in a monadic divine other, but in the trinitarian God's loving 
approach. Fifth, God is understood as being love rather than as merely having love, for it 
is as the trinitarian God of love - and not as a unitary subject - that the divine spirit finds 
its actualisation. 
For Pannenberg, all of God's economic activity, which is the subject of volumes 2 and 
3 of ST, must be understood both within a general trinitarian context and by detailed 
reference to the being and action of the trinitarian persons and their relations one with 
another. The trinitarian frame of reference is provided not only by the trinitarian account 
in volume l's account of the subject being triune, but also by Pannenberg's appropriating 
spheres of God's economic activity to individual divine persons and by his understanding 
God's trinitarian self-unveiling as a process. In ST creation is appropriated to the Father 
in chapter 7, the consummation is appropriated to the Spirit in chapter 15, and it is clear 
in chapters 10 and 11 that reconciliation occurs as a result of the coming into time and 
obedience of the Son. Pannenberg, then, understands and employs appropriation in a way 
similar to much of the theological tradition, although there tends to be more profiling of 
the specific activity of each of the divine persons within the discussions of the various 
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theological loci. God's action is not just appropriated to the trinitarian persons but it is 
also sequential in a way that corresponds to the divine life. That God as Trinity is a 
multiple unity rather than just a simple one allows the diversity of divine activity to be 
one and the same creative action. In the same way, God's one creating action that is 
consummated in the eschaton is not monochrome, but is a process with sequence and 
multiplicity that are grounded in the trinitarian plurality of the divine life. So, for 
instance, ST chapter 11 includes within God's reconciliation of the world the church's 
ministry of reconciliation under the Spirit's action, and chapter 15 states that it is only in 
the light of the completion of divine action by the Spirit that we can present the final 
content and vindication of all God's ways. How each of the various elements of God's 
economic activity is conceived as trinitarian we now go on to ask. 
What does it mean for Pannenberg that the doctrine of creation is trinitarian? It 
means that, in creating, God's action is genuinely free, since as the triune God is already 
active in and towards Himself in His intra-trinitarian life. Though appropriated to the 
work of the Father, Pannenberg emphasises how this also involves the distinct work of 
both the other triune persons. As for the Son, He is creation's Logos and Mediator, for 
just as He distinguishes Himself from the Father, so this very self-distinction gives rise to 
creation's existence and independence. For as the principle of differentiation within the 
triune Godhead, He is the noetic and ontic basis for creation, and the ultimate source of 
its pluriformity. As for the Holy Spirit, it is He who makes possible both God's presence 
with His creatures and the creatures' participation in God. For, as the medium of 
fellowship of the eternal triune relation of Father and Son, He enables creation to share in 
the eternal self-distinction of the Logos. Finally, Pannenberg's view that God's act of 
creating does not concern merely the world's beginning, but refers to all world time, is 
also trinitarian, since he understands creation to be completed by the taking shape of the 
Word and the moving of the Spirit in space and time. 
What does it mean for Pannenberg that theological anthropology is trinitarian? 
Pannenberg's own trinitarian approach differs from other accounts of understanding 
humanity in terms of the Trinity, since he does not see the Trinity primarily as a model 
for understanding either the human mind or human society, but sees the Trinity as the 
essential framework within which to understand humanity. This framework is provided 
by the being and action of the Son and the Spirit. The relevance of the Holy Spirit for 
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Pannenberg's theological anthropology is that He is the Life-Giver who animates all our 
being and on whom humanity depends in every part. The relevance of the Son is that 
humanity is destined to be transformed into the likeness of Jesus Christ, the Son of God 
incarnate, a destiny which is realised as by the Spirit we accept our finitude just as Christ, 
the image of God, distinguished Himself from the Father. 
What does it mean for Pannenberg that christology is trinitarian? Within the 
context of a trinitarian presentation such as ST Pannenberg lays significant emphasis on 
the ontological basis for Jesus' divine sonship being the Son's eternal self-distinction from 
the Father. A trinitarian christology of this sort should be confused with attempts to 
understand Christ's divine person by presupposing a version of the Trinity from which 
one derives the incarnation - this would, he thinks, be the wrong sort of christology 
"from above to below. " Rather, we know that Jesus is the Son of God incarnate, the 
second person of the Trinity, as the reasonable and necessary explanation of His history. 
Furthermore, Pannenberg emphasises that the incarnation is the self-actualisation of the 
whole Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and so in Jesus Christ we are dealing with 
the divine reality in its triune fullness. 
What does it mean for Pannenberg that the doctrine of reconciliation is trinitarian? 
It means that God's reconciliation of the world to Himself must be understood in relation 
to each of the triune persons. Reconciliation is the work of the Father, who gives His Son 
for us and sends Him to die for our salvation. It is the work of the Son, who actively 
obeys the Father in giving Himself for our sins as our Representative, and as the ascended 
Christ is our Prophet, Priest and King. Finally, it is the work of the Holy Spirit, who 
completes reconciliation by lifting us up into ecstatic union with Jesus Christ, by enabling 
us to live in joyful differentiation from God. 
What does it mean for Pannenberg that the doctrine of the kingdom and the church 
is trinitarian? It means understanding the formation of the kingdom and the church as 
the work of the Spirit, not just as the gift of the Father and the Son involved only in the 
application of redemption, but as the divine Life-Giver who unites believers to Jesus 
because He is powerfully active at every stage of the consummation of creation. The 
kingdom and the church are the work of both the Son and the Spirit, the Son as the One 
into whose body believers are gathered, and the Spirit as the one by whom they can thus 
belong to church and kingdom. This work of the Spirit is part of His general activity of 
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enabling ec-static existence as the medium of fellowship both in God's internal and 
external actions, and so also marks His action in and to the church. For all Christians this 
means that the Spirit lifts them up into Jesus' filial relation to the Father, and thus into the 
triune life. And for the Christian life, this ec-static existence in Christ by the Spirit takes 
form as faith, hope, love, adoption and justification, and is signified in the church 
community in the sacraments of baptism and eucharist. 
What does it mean for Pannenberg that eschatology is trinitarian? It means that both 
the destiny of the whole created order as well as how creation reaches that destiny are 
shaped by the God of Father, Son and Spirit. Our eschatological destiny is trinitarian in 
nature, since it is to participate in the very inner-triune divine life. Although, as we have 
already noted, Pannenberg's emphasis is on the Holy Spirit, to whom as the end-time gift 
glorification is to be appropriated, the other two persons are integrally at work. All three 
persons are involved in the eschatological judgement, the Father as the ultimate Judge, 
the Son as the one executor and criterion of the judgement, and the Spirit as the means of 
purification and transfiguration. Finally, the eschatological vindication of God's justice 
must itself also be understood in trinitarian terms, since it is with the completion of the 
Trinity's economic work, i. e. the consummation of creation by the Spirit, that we shall 
definitively see that the true God really is the loving Trinity of Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. 
There is very much to commend in STs account of the being and action of the triune God. 
In answer to our second question, how far Pannenberg's theology been successful in 
fulfilling his trinitarian ambitions, we must state that there is a significant body of 
evidence to suggest that he has gone a long way to realising his goal. We note six points. 
Firstly, the Trinity controls the fundamental structure of Pannenberg's theology. 
God, the central topic of Pannenberg's entire theological project, is clearly shown to be 
triune in nature. The answer to the question `Who is God? ' which takes up the latter 
chapters of volume 1, is determined not by some monad, or even a version of the Trinity 
that is liable to some pre-trinitarian conceptuality, but by the God of Father, Son and 
Spirit who was revealed in the history of Jesus of Nazareth. And the answer `What does 
He do? ' which is the subject matter of the second and third volumes, is shown to be 
sequentially and simultaneously the action of no other God than that of Father, Son and 
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Spirit. According to ST, all reality is comprehended by the prevenient, sequential and 
active love of the triune God. 
Second, Pannenberg does not separate God in se from God pro nobis - the God who 
is, is the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. One of the central emphases of trinitarian 
theology is that the God who is eternally is the very same that appears in our history for 
our salvation, and so it is this triune God of revelation that shapes everything that 
theology goes on to say. Pannenberg maintains this insight and in some ways even 
intensifies it with his founding trinitarian dogma on revelation and his rejection of 
thought forms that are reducible to pre-trinitarian monotheism. Also, his adoption of 
Rahner's Rule and his understanding of the incarnation as God's self-actualisation do not 
spring from a desire to undermine either the immanent Trinity or the significance of 
God's temporal action. Rather, they assert that God's action in Jesus Christ is not the 
completion of an otherwise incomplete God, not a repetition of divine reality, but is very 
God Himself. 
Third, Pannenberg has offered new trinitarian terminology that befits his close 
correlation of God in se with God pro nobis. While not rejecting the importance of 
relationships of origin, Pannenberg's unfolding of the triune being and action is not 
bound by them. The use of self-distinction does better maintain what scripture records of 
the subjectivity of each of the persons and the reciprocity of their relations, than does a 
sole reliance on the processions. And when shorn of notions that tie the being of God to 
dependence on either the world or His economic action within it, the idea that the 
persons depend on one another for their deity makes it clearer than traditional 
terminology that the Father is not God a se. 
Fourth, Pannenberg maintains for the most part emphasis on the divine oneness that 
does not compromise the divine threeness and emphasis on the divine threeness that does 
not compromise the divine oneness. Some commentators have criticised Pannenberg for 
making the divine unity the result of the trinity, and so veering towards tritheism. 
Although we have misgivings about some of his statements, especially in our second 
chapter, he is not prey to fundamental modalist or tritheist tendencies. According to 
Pannenberg, to see the unity as something that produces the divine trinity (e. g., by the 
mental analogy) is to posit a basis of pre-trinitarian monotheism, and to see the Trinity as 
something that produces the divine unity (e. g., by perichoresis) is the very tritheism that 
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he criticises both in antiquity and in the present. Perhaps the most significant 
contribution in this area is Pannenberg's adoption of terminology from field theory. By 
understanding the divine essence as field rather than mind, his account in ST chapter 6 
allows for a genuine and underived trinitarianism in talk of God that other theological 
models cannot achieve. 
Fifth, Pannenberg's account of God's activity in and to the world offers a particularly 
intricate profiling of the actions of the different persons. Beyond his appropriation of 
various spheres of divine activity to the different persons, the doctrines he covers in ST 
volumes 2 and 3 are invariably structured around the work of the Son and Spirit. Chapter 
11 on reconciliation is a striking example of how Pannenberg takes great pains to 
delineate the specific work and importance of each of the persons in turn in the work of 
atonement. And the chapters on creation and eschatology show how his use of 
appropriation is highly nuanced, as his attribution of spheres of divine activity to the 
Father on the one hand, and the Spirit on the other, accommodate detailed accounts of 
the subjectivity of the other persons. 
Sixth, in ST Pannenberg breaks new ground in applying the Trinity to a Christian 
understanding of reality. His use of the doctrine of the Trinity both as the general 
framework for his systematic theology and in the detailed exposition of the various 
doctrinal topics, demonstrate that he is in the most august company of trinitarian 
theologians. Indeed, at points he even seems to go beyond them. We see this in some of 
the topics he discusses in STchapter 5 where trinitarian terminology is better fitted to the 
triune persons' economic action. In the later chapters, too, we see this particularly in his 
treatment of the divine essence and attributes, where his account stands out since unlike 
most other discussions he pays attention both to trinitarian theology and to the locus de 
deo uno, as well as in his discussion of creation, whose details are worked out with an 
intricate trinitarian detail that one would be hard pressed to find elsewhere. 
These are significant matters worthy of commendation, and as a piece of trinitarian 
theology STis a very impressive work that brooks few rivals. There do seem to be many 
areas in which Pannenberg's theology ranks with some of the most perceptive work on 
the Trinity available, and some at which he takes understanding of the being and action of 
the triune God further than it has been before. We, therefore have substantial evidence 
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that Pannenberg's high ambitions might be met and that this may well be a theology more 
trinitarian than any he knows of. 
Notwithstanding the undoubted rigour with which Pannenberg has undertaken to write a 
theology more trinitarian than any he knows of, we have had cause to raise points of 
criticism. Our survey has questioned Pannenberg on a number of matters, especially 
those that directly relate to his success in realising his trinitarian ambitions. These 
criticisms cluster around five issues that seem most germane to the particular topic we are 
concerned with here. 
Firstly, one might want to question Pannenberg's historical judgements. His own 
positive proposals are often made in critical interaction with Western understandings of 
the Trinity. Admittedly, in this he is not alone, since much contemporary literature on 
trinitarian theology sees fundamental weaknesses in the tradition of trinitarian thought 
deriving from Augustine. Yet these historical details are more than incidental matter, but 
help to shape Pannenberg's own presentation. In the later chapters of ST volume 1, for 
instance, he offers an account of mainstream Western trinitarian thought as prey to 
modalising conceptualities, and then contrasts this with a questionable assertion of the 
present revelation of God's Trinity and a present hiddenness of His unity. And in his 
account of the work of the Spirit he offers another questionable proposal by presenting it 
as the alternative to a less than generous account of Western pneumatology. 
Second, Pannenberg's belief that God's trinitarian activity to and in the world is 
fundamentally one action appears to be in tension with the biblical witness. Pannenberg 
often uses the Trinity to emphasise the continuity in all of God's economic action, either 
to understand God's action as a process (as in his treatments of creation and theodicy) or 
to understand the person and ministry of Christ not as new creation but as the completion 
of the existing one (as in his christology). Yet, as we noted in discussing the Spirit's role 
in reconciliation, the unity of the divine agent (which is one of the key points of 
trinitarian theology) entails that each person is involved in the work of recreation. The 
emphasis on the unity tends to mute the fact that the triune work of salvation is one of 
radical discontinuity, the death of the old and its resurrection into newness. 
Third, there are problems with how Pannenberg relates God in His immanence and 
God in the economy. On Pannenberg's adoption of Rahner's Rule of identity, we are not 
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so critical here as some others have been, detecting a Hegelianism that fundamentally 
negates God's freedom. Nevertheless, his identification of God's being with His rule is in 
tension with his emphasis on the primacy of the immanent Trinity. It seems that what is 
decisive for the reality of God is not the divine Trinity but the course of history in which 
He acts. And the impression is also created that full knowledge of God is achieved not so 
much by the direct action of Son and Spirit, but by the natural completion of the course of 
history. In some of Pannenberg's formulations, then, it is not so clear that the abiding 
initiative is with the triune God and his free action rather than the course of creaturely 
time. 
Fourth, Pannenberg's christology is unclear on certain matters where one would 
expect the primary importance of the Trinity to be asserted. On the one hand, 
Pannenberg does not make the distinction that Christ's divine identity is revealed in but 
not in virtue of His human nature, thus not making clear that Christ's self-unveiling is not 
solely dependent on His trinitarian power. On the other hand, Pannenberg believes that 
the Trinity functions as a basis for our understanding of Jesus only ontologically and not 
noetically, and so is the basis for Christ's personal identity, but not for how we come to 
know Him. 
Finally, there are those passages in ST where the Trinity does not appear to be 
operative. Among the topics we have already considered, those of faith and the method 
of christology have been striking examples of reticence on the Trinity where in other 
theologies trinitarian construals are common. Even more strikingly we can also include 
the early chapters on the concept of God and the nature of religion, as well as his 
treatment of revelation, which with a few exceptions is silent on the Trinity. This would 
seem to be the most serious reservation we should have in concurring with Pannenberg 
that his is the most trinitarian of theologies. It is an arguable matter to criticise a 
trinitarian theology where the Trinity is used in different ways and where different 
versions of the Christian Trinity are adopted from what one might prefer oneself. It is 
much more clear-cut when the criticism is not about the wrong sort of trinitarianism, but 
about no trinitarianism at all. 
It is this final area of criticism that we go on to examine in more detail in a second 
section where we go beyond offering a critical analysis of Pannenberg's trinitarian 
theology, and provide a constructive theological proposal in the light of what Pannenberg 
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has to say about the Trinity in ST. Not only is this the most serious of our criticisms, but 
there also seems to be a pattern to these instances of trinitarian reticence. The Trinity 
tends to fall from view when Pannenberg is dealing with how one comes to know God, 
when he deals with faith, the basis of christology and the doctrine of revelation and what 
one might call his theological method'. The desire to be the most trinitarian of theologies 
is undone by a prior commitment which seems to get in the way of the Trinity being put 
to work in all areas of Pannenberg's theological thought. Rather than giving the Trinity 
full sway and saying that all our knowledge of God has a radically trinitarian basis and is 
possible only by the Spirit, Pannenberg maintains that God can be known in a way that is 
open and impartial, a natural consequence of our deliberation on the historical process. 
The Trinity is clearly operative in what one has to say about God, but it is not so clear 
how - or if - the Trinity is operative in Pannenberg's account of how we get to know and 
talk about God. There is scarcely any account of how the Trinity affects the practice of 
theology. And it is for this reason above all others that we cannot give an unequivocally 
positive answer to our second question, how far has Pannenberg's subsequent work been 
successful in realising his stated trinitarian ambitions. 
1 By method we mean how the dogmatic material about the trinitarian God sublates, i. e., fulfils, 
corrects and transforms, the given of the knowledge of God in experience which to which we can apply 
suitable philosophical criteria. On this see Shults and J. Martinez-Camino "Aufhebung: Zur 
Architektur des ersten Bandes der 'Systematischen Theologie' Wolfhart Pannenbergs' in Kerygma und 
Dogma 45 (1999), pp. 91-101. 
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PART TWO 
ON BEING A TRINITARIAN THEOLOGIAN 
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Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God'(Matthew 5: 8) 
Trinitarian theology has been a flourishing part of the theological academy in recent years 
and has spawned numerous examples of academics described as trinitarian theologians. 
One of the features of this phenomenon has been the importance of the Trinity, not just 
as a doctrine to be affirmed, but as regulative for the explication of other loci in Christian 
systematic theology. That is, it has been a matter not just of forcefully stating the doctrine 
but also of using it to deal with other topics in Christian teaching. From being the last 
word in theology as in Schleiermacher's Christian Faith, it has become not just the first 
word, but also a constant point of reference throughout Christian doctrine. 
In many ways Pannenberg's ST represents one of the most accomplished retrievals of 
trinitarian doctrine, even among the many trinitarian theologies that have been written 
during the renaissance of the doctrine in the 20th century. His contribution to this 
recovery and advancing of the centrality of the specifically trinitarian God in all parts of 
Christian theology, as we have seen, is very impressive. Questions have had to be raised, 
however, about how far the high trinitarian credentials Pannenberg has set himself have 
been met, in particular in his account of how we come to know God. In this conclusion 
we shall give some structure to these criticisms and offer a theological proposal that gives 
a better account of what must be said in light of the God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
From a trinitarian perspective the central misgiving with ST, in our view, is that 
Pannenberg offers no account of what it means to be a trinitarian theologian. What do 
we mean by this? Crucially, we do not have in mind only how one should write about 
the Trinity, as if only the product of the theologians' intellectual efforts should meet the 
rigors of trinitarian orthodoxy. It is not so much a matter of writing a trinitarian 
theology. Rather in dealing with the specific issue of how to be a trinitarian theologian, 
we question what it means for the practice of theology to be trinitarian, not just its 
conclusions. What role, that is, does the Trinity play in the formation of the theologian 
and in the discipline of doing theology? And what sort of practice or method of doing 
theology is most fitting for study of the God who is trinitarian? 
The two issues, how to write a trinitarian theology and how to be a trinitarian 
theologian, are, of course, not wholly separate. The practice of theological reflection, no 
less than its results, has to be located dogmatically. For the habitus or piety of the 
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theologian is neither basic nor primary, but is itself based on a state of affairs determined 
by the triune God and so is secondary to His reconciling action in the economy of 
salvation. Yet the question how to be a trinitarian theologian is distinct and important. It 
is not exhausted by the mere fact that one concludes that God is indeed the triune God of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, regardless of how in fact one arrives at such a conclusion. A 
rigorously trinitarian theology must be trinitarian here too. 
The trinitarian rigour seems to be absent from Pannenberg's account at such points. 
That is, for all that he is concerned with how to write a trinitarian theology, he provides 
scarcely any account of how to be a trinitarian theologian. The stated aim for the STto 
provide a theology `more trinitarian than any I know of and the rich trinitarian 
explanations of the various doctrines of God's economic activity need to be qualified by 
this important observation: it is difficult to see how the Trinity affects how Pannenberg 
understands the theological task. Indeed when he comes to talk about theological method 
the trinitarian language becomes markedly sparse in a way that is striking given its 
prolixity elsewhere. In this concluding part of our study we examine why this is so, and 
how in dogmatic terms one can be not merely a writer about the Trinity, but a genuinely 
trinitarian theologian. 
The dogmatic shape of a systematic theology is affected by a trinitarian account of the 
practice of theology. In particular it requires both particular understandings of certain 
theological loci and also an account of theological disciplines or virtues. The particular 
loci affected are those of theological method, revelation, faith and christology. All of 
these topics are highly significant for an account of how the self-revelation of the triune 
God is given and received. And the theological disciplines or virtues that are an integral 
part of an account of being a trinitarian theologian include the ones we shall treat here, 
namely humility, prayer and faith. All three of these follow from a trinitarian account of 
how we come to know God, as we shall see. It is worth noting that in ST what 
Pannenberg has to say on those theological topics is less than clear, and when one looks 
for an account of the virtues involved in theological study, it is not to be found. 
We have studied Pannenberg's theology by analysis of his major writings and have 
distilled the relevant points into thesis form. To conclude our study of Pannenberg's 
doctrine of the trinitarian God we shall also provide three theses of our own that 
supplement and correct the points in STwhere we consider Pannenberg's theology to lack 
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an account of being a trinitarian theologian. The misgivings we have earlier voiced about 
his handling of, among other things, christology, pneumatology, the doctrines of 
revelation and faith, we shall not only explicate in more detail, but also consider as part of 
our own constructive proposal for how the Trinity rightly affects not the results of 
theological endeavour, but the very task of theology itself. 
1. - The Trinity 
has to determine not just the results the theologian comes to, but also the 
method and practice of arriving at them. For this reason to be a trinitarian theologian 
requires humility, since knowledge of the triune God is not possible without the 
sanctification of the Spirit who bestows it. 
The Trinity does determine Pannenbergs practice of theology. In the foreword to the 
final volume of SThe writes: 
`above all I thank God, who has daily given me strength to work on the book..., 
the purpose of which is to serve the praise of the glory and truth of God so far as 
my feeble powers allow' (3. xvi). 
Both his faith and his theology are sustained by the triune God of Father, Son and Spirit, 
the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, and this is a truth he is happy to acknowledge in 
the foreword. ' 
Yet within the main text of ST, as in his other works, there is a marked reticence to 
explicate the importance of the trinitarian God in the task of theology. For all 
Pannenberg's insistence that one has to write a trinitarian theology, there is no account of 
how the Trinity affects what it means to be involved in the task of theology. That is, 
despite the claim to write `a theology more trinitarian than any I know of, ' nevertheless 
the practice and method of arriving at the truth about God, as Pannenberg presents them, 
for all that they lead to the Trinity in the end, are not a trinitarian possibility from the 
beginning - or if so, it is far from clear. 
1 On 1.50 Pannenberg mentions the presuppositions of Christian theology, but they are all historical 
givens: `the fact of Christian teaching itself. -the varied reality of Christianity in history ... its cultural 
impact ... the church's proclamation and 
its liturgical life. ' Subjective faith, he states, does invariably 
precede theological reflection. Nevertheless, there is no intimation that knowledge of God might bring 
with it, or require, obedience. Moreover, that Pannenberg does not offer an account of the theological 
virtues in ST in no way means that Pannenberg, either as man or as theologian, lacks the humility, 
prayerfulness or faith that the task of theology requires. 
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We note two examples. Our first is Pannenberg's discussion of faith, whose 
problematic nature we intimated earlier. In answer to the question, `What has this to do 
with the trinitarian God? ' we answered `Not much. ' We granted that the overall context 
and ultimate basis for the discussion were trinitarian, but the treatment in ST vol. 3 is 
worth investigating in more detail 
We shall investigate Pannenberg's actual understanding of faith in three steps. 
Firstly, he says that faith is the proper attitude towards truth that lies in the future. 
Unlike knowledge, which is oriented to the present things or experience, faith `directs 
itself to the future, as trust, ' reaching beyond temporal boundaries to `a future knowledge 
of the truth (the stable reality) on which it relies' (3.137). It is related to the future, 
which is the future God will bring - and therefore related to God. 
Second, faith rests on knowledge and assent. While differing from Greek 
conceptions of knowledge due to its inherent relation to history, faith - like knowledge - 
`is a form of the way we relate to truth' (3.136). It is knowledge of, and assent to, the facts 
of history in which God revealed Himself first, and only then is it trust or assurance, for 
which the knowledge and intellectual assent are presuppositions. This, Pannenberg 
argues, was the understanding of Luther. His, and the Reformation's, idea that faith is 
above all trust `does not rule out the elements of knowledge (notitia) and assent (assensus) 
but instead presupposes them' (3.138). For it was `[f]rom the thought of the assent of 
faith, ' Pannenberg states, that Luther `moved on to a much bolder idea of the immediacy 
of faith to God and its fellowship with God' (3.140). 
Third, faith requires reliance on the results of historico-exegetical knowledge. Again 
taking up the language of the medieval and Reformation ages, Pannenberg says that 
`knowledge (notitia) of the facts of history in which God revealed himself and assent 
(assensus) to these are essential presuppositions of Christian trust (fiducia)' (3.150). And 
since in our critical age there is no easy identification of the `facts of history' with either 
the traditions of the church or the witness of scripture, then, 
`If under these new conditions Christian theology clings to the authoritative 
form of establishing its teaching, especially as regards its historical foundations, 
then in a way that was not true in earlier centuries it comes into basic conflict 
with reason' (3.147). 
There would not be the notitia or assensus to legitimate the fiducia. 
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Pannenberg expresses this with a key distinction he takes over from Wilhelm 
Herrmann. On the one hand there is the ground of faith, which is the events, historically 
considered, of the life of Jesus of Nazareth. On the other there are the thoughts of faith, 
which are conclusions about the nature of God, human experience and the Christian life, 
drawn on the basis of that history. And the legitimacy of such thoughts of faith, which 
necessarily remains provisional during the course of history, is their correspondence to 
and derivation from this ground of faith in the historical Jesus. 
What should we make of this account of faith? Christoph Schwoebel has noted 
sympathetically: 
`Pannenberg's discussion of faith is a constant tacit dialogue with his critics in 
German theology, who have either challenged Pannenberg for not giving faith a 
constitutive role in his theology or for reducing faith to assenting to historical 
facts. '2 
Hence Pannenberg emphasises that he is concerned with 
`a more nuanced conception of the essential structure of faith itself quite apart 
from purely historical inquiry or from any limited and restricted presentation of 
the matter that is normative from a confessional standpoint' (3.139). 
Certainly, Pannenberg has clearly demonstrated here that, whatever its other merits, he 
definitely intends not to do away with faith, but to provide an account of faith that takes 
account of the modem age's sense of the `involved relativity of historico-exegetical 
knowledge' (3.154). Whether on such terms as Schwoebel mentions Pannenberg's 
account passes muster is a debatable point, but in trinitarian terms the discussion is 
certainly deficient. 
Above all, we should notice what Pannenberg does not say. Beyond the fact that this 
discussion of faith in volume 3 of ST comes within a section dealing with the works of the 
Spirit in individual Christians, there is no account of what this account of faith has to do 
with the Trinity, since it is not worked out in terms of the being and action of the divine 
persons. Here, it would seem, the high trinitarian credentials have not been met. Yet this 
is all the more remarkable, since it is not too difficult to see how a trinitarian account of 
faith could be given. One can readily think of faith as, for instance, the human response, 
effected and enabled by the Holy Spirit that receives the grace of God the Father 
accomplished by God the Son, and many other theologies provide an account of faith 
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along these lines or with variations. So, to take an example from his discussion, 
Pannenberg is right to note that `[k]nowledge of the history of Jesus does not necessarily 
move us to faith. ' The trinitarian rationale for this is that what is missing is the action of 
the Holy Spirit. But it is not such a trinitarian rationale that Pannenberg offers. Instead, 
he continues: 
Where the motives behind faith's assent may really find their basis is in the broad 
sphere of the ineffable relation of human existence to the divine mystery that 
surrounds and sustains our living of it' (3.150). 
Our other example, which we shall deal with much more briefly, is Pannenberg's 
discussion in the early chapters of ST of theological knowledge. This is not the major 
theme in these chapters which deal with the meaning and truth of the term "God" on the 
one hand, and the nature of religion and the religions on the other. Nevertheless there is 
a cluster of questions that combine to make the issue of theological knowledge an 
important sub-theme. These include what general awareness of God we have as humans, 
what criteria we should offer for accounts of the basis of the general awareness, and how 
religions may offer explanations for this awareness. 
As human beings we have, Pannenberg says, awareness of this all-pervasive, all- 
determining something, which, though not identical with anything in the world, is 
nevertheless the basis of the universe and its operations. This nameless power 
Pannenberg calls the all-determining reality, for it is only such a God that could be the 
author of a world such as this; and he also calls it the true Infinite. For, in distinction 
from concepts that define God's essence either by identifying Him with created reality or 
one of its parts, or by conceiving Him as the opposite of world reality and again making 
description of the divine dependent on the world, the term true Infinite preserves the real 
distinction of God from everything creaturely. And it is God in His revelation that fulfils 
such a requirement of the divine absolute: `the making finite of the Infinite... is 
transcended in the event of the revelation of God' (1.187). 
We need not deal with specific details from this complex and wide-ranging 
discussion in STchapters 2 and 3, but should notice just one important point. Again, it is 
striking is that trinitarian language and talk of the specifically Christian God of Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit is really very sparse. In a lengthy discussion there are a mere handful 
Z (1996), p. 517. 
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of references, none of which seem to be essential to the argument .3 In view of 
Pannenberg's aspirations this might seem surprising, since here too, it is far from 
impossible to see how a trinitarian account could be given. Many theologians have drawn 
on John 1: 18 where the evangelist says `No-one has ever seen God, but God the one and 
only who is at the Father's side, he has made him known' as well as other passages in the 
New Testament. According to these, knowledge of God is a reality eternally immanent 
within the Trinity in se and becomes a possibility pro nobis by the action of the economic 
Trinity. Yet, as with Pannenberg's account of faith, such a trinitarian construal is not 
given. 
Why does Pannenberg do this? Why in a presentation of Christian truth so replete 
with discussion of the specifically triune God in treatments of the divine essence and 
works, from creation right through to consummation, does talk of the Christian God of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit retire from the scene when the subject under discussion 
becomes how we come to know about God? In part this arises from material reasons, 
namely how Pannenberg thinks of the substance of Christian theology, in part also from 
apologetic reasons, namely with how Pannenberg conceives the state of contemporary 
Western society, especially its intellectual attitude towards Christian truth claims. 
The material reasons for this approach that arise from the substance of Christian 
theology will have to be treated only cursorily. Key is Pannenberg's belief that God 
makes Himself known in and through the course of history. God's acts of self- 
manifestation are not, he says, `original and new communications' but are part of, and 
derive their authority from, the whole course of history. 4 The self-revelation of God, that 
is, is only complete as the whole of history comes to its end and is taken up into eternity. 
It is then that the deity of God will be clear to all, and that the universe from its 
beginning has been the creation of the Christian God 
3 1.6 notes the reliance on the question of the identity of economic and immanent trinities of the claim 
that theology is the science of God. 1.30 cites the Trinity as part of the essential content that is 
intended by the Protestant doctrine of the clarity of scripture. 1.80 notes that Augustine believed 
contemporary Platonist natural theology included knowledge of God as Trinity. 1.8 1 discusses medieval 
debates on whether both God's unity and trinity are accessible to rational knowledge. 
4 This even applies to scripture. In a recent paper he has written: '[T]he divine authority of the 
Scriptures themselves has to be argued for, not merely presupposed, and this can be done only, if the 
God to whom the Scriptures witness is truly God, the creator of heaven and earth and of every human 
being, and that not only in the perspective of a particular faith, but with plausibility for all, at least in 
principle, in the sense that such plausibility may be claimed and argued for with good reasons' 
("Theology examines its status and methodology", p. 4). 
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This clarity arises because at the eschaton there will be a correspondence between on 
the one hand the whole course of earthly history, and on the other the triune God of love. 
Even though, in Pannenbergs view the whole of history has come to light in the life of 
Jesus as a `proleptic anticipation, ' and before then all Christian claims to truth can be 
presented only as hypotheses, not as self-grounded dogmas. Christianity's truth, he says, 
comes not from some a priori authority, but is corroborated by its coherence with all that 
is true. That is, it must correspond to the evidence of human history. As Pannenberg 
puts it, 
'The systematic investigation and presentation itself entails also a very specific 
understanding of all that is true. Systematic theology ascertains the truth of 
Christian doctrine by investigation and presentation of its coherence as regards 
both the interrelation of the parts and the relation to other knowledge' (1.21-22). 
For it is inevitable, he continues, that `tension arises between systematic theology and 
conceptions in which the truth of Christian teaching is assumed prior to any systematic 
ascertainment, ' whether this be the authority of divine revelation or church consensus. 
This provides a material basis for the debatability of God. `We cannot, ' he writes, 
`definitively determine the true meaning of things and events in our world so long as the 
course of history continues. ' 5 For this reason, all our theological statements, like other 
statements, rest on anticipation and are either falsified or confirmed by the ongoing 
historical process. For, `as time advances it brings to light what is constant and true in the 
world of our beginnings, and what is unreliable - firm and lasting though it might seem to 
be' (1.55). Speech about God, then, takes place, not by theologians deciding what is true, 
but by the open process of their repeating and anticipating the coherence of divine truth 
itself, in hope that the corroboration of theological statements comes from the validation 
of history. 
There are also apologetic reasons for this approach, which are occasioned by the 
specific conditions of late modern Western society. Pannenberg writes: 
`Enlightenment criticism of both scripture and church doctrine has made it 
impossible ever since, in the presentation of Christian doctrine, freely to use 
them as authorities for divine revelation as medieval theology and the older 
Protestant theology did, and in their historical situation could rightly do' (1.26). 
5 See BQT I, 156ff and 163ff. 
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Corroboration of claims to theological truth or hypotheses could, for Pannenberg, rightly 
demonstrate the plausibility of revelation merely by the scriptural record of Christ's 
history and significance as the church has received it in an age that was pre-critical. Yet 
if, with the onset of enlightenment and historical criticism of scripture and church 
doctrine, 
`Christian theology clings to the authoritative form of establishing its teaching, 
especially as regards its historical foundations, then in a way that was not true in 
earlier centuries it comes into basic conflict with reason' (3.147). 
The contemporary church in the West can no longer adopt this strategy, since it would 
appear authoritarian and subjective, and so would lack credibility. Otherwise faith would 
appear `as irrational commitment to a content which is regarded as "true" only in a private 
perspective. '6 Religious need would therefore easily assume the form of irrational 
commitment if the church recognised and affirmed as such. 
Such material and apologetic motivations, however, are not sufficient. To find 
biblical warrant for such an approach as Pannenberg adopts is far from obvious. 
Confirmation of the truth of the gospel in the New Testament is always spiritual in 
nature, that is, it is a work of the Holy Spirit. As the apostle Paul writes, 
`My words and my gospel were not in plausible words of wisdom, but in 
demonstration of the Spirit and of power, in order that your faith might not rest 
in the wisdom of men but in the power of God' (1 Cor. 2: 4-5). 
To one without the Spirit of God the Christian message is 'foolishness' and cannot be 
understood, because `spiritual things are spiritually discerned' (v. 14). 
Pannenberg does not deny this, and at certain points will affirm it, even at times 
without reservation? Significantly, however, he will not let this truth be operative in the 
rationality and plausibility of Christian theology, or in how the theologian goes about the 
task of discerning divine truth. 
So, how to be a trinitarian theologian? To be a trinitarian theologian, firstly, requires 
humility. `All right knowledge of God, ' Calvin said, `is born of obedience. " For the Spirit 
by whom alone we come to know God in Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 2.10) is also the same Spirit 
by whom we mortify the flesh (Rom. 8: 13). In other words, there is no knowledge of God 
6 Christianity in a Secularized World (London: SCM, 1989), p. 44 
7 See for instance 3.623. 
1 Institutes 1.6.2. 
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that is not itself obedience. To know God is not just something that demands obedience, 
or that accompanies obedience, or that when properly conceived should lead to 
obedience. It is not as if we can know God independently of us being put at His service. 
Knowledge of God is itself obedience, as our epistemological capacities are put into free 
subjection to the divine truth. And knowledge of God is sanctification, as the Spirit 
commandeers and transforms our cognitive processes to show us God in the face of Jesus 
Christ. To know God is not just something that demands holiness, or accompanies 
holiness, or that when properly conceived should lead to holiness. Knowledge of God is 
not independent of, but is part of, sanctification by the Spirit. It is itself holiness, holiness 
of the mind. 
This is a theme that is common within the theological tradition. And it is interesting 
to note that it is a theme that Pannenberg explains away either by being hostile to it or by 
downplaying it. We can see examples of this in two striking, if also questionable, 
historical judgements he makes. 
The first example is one he is hostile to, namely Pietism. In particular we note 
Pannenberg's treatment of Pietism in volume one's handling of theological prolegomena, 
where the movement is presented in an unabashedly negative light. What is specifically 
in Pannenberg's sights here is the Pietist view, `which maintained that a theologian's faith 
is necessary to theological knowledge and doctrine' (1.37). For Pannenberg this is simply 
`subjectivism' that has bedevilled modern theology at least since the time of 
Schleiermacher. Yet here Pannenberg confuses faith that is obedient to the content of the 
gospel with faith-consciousness that absorbs it. To say that faith is necessary for the 
theological task is quite a different matter from `viewing theology as simply the expression 
and presentation of the theologian's piety' (1.37), as he then goes on to describe the Pietist 
position. 
What Pietism did realise in reaction to what it perceived as tendencies to rationalism 
is that knowledge of God, and therefore theology too, involves the transformation of the 
knower. It is legitimate, therefore, for dogmatics to include the theme of the theologian 
within its presentation, for although the faith of the theologian does not exhaust or absorb 
its subject matter, the subject-matter of theology, i. e. the triune God of Jesus Christ, is the 
One who dwells in unapproachable light, and whom without holiness we cannot see. 
And in this, whatever may be their errors or excesses in other matters, the Pietists were 
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correct. Knowledge of God is a spiritual possibility rather than a natural one, for it 
requires new birth -'without holiness no-one will see the Lord. ' 
The second is his interpretation of Reformation views of faith. We noted before that 
a key defence of Pannenberg's argument is that Luther, too, believed that faith as trust 
(fiducia) presupposes the elements of knowledge (notitia) and assent (assensus). Again, as 
with his treatment of Pietism, he makes the historical material be fitted into what can 
only be called a false dichotomy. Of course Pannenberg is correct to say that `[t]he 
Reformers... took for granted the authoritative imparting of knowledge of the historical 
data underlying historical teaching' (3.145-146). But it is too much to say that notitia and 
assensus form the foundation or presupposition for fiducia in their theology. 
There are numerous examples of this within the Reformers' thought, but we shall 
examine Pannenberg's own example, Martin Luther. His understanding of faith certainly 
does not fit Pannenberg's description of fiducia presupposing notitia and assensus. We 
note two remarks in his Table Talk. 
`Before we come to faith and the knowledge of God, our reason is darkness; in 
the believers, however, it is a most useful ... Faith then is aided by reason, 
rhetoric, and language which were such great obstacles before faith. Enlightened 
reason which is incorporated into faith receives gifts from faith. 9 
`Reason enlightened by the Spirit helps us to understand the Holy 
Scripture... Reason, insofar as it is enlightened, serves faith in thinking about 
something... Enlightened reason receives all of its thoughts from the Word. '10 
If anything, for Luther, it is knowledge and assent that presuppose faith, not vice versa as 
Pannenberg suggests. Reason needs to be enlightened, and rather than being the 
foundation for faith it is its recipient. And central to his understanding of how our 
intellectual capacities can be made fit to receive the divine gifts is that which remains in 
the background in Pannenberg's own presentation, i. e., the person of the Spirit. For 
Luther, as for the rest of mainstream Reformation theology, faith is the `direct effect of 
regeneration. "' 
9 "The Place of Reason in Christian Life" in Luther's Works vol. 64 `Table Talk" (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1967), p. 183 (WA, TR 3,2938). 
10 "The Right and Wrong Use of Reason", ibid., p. 71 (WA, TR 1,439). 
" H. Witsius, De Oeconomia Foederum Dei cum hominibus libri quattuor (Utrecht, 1694), III. vii. I, 
cited in Heppe, pp. 526-527. According to Witsius, `The principal act of the spiritual life implanted in 
the elect by regeneration and the true source of the consequent vital operations is faith in God through 
Christ. ' 
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The remarks of Berkouwer are a surer guide. He may overplay the rationalism of 
Pannenberg's account of faith, but he deftly exposes the falsity of his understanding of the 
Reformers. `The reformers, ' he says, 
`were not strangers to Pannenberg's problem. They also thought about the 
nature of faith and they, too, used various words to get at it: words like notitia, 
assensus, and fiducia. Interestingly, they never thought it necessary to set these 
off into different time periods of Christian experience. Calvin used the word 
cognitio, but did not reduce faith to intellectual knowledge with it because he 
insisted that this cognitio was directed to "the benevolence of God toward us" 
and was more an affair of the heart than of the head. They were not offended 
either by words like notitia and assensus. Intuitively, they refused to isolate 
aspects of faith from one another. "How could it be fiducia without at the same 
time, and because it is fiducia, being notitia and assensus too? " (Barth CD I/l, 
p. 269). The reformers never talked as if one first accepted and agreed to 
something and thereafter believed and trusted. "2 
These two historical examples are pertinent for any account of how to be a trinitarian 
theologian. Both rightly state that knowledge of God, including that of the theologian, is 
irreducibly and primarily a spiritual affair. And since the decisive factor is the Spirit of 
the crucified and risen Jesus, knowledge of and faith in God requires the mortification and 
vivification of the mind that the Spirit brings. Naturally, this does not fit well with 
attempts, such as Pannenberg's, to offer a presentation of Christianity that seeks to meet 
the world on neutral territory where the theologian adopts a position of impartiality. It is 
difficult to imagine the following comment on the lips of the Reformers, for instance: 
Theologians can do justice to this task [i. e. the systematic presentation of 
Christian doctrine] only if they examine the Christian truth claim as impartially 
as possible. They cannot begin, then, with a firm presupposition of the truth of 
Christian revelation. If they did, they would make thus truth a matter of mere 
subjective conviction, which would be little more than an objective untruth and 
perhaps even an in many ways attractive fable (2. xiii). 
Unlike both the Reformers whose support he mistakenly claims and the Pietists 
whom he misrepresents, Pannenberg's procedure does not pay due attention to the truth 
that the practice of theology too is the triune God's act of saving grace, that it is in the 
words of Johannes Gerhard a habitus theodotus, a "God-given aptitude. " Or, to put it in 
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terms of a generalisation: Pannenberg gives the impression that the triune God transforms 
everything except the practice of doing theology. The impression is created that both the 
theologian and her theological activity are detached from the world's reconciliation to 
God and the transformation they must undergo. Whereas all of creation is commanded to 
lay its weapons of war at the feet of the King of love, the conceptual tools of theological 
analysis still await their full decommissioning. Yet this procedure is not an option for the 
theologian, far less with any self-confessed trinitarian theologian. Our knowing, just as 
much as our being, needs to be crucified and raised with Christ, and to be quickened by 
the life-giving Spirit. And the practice of theology, like other tasks of Christian 
discipleship, is a treading of the path He bids us follow. 
2. The Trinity has to be not just the conclusion to, but the presupposition of, the 
doctrine of revelation, since it is the gracious human participation in the knowledge 
that is already enjoyed by the trinitarian persons. For this reason to be a trinitarian 
theologian requires prayer that we too might share in knowledge of God. 
In terms of the dogmatic structure it was Barth who famously put discussion of the 
doctrine of the Trinity at the beginning of his doctrine of the Word of God, rather than 
after his treatment of the one God (the standard procedure of orthodox Western 
dogmatics) or even before a treatment of the divine essence and attributes but after the 
discussion of revelation. 13 Pannenberg will not take this step, however, and puts the 
chapter entitled `The Trinitarian God' after `The Revelation of God' and before `The Unity 
and Attributes of the Divine Essence. ' 
This matter is worth investigating, not least because at least in some ways one might 
have thought that he would have followed Barth's positioning. For one thing, as we have 
seen, Pannenberg maintain that his theology will be of the highest possible trinitarian 
credentials, and right from the beginning he asserts that our knowledge of God can only 
be rightly understood as the revelation that is made possible by God alone. He writes, 
12 G. C. Berkouwer A Half Century of Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977) p. 175. 
13 See CD U1, esp. pp. 295-304 on "The Place of the Doctrine of the Trinity in Dogmatics. " 
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`human knowledge of God can be a true knowledge that corresponds to the 
divine reality only if it originates in the deity itself. God can be known only if 
he gives himself to be known. ' 
Otherwise, he says, it is `inaccessible to us' (1.189). For another, he too, like Barth is 
critical of the sort of natural theology that suggests that the knowledge of God is a 
possibility at our disposal (1.75). Furthermore, after he has treated the doctrine of 
revelation, Pannenberg provides remarks that demonstrate that our knowledge of God is 
to be understood in trinitarian terms. So, for instance, in his discussion of the divine 
essence, he states, `The God who dwells in inaccessible light is made known by the Son. 
To know the incomprehensible God, therefore, we must hold fast to the Son' (1.339). 
For these three reasons one might have thought that Pannenberg would have 
followed Barth's positioning. But he does not. The chapter on revelation itself comes 
after one on the truth of Christian doctrine as a theme of theology, another on the 
concept of God and its truth, and a third on the divine reality in the experience of the 
religions. And it precedes a fifth chapter on the trinitarian God and subsequent chapters 
on a trinitarian explication of the divine essence and activity. So, for a self-avowed 
trinitarian theology written in the wake of Barth's CD (whatever the intricacies of the 
relationship between the men of Basel and Munich and their theological magna opera), 
this choice of systematic placement has to be among the most startling of all the points of 
Pannenberg's trinitarian theology. 
Yet Pannenberg has more important commitments that explain his systematic 
placement of the doctrines of revelation and of the trinitarian God, and they are 
commitments in tension with his desire to write the most trinitarian of theologies. They 
have been hinted at already in the remarks on the material and apologetic reasons for 
Pannenberg's general theological approach, but here some more specific comment is 
required. 
Pannenbergs procedure in dealing with how we come to know God is to separate 
ontology and epistemology. The ontology, i. e., the material substance of theology, is, for 
Pannenberg, the primacy of the triune God. The epistemology on the other hand, i. e., his 
theological method and account of how we come to know about God, is to clarify a 
general notion of God and see how the history of the divine action clarifies, fulfils and 
transforms it. As he puts it, 
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`Dogmatics, although it treats all other themes sub ratione Dei and thus discusses 
them in exposition of the concept of god, cannot begin directly with the reality 
of God... [I]ronically God is then only a human idea ... The question how we 
come to count on God as a reality needs careful clarification. In the process the 
reality of God to which scripture bears witness can be publicly discussed as true 
reality and the way can thus be cleared for dogmatic presentation in the true 
sense' (1.61). 
That is, although God precedes and determines all things, He must not be allowed to 
precede and determine the discussion, lest this appear authoritarian or subjective. 
And this procedure is operative too in his account of divine revelation in ST chapter 
4- or at least mostly so. To summarise the discussion, Pannenberg notes that revelation 
in the biblical record comes in many forms, invariably to modify an existing idea of God, 
rather than as original and new communications of deity. Hence it is insufficient to 
conceive revelation merely as a special divine communication, but also as the summation 
of human history. According to Pannenberg this is the understanding of the biblical 
record. Not only in the OT is there a general knowledge of God as elohim, but it is only 
through witness of faith of Israel, i. e., special revelation, that one can know Him as 
YHWH, but also 
`the NT statements about the revelation of God in the person and work of Jesus 
Christ seem to be totally shaped by the basic thought of a revelation of God by 
historical acts' (1.227). 
It is also the view of the early church, in distinction to that of the church of the medieval, 
Reformation and modern eras: 
`the fulfilment of prophecy in Jesus of Nazareth was the basis of belief in his 
divine sonship and therefore of the revelation of God in him by the incarnation 
of the Son... The concept of revelation was not, then, the basis of the argument 
but its goal' (1.218). 
The tendency of much recent theology, which in Pannenberg's opinion at least is to 
reduce the revelation of God to divine speaking as the origin of all our knowledge of 
divine reality, he therefore considers to be mistaken. God's revelation is not an original or 
self-grounding address, but is the series of God's actions in the world that give form and 
content to a pre-existing inchoate knowledge of divine reality. 
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What about the Trinity in all of this? Well, in ST chapter four there are several 
references to a trinitarian explication of divine revelation. They fall into what could be 
termed three groups. 
The first group is of what we might call historical references, where the reference to 
the Trinity is not in Pannenberg's own voice. Rather, it is a citation in one of 
Pannenberg's historical surveys of the view of another theologian, whose account of 
divine revelation is in terms of the Son's revelation of the Father by the Spirit. " The 
second group is of direct references to the Trinity as part of Pannenberg's own 
constructive account. For this one has to wait until page 257, the penultimate paragraph 
of the chapter on revelation, where Pannenberg states that the `implication of the self- 
revelation of God by his Word is explicated by the doctrine of the Trinity. ' The Trinity, 
then, is in Pannenberg's presentation the conclusion one reaches on the basis of evidence 
and premises that are not of themselves avowedly trinitarian. 
The third group of references do in fact concern the role of the triune persons in our 
reception of revelation. And it is here that we take up the ambiguity in Pannenberg's 
position when we noted that it is `mostly so' and not always that Pannenberg resists the 
idea that the Trinity might be the explicit presupposition of our knowledge of God, rather 
than the reasoned conclusion we reach as the content and basis of revelation. The overall 
shape of the argument is as we have already presented it, the Trinity being presented 
merely as the conclusion reached on the basis of premises that are not explicitly 
trinitarian. Yet, when writing against some of the criticism directed against RaH his 
apologetic remarks point in a different direction. So when dealing with RaHs claim that 
the revelation of God `is open to anyone who has eyes to see' and does not need any 
supplementary inspired interpretation, " he allows a reading of it that includes a role for 
the Son and Spirit: 
`The thesis that we may know eschatological revelation without any 
supplementary inspiration is not directed against the function of the Word, the 
apostolic kerygma, relative to faith in the saving event of Christ's person and 
work, nor is it directed against the interrelation of Word and Spirit. On the 
14 E. g., the treatments of Ignatius, Irenaeus, Justin and Origen on 1.215ff., the reference to the debate 
between Basil Mitchell and Maurice Wiles on 1.234, and discussion of Barth and Juengel on 1.235ff. 
15 RaH, pp. 135ff. 
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contrary, it presupposes the relation of the Spirit to the Word in virtue of the 
latter's content' (1.250). 16 
We note the qualification or clarification represented by these references. We 
cannot judge it as sufficient, however. The importance of the Trinity in how one comes 
to understand God's revelation is at best very much in the background in both RaH and 
ST. Indeed, ST chapter 4 enlarges on the theme only to meet the criticism that the 
Trinity was not excluded from RaHor that it could not be operative in any way at all, but 
its own positive account of divine revelation does not show that the Trinity is operative in 
any significant sense. By Pannenberg's own understanding of what a trinitarian theology 
is, the doctrine of the Trinity must be not just affirmed but also put to use, and while we 
acknowledge the former there is not much evidence of the latter. Are not the `eyes to see' 
a gift that can only be given by the special action of the Son and Spirit, and so not 
generally or naturally available? If revelation and its reception are really possible only by 
the prevenient action of Son and Spirit, why are they not mentioned in more than a 
handful of remarks? And, more importantly, why are they not mentioned in a systematic 
theology that seeks to be more trinitarian than any other? There is, then, a decided 
reticence when it comes to explaining God's revelation in terms of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
This reticence on the matter of the Trinity comes at a price. As well as contributing 
to unduly complex argument where trinitarian language would get to the point more 
straightforwardly and arguably more successfully, '' it also leads to some highly 
questionable theological judgements. To take an example, the reason Pannenberg gives 
for why dogmatics cannot begin directly with the reality of God is that `the reality of God 
is initially present only as a human notion, word or concept' (1.61). Yet is not one of the 
central implications of a doctrine of the Trinity that God's reality is fully realised and 
sufficient before and without creaturely reality and comprehension and that it can only 
16 Indeed, closer attention to RaH reveals statements such as that on p. 136: 'the gospel.. . which for its 
part belongs to the sphere of the Spirit'. Pannenberg thinks that he dealt with this matter `too cursorily 
to ward off the misunderstandings which came to light in discussion of the thesis' (1.250). See also 
"Christologie und Theologie" pp. 134-135. 
17 Take for instance Pannenberg's extended discussion of how, if at all, revelation can be conceived of 
as the Word of God. Until the final paragraphs Pannenberg will employ the phrase 'Word of God, ' not 
in its trinitarian sense as the second divine person, but only on the analogy of human words, that is as a 
special communications. Were he to follow the prologue to the fourth gospel and being by identifying 
the divine Word with Jesus Christ, then there would be no need subsequently to marry together two 
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be understood as such? Again, Pannenberg dismisses as subjectivist the methodology of 
theologians like Dorner, who do in fact seek to begin their account of the being and 
knowledge of God not with human experience but the immanent Trinity. So, for instance, 
he can write that `According to I. A. Dorner "Christian experience or Christian faith" is 
the "noetic source" of dogmatics as well as ethics' (1.43), whereas Pannenberg's own 
remarks elsewhere on Dorner'8 and the research of Pannenberg's own pupil, Christine 
Axt-Piscalar suggest otherwise. 19 
Yet the point at which the highest price is paid is in the very separation of ontology 
and epistemology that is the key to the procedure Pannenberg adopts. We shall 
investigate this by answering two possible defences of Pannenberg's approach. One 
would be to say that one gets to the Trinity at the end, and that this is sufficient. The 
other would be to make the point that we can only legitimately talk about the Trinity, 
once we have worked out how we come to know Him. 
We offer two responses to such defences. The first is the incompatibility of 
Pannenberg's method with his self-stated aim. Even were such objections legitimate - 
and in our view they are not - and even were Pannenberg right to argue that the only 
sufficient grounding of Christian truth is to suspend talk of the God of Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit - and in our view he is not - his self-avowed trinitarian aspirations come 
under suspicion. By refusing to make the doctrine of the Trinity operative 
here, in 
contrast to many other theologians, Pannenberg undermines the credibility of his claim to 
write a theology `the most trinitarian he knows of. ' 
An account where the Trinity is operative only at the conclusion of the argument 
and only accounts for the content of our knowledge of God is by definition less trinitarian 
that one in which the Trinity is also operative throughout the argument and within the 
elements that otherwise might seem separate or opposed, i. e., God's special, personal address with his 
action in history. In Christ, the Son incarnate, we see that they are given to us together. 
18 `Dorner worked out the fundamental significance of the knowledge of God for the religious certainty 
of faith' (1.126). 
19 In Der Grund des Glaubens: Eine theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Verhaeltnis von 
Glaube und Trinitaet in der Theologie Isaak August Dorners (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 
pp. 254-255, she writes: 'Gegen Schleiermacher und die primaer am religioesen Bewusstsein orientierte 
zeitgenoessische Tehologie setzt Dorner daher um willen des Glaubens die konstitutive Bedeutung der 
immanenten Trinitaet und die Begruendungsfunktion der Trinitaetslehre fuer die Glauhenslehre ins 
Recht.. . Im Durchmessen 
der theologiegeschichtlichen Entwicklung seiner Zeit im Zusammenhang der 
Frage nach der rechten Begruendung der Theologie kommt er zu der bestimmten Ueberzeugung, es 
werde der Glaube als die unveraeusserliche Basis der theologischen Reflexion richtig verstanden und 
absolut begruendet nur durch die Lehre von Gott als dem in sich trinitarischen. ' 
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account of how we come to know about God. As Barth wrote in defence of his placement 
of the doctrine: 
When we ask. Who is the self-revealing God? the Bible answers in such a way 
that we have to reflect on the triunity of God. The two other questions: What 
does this God do and what does He effect are also answered primarily... by new 
answers to the first question: Who is He? The problem of the three answers to 
these questions ... is the doctrine of the Trinity. In the first instance the problem 
of revelation stands or falls with this problem20 
The second is that such objections presuppose some neutral, impartial position from 
which we might view the triune God, some place that is not altogether constituted by His 
reconciling action. If it is indeed the case that to God, through God and for God are all 
things, what possible correspondence with reality could there be by postponing both talk 
of the world and our position in it in terms of this trinitarian reality? And if it is indeed 
the case that God is known only through the Son in the power of the Holy Spirit, what 
possible way of knowing God could there be that is not the special work of the triune 
God? There does not exist, then, any empty space we may occupy that is immune from 
the presence and work of the triune God of holy love. And we are not immune from this 
as knowers either. We cannot retire to some epistemological hinterland to talk of God in 
the abstract or of knowledge of Him in the abstract. Again, as Barth realised, 
'The knowledge bestowed upon us through [God's] revelation cannot be fulfilled 
without the confession in humility that we not only do not know Him apart 
from His revelation, but that even in His revelation we know Him only in 
consequence of the fact that knowledge of God is real as God's own hidden work 
in His being as the triune God from eternity to eternity. '2' 
The placing of the doctrine of the trinitarian God within and not just after the 
treatment of revelation helps to safeguard this truth. It makes clear both that it is this 
triune God that we know, and that it is this triune God that enables us to know. That is, 
on the one hand, it makes clear that at every point in theological discussion one has to do 
with this God of Father, Son and Spirit, rather than some unspecified notion of a first 
cause, a nameless Other or a True Infinite. We know this God and not any other. And on 
the other hand it makes clear that our knowledge of this God is made possible not by 
20 CD U1, p. 303, emphasis added. 
21 CD II/l, p. 50. 
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human wisdom, insight or deliberation but by the gracious intervention of this triune God 
who by the Spirit enables us to know the Father in the Son. We know God in this way 
and not any other. There is no room for any other God, or 
for any other way of 
approaching Him. So, when Pannenberg does on occasion offer remarks such as this - 
`one does not enter this circle of the divine life, unless one is already within it'22- his 
emphasis on our deliberation on the course of history rather than the work of Son and 
Spirit, together with the reasons for his arrangement of the doctrinal loci, suggest that the 
work of the Trinity is not the necessary and sufficient condition for our knowledge of 
God. 
Let us be clear on what is being argued here. It is not that a mere positing of a 
section dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity on pages numbered within or before the 
doctrine of revelation will of itself ensure that one's theology, including its methodology, 
will meet the highest trinitarian credentials. Indeed in our view in practice such 
placement of theological topics has not of itself commended or condemned theologies. So, 
for instance, Thomas Aquinas, at least on our reading, is not guilty of making the doctrine 
of the Trinity incidental either to his doctrine of the divine essence or to his 
understanding of our knowledge of God, even though his section discussing the triune 
God comes after that of the one God. 23 Nor does placing the Trinity early on in the 
systematic structure guarantee exemption from the sort of rationalism that 
immunises 
human reason from the obedience and humility that make up knowledge of God. Take, 
for instance, Hegel's attempt to understand our knowledge of God as the trinitarian 
unfolding of God's being as spirit 24 What is being argued here is this: the fact that 
Pannenberg places the doctrines of Trinity and revelation the way he does and his reasons 
for doing so are problematic for a theology that is thoroughly trinitarian. A re-ordering of 
the doctrines, with the doctrine of the triune God before or within the treatment of 
revelation, reflects both the ontological and epistemological primacy of the triune God in 
22 GST, p. 134. 
23 See for instance STh 1.32.1 ad. 3: `To know the divine persons was necessary for us for two reasons. 
One in order to have a right view of the creation of things ... The other and more 
important reason is so 
that we may have the right view of the salvation of mankind. ' 
24 Similar charges have been laid against Robert Jenson's recent Systematic Theology, e. g. by George 
Hunsinger in "Robert Jenson's Systematic Theology: A Review Essay" SJT 55 (2002), pp. 161-200. 
P. 199 especially criticises Jenson's alleged `resort to rationalistic metaphysics. ' Hunsinger continues, 
`Jenson's alliances... represent a vexed commitment to rationalism at the expense of the ecumenical 
tradition. ' Whereas we do not find all of Hunsinger's criticisms of Jenson equally convincing, they at 
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His dealings with us. And it is a re-ordering that, for the reasons we have stated, 
Pannenberg not only does not, but also cannot consistently make. 
So, then, how to be a trinitarian theologian? To be a trinitarian theologian requires 
prayer. Knowledge of God is a divine reality already, and a self-sufficient one at that. 
Knowledge of God by God is natural, since by the Spirit the Father knows the Son and the 
Son the Father. And no other entity - certainly no creaturely entity - is necessary for this 
self-knowledge to be actualised. Knowledge of God by human creatures, on the other 
hand, is another matter entirely. It is not natural, for it is a matter of God's grace and 
choice. It is not something we have at hand, since by its very nature it is something that 
can only be bestowed by His hand. It is a gift of the divine freedom. For, `No one knows 
the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to 
whom the Son chooses to reveal Him. ' 
For this reason knowledge of the triune God can never be achieved by our unaided 
efforts. It is not the result of our deliberation or decision. Rather it must be sought from 
the turning of the gracious God in answer to our petition. There is, of course, more to the 
task of constructing a contemporary account of the reality of the God of Jesus Christ than 
a confession of our own unaided inability to meet such a task, just as prayer by itself is 
insufficient if it does not also lead to action and to praise. But to conceive of the 
theological task as an autonomous or natural exercise of corroborating and systematising 
God's revelation, is a temptation that we must ask our Father to lead us out of. 
3. To understand Jesus rightly, full and irreversible priority, both ontological and 
epistemological, must be accorded to God the Son, the one who became incarnate, 
and so is incompatible with approaches such as the Quest of the Historical Jesus, 
which allow epistemological priority to Christ's humanity as such. For this reason to 
be a trinitarian theologian requires faith, for it means the miraculous enabling of 
sinful humanity to perceive what is in itself invisible and unapproachable. 
least show that the idea of a theology that starts with the doctrine of the Trinity and yet is guilty of 
rationalism, is by no means impossible, as the case of Hegel would also suggest. 
I Matt. 11: 28. 
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`Only God can reveal God. ' This truth was given fine expression by that most trinitarian 
of theologians, Augustine. His De Trinitate26 proves to be particularly relevant to how 
christology operates within many modern systematic theologies, including Pannenberg's. 
In De Trinitate Pannenberg argued at length against the idea, held both by anti- 
Nicene Homoians and within the mainstream theological tradition of the West, that the 
Son is the visibility of the Father. ' The view that the Son is the visible image of the 
invisible Father had been, it seems, the favoured approach of the West in combating 
modalism, but by Augustine's time was subject to the weakness of separating the Son who 
is visible by nature from the Father who is invisible. 
Augustine argued therefore in the early books of De Trinitate that in all the 
appearances in the world of the Son of God, including the incarnation, it was only the 
creaturely form He assumed that was visible, and His divine person itself remained 
invisible. For in this age, Augustine believed, we do not see the Son in the form of God, 
but only under the form of a servant. For, `divinity cannot be seen by human sight in any 
way whatever; it is seen by a power of sight which makes those who already see with it 
not human but superhuman. "' And since, he continues, we do not perceive God directly, 
but only indirectly under the creaturely form, we have to understand man's knowledge of 
God as the knowledge of faith, which is the superhuman perception we receive by the gift 
of the triune God. 
Understanding Jesus as the second person of the Trinity, then, involves both an 
ontological and an epistemological claim. Ontologically it means that all the qualities of 
Godhead that are properly the Father's are properly the Son's also, and that in Jesus we 
are dealing with nothing less than God himself. And epistemologically it means that our 
knowledge of God the Son is not in terms of, but only by means of, the human nature he 
assumed. We know God the Son in virtue of the eternal deity that He already possesses 
and that He shares with the Father. Knowing Jesus, then, involves a special type of 
knowing that is not applicable to any other part of created reality. 
26 The following references are from Edmund Hill's translation The Trinity (Hyde Park, NY: New City, 
1991). 
27 For details see Michel Rene Barnes "The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5: 8 in 
Augustine's Trinitarian Theology of 400" Modern Theology 19 (July 2003), pp. 329-353. 
281.2.11 
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`the bad... will only be able to see [Christ] in the form by which he is the Son of 
man... The form of God, however, in which he is equal to the Father, this the 
wicked will undoubtedly not see. 129 
All other creatures are to be understood just as that, as creatures, with all their creaturely 
particularities and similarities. They are thus suited to creaturely knowing. Yet this one 
creature cannot be understood just as that, but in terms of His divinity, which is unique 
both in number and kind. 
'"He who believes in me does not believe in what he sees" or our hope would in 
that case be in something created, but he believes in him who took a created 
form in which to appear to human eyes, and thereby to purify our minds for 
contemplating him by faith in his equality with the Father. '30 
Jesus Christ, the eternal Son who is God forever with the Father and Spirit, has to be 
known by faith. 
In modern theology there is a most conspicuous failure to pay heed to this truth 
outlined by Augustine, an attempt to get at a true account of who Jesus is that is readily 
available, or at an account of his deity that is naturally visible. The meaning and 
significance of the man Jesus is to be perceived in terms of general principles equally 
applicable to other historical figures, and in this way such an approach by-passes faith. 
That is the so-called Quest of the Historical Jesus, which seeks to understand Jesus' 
identity by applying tools of historical method applicable to any other human figure. And 
in terms of the trinitarian arguments set out by Augustine, this quest is, in trinitarian 
terms, a step backwards. 
Here we return to Pannenberg and to the misgivings we noted in our treatment of 
the trinitarian christology of ST. Two points were noted in particular. Firstly, we noted 
that Pannenberg is unclear on whether Jesus' uniqueness and significance are to be 
understood in virtue of the Trinity. Second, we criticised the fact that the ontological 
basis of Pannenbergs christology was trinitarian, but not the noetic basis. Notably, both 
points are necessary for a coherent defence of discovering Jesus' identity by means of 





Pannenberg's defence of the Quest of the Historical Jesus articulated famously in 
JGMis still operative in the later ST, and we shall investigate it in some detail to develop 
the criticisms we suggested earlier and to show that his reliance on this historical quest 
both fails to deal adequately with compelling critiques raised against it, and is inimical to 
thoroughgoing trinitarianism. The chief target in the opening pages of JGM is some 
dominant strains within 20thcentury Lutheran theology, represented by Rudolf Bultmann 
and Paul Althaus. Yet, Pannenberg seeks to take the rug from under the feet of such 
thinkers not by dealing with them directly, but by demonstrating how they recapitulate 
problems most evident in the work of Martin Kaehler's The So-Called Historical 
[historisch] Jesus and the Historic [geschichtlich] Biblical Christ. 31 There are two 
problems with this. For one thing, he misrepresents Kaehler's position, and for another, 
he sidelines the trinitarian rationale at the heart of Kaehler's reasoning. 
Pannenberg misrepresents Kaehler's position by aligning him too closely to other 
modern theologians who derive Jesus' significance from the faith-consciousness of those 
who believe in Him. So in JGM, for instance, Pannenberg seems to conflate Kaehler's 
position with Ritschl's comment that `One can attain the full extent of [Jesus'] historic 
reality only out of the faith which the Christian community has in him. '32 And he 
considers Kaehler's arguments to be crucial for the later views of Bultmann. 33 
That this critique is unjustified we can see in two ways. Firstly, Kaehler was not just 
asserting a dogmatic or ideal Christ against a Jesus of historical substance. As he states, 
'The Jesus of the Life-of-Jesus movement" is merely a modem example of 
creativity, and not an iota better than the notorious dogmatic Christ of Byzantine 
Christology. One is as far removed from the real Christ as is the other. In this 
respect historicism is just as arbitrary, just as humanly arrogant, just as 
impertinent and "faithlessly gnostic" as that dogmatism which in its day was also 
considered modem. '34 
Kaehler was equally critical of the `pallid outline'35 of the dogmatic Christ as he was of 
Hegel's substituting of an ideal Christ. And insofar as the Quest of the Historical Jesus 
31 (tr. C. Braaten) (Philadephia: Fortress, 1964). 
32 Ritschl The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation p. 3, cited in JGM, p. 22. 
33 `The idea that theology, when it deals with Jesus Christ, must take its starting point in the 




was `set[ting] the Bible against an abstract dogmatism, ' it was, he said, `completely in the 
right'36 
Second, Geschichte is opposed to Historie not as event (contra Bultmann) but as 
method of investigation. Kaehler makes clear what he means by Geschichte, and it is not 
the general critique of the objective view of history advocated by Bultmann 37 For 
Kaehler, Geschichte is 
`a term coined to designate what.. . would not even exist apart from history but 
whose significance is not exhausted in the historical effects of a particular link in 
the chain of history or in the beginnings of a new historical movement, because 
in the supra-historical what is universally valid is joined to the historical to 
become an effective presence. 38 
So, for Kaehler, it is the historical, or historisch, investigation into the life and psychology 
of Jesus that is the more speculative. The documents we have, i. e. the gospels, are not 
biographies, so biographical or psychological profiles can only be reconstructions - even 
constructions - that are the refraction of the historian's self-image. 
The reason for this is not a general view about history, but a specific view of the 
person of Jesus Christ. This leads us to the second problem with Pannenberg's treatment 
of Kaehler, where the important implications of this otherwise insignificant piece of 
historical theology come into view. 
This second problem with Pannenberg's treatment of Kaehler's critique of the Quest 
of the Historical Jesus is that he sidelines the trinitarian rationale at the heart of Kaehler's 
reasoning. Kaehler's is not just an argument about texts and philosophies of history that 
query human ability to comprehend history in general, but is one that reasserts the 
indispensable primacy of divine agency in perceiving the identity of Jesus Christ. 
Geschichte finds its determinative meaning therefore not in the faith-consciousness of the 
religious community, but in the powerful action of the triune God. Kaehler asks, 
`Now if the Word became flesh in Jesus, which is the revelation, the flesh or the 
Word? Which is the more important for us, that wherein Jesus is like us, or that 
wherein he was and is totally different from us? Is it not the latter, namely, that 
36p46. 
37 For Bultmann's more philosophical understanding, that the essence of history in general - rather than 
just the history of Jesus Christ - cannot be grasped by viewing it, see e. g., his Jesus and the Word 
(London: Nicholson & Watson, 1935), pp. 3-15. 
38 p. 47 fn. 2. 
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which he offers us, not from our own hearts, but from the heart of the living 
God? '39 
And it is for this reason that the epistemological basis for our confession of Christ as God 
cannot be history in itself. We believe not in virtue of the intrinsic self-evidence of 
certain events or indeed of any creaturely phenomena, but in virtue of the intrinsic power 
of the trinitarian God. 
Indeed, Pannenberg often reads those who urge an objective foundation for Christ's 
person and significance within God's immanent triune life as actually advocating a 
subjective foundation within the human faith-consciousness: It is a failure to appreciate 
the trinitarian rationale at the heart of positions such as Kaehler's, that informs his 
evaluation of such thinkers as subjectivist. 
In our fifth chapter we noted Pannenberg's failure to observe a distinction that is 
present in other christologies, namely that although Christ's identity is revealed in his 
human nature, but not in virtue ofit. Our discussion of Pannenberg's christology and his 
reading of Kaehler has shown that failure to respect this distinction leads to problems that 
are of moment for Pannenberg's trinitarian credentials. According to Pannenberg's 
understanding of how we perceive Christ's identity, there is either an epistemological 
basis in Jesus' history, in particular his resurrection insofar as it is accessible to general 
historical investigation, or a foundation in Christian experience. Yet there is another 
option, namely that the epistemological basis is the Trinity itself, God Himself in the 
person of the Son. The ontological basis is also the epistemological basis, i. e. the eternal 
Son who alone sustains and directs Christ's person and His knowability. The fact that 
Pannenberg does not adopt this third - and trinitarian - option presents problems for his 
theology. Not only would this resolve some of the difficulties we have noted in his 
christology as well as in other doctrines, but it would allow Pannenberg better to fulfil his 
trinitarian ambitions. Christ would be knowable as the Son of God in virtue of His being 
the Son of God, not in virtue the particularity of His humanity independent of its being 
assumed. And the ontological basis of His person as well as the epistemological basis 
would be His being God the Son, rather than the phenomenon of an empty tomb and a 
resurrected body. That is, Pannenberg rejects the `subjective' basis in Christian 
experience in favour of the `objective' basis in history per se and what can be verified on 
39 Ibid., p. 58. 
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general historiographical criteria, whereas he could have located a basis in the ultimate 
objectivity of the eternal Trinity. 
In practice Pannenberg's approach - and here he is in line with the quests of the 
historical Jesus in general - has two implications, both of which wrest away the primacy 
from the incarnate Son of God and give it to the humanity as such. The first is that Jesus' 
significance or uniqueness has to be found in his human nature, otherwise how could one 
ever notice anything below to move above from. This, as we have seen, Pannenberg does, 
but in doing so he himself admits that there is little support for this within the theological 
tradition. Of course, this in itself does not decide against Pannenberg, but for a theologian 
whose theological positions are worked out with close comparison with the history of 
ideas, it does point to the isolation of his position within the church's thought. 
Pannenberg says that even the most likely patristic precedent for developing a purely 
human uniqueness of Jesus, namely the christology of Antioch, did not do so. 'This 
theology, ' he writes, 
`like that of Alexandria, firmly accepted the deity of Jesus, even before his birth, 
as a presupposition throughout his human history. There was thus no need to 
make a special theme of the human uniqueness of Jesus and his history and to 
treat this as a basis for what was said about his deity' (2.301). 
On this matter the weight of argument rests with the traditional approach rather 
than Pannenberg's. For there are two major problems with his finding a basis for Christ's 
significance in his humanity per se. For one thing, it lacks exegetical foundation. In the 
gospels, both in the Synoptics and in John, whether by accounts of incarnation in the 
virgin's womb, " prologue4l or reference to Christ as the "Lord" of the OT, 43 it is made 
clear from the very outset that the significance of this one is the coming into time of 
almighty God. For another Christ's uniqueness and significance are not explained by 
means of the Trinity. Of course, since Christ is God-become-man His uniqueness and 
significance are also human, but Pannenberg is arguing for something more. Pannenberg 
ao See for instance his readings of Dorner and Barth. 
a' Matt. 1: 18-25, esp. v23; Luke 1: 26-45, esp. vv32,43 
42 John 1: 1-18. 
43 Mark 1: 2-3. 
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requires a part of Christ's significance that is to be found not in trinitarian terms, but 
solely in human terms. Yet none such exists 4 
The second implication that wrests primacy away from the Trinity is that 
confirmation of Jesus' authority is not something He already possesses in His person, but it 
is granted to Him by the course of His earthly life. For Pannenberg Christ's authority is to 
be discerned, not first of all in His person, but in His message, miracles and especially in 
the resurrection, all of which confer authority on Him as the Messiah of God. It is `the 
resurrection of Jesus, ' Pannenberg says, which `confirmed not merely his message and 
work.. . but Jesus himself. ' 
Again this does not match the witness of the New Testament. For in the gospels, 
both in the Synoptics and in John, right from the beginning of His ministry this authority 
is not something conferred on Him by His life and work, but revealed through them is the 
fact that He is already `the one having authority' (Mark 1.22). Indeed the despoiling of 
Satan that takes shape in Jesus' miraculous ministry, occurs because the strong man has 
already been tied up (Mark 3.27). In John also Jesus' miracles are not instances of Jesus 
receiving glory from His deeds, but of Him revealing the glory He already has. 45 
Knowledge of Jesus, no less than knowledge of the triune God - for is it not the same 
thing? - is not a natural possibility achieved by human deliberations on the earthly 
history and reality of Jesus of Nazareth. Our knowledge of the incarnation is and remains 
only a trinitarian possibility, as was the event of the incarnation itself. The divine power 
and wisdom, which is the person of Jesus Christ crucified and resurrected, are invisible to 
unaided human perception. For they are visible only spiritually. As Paul says: 
`We speak of God's secret wisdom, a wisdom that has been hidden and that God 
destined for our glory before time began. None of the rulers of this age 
understood it, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. 
However, as it is written: "No eye has seen, no ear has heard, no mind has 
conceived what God has prepared for those who love him" - but God has 
revealed it to us by his Spirit' (1 Cor. 2: 7-10). 
Here too, it is not a matter of human deliberation but of the Spirit's action. 
44 For the same reason we find problematic Pannenberg's adoption of `mutual conditioning' in his 
doctrine of creation. See, e. g., 2. xiv. 
45 See 2: 11 
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So, then, how to be a trinitarian theologian? To be a trinitarian theologian requires 
faith. In this age we do not see God face to face, and such knowledge as we do have of the 
God of Jesus Christ appears in a hidden form. Faith is a perception of and clinging to the 
invisible God by means of the visible mask. It is trust in Jesus, the Son of God who has 
become incarnate, by means of the humanity to which He has united Himself. 
It is not just a matter of the provisionality of our knowledge being lifted by the 
conclusion of the temporal process. Rather, we shall be changed, fitted for direct 
perception of the God who dwells in inapproachable light. The Son of God, although He 
became part of creation, is not known in virtue of His creatureliness. He is known in 
virtue of His divine saving power, a knowledge that cannot be achieved by any natural 
process. We can characterise this by some terminology borrowed from Hans Urs von 
Balthasar. 16 It is not just that we eschew an `epic' approach that takes an external 
perspective on the completed history, in favour of a `dramatic' approach that takes the 
perspective of a participant in the drama. It is not that we are in a drama, but that we are 
in this drama, the drama of the reconciliation of the world to God through Christ's death 
and resurrection. What needs to be overcome, therefore, is not so much temporality, as it 
is sin. The difficulty we have in knowledge of God is not so much that we are historically 
situated, but that we are at enmity towards Him. We live in the history of a world that is 
radically at odds with its Maker, but that He has miraculously entered to save and renew. 
What we require, then, is supernatural salvation: the transcendent God must 
intervene by becoming and transforming created reality. And what we require is 
supernatural knowledge: the incomprehensible God must take on visible form and 
transform our epistemological capacities to be fitted to His divine reality. That is, we 
require faith, which is the knowledge of the invisible God that is possible only by the 
Spirit. And this faith is not just divine cognitive help that is provisional to the completion 
of history. Faith passes away, but not because the course of earthly things is completed 
but because all things are eschatologically renewed, and it is surpassed not by the 
fulfilment of the historical process but by beatific vision which is no less a supernatural 
work of the Spirit. 
46 H. U. von Balthasar Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 1 (tr. G. Harrison) (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1988). The contrast of epic and dramatic is taken up by Nicholas M. Healy in his 
Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
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Pannenberg's theology is of the dramatic type, but it often sounds as if it is dealing 
with the wrong sort of drama, i. e., a general one which must come to its conclusion but in 
which we undergo no transformation. The most blatant examples of such remarks are his 
comments on faith itself. For instance, 
`Naturally, knowledge of the historical data in which God has revealed himself 
according to the church's proclamation is at best, like all human knowledge, a 
matter of probability, and it remains to be exposed to many objections as regards 
both the facts maintained and the significance. This is why historical knowledge 
has constantly been found insufficient from the days of G. E. Lessing onward if 
viewed as a basis for the certainty of Christian faith' (3.153-154). 47 
But that is not why. Any amount of knowledge of the historical process will never be 
enough in itself to reveal Christ or the triune God. His being is not exhausted by His 
dealings in the world nor is it naturally identical with them. This insufficiency is 
explained by the fact that faith has to do not with a creaturely reality in the process of its 
own natural completion, but with a supernatural one, the God become flesh. 
By no means is Pannenberg's theology always prey to this wrong sort of dramatic 
approach. Yet at certain key points it is the natural course of history rather than the 
direct action of God in history that provides the basis of our knowledge of God. As we 
have seen, this is the case in Pannenberg's christology. Knowledge of the divine agency 
in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, according to ST, requires a historical foundation that treats 
its object in the same terms as it would any other natural object. 
This `general-dramatic' perspective is operative elsewhere in Pannenberg's theology. 
One can see it in many of the applications of the axiom `God's being is His rule, ' where 
Pannenberg understands God's actions in history to decide for His being and also the 
course of creation (if not its existence) to be essential for God to be who He is. As we 
have noted above on Pannenberg's doctrines of the Trinity and of creation, he guards 
against interpretations that imply necessity within God, but clarity can never be fully 
achieved since Pannenberg remains tied to the belief that there is a sort of natural 
necessity to our knowledge of the divine. In addition, the discussions of faith, theodicy 
and the divine being also suggest that complete and direct knowledge of God is achieved 
47 Emphasis added. 
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not so much by the direct and supernatural action of Son and Spirit, but by the natural 
completion of the course of history. 
One can see it also in Pannenbergs emphasis on the unity of God's action and the 
continuity of His saving activity with His creative activity. On his interpretation, the 
reality of the incarnation, God-in-Christ, does not require the utter transformation of our 
epistemological faculties; it is one more object that is naturally, and so not of necessity 
spiritually, visible. As we noted in our conclusion, this emphasis in Pannenberg's 
doctrines of creation, kingdom and church, as well as his christology and eschatology, on 
the continuity of the divine-human drama that Pannenberg terms the completion of 
God's ongoing work of creation, tends to mute the actual and utter discontinuity of the 
triune work of salvation, i. e., the discontinuity of the death and resurrection of all created 
reality in Jesus. What we have in Christ is the utter reconstitution of what went before - 
not its mere completion - and its being made wholly new - not merely its being brought 
to perfection. It is new, spiritual reality that is made known on new, spiritual terms. 
That this approach is incompatible with the object of theology we can see from the 
following two quotations. The first, from Pannenberg is this: 
`Nothing must mute the fact that all truth lies right before the eyes, and that its 
appropriation is a natural consequence of the facts. There is no need for any 
additional perfection of man as though he could not focus on the "supernatural" 
truth with his normal equipment for knowing. '48 
The second is less sanguine about the possibilities of our natural ability to grasp God in 
His revelation: 
`Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God' (Matt. 5: 8). 
Faith in Christ and knowledge of the triune God in general is not individualist or 
subjective, but it is neither generally available nor a natural consequence of the facts. It is 
visible only spiritually, and so only along with the purification that the Spirit's work in 
reconciliation brings. 
Christian theology is charged with the task of giving an account of the being and action of 
the God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit within the situation God has placed it. For the 
contemporary theologian in the West this means in broad terms to speak about the 
48 RaH, p. 136. 
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Trinity within the context of Western modernity, i. e., it means contemporary trinitarian 
theology. Pannenberg's STis one of the most impressive attempts within recent theology 
to take up this task. Without doubt it offers a serious and detailed treatment both of the 
Christian faith and of the intellectual climate of contemporary Western society, and for 
seriousness and detail it has few rivals. 
Yet the encounter of modem society with divine truth entails more than seriousness 
and detail. Encounter also means transformation. It means the transformation of the 
world to be addressed by the word of God, and it means the transformation of those 
charged to deliver that address including the theologians who help formulate it. It means 
transformation because God is this triune God. He is the God who has made all things 
new by crucifying and raising them with Christ - the Father commissioning it, the Son 
effecting it and the Spirit applying it. At each stage He is the God of this total 
transformation. 
Since encounter with this triune God entails transformation, both the modern West 
and the modern theologian must undergo the mortification and vivification that this 
transformation involves. If knowledge of God is really to be considered a radically 
trinitarian possibility and not just a natural one, then we may no longer consider as 
absolutely final that, as Pannenberg states, in the light of secular awareness the step 
towards an explicit commitment in faith looks like a leap into the irrational. '49 And if 
theologising about God is really to be considered a trinitarian possibility and not just a 
natural one, then the position the theologian must adopt cannot be that of neutrality, 
impartiality or detachment. For, to speak of God, the theologian too must be 
miraculously caught up by the Spirit and adopt instead the humility, prayer and faith that 
He gives. 
One must walk the same path that Pannenberg treds in ST. If we with him are 
charged to speak of the triune God within the context of Western modernity, we must 
follow Pannenberg much of the way, but not quite all. 
49 Christianity in a Secularized World, p. 44. 
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